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 Abstract 
 
 
Earnings management is an area in which managers are able to exercise discretion 
over financial reporting to achieve various objectives. Researchers have been 
investigating the pervasiveness of earnings management and incentives that induce 
earnings management. However, the evidence is mixed and studies of using 
Australian data are scarce. This thesis is an empirical investigation of earnings 
management in the Australian context addressing if and why Australian firms engage 
in earnings management. 
 
Based on a sample covering all ASX listed firms during the period of 2000 to 2006, 
this study examines the overall breadth and scope of earnings management behaviour 
in a broad context across Australian industry sectors and individual firms’ 
characteristics. The result suggests that Australian firms engage in earnings 
management. The level of earnings management practices in some specific industries 
and the association of these practices with firms’ characteristics may help the 
assessment and improvement of the overall quality of financial reporting.   
 
Based on a sub-sample, this study also examines whether the practices of earnings 
management is induced by executive compensation incentives. It extends prior 
research by using more relevant, recent, and large-scale compensation data to capture 
the dynamic relations between earnings management and different forms of executive 
pay. Such dynamic relations may be of interest to compensation committees in 
designing compensation structures that balance the incentives to improve firms’ 
performances with the incentive to earnings manipulation. 
 
This study also examines whether earnings management is induced by benchmark 
beating incentives. It extends prior research by examining under what circumstance 
managers are more likely to beat benchmarks. The results suggest that managers beat 
two earnings benchmarks: reporting profits and sustaining prior year’s earnings. More 
importantly, managers are more likely to exercise positive discretionary accruals to 
inflate earnings to beat ex post benchmarks when the true earnings are below relevant 
benchmarks. This will be of interest to regulators as an effective way to detect 
earnings management may be pronounced when the ex ante condition under which 
firms seek to manipulate earnings is identified.  
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Accounting earnings is one of the major indictors in annual reports that have been 
widely used by internal and external financial statement users in decision making. 
Investors will look for companies with favourable accounting earnings figures in 
making investment decision. Corporate policies such as executives’ compensation, 
debt covenants, and capital raising are also shaped by reported earnings. Ideally, 
accounting earnings should be stated in a timely and reliable manner, truly reflecting a 
firm’s financial performance and effectively facilitating the decision making process. 
However, the separation of ownership and control of a firm determines that managers 
will have control advantages over external information users in producing this 
information, and thus managers will have the opportunity to exercise discretions over 
reported earnings for their own benefit. This is regarded as earnings management 
behaviour. Earnings management is an issue that directly affects overall integrity of 
financial reporting and significantly influences resource allocation throughout the 
economy (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). The objective of this study is to conduct a 
comprehensive analysis in understanding earnings management of Australian firms: 
by undertaking an investigation of earnings management practices across Australian 
industries and managerial incentives.  
 
1.2 Definitions of earnings management 
 
There is no common definition for earnings management in the literature; the 
following are several different definitions that are often cited in the earnings 
management research. Securities and Exchange Commission defines it as “Abusive 
earnings management involves the use of various forms of gimmickry to distort a 
company’s true financial performance in order to achieve a desired result” (SEC, 
1999, p.84). The text book, ‘Financial Accounting Theory’, defines it as “Earnings 
management is the choice by a manager of accounting policies so as to achieve some 
specific objective” (Scott, 1997, p.369).  Academia defines earnings management as 
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“a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting, with intent of obtaining 
some private gain” (Schipper, 1989, p92). Recently, academia defines it as “Earnings 
management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in 
structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders 
about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence 
contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting number” (Healy and 
Wahlen, 1999, p.386).  
 
The above definitions suggest that earnings management is more likely to occur due 
to the contractual relationship between firms and stakeholders and the purpose of 
earnings management is to maximize managers own utilities. The terms “distort a 
company’s true financial performance”, “private gain”, and “mislead” appear to 
emphasize the opportunistic characteristic of earnings management. Managers 
exercise discretion over financial reporting to hide firms’ true financial performance 
in order to maximize their own benefits; and, these benefits will occur at the expense 
of shareholders, bondholders or other stakeholders. However, some studies have 
documented the possibility that earnings management can improve the information 
content of accounting earnings. Holthausen and Leftwich (1983) further pointed out 
that managers exercise discretion in reported earnings to signal inside information 
with investors and thus help investors to predict firms’ future performance.    
 
To better understand earnings management, therefore, one needs to understand the 
distinction between earnings management and accounting fraud. Brown (1999) argues 
that there is no clear difference between earnings management and fraudulent 
reporting. Often, investors classify earnings management as fraud because they 
believe earnings management distorts true earnings. However, Dechow and Skinner 
(2000) suggested that earnings management is not fraudulent behaviour where the 
intention is to deceive, for instance, fabricating false invoices, recording forged 
transactions, falsifying altering documents, or deleting records. Rather, it is a matter 
of presentation and it could be regarded as a misstatement of reported earnings.  
 
1.3 Approaches to detect earnings management 
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To date, earnings management activities have been detected through examining the 
changing of accounting choices, real transactions, total accruals and/or discretionary 
accruals, specific accruals, the distribution of reported earnings and income 
smoothing behaviour. Since the middle 1980s, the accrual approach has become the 
primary methodology in detecting earnings management.1 Nevertheless, researchers 
require a sophisticated model to separate discretionary accruals from total accruals. 
Omitted variables, misspecification and lower testing power are the three major 
econometric limitations that most models present. The distribution method has 
emerged to avoid this problem but it is less useful in detecting contract-driven 
earnings management. This study uses discretionary accruals as a broad means of 
detection as discretionary accruals capture the aggregate effect of earnings 
manipulation.  Earnings distribution is also used to detect earnings management to 
beat specific benchmarks. 
 
The detection of earnings management has also been linked to management incentives 
because managerial incentive conditions are likely to influence earnings management. 
Executive compensation contract is an incentive where opportunistic earnings 
management behaviour is likely to be detected since CEOs are expected to have 
incentives to manipulate earnings if executive compensation is strongly linked to 
performance.  A substantial literature has emerged to test the relationship between 
executive compensation and earnings management and has documented that 
compensation contracts create strong incentives for earnings management. Another 
setting for earnings management is earnings benchmarks. As capital markets put 
pressures on managers, managers have incentives to beat relevant benchmarks in 
order to avoid disappointing the markets.  
 
Based on the premises of accrual method, executive compensation and benchmarks, 
this thesis focuses on two central investigations regarding earnings management in the 
Australian context: (1) the detection of earnings management across Australian 
industries (2) the management incentives that drive earnings management. The 
                                                 
1 McNichols’ (2000) survey shows that during the period of 1993 to 1999, The Accounting Review, Contemporary 
Accounting Research, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Journal of Accounting Research, Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting, and Review of Accounting Studies published 55 articles investigated earnings management. Of the 55 
articles, 23 papers used total accruals or discretionary accruals approach and 22 of them concluded that they found 
evidence of earnings management.   
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investigation of these issues may help regulators to assess the appropriate level of 
management judgment over financial reporting. If earnings management is found to 
be pervasive in a particular industry, regulators may refine existing accounting 
standards or require additional disclosures to improve the quality of financial 
reporting for that industry. Moreover, if there are identifiable executive compensation 
incentives under which opportunistic earnings management is more likely to be 
triggered, compensation committees can consider recontracting with executives or 
redesigning an optimal compensation structure.  Finally, if there are identifiable 
benchmarks that induce managers to inflate earnings, investors should reconsider the 
reliability of using benchmarks in evaluating firms’ performances and investment 
decisions.   
 
1.4 Motivations and objectives  
 
This study is primarily motivated by the increasing concern of the academic, 
practitioners, regulators, and standard setters regarding the quality of earnings and 
financial reporting. Arthur Levitt, the chairman of the SEC, in his 1998 speech, “The 
Numbers Game”, revealed that the use of premature revenue to meet Wall Street 
expectations is one of the fundamental problems with current financial reporting. In 
recent years there were several corporate collapses around the world: for example, 
Enron, Arthur Anderson, and WorldCom in the U.S.; Robert Maxwell, Swiss Air, 
Phillip Holzmann in the E.U.; HIH Insurance, One.Tel, and Harris Scarfe in Australia. 
These cases have impacted on investors’ confidence in the capital markets and thus 
attracted research attention on earnings management behaviour. This study therefore 
is motivated to discover whether earnings quality has increased or declined over time.  
 
Australian regulators have recognized the importance to strengthen an effective 
disclosure regime to ensure timely and reliable information, ethical practices and 
legislative standards. One of the milestones in accounting regulation change is the 
introduction of the Government’s Corporate Law Economic Reform Program 
(CLERP) in 2002 and the enactment at 2004. To further strengthen the financial 
reporting framework of Australia, a range of rules have been covered including 
auditing profession, audit services, auditor independence, auditor liability, accounting 
standards, requirement for accounts to be true and fair, analyst independence, 
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shareholder participation and information. Given the sample period of this thesis 
covers years 2000 to 2006, it is possible that the introduction of CLERP may have an 
impact on the earnings management behaviour. The thesis’ primary emphasis, 
however, is from a financial economics perspective. Areas such as auditing 
profession, audit services, auditor independence, and accounting standards are not 
primary focus of this thesis. 
 
This thesis also conducts a comprehensive investigation of earnings management in 
an Australian context. Such comprehensive investigation includes the use of various 
approaches in detecting earnings management and the examination of various 
incentives that induce earnings management behaviour. It compares performances of 
Jones Model, Modified Jones Model, Cash Flow Model and Performance Adjusted 
Technique in earnings management detection. As the Australian academic research 
pertaining to executive compensation incentives and earnings benchmark beating 
behaviour is relatively limited, this study also thoroughly investigated these two 
incentives of earnings management.  
 
This study also attempts to assess whether earnings management behaviour is 
widespread or attributable to a few firms in the Australian market. Previous studies 
have found earnings management behaviour consistent with various managerial 
incentives:  to increase bonuses (Healy, 1985; Gaver et al., 1995; Guidry et al, 1999); 
to gain from stock options (Baker et al., 2003; Cheng and Warfield, 2005; 
Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006); to increase stock prices in equity offering (Teoh et 
al., 1998a; Teoh et al., 1998b); to avoid violating lending contracts (DeFond and 
Jiambalvo, 1994; DeAngelo and Skinner, 1994; Charitou et al.,2007); to reduce 
political costs (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; Cahan, 1992; Han and Wang, 1998; 
Monem, 2003); and to meet or beat earnings benchmarks (Burgstahler and Dichev, 
1997; Burgstahler and Eames, 1998; Holland and Ramsay, 2003; Coulton et al., 
2005). However, few studies have examined the overall magnitude of earnings 
management and little evidence is provided towards the pervasiveness of earnings 
management, especially in Australia.   
 
Further, this study examines the impact of executive compensation on earnings 
management as previous findings are mixed and inconsistent. On one hand, some 
researchers claim that they have detected earnings management behaviour that is 
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driven by compensation incentives. The existence of a compensation agreement 
induces management choice of accounting policies that will increase reported 
earnings (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; Hagerman and Zmijewski, 1979; Zmijewski 
and Hagerman, 1981). On the other hand, some researchers argue that empirical 
evidence linking compensation and accounting policy choices are not conclusive 
(Holthausen, 1981; Bowen et al., 1981). Moreover, Healy (1985) found that managers 
will decrease earnings further when earnings fall below the lower bound of a bonus 
plan. However, others do not support Healy’s bonus plan hypothesis. Holthausen et al. 
(1995) found no evidence that managers engage in downward earnings management 
when earnings are below the lower bound of a bonus. The inconsistency of the 
evidences across studies therefore casts doubt on the impact of compensation on 
earnings management.  
 
Despite substantial research on earnings management in the U.S. market, Australian 
academic research has been relatively limited. This author has surveyed Australian 
studies of earnings management across all possible research databases and has listed 
these studies in Appendix 1. The review of Australian research not only shows that 
research on earnings management is limited within the Australian context, but also 
reveals the gaps within existing studies. The executive compensation incentives have 
not yet been well examined in the Australian context. Balachandran et al. (2008) 
found that managers with option holdings use two mechanisms (discretionary current 
accruals and on-market buyback announcements) to drive up share prices. However, 
other forms of executive compensation, such as salary, bonus, and shares are not 
examined. Also, they focus on on-market share buyback firms only with a small 
sample size of 138 firms. This may limit the generalizability of the findings.  
 
The capital market in Australia is relatively small and highly concentrated with 
resource based companies compared to the U.S market. Analysts following Australian 
markets are fewer and the regulatory scrutiny level of the Australian market is argued 
to be lower than that of U.S (Chan et al., 2005). Also, the accounting standards, 
institutional structure, and corporate governance of Australia are different from those 
in the U.S.  For instance, the required frequency of financial reporting is twice per 
year in Australia while in the U.S. it is four times per year. More importantly, 
Australian CEOs are commonly remunerated with salaries and bonuses than with 
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equity-based compensation; whereas in the U.S. stock options have replaced salaries 
and bonuses and have become the single largest component of CEOs’ compensation 
since 1990s (Izan et al., 1998; Matolcsy and Wright, 2007; and Murphy, 1999). Given 
all these differences, it is not clear that the evidence gathered from U.S. firms would 
be applicable to those in Australia. Therefore, further investigation of whether and 
how executives’ compensation affects earnings management within the Australian 
context is necessary. 
 
The other limitation of existing studies is related to benchmark beating incentives. It 
is still a puzzle whether benchmark beating is caused by earnings management 
(Coulton, 2005). The evidence on earnings management behaviour to achieve 
benchmarks is based upon distribution of ex post reported earnings. However, these 
reported earnings could be due to the managers putting real effort into improving a 
firm’s performance (Dechow et al., 2003). Therefore, previous evidence of 
benchmark beating for the purpose of earnings management, based only on 
distribution of reported earnings, is not conclusive. This issue is also unresolved in the 
Australian context. Using the distribution method, Holland and Ramsay (2003) 
detected earnings management by Australian firms to achieve earnings targets. 
However, Coulton et al. (2005) suggested that earnings discontinuity as an evidence 
of earnings management requires careful interpretation. Benchmark beating as a cause 
of earnings management still remains an open question. This thesis is motivated to 
examine these issues in a comprehensive manner and add additional evidence in this 
area of earnings management. This study extends Holland and Ramsay (2003) and 
Coulton et al. (2005) by investigating whether managers manipulate earnings to meet 
or beat two specific ex ante benchmarks: above-zero earnings (profits) and earnings 
increase (sustain prior year’s earnings). This study differentiates the research design 
by conditioning the analysis and results on benchmarks of pre-managed earnings. Pre-
managed earnings is used as a measure of true earnings level of a firm and this study 
postulates that managers use it to engage in earning manipulation only if the earnings 
are short of its benchmark levels on an ex ante basis. The examination of pre-
managed earnings identity the ex ante condition under which firms seek to manipulate 
earnings. This study also quantifies the frequency of earnings management for 
benchmark beating purposes. Such information may be helpful for standard setters in 
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assessing the pervasiveness of earnings management and the overall integrity of 
financial reporting. 
 
In summary, the major objectives are: 
 
1. To detect whether earnings management takes place in the Australian context and 
to examine the overall magnitude and directions (upwards/downwards) of 
earnings management across industries and firms.   
2. To investigate why earnings management takes place. This study intends to 
investigate two incentives that will induce earnings management: the executive 
compensation incentive and benchmark beating incentive.  
3. To extend earnings management literature in two ways: first, the examination of 
executive compensation is extended to both total compensation and decomposed 
individual components; second, the examination of benchmark beating behaviour 
is extended to what extent benchmark beating is caused by earnings management 
and under what circumstance managers are more likely to exercise discretion to 
beat benchmarks. 
4. To employ a combination of both discretionary accruals and the distribution 
methods in an attempt to improve the validity and reliability of the tests.  
 
1.5 Significance of the study 
 
This study will contribute to the earnings management literature in several ways. 
First, this study investigates the overall breadth and scope of earnings management 
behaviour in a broad context by a comprehensive analysis of reported earnings across 
Australian industry sectors and individual firm characteristics. This may be of interest 
to investors and regulators. The level of pervasiveness of earnings management 
practices in specific industries and the association of these practices with firm 
characteristics may help investors assess the overall quality of financial reporting.   
 
Second, the detection of earnings management in this study goes beyond the general 
evidence on the existence of earnings management behaviour; it also investigates the 
causes of earnings management. This study examines two incentives—the executive 
compensation and the benchmark beating incentives. Moreover, to this author’s best 
knowledge, no studies in Australia have been found to assess earnings management in 
 
 
15
the context of executive compensation incentives and the tiers of CEO compensation 
package. This study takes a comprehensive view of the compensation contract and 
provides evidence on executive compensation mix and earnings management. This is 
the first attempt to address what is largely absent in Australian research: executive 
compensations, fixed and at-risk compensation, create different incentives for 
earnings management. 
 
Third, the findings of earnings management related to executive compensation may be 
of interest to investors because such relations indicate opportunistic earnings 
management behaviour. Dechow et al. (1996) report substantial corporate costs due to 
opportunistic earnings management behaviour: firms which have committed 
accounting fraud experienced average 9% of losses in shareholder wealth. Teoh et al. 
(1998a, 1998b) and Teoh et al. (1998c) found IPO firms experience significant long-
run underperformance in a five-year period after aggressive earnings management. 
When earnings management is driven by opportunistic management incentives, firms 
will ultimately pay a price and its negative impact on shareholders is economically 
significant. This study will contribute to investors since rational investors make 
investment decision primarily based on the prediction of firms’ future performance 
and such prediction is largely influenced by current reported earnings.  
 
Fourth, the results of this study may be of interest to compensation committees in 
designing compensation structures that balance the incentives to improve firm 
performance with the incentive to earnings manipulation. The positive effect of at-risk 
compensation on the magnitude and directions of earnings management has important 
implications for the design of executive compensation packages. In theory, a link 
between a CEO compensation and a firm performance will promote better incentive 
alignment and higher firm values (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Thus, at-risk 
compensation may have a positive effect on firm value if the use of at-risk 
compensation is at some optimal level. Whenever it goes beyond the optimal level, 
the excessive part should lead to earnings management. In this case, compensation 
committees may re-contract with CEOs in an optimal at-risk compensation level that 
will rebalance the incentive to improve firm performance with the incentive to 
earnings management.    
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1.6 Main findings 
 
This study found that Australian firms engage in earnings management. Using a 
estimation sample of 5,947 firm-year observations with broad industry representation 
including all ASX listed firms, significant earnings management evidence is found. 
The mean (median) total absolute value of discretionary accruals after adjusting cash 
flows and earnings effects is 0.1324 (0.0696), which represents an  average magnitude 
of 13% of total assets. Specifically, a higher magnitude of earnings management is 
found to take place in the sectors of Metals & Mining, Information Technology, 
Energy, and Telecommunication & Utilities. Moreover, the magnitude of earnings 
management increased from 2000 to 2006. The mean (median) absolute value of 
adjusted discretionary accruals is 0.1064 (0.0561) for the year 2000, which has been 
increased to 0.1618 (0.0807) for the year 2006. Specifically, downward earnings 
management is found in Industrials while upward earnings management is 
documented in the sectors of Telecommunication & Utilities and Health Care. Year 
2005 shows downward earnings manipulation while the year 2006 shows upward 
earnings manipulation. 
 
This study then looks for explanations for the variation in earnings management 
behaviour. Firm characteristics such as size, book-to-market ratio, and profitability 
are found to play significant roles in shaping earnings management behaviour. The 
relationship between firm size and absolute adjusted discretionary accruals appears to 
be negatively monotonous by portfolios. It is also observed that as the absolute 
adjusted discretionary accruals increase, the book-to-market ratio decreases. 
Profitability tends to become poorer when absolute adjusted discretionary accruals are 
of increasing nature. Moreover, smaller size and lower book-to-market ratio firms are 
associated with both income-increasing and decreasing earnings management 
activities.  The results regarding size are particularly strong. The average firm size 
(defined as a logarithm of the total assets) of the portfolio decrease as both positive 
and negative adjusted discretionary accruals increases with the smallest size being 
9.5033 (10.3254) for the highest positive (negative) adjusted discretionary accruals 
portfolios.   
 
This study also found that earnings management is associated with executive 
compensation. Using a subsample of 3,326 firm-year observations covering the period 
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of 2000 to 2006, this study found that executive compensation creates incentives for 
earnings management behaviour. The results show that fixed compensation has a 
negative impact on the magnitude of earnings management: for every one million 
dollar increase in CEOs’ fixed compensation, the magnitude of adjusted discretionary 
accruals as a percentage of total assets will reduce by 4.67%. In contrast, for every 
one million dollar increase in CEOs’ at-risk compensation, the magnitude of adjusted 
discretionary accruals as a percentage of the total assets will increase by 2.46%. When 
the fixed compensation and at-risk compensation is further decomposed, salaries are 
found to be significantly negatively associated with the magnitude of adjusted 
discretionary accruals while bonuses and options are found to be significantly 
positively associated with the magnitude of adjusted discretionary accruals. This 
suggests that fixed compensation is more likely to constrain earnings management as 
earnings management is costly. At-risk compensation, however, would induce 
managers to engage in earnings management because at-risk compensations are 
usually based on earnings performance and managers may opportunistically exercise 
discretions through accruals to exploit the nonlinearity in the payoffs.  
 
Finally, this study found that earnings are managed through discretionary accruals to 
beat two earnings benchmarks: reporting profits and sustaining prior year’s earnings. 
There is evidence of discontinuities in the distribution of reported earnings and 
changes in earnings while distributions of pre-managed earnings and pre-managed 
earnings changes do not show significant discontinuities. Further, the adjusted 
discretionary accruals have the effect of increasing the frequency of observations to 
report profits and earnings increases. The result suggests that 8.11% of the firms 
shifting from pre-managed earnings losses to report post-earnings profits; with 3.48% 
of the firms shifting from pre-managed small earnings losses to report small earnings 
profits. Similarly, 11.61% of firms shifting from pre-managed earnings declines to 
report earnings increases; with 5.53% shifting from pre-managed small earnings 
decrease to report small earnings increase. More importantly, the results show a 
significantly positive association between adjusted discretionary accruals and pre-
managed earnings below the benchmark and this association holds true for two 
benchmarks and for both big and small regions. Therefore, this study suggests when 
pre-managed earnings below zero (prior year’s earnings), firms are more likely to 
exercise positive discretionary accruals to inflate earnings to beat ex post benchmarks.  
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1.7 Organization of the thesis 
 
This thesis consists of nine chapters and is organized as follows. This chapter, 
Chapter 1 is an introduction to the general background of earnings management 
research and provides motivations, objectives, and significances for this study.  
Chapter 2 reviews previous literature related to earnings management, executive 
compensation incentives and benchmark beating incentives. Chapter 3 discusses the 
research and investigation issues of this thesis developed from the review of literature. 
Chapter 4 describes research design, methodology, data sources, and empirical 
models used in this study. Chapter 5 presents the results of earnings management 
detection. Chapter 6 reports the findings of the association between earnings 
management and executive compensation incentives. Chapter 7 reports the findings of 
the association between earnings management and benchmark beating incentives. 
Chapter 8 pertains to sensitivity analysis that mainly examines the endogeneity issue. 
Finally, Chapter 9 summarizes the findings along with the implications, limitations, 
and discusses future research directions.  
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Chapter 2  
Literature Review 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Earnings management behaviour has been detected through variety of methods, for 
example, through the changing of accounting choices, real transactions, total accruals 
and/or discretionary accruals, specific accruals, the distribution of reported earnings 
and income smoothing. Since the middle of 1980s, the accrual approach has become 
the primary focus (McNichols, 2000). GAAP requires that revenues be recognized 
when earned and should match expenses to those revenues, irrespective of whether 
cash has been received or paid. Accruals are used to reduce inconsistencies 
encountered as a result of difference in timing of the recognition (Dechow and 
Skinner, 2000). Managers believe that the accrual technique is a desirable vehicle to 
achieve their objectives as it is less visible and hard to detect (Dechow, 1994).   
 
Earnings management is classified as contract or market driven (Dechow and Skinner, 
2000). On one hand, earnings management can occur in management compensation 
contracts (for example, Healy, 1985) in solving the agency conflict between managers 
and shareholders; in debt contracting (for example, DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994) 
which targets a firm’s creditors; and in regulatory contracting (for example, Cahan, 
1992) to avoid legal restrictions from regulators. On the other hand, earnings 
management either in the objective of avoiding losses or earnings declines (for 
example, Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997), sustaining previous earnings (Holland 
andRamsay, 2003), or meeting analysts’ expectation (for example, Burgstahler and 
Eames, 1998), are documented to drive the stock market’s performance. The 
following literature review is about the detection and incentives of earnings 
management which are the two central issues that this thesis will investigate.  
 
2.2 Approaches in detecting earnings management  
 
Empirical studies have documented various approaches in detecting earnings 
management, such as changing of accounting choice, real transactions, total 
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accruals/discretionary accruals, specific accruals, benchmark beating (earnings 
distributions approach) and income smoothing. This study mainly focuses on 
detecting earnings management through discretionary accruals, approaches other than 
total accruals/discretionary accruals are reviewed in Appendix 2. 
 
2.2.1 Accounting choice 
 
In the 1970s and early 1980s, a large number of studies found that managers exercise 
discretion through the choice of accounting methods or polices. Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978) documented that managers will lobby for and choose accounting 
policies which can decrease tax payments, help secure favourable regulations, reduce 
political costs, reduce information production costs, and increase accounting earnings. 
In testing whether the existence of incentive compensation plans effect managers’ 
decisions in accounting choices, Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) examined 
accounting choices of inventory method, depreciation method, the treatment of the 
investment tax credit, and pension costs amortization; Holthausen (1981) examined 
the case of depreciation switch-back policy; Bowen et al. (1981) focused on interest 
capitalization policy; and, Skinner (1993) studied depreciation policy and goodwill 
procedures. These studies examine one accounting method or choice at a given time 
and findings are mixed.  
 
Other studies argue that using only one accounting method or choice somewhat limits 
the picture of a firm’s income reporting strategy. These studies form a portfolio with 
different accounting choices in an attempt to detect the aggregate effect of accounting 
choices on reporting. For example, Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981) and Robbins et 
al. (1993) developed an optimal multi-dimensional income strategy and an income 
strategy score with the combination of accounting method choices that increased or 
decreased reported earnings respectively. These studies, regardless of whether 
investigating earnings management through the choice of individual accounting 
methods or the combination of different accounting methods, typically use a 
dichotomous variable or categorical variable to capture income-increasing or income-
decreasing earnings management through the choice of accounting policies.  
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2.2.2 Real transactions 
 
Besides changing accounting policies, managers can also manipulate earnings 
upwards or downwards through real transactions.  Schipper (1989) is one of the first 
to consider that earnings management can be done through real management 
transactions: “A minor extension of this (earnings management) definition would 
encompass ‘real’ earnings management, accomplished by timing investment or 
financing decisions to alter reported earnings or some subset of it” (Schipper, 1989, 
p92). Bartov (1993) provided evidence that managers avoid reporting losses and debt 
covenant violations by selling fixed assets. Baber et al. (1991), Dechow and Sloan 
(1991) and Bushee (1998) documented that for-profit firms, managers are more likely 
to use R&D expenditures to manipulate earnings. Graham et al. (2005) surveyed 401 
financial executives and showed that managers prefer to manage earnings through real 
actions as opposed to accounting actions in attempting to meet or beat earnings 
benchmarks. Roychowdhury (2006) further documented the type of transactions that 
have been used by managers to avoid reporting annual losses and negative changes in 
earnings. For example, price discounts are used to increase sales and overproduction 
is used to spread fixed overhead over more units thus reducing cost of goods sold.   
 
2.2.3 Total accruals/discretionary accruals 
 
A substantial literature detects earnings management based on discretionary accruals.  
Earnings have two components, cash flow from operations and total accruals. Total 
accruals are the management judgements and estimates about cash flows in order to 
make accounting earnings better reflect a firm’s underlying economic performance. 
Total accruals, in further, is the sum of discretionary accruals and non-discretionary 
accruals. Non-discretionary accruals is the component that is imposed by the 
accounting regulator in adjusting a firm’s cash flows. Discretionary accruals is the 
component that managers can choose within the flexibility of accounting regulations 
in adjusting a firm’s cash flows. Due to this flexibility, discretionary accruals is the 
component that often gives managers opportunities to manipulate earnings (Dechow, 
1994).  
 
Healy (1985) was the first to introduce discretionary accruals to detect earnings 
management.  He assumed that discretionary accruals is the component that is subject 
 
 
22
to managerial discretion while non-discretionary accruals is the expected level of 
accruals in the firm given no earnings manipulation.  As both components of accruals 
are unobservable, Healy further assumed that the discretionary accruals component in 
a given year is total accruals scaled by lagged total assets and so effectively, non-
discretionary accruals are zero in expectation. He found that accruals are used by 
managers to maximize their bonus. 
 
DeAngelo (1986) assumed that non-discretionary accruals follow a random walk and 
her approach in detecting earnings management is that the unusual behaviour of 
discretionary component of accruals should be reflected from the change in total 
accruals from year t-1 to year t. This effectively sets the expectation of non-
discretionary accruals in the current year as the prior year’s total accruals. With this 
approach, she detected managers systematically understate earnings prior to the 
buyouts in a sample of 64 companies whose managers propose to go private by 
purchasing all of the publicly held common stock.  
 
Both Healy and DeAngelo approach that assumed the non-discretionary accruals 
component is constant and all earnings management activities can be captured by total 
accruals. However, such assumptions are unlikely to be empirically descriptive. 
Kaplan (1985) suggested that the level of non-discretionary accruals should change 
from period to period in response to changes in economic circumstances. Although 
Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986) captured either income-increasing or income-
decreasing techniques that managers have incentives to employ, they neglected the 
changing of non-discretionary accruals and they misclassified all accruals as a 
discretionary component. As such, both approaches tend to detect earnings 
management with error.  
 
To overcome this limitation, Jones (1991) introduced a linear regression approach to 
control for non-discretionary determinants of accruals. She used changes in sales 
control for non-discretionary accruals of current assets and liabilities; property, plant 
and equipment control for the non-discretionary component of depreciation expense. 
The rationale is that a firm’s working capital accruals depend on sales, while its 
depreciation accruals depend on the level of property, plant, and equipment. She 
estimated discretionary accruals, the proxy for earnings management, as residuals 
from regression of total accruals on nondiscretionary determinants of accruals. With 
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this estimation procedure, she subsequently detected that managers exercised more 
negative discretionary accruals to reduce income during the U.S. import relief 
investigations.   
  
Dechow et al. (1995) pointed out that although all models used to separate total 
accruals between non-discretionary and discretionary components appear to produce 
reasonable, well specified tests for a random sample, the testing power is low and the 
level of discretionary accruals needs to be very large relative to earnings to be 
detected. They applied a time-series Jones Model to a sample where they have 
artificially manipulated earnings. They reported that a time-series Jones Model can 
detect earnings management close to 100% level only when the induced manipulation 
exceeds 50% of total assets. When the induced manipulation is equal to 5% of total 
assets, this model can only detect less than 30% of the manipulation. Dechow et al. 
(1995) also introduced a cross-sectional Modified Jones model. In this model, 
changes in account receivables is deducted from change in revenues in order to avoid 
measurement error when discretion is exercised through non-cash revenues (account 
receivables). They suggested that the power of testing earnings management is highest 
for the modified Jones model. 
 
Peasnell et al. (2000) evaluated different models in detecting earnings management 
and suggested that the power to detect earnings management seems to be higher for 
the cross-sectional Jones Model. They stated that the rejection rates of the null of no 
earnings management can be as high as 40% of the cases when earnings manipulation 
equals only 2% of total assets.  Nevertheless, Jeter and Shivakumar (1999) argued that 
the greater power of the cross-sectional model in detecting earnings management may 
also be attributable to model misspecification. Furthermore, when the models are 
applied to investigate earnings management in a sample with firm-years experiencing 
extreme financial performance, all models lead to misspecified tests.  
 
Empirical studies further point out that detecting earnings management based upon 
discretionary accrual will result in misleading inferences about earnings management 
behaviour because this type of model suffers from correlated omitted variables 
problems and therefore is potentially misspecified. In particular, there were two 
sources identified as contributing to model misspecification.  
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First, researchers found the omitted operating cash flows can result in model 
misspecification. McNicholos and Wilson (1988) constructed ten operating cash flow 
portfolios and found systematic negative association between operating cash flows 
and accounting discretions across portfolios. Specifically, when operating cash flows 
are unusually high, managers tend to decrease earnings. When operating cash flows 
are poor, managers tend to increase earnings; however, if operating performance is 
extremely poor, some firms may decrease income further. This is the so-called ‘taking 
bath’ strategy. Dechow (1994) also found that changes in cash flow from operations is 
negatively correlated with total accruals. Furthermore, Dechow et al. (1995) showed 
that cash flows from operations influence the magnitude of discretionary accruals. 
The higher level of operating cash flows was associated with a lower level of 
discretionary accruals.  
 
In order to control cash flow effects, Kasznik (1999) added the change in operating 
cash flows into the Modified Jones Model. This modification was later found to be 
necessary when Yoon and Miller (2002) detected an association between cash flows 
and earnings management from Korean industries. Baruat et al. (2006) applied this 
model and found discretionary accruals were used to achieve earnings benchmarks.  
Shuto (2007) also used this model and detected earnings management to be associated 
with executive compensation in Japanese firms.  
 
Second, the model may also misspecify without controlling for extreme earnings 
performance. In fact, Kaszink (1999) showed a correlation between discretionary 
accruals and a firm’s earnings performance. Firms with higher earnings tend to 
exhibit positive discretionary accruals while firms have lower earnings tend to show 
negative discretionary accruals. Presumably this arises because firms with abnormally 
high (low) earnings have positive (negative) shocks to earnings and that includes an 
accrual component. As a result, researchers are more likely to detect income-
increasing earnings management for higher profitable firms and income-decreasing 
earnings management for lower profitable firms.  
 
In order to address the correlated omitted variable problem that resulted from earnings 
performance, Kaszink (1999) suggested a Performance Adjust Technique (also known 
as Matched Portfolio Approach) to adjust estimated discretionary accruals by 
removing the effect of a firm’s earnings performance.  He sorted the estimated 
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discretionary accruals into percentile based on earnings performance (measured as 
return on assets). Then, he computed the median discretionary accruals for each 
percentile and subtracted it from each observation’s discretionary accruals in that 
percentile. By doing that, evidences on earnings management are suggested to be 
more reliable as measurement errors that are potentially correlated with earnings 
performance are removed.  
 
The other modifications in attempting to control for a firm’s performance include 
Kothari et al. (2005) who directly introduced return on assets as an additional 
independent variable into the modified Jones Model. They also adopted a 
performance-matched approach. This approach calculates performance-matched 
discretionary accruals by matching the firm-year observation of the treatment firm 
with the firm-year observation for the control firm from the same industry and year 
with the closest return on assets in the current year or the prior year and then 
subtracting the control firm’s discretionary accruals from the treatment firm’s 
discretionary accruals.   
 
Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) used an instrumental variables (IV) approach in 
estimating discretionary accruals. The IV approach involves replacing the 
independent variables that are correlated with the error terms with instruments that are 
assumed to be highly correlated with the original variables, but uncorrelated with the 
error terms. They also used a generalized method of moment (GMM) method to 
estimate model parameters. However, as the data requirement and the complexity in 
applying the IV approach, this approach has not yet been thoroughly tested or widely 
adopted. 
 
2.2.4 Specific accrual 
 
Different from the total accrual approach, a specific accrual focuses on industry 
setting in which a single accrual is sizeable and requires substantial judgement. This 
approach detects earnings management from investigating management discretions 
through specific accrual account such as bank loan loss provisions, claim loss reserves 
for property-casualty insurers, and deferred tax valuation allowances. McNichols and 
Wilson (1988) detected that managers manipulate earnings through bad debt 
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provisions. Petroni (1992) documented earnings management evidences from claim 
loss reserve account. Beaver and Engel (1996) found that managers exercise 
discretions through the use of allowances of loan losses. Finally, Beneish (1997) 
found that earnings manipulation can be reflected from various indexes including 
days in receivable index, gross margin index, depreciation index, SG&A expense 
index, total accrual to total assets index. He constructed an earnings management 
score based on the weighted indexes and asserted that such a score is useful in 
detecting earnings management. This approach enables researchers to develop 
intuition for the key factors that influence the behaviour of the accrual in a particular 
industry. However, McNichols (2000) pointed out the findings from studying a 
specific accrual may not be generalized as those from the total accrual approach. It 
may preclude detection of earnings management behaviour if a specific accrual is not 
sufficiently sensitive. 
 
2.2.5 Earnings distribution 
 
The distribution approach in detecting earnings management is relatively new in the 
literature. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) studied the density of the distribution of 
earnings after management. If managers engage in earnings management to beat 
earnings benchmarks, then the distribution of earnings will show less than expected 
observations just below the threshold, and more than expected observations just above 
the threshold. This will result in a discontinuity in the earnings distribution and the 
discontinuity (or earnings kink) is the evidence of the earnings management. 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), Degeorge et al. (1999) identified three psychological 
thresholds that managers are usually concern with—positive earnings, last year 
earnings, and analysts’ consensus forecast.  
 
A noteworthy feature of the distribution approach is that it infers earnings 
management while avoiding the measurement error and model misspecification 
problem inherent in accrual-based earnings management studies.  McNichols (2000) 
pointed out that the distribution method is powerful in detecting earnings management 
as it allows the researcher to make a strong prediction from the frequency of earnings 
realizations rather than from a measure of discretionary accrual component of 
earnings. Moreover, the distribution method also provides a powerful tool in detecting 
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earnings management when large number of firms appears to manage earnings. 
Burgstaher and Dichev (1997, p101) state “an investigation of the prevalence of the 
avoidance of earnings decreases and losses suggests that this is a pervasive 
phenomenon”. This method is particularly useful when a researcher’s aim is to detect 
the frequency and scope of earnings management since it identifies a context in which 
large numbers of firms appear to manage earnings. It is of interest to regulators as 
they consider material any earnings management that converts losses into profits, 
triggers bonuses, or crosses performance thresholds for other covenants. 
 
2.2.6 Income-smoothing 
 
Literature used ‘income smoothing’ more often in the 1980s. Income-smoothing is a 
specific case of earnings management which has a clear objective to reduce the 
temporal volatility of earnings and to produce a steadily growing stream of profits 
(Schipper, 1989). The income smoothing hypothesis refers to managers who have an 
incentive to manipulate earnings to some predetermined budget number (see 
Fundenberg and Tirole, 1995; DeFond and Park, 1997). In the early stages researchers 
detect income-smoothing behaviour based on the comparison of earnings volatility 
between firms with more and less smooth reported earnings. Imhoff (1977) 
recognized that the problem with this approach is the difficulty in distinguishing 
naturally smoothed earnings from intentionally smoothed earnings. For instance, 
some industries have a less volatile income stream because of the produce nature is 
less affected by business cycles but not due to the smoothing activity. Imhoff (1977) 
and Eckel (1981) suggested that a firm could be classified as an income smoother if 
the variance of earnings is smaller than the variance of sales. Wang and Williams 
(1994) classified a firm as an income smoother if the firm’s cash flows volatility is 
higher than earnings volatility. As cash flows are less subject to managerial 
manipulation than accruals, low earnings volatility indicates accruals have been used 
to reduce the earnings volatility. Such an approach is applied in detecting income-
smoothing, which has a narrower application. 
 
2.3 Earnings management and industry sectors 
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The magnitude of earnings management is likely to vary across industries because of 
differences in cash flow and sales volatility, operating cycle, intangibles use, and 
capital intensity. Knowing which industries exhibit higher magnitude of earnings 
management as opposed to other industries has implications for firm valuation and 
investment decisions (Francis et al., 2008). Earnings management evidences have 
been found in the dual economy and some specific industries.  
 
2.3.1 The dual economy  
 
In the dual economy theory, Averitt (1968, pp.6−7) defines American economy as ‘a 
composite of two business systems’ that later to be called the core and the periphery. 
Bluestone et al. (1973, pp.29−30) describe that ‘the core economy is by far the largest 
sector…with high productivity and profits, intensive utilization of capital, high 
incidence of monopoly power and a high degree of unionization…Unlike core sector 
industries, the periphery lacks almost all of the advantages normally found in core 
firms.’   
 
Beck et al. (1978) operationally classified industries into core and periphery sector on 
the basis of two-digit SIC codes. The core sector includes Mining, Construction, 
Metals, Machinery, Transportation, Paper and Printing, Chemicals, Communications, 
Utilities, Finance and Real Estate. The periphery sector includes Agriculture, 
Furniture and Fixtures, Food and Tobacco, Textile, Retail, Business and Personal 
Services, and Entertainment.  Theory of dual economy suggests that firms in the 
periphery sector face a more restricted opportunity structure and a higher degree of 
environmental uncertainty than firms in the core sector. 
 
Belkaoui and Picur (1984) applied the dual economy theory in the study of earnings 
management and suggested that the periphery industry is more likely to manage 
earnings because they have more predispositions and more opportunities to do so. 
Using a sample of 171 U.S. firms, they found a larger frequency of income smoothing 
(a means of earnings management) in the periphery sector than in the core sector. In 
contrast, Albrecht and Richardson (1990) used a sample of 256 U.S. firms and argued 
that the different extent in earnings manipulation behaviour between core and 
periphery sectors is not supported.  
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Kinnunen et al. (1995) also tested this theory in Finnish industry and found that both 
the potential and the actual earnings management are significantly larger in the core 
sector of Finnish industry. In Australia, Jones and Sharma (2001) reported some 
evidence of the scope of earnings management where earnings are significantly less 
managed in the ‘new economy’ firms, including Health, Biotechnology, Information 
Technology, and Telecommunications.2  
 
2.3.2 Specific industries 
 
Except the dual economy, researchers have documented earnings management 
evidences on a specific industry. Robbins et al. (1993) focused on the U.S. healthcare 
industry and provided some insight into the linkage between management 
compensation incentives and management’s choice of accounting methods. Key 
(1997) investigated discretionary accruals for firms in the cable television industry 
and documents that firms in this industry defer earnings during the time of 
Congressional hearings on deregulation the industry. Cahan et al. (1997) found that 
chemical firms engaged in income-decreasing earnings management during the time 
when the U.S. Government was reforming the environmental legislation. Hall and 
Stammerjohan (1997) show that managers of oil firms engage in earnings 
management as a response to high debt levels, pending legal damage rewards and 
foreign competition. Han and Wang (1998) found that during the 1990 Gulf War, oil 
industry firms used accruals to reduce quarterly earnings to relax the price control 
over gasoline so that they could increase the oil price and thus make profit.  
McNichols and Wilson (1998) found income-decreasing manipulation in printing and 
publishing, nondurable wholesale goods, and business services industries. Teoh et al. 
(1998a) show that over 30% firms that reported higher net income before seasoned 
equity offerings are from electronic equipment and service industries. Navissi (1999) 
found that New Zealand manufacturing firms who apply for price increases engage in 
downward earnings management. Beasley et al. (2000) documented evidence of 
earnings management among technology firms and financial-services firms. Nelson et 
al. (2002) reported significantly high earnings management attempts by firms in the 
electronics industry. Monem (2003) found a downward earnings management by the 
                                                 
2 Jones and Sharma (2001) defined ‘new economy’ as firms with high growth, poorer earnings performance and 
poorer cash flows. In Australia, 214 firms were listed under new economy industry classification of ASX in March 
2001. They were health and biotechnology, high technology, and telecommunications. 
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Australian gold-mining industry to reduce income tax after the introduction of the 
Australian Gold Tax in 1991.  
 
Therefore, both studies of the dual economy and specific industries suggest that the 
industry classification has proved to be of considerable significance in the area of 
earnings management.  
 
2.4 Earnings management and firm characteristics 
 
Besides industry sectors, firm-level characteristics and their contribution to a higher 
(lower) propensity for earnings management is also worth examining. In this section, 
studies of firm characteristics including size, growth, profitability, leverage, book-to-
market, capital intensity, and lagged total accruals and their impacts on earnings 
management are reviewed.  
 
2.4.1 Firm size 
 
Firm size is documented as an influential factor in earnings management and there are 
two schools of thought about firm size. On one side, Watts and Zimmerman (1978) 
proved that large size firms are more political sensitive and easier to attract political 
exposure. The political concerns suggest that managers of large firms are more likely 
to engage in income-decreasing earnings management to reduce political costs. This is 
the political cost hypothesis which illustrates that larger firms are more likely to have 
implications for the determination of accounting numbers. Manzon (1992) also found 
that large firms use discretionary accruals to reduce earnings in order to minimize 
income tax. As large firms are followed by more analysts, Das et al. (1998) suggest 
that these firms face greater pressure to achieve earnings benchmarks than smaller 
firms. 
 
On the other side, Bathke et al. (1989) documented a positive relationship between 
firm size and earnings stability. The underlying argument is that there is less need for 
large size firm to manage earnings because large firms have sufficient financial 
resources to diversify risk and to stabilize growth that lead to a more stable earnings 
stream. Koh (2003) and Holland and Jackson (2004) also suggested that larger firms 
are less likely to engage in earnings management as close scrutiny will constrain 
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managers’ abilities to exercise discretions. Recently, Sanchez-Ballesta and Garcia-
Meca (2007) found earnings management is more prevalent among smaller firms in 
the Spanish context because smaller firms tend to be neglected by financial analysts 
and regulators. In fact, in the earlier time, Sloan (1996) has already documented that 
smaller firms are associated with both income-increasing and decreasing earnings 
management. 
 
2.4.2 Growth opportunities 
 
Growth opportunity is another firm-level characteristic that has been studied 
frequently. Beaver et al. (1968) found that growth opportunities provide managers 
with incentive to smooth earnings as earnings volatility increases perceived firm risk 
which adversely affects the cost of the capital needed by the firm. Dechow et al. 
(1998) found that accruals are positively associated with sales growth. McNichols 
(2000) also shows that discretionary accruals are related to forecasted sales growth.  
Skinner and Sloan (2002) found that growth firms are penalized by the market if they 
report negative earnings surprise. Thus, high growth creates incentives for managers 
to meet earnings benchmarks. Richardson et al. (2002) also found that restatement 
firms3 tend to be high growth firms. These firms are found to inflate earnings to meet 
or beat analysts’ forecasts as they are under markets’ pressure. Pincus and Rajgopal 
(2002) documented a positive association between firms growth level and earnings 
management. They explained that growth firms are more likely to hedge cash flows to 
assure the availability of funds. Young (1999) found that discretionary accruals are 
positively associated with firm growth since firms experiencing large growth will 
incur large current assets and current liabilities. He further pointed out that the impact 
of firm growth on current assets accruals and current liabilities accruals is not 
symmetrical; rather, most of the variation in working capital accruals is from current 
assets. Firth et al. (2007) recently pointed out that it is easier for fast growing firms to 
engage in earnings management than it is for mature firms since it is difficult to 
observe the business activities of fast growing firms.  
 
                                                 
3 Restatements because of accounting errors are a symptom of poor earnings quality (Levitt, 2000). Earnings 
management can lead to earnings restatements.  
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2.4.3 Profitability 
 
Profitability also affects the magnitude of earnings management and it involves two 
streams of studies. One stream of studies asserts that lower accounting profits provide 
motivation for firms to manipulate earnings because low profitable firms are possibly 
facing more financial constraints. White (1970) first documented that firms with 
declining profitability tend to smooth earnings. Ashari et al. (1994) reported that 
managers’ incentives to smooth earnings will be stronger when the firm’s profitability 
is poor and its fluctuations in income are severe. Wang (2004) argued that the firm’s 
propensity for fraud is positively related to growth prospects and negatively related to 
the profitability of the firm’s current assets. The underlying notation for his 
predications is that firms with good growth opportunities but low profitability should 
demand more external finance as these firms suffer from a cash flow squeeze.  
 
The other stream of studies, however, argues that profit firms have greater incentives 
to manage earnings than do loss firms. Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) pointed out that 
earnings management firms tend to exhibit a high profitability as it affects managers’ 
job security and the compensation contract, which gives managers implicit incentives 
to manipulate earnings. Moreover, Hayn (1995) reported that price-earnings relation 
for profit and loss firms is asymmetrical and the market rewards firms that report 
profits. In addition, Degeorege et al. (1999) showed that earnings management to 
meet or beat earnings benchmarks matters only if firms first report profits. These 
findings suggest that profit firms have greater market-based incentives than loss firms 
for managing earnings to meet the earnings benchmarks.  
 
2.4.4 Leverage 
 
Previous studies also show that high leverage firms tend to engage more in earnings 
management. Watts and Zimmerman (1978) documented that aggressive earnings 
management has been used by firms to improve debt ratings and prevent covenant 
violations. Press and Weintrop (1990) also suggested that the closer to default on debt 
covenants, the more managers will engage in earnings management.  DeFond and 
Jiambalvo (1994) found that managers increased income one year prior to the 
covenant violation as managers tried to convince the creditors that the firm is in a 
good financial condition, and thereby avoid being in technical defaults. Dechow et al. 
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(2000) argued that by avoiding reporting a loss a firm potentially avoids costs of 
renegotiating with debtholders. Hence, they predict that debt level should be 
positively correlated with discretionary accruals. 
 
However, DeAngelo and Skinner (1994) argued that managers of financially troubled 
firms would highlight the firm’s financial difficulties by reducing the reported 
earnings so that they could obtain better terms in their contract renegotiations. Despite 
the evidence being mixed in terms of whether high leverage firms engage in income-
increasing or income-decreasing earnings management, it is clear that firm’s leverage 
affects earnings management in the presence of debt contracts and financial distress.  
Recently, Charitou et al. (2007) investigated the period from 1986 to 2004 and found 
that managers of 859 U.S. bankruptcy firms were involved in income-decreasing 
earnings management prior to the bankruptcy filing. They further explained that new 
management following management turnover shift earnings downwards as a part of 
wider strategy so that they can blame the ‘old’ management for the firm’s distressed 
condition. Such explanation is consistent with DeAngelo and Skinner (1994). 
 
2.4.5 Book-to-market 
 
Discretionary accruals are also found to be affected by book-to-market. Book-to-
market is a widely investigated anomaly that has been argued to affect future stock 
returns. Firms with high book-to-market ratios are usually composed of a relatively 
large proportion of assets-in-place and knowed as value stocks. In contrast, firms with 
low book-to-market ratio are more likely to have larger growth opportunities, these 
stocks are referred to as growth or glamour stocks. Low book-to-market predicts 
negative abnormal returns, whereas high book-to-market predicts positive abnormal 
returns. Beaver (2002) further pointed out that those accruals are also an important 
value-growth anomaly, and it is possibly linked to book-to-market anomaly. 
Subraranyam (1996) found that discretionary accruals are priced by the capital market 
and therefore are value relevant. Managers of low book-to-market firms tend to have 
greater incentives to engage in earnings management to beat earnings targets because 
stock prices in such firms are more sensitive to reported earnings. Sawichi and 
Shrestha (2008) investigated the relationship between earnings management and 
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insider trading, and found that on average, glamour firms with low book-to-market 
ratios have income-increasing discretionary accruals.  
 
 
2.4.6 Capital intensity 
 
Managers’ ability to exercise discretion depends on the level of current 
assets/liabilities and noncurrent assets/liabilities. Capital intensity measures the 
portion of the firm’s noncurrent (fixed) assets to the total assets base. Lower capital 
intensity implies higher proportion of current assets and lower proportion of 
noncurrent assets. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) suggested that firms with large 
current assets/liabilities provide more room for the managers to exercise discretions 
through working capital accruals than the firms with large noncurrent assets 
(fixed)/liabilities. As such, lower capital intensity enhances managers’ abilities in 
exercising discretions. Francis et al. (1999) used capital intensity ratio to measure the 
level of noncurrent assets/liabilities to current assets/liabilities and suggested that the 
lower the capital intensity ratio the higher the likelihood for managers to manipulate 
earnings through working capital accruals. In a similar vein, Bradshaw et al. (1999) 
suggested that managers have more discretion and flexibility over short-term working 
capital accruals. Young (1999) reported a negative association between capital 
intensity and the level of discretionary accruals.   
 
2.4.7 Lagged total accruals 
 
In the long run, earnings equal cash flows. Accruals will sum to zero over a 
managers’ employment horizon with the firm and accruals applied in the current 
period being reversed in the future. For example, if a manager selects a negative 
accrual by increasing a bad debt provision in the current period, then the need for the 
same amount of bad debt provision in the future period is removed. Healy (1983) 
suggested that managers’ decision in choosing discretionary accruals depend on their 
employment horizon. As discretionary accruals are constrained to sum to zero over an 
employment horizon, one period’s use of discretionary accruals fixes their decision in 
the second period. This is the mean reverting feature of accruals. Dechow (1994), 
Dechow et al. (1995) and Sloan (1996) found that accruals are mean reverting. The 
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majority parts of the current period accruals will be mean revert in the next year. This 
means a higher level of lagged total accruals will constrain managers’ abilities to 
manage earnings upward in current year. Dechow et al. (2003) suggested that accruals 
are less persistent than cash flows because accruals reverse in the following years. As 
such, some proportion of accruals can be predicted from last year’s accruals. They 
include the lagged total accruals into the Modified Jones Model in an attempt to 
capture the predictable component of total accruals.  
 
In all, these studies imply that the magnitude of earnings management is likely to vary 
among firms because of different characteristics in size, growth rate, profitability, 
leverage, book-to-market effect, capital intensity, and lagged total accruals. Therefore, 
the examination of firm characteristics may useful in discovering what kind of firms 
will exhibit higher level of earnings management.   
 
2.5 The incentives of Earnings management 
 
Earnings management is found to be driven by different managerial incentives. 
Previous studies have identified that executive compensation contracts create 
incentives for earnings management. Recent studies also found that the capital market 
induces managers to manipulate earnings. Positive earnings announcements often are 
followed by stock price increases. The following literature review is focused on 
earnings management incentives: the executive compensation incentive for the 
contract driven earnings management and the benchmark beating incentive for the 
capital market driven earnings management.  
 
2.5.1 Contract-driven Earnings management 
 
In the literature, executive compensation is one type of contract that has been found to 
create strong incentives for earnings management.4 Agency theory predicts that there 
is potential conflict of interest between managers and owners/shareholders, 
                                                 
4 Other contracts include debt contracts and studies found there is an association between earnings management 
and debt covenant violations. These studies include Watts and Zimmerman (1978), McNichols and Wilson (1988), 
Press and Weintrop (1990), Healy and Palepu (1990), Beneish and Press (1993), Hall (1994), DeFond and 
Jiambalvo (1994), Sweeney (1994), and DeAngelo and Skinner (1994). Regulation could be viewed as a special 
form of contract between firms and regulators and regulation also creates incentives for earnings management. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) point out firms with high accounting earnings are more likely to decrease earnings 
in order to reduce political costs. Other studies include Han and Wang (1998), Cahan (1992), Lim and Matolcsy 
(1999), and Monem (2003). 
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owners/shareholders design management compensation contracts in order to constrain 
management to act in their best interest (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Theoretically, 
management compensation contracts are viewed as devices to reduce the conflict of 
interest between managers and shareholders and, thereby, maximize a firm’s value. 
However, these compensation contracts may induce earnings management simply 
because managers’ compensation is either tied to accounting earnings (for example, 
bonus) or stock prices (for example, options). As such, there is a possibility that 
rewarding managers on the basis of reported earnings or stock performance may 
induce them to manipulate such figures to improve their apparent performance and, 
ultimately, their related compensations. In the following sections, studies related to 
the early executive compensation, bonus plan maximization hypothesis and equity-
based compensation are reviewed.  
 
2.5.1.1 The early executive compensation studies 
 
The early compensation hypothesis stems from the positive accounting theory. Watts 
and Zimmerman (1978) developed a positive accounting theory based on the 
proposition that managers attempt to maximize their utility which is directly related to 
their wealth. They argued that there are several factors that can increase management 
wealth: (1) decreased (delayed) tax payments, (2) favorable regulations, (3) reduced 
political costs, (4) reduced information production costs, and (5) increases in reported 
earnings that are used as a base measure in incentive bonus plans. The first four 
factors would, ceteris paribus, increase firm cash flows and thus lead to higher stock 
prices, while the last factor would directly increase management compensation. Using 
a sample of 52 firms which made submissions to the FASB (Financial Accounting 
Standards Board) about the proposed GPLA (General Price Level Adjustment) 
standard in 1974, they also found that managers will to choose accounting standards 
to report lower earnings that will result in lower tax, regulatory and political costs. 
 
Although Watts and Zimmerman (1978) developed a theory hypothesizing the 
economic incentives managers have in selecting accounting policies, they did not 
provide direct evidence on the association between management compensation and 
earnings manipulation. Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) later examined whether the 
existence of incentive compensation plans in addition to size, industry concentration, 
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risk, and capital intensity effected management discretions. In this study, management 
discretions are measured as four accounting choices of inventory method (LIFO 
versus FIFO), depreciation method (accelerated versus straight-line), the treatment of 
the investment tax credit (deferral versus flow-through), and pension costs 
amortization (less than 30 years versus more than 30 years). Using a random sample 
of 300 non-regulated industrial firms in 1975, they found that the existence of 
incentive compensation plans induced a management choice of accounting methods 
that would increase reported earnings.  
 
Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981) extended Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) and 
argued that management would adopt a multi-dimensional income strategy with each 
accounting policy choice being one dimension of that optimal strategy. An optimal 
strategy means management faces the trade-offs between income-increasing policies 
and income-decreasing policies. For instance, management compensation plans 
induce managers to inflate earnings while firm size encourages managers to deflate 
earnings. Using the same sample of Zmijewski and Hagerman (1979), Hagerman and 
Zmijewski (1981) found the existence of a profit-sharing plan, size, degree of 
concentration and debt to total assets ratio all influence a firm’s accounting strategy. 
Based on the assumption that accounting policy decisions are made jointly, Hagerman 
and Zmijewski (1981) tested positive accounting theory using an overall model and 
individual factors that were hypothesized to be important in a manager’s decision of 
accounting choices.  
 
Using a sample of 96 firms which voluntarily switched depreciation method from an 
accelerated method to a straight-line method covering the period from 1955 to 1978, 
Holthausen (1981) modeled abnormal stock returns as a function of the existence of a 
management compensation plan, the impact of the depreciation change on reported 
earnings, the firm’s deviation from its dividend constraint and the size of the firm. 
The function addresses two issues. First, there should be an impact of an 
unanticipated change of depreciation policy on the market value of the equity at the 
time of announcement. Second, abnormal stock returns should have a negative 
association with the existence of a management compensation plan if managers use 
income-increasing depreciation techniques to inflate their bonus. However, the 
evidence is not consistent with the hypothesis that management compensation 
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contracts are important determinants of the decision to change depreciation 
techniques. 
 
Skinner (1993) related management compensation agreements with a firm’s 
investment opportunity set. First, firms using incentive bonus plans are found to have 
higher mean and median gross property, plant and equipment to firm value ratios 
(more assets-in-place) but smaller Tobin’s  q and R&D ratios (fewer growth 
opportunities). Second, firms with bonus plans are more likely to select income-
increasing depreciation and goodwill procedures. Based on these two findings, 
Skinner (1993) suggested that investment opportunity set affects accounting choice 
indirectly through its effect on the nature of a firm’s compensation contracts.   
 
However, this study has two limitations. First, the sub-sample Skinner (1993) used in 
testing the relation between the investment opportunity set and compensation 
contracts consists of the 100 largest firms from an estimation sample. Such a self-
selection problem could result in a bias test as large firms have relatively more assets-
in-place. Second, simultaneity problem could arise when investment opportunity, 
compensation and accounting choice determines each other. In this case, the error 
terms in the logit regression will be correlated with some of the independent variables, 
leading to inconsistent estimates of the coefficients.  
 
The review of above studies reveals some common features of early research of 
compensation incentives. These studies focus on one-time events such as changes in a 
specific accounting method and ignore all other accounting choices. They typically 
use a single 0-1 dummy variable to estimate the impact of a short-term bonus plan and 
use a dichotomous variable or a categorical variable to capture income-increasing or 
income-decreasing earnings management through the choice of accounting policies.  
 
2.5.1.2 Bonus plan maximization hypothesis 
 
Rather than using a single dummy variable to estimate the impact of a short-term 
bonus plan, there is another line of research that focuses on detailed bonus plans. 
Moreover, it uses discretionary accruals to capture earnings management through 
aggregate accounting choice. This line of research forms a more complete theory of 
earnings management and management compensation.  
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One of the most widely cited papers in this line of research is Healy (1985). Using a 
sample of 1,527 firm-year observations covering the period from 1930 to 1980, this 
study discovered that bonuses were not simple linear functions of accounting 
earnings. Instead, they are piecewise linear functions with lower and upper bounds 
defined in the funding formula for use in bonus computations.5 That is, managers 
decrease income when earnings before discretionary accruals is below the lower 
bound of the bonus plan; (2) managers increase income when earnings before 
discretionary accruals fall between the upper and lower bounds of the bonus plan; (3) 
managers decrease income when earnings before discretionary accruals is above the 
upper bound of the bonus plan. Such a piecewise linear bonus function contradicts the 
conventional wisdom that managers with a bonus plan will always choose income-
increasing accounting choices. In fact, when earnings are far below the lower bound, 
managers are more likely to adopt a ‘bath taking’ strategy to further reduce current 
earnings in order to increase the probability of meeting future earnings’ targets. Later 
researchers refer Healy’s theory of managers using discretionary accruals to maximize 
short-term bonus compensation as the bonus-maximization hypothesis.  
 
Nevertheless, this study has three limitations. First, errors in measuring earnings 
before discretionary accruals are perfectly negatively correlated with measurement 
errors in discretionary accruals.6 This implies a number of firm-years observations 
with positive measurement error in earnings before discretionary accruals are more 
likely to present negative measurement errors in discretionary accruals. Such relation 
increases the probability of incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis. Second, Healy 
(1985) used the chi-square test of independence in the contingency table. This method 
is useful in determining whether a relationship exists between two variables, for 
example accruals and bonus plan parameters. However, it does not enable researchers 
to estimate or predict the value of one variable based on the value of the other 
(Kenkel, 1989). In order to determine that dependence does exist between accruals 
and bonus parameters, certain functional relationship between these two quantitative 
                                                 
5 The lower bound, usually defined as invested capital, is the threshold that net income must exceed before a bonus 
can be earned. The upper bound, often defined as a percentage of cash dividend paid out or a maximum percentage 
of invested capital, limits the maximum bonus that can be rewarded. 
6 This is because the sum of the proxy variables (earnings before discretionary accruals and discretionary accruals) 
are constrained to equal the sum of the measured variables (cash flows and total accruals) by the accounting 
earnings identity where aaccounting earnings = cash flows + total accruals; also, accounting earnings = earnings 
before discretionary accruals + discretionary accruals. 
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variables needs to be further developed. Finally, Healy (1985) introduced 
discretionary accruals as a new proxy for earnings management which later was 
widely applied in measuring earnings management. However, the expected level of 
non-discretionary accruals is assumed to be zero and total accruals are used as a 
substitute of discretionary accruals. Kaplan (1985) pointed out those non-
discretionary accruals are unlikely to be zero as working capital accounts fluctuate 
with the changing economic conditions of the firm. The substitution of total accruals 
for discretionary accruals makes the results of Healy’s empirical tests difficult to 
interpret.  
 
Gaver et al. (1995) extended Healy’s work. The principle difference between the two 
studies is that Healy (1985) used total accruals while Gaver et al. (1995) used 
Modified Jones Model and Industry Index Model to estimate discretionary accruals. 
Using updated data with 837 firm-years covering the period from 1980 to 1990, Gaver 
et al. (1985) found that when earnings before discretionary accruals fall below the 
lower bound, managers appear to exercise positive discretionary accruals. Hence, 
Gaver et al. (1995) believed that their results were more consistent with the income 
smoothing hypothesis than with Healy’s bonus hypothesis.   
 
Holthausen et al. (1995) also extended Healy’s work. These two studies have two 
essential differences. First, Healy (1985) made inferences about CEO incentives based 
on funding formulas while Holthausen et al. (1995) used a budget-based 
compensation scheme. Unlike funding formulas, a budget-based compensation 
scheme clearly defines minimum, target, and maximum bonus payments at the 
beginning of the year and thus allows authors to directly determine whether CEOs are 
below the lower bound, above the upper bound, or in between the lower and upper 
bound. This budget-based compensation scheme hence provides a direct linkage 
between the financial performance of the firm and the annual bonus earned by an 
executive.  
 
Second, Healy (1985) made predictions about earnings management based on ex ante 
earnings before discretionary accruals. In contrast, Holthausen et al. (1995) replaced 
earnings before discretionary accruals with an ex post actual bonus. They predicted 
that managers have an incentive to select income-decreasing discretionary accruals if 
the actual bonus is below (above) the lower (upper) bound; while managers have an 
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incentive to select income-increasing accruals if the actual bonus is between the lower 
and upper bounds. Their approach is ex post and called as fixed-target hypothesis.  
 
Using confidential compensation data with 443 firm-year observations provided by 
two different human resources consulting firms that covered periods of 1982 to 1984 
and 1987 to 1991, Holthausen et al. (1995) estimated discretionary accruals from the 
Modified Jones Model. The results from t-tests and chi-square tests show a downward 
earnings manipulation at the upper bound relative to those between the lower and 
upper bound. However, results do not support that managers manipulate earnings 
downwards when compensations are below the lower bound of their contract.  
 
Guidry et al. (1999) tested the bonus maximization hypothesis at the business unit 
level for a multinational conglomerate. Using 117 different U.S. business units and 
179 business-unit-years observations over the 1994-1995 time period, they 
documented that business-unit managers manipulated earnings in order to maximize 
their short-term bonus plans. Given that incentives of individual managers may differ 
from one business unit to the other, income-increasing discretionary accruals in one 
business unit can offset income-decreasing discretionary accruals in another business 
unit. The investigation of business-unit level increases the probability for earnings 
management behaviour to be detected. Thus, this examination of earnings 
management at business-unit level was innovative. 
 
In all, the focus of above studies is on whether discretionary accruals are consistent 
with the incentive provided by bonus plans. In the examination, they used 
discretionary accruals but not accounting choices as proxies for earnings 
management; they used bonus plan but not the actual compensation paid. 
 
2.5.1.3 Actual cash compensation and bonus 
 
Recently studies began to investigate the effect of discretionary accruals on actual 
compensation paid. Using 3,439 firm-years observations from Compustat between 
1980 and 1993, Balsam (1998) found that cash flows, discretionary accruals, and non-
discretionary accruals are all significant determinants of CEO cash compensation; 
discretionary accruals receive less weight than other earnings components in the 
compensation function since they are subject to management manipulation. 
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Furthermore, managers use income-increasing discretionary accruals to increase 
compensation. The significant positive coefficient on this variable reveals that 
positive discretionary accruals are given more emphasis in compensation decisions 
than negative discretionary accruals.  
 
In addition, the association between discretionary accruals and CEO cash 
compensation varies depending on the circumstance of the firm. The circumstance is 
defined as whether positive discretionary accruals are used to achieve earnings 
benchmarks: (1) report profits; (2) report income increases; (3) report income 
increases plus a drift factor.7 The compensation committees can distinguish between 
the components of earning and reward managers when their discretionary behaviour 
achieves the firms’ goals.  
 
Shuto (2007) examined the effects of discretionary accruals and extraordinary items 
on Japanese executive compensation. In Japan, executive compensation is not 
publicly available and only the total amount of compensation paid to all directors is 
disclosed. Shuto (2007) used the total cash compensation data (the sum of salary and 
bonus) of the board of directors as a proxy for executive compensation and 
discretionary accruals were estimated from the Cash Flow Modified Jones model 
(Kasznik, 1999).  
 
Using a large sample of 16,368 firm-year observations from the period between 1991 
and 2000, Shuto (2007) first analyzed the relation between earnings components and 
executive compensation and found that non-discretionary earnings components are 
more value-relevant than discretionary components and shareholders are in favor of 
these more value-relevant earnings components in evaluating executive 
compensation. Moreover, this study found that managers who do not receive any 
bonus are more likely to exercise income-decreasing discretionary accruals and 
extraordinary items. Shuto (2007) interpreted this finding as evidence that managers 
engage in ‘big bath’ earnings management when there is no bonus rewarded.  
 
Both Balsam (1998) and Shuto (2007) argued that the association between 
discretionary accruals and executive compensation varies depending on the 
                                                 
7 Two drift factors are used, the first being the change in the consumer price index, and the second being the 
average growth in income over the previous five years 
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circumstances of a firm; the latter study examined two other circumstances: (1) when 
firm managers use unusually high (low) discretionary accruals to increase (decrease) 
income; (2) when firm managers use discretionary accruals to smooth income. The 
results from the Vuong (1989) test8 suggested that shareholders should distinguish 
between the components of earnings and rewards managers when they smooth income 
to beat earnings target.  
 
While beating relevant earnings benchmarks is found to be a circumstance under 
which managers will exercise positive discretionary accruals to maximize their 
compensation, neither study further explored the effects of missing earnings 
benchmarks on the CEO’s compensation. Matsunaga and Park (2001) filled this gap 
by pointing out that CEO compensation would be reduced when a firm misses an 
earnings benchmark because the compensation committee may view this as a signal of 
poor management performance. Three earnings benchmarks were tested: (1) quarterly 
consensus analyst forecast; (2) the earnings for the same quarter of the previous year; 
and (3) zero profit.  
 
Using 3,651 firm-year observations from 1993 to 1997, results showed significantly 
negative associations between the change in CEO cash bonuses and earnings below 
consensus analysts’ forecasts and prior year earnings. Moreover, the Wald tests report 
the negative coefficient is significantly stronger when a firm misses the prior year’s 
earnings more frequently, suggesting an incremental penalty on executives’ 
compensation if the firm misses earnings benchmark more frequently. Although 
Matsunaga and Park’s study did not involve the estimation of discretionary accruals, 
it has implications for studies of earnings management and executive compensation. 
Earnings benchmarks create incentives for managers to engage in earnings 
management as managers are penalized for lower bonuses when they missed earnings 
benchmarks. 
 
2.5.1.4 Equity-based compensation incentives 
 
                                                 
8 Vuong (1989) test is designed to compare the explanatory power of the two competing models by computing the 
ratio of adjusted R-square of two competing models. Shuto (2007) used this test to imply that Net Income explains 
significantly more of the variation in Bonus than Non-discretionary Earnings.  
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Modern corporations adopt various mechanisms to align managers’ incentives with 
those of shareholders. A contemporary executive compensation package mainly 
contains five components, base salary, annual bonus, stock options, stock grants, and 
long-term incentive plans (Murphy, 1999). As different form of compensation may 
have different risk and incentive profiles (Anderson et al., 2000), recent compensation 
related earnings management studies considered the interplay between the 
compensation components and their different incentives that may cause earnings 
management.  Further, there has been a large increase in the level of CEO pay since 
1980 and this growth has been driven drastically by the substantial increase in stock-
option grants (Hall and Liebman, 2000). By tying executive pay to stock price 
outcomes, equity-based compensation encourages managers to make operating and 
investing decisions that maximize shareholder wealth. However, researchers suggest 
that tying management compensation to the stock price may bring a new set of 
problems. For example, CEOs who have high levels of option and stock holdings are 
found to manipulate earnings in order to increase their own utility at the expense of 
shareholders, which contrary to the designed incentive effects of equity compensation.  
 
Gao and Shrieves (2002) investigated whether the five separate compensation —
salary, bonus, options, restricted stock, and long-term incentive plans — embody 
different incentives for earnings management. They suggested that the non-linear 
payoffs from the stock options and bonus component of compensation create 
managerial incentives to exploit earnings manipulation to the large extent. Compared 
to options, restricted stocks create less incentive for earnings management because 
restricted stocks have linear payoffs based on stock price movements. With base 
salary, a manager who receives a fixed salary would have an incentive to reduce 
earnings management behaviour since earnings management behaviour is costly, with 
the costs of losing reputation, losing job, and increasing litigation risk. Finally, long-
term incentive plans are compensated at a firm’s long term performance, usually three 
to five years. Given the mean-reverting property of accruals, managers are likely to 
mitigate incentives to manage earnings.  
 
Results from empirical analysis are generally consistent with the predication. Bonus 
and option compensation are positively and significantly related to discretionary 
accruals while salary is significantly negatively associated with discretionary accruals. 
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Restricted stocks are weakly associated with discretionary accruals with a positive 
sign. Long-term incentive plans are not associated with discretionary accruals. 
Moreover, they show that the relationship between compensation components and 
earnings management is conditional on proximity of pre-managed earnings to an 
earnings benchmark, the closer the level of pre-managed earnings to earnings 
benchmarks (zero earnings and prior year’s earnings), the more likely that managers 
engage in earnings management.  
 
Cheng and Warfield (2005) investigated five elements of executive equity incentives: 
option grants, unexercisable options, exercisable options, restricted stock grants, and 
stock ownership. They found that CEOs are more likely to sell shares in the year after 
earnings announcements when they have high unexercisable options or stock 
ownership. Moreover, the probability of earnings management is also higher for 
CEOs with high unexercisable options and ownership, and they tend to increase stock 
sales after earnings management. The underlying logic is that CEOs who are 
compensated heavily by equities tend to sell their shares in the future in order to 
reduce the risk exposure for holding them. Such trading behaviour induces earnings 
management to take place in an attempt to increase the price of the shares to be sold.  
 
Without estimating discretionary accruals, Cheng and Warfield (2005) used the 
probability of meeting or just beating analyst’s forecasts as proxy for earnings 
management and quantified that earnings management will be increased by 16.3 
(30.5)% for every one standard deviation increase in unexercisable options 
(ownership). They also investigated whether equity compensation created an incentive 
for income smoothing. The form of income smoothing they defined was that 
managers avoid large positive earnings surprise equal to or greater than four cents. 
This finding was consistent with income smoothing behaviour that managers with 
consistently high equity incentives avoided reporting large positive earnings surprises, 
which leads to increased reserving for beating analysts’ consensus forecasts in the 
future.   
 
Ke (2001) linked beating profits and last year’s earnings behaviour with CEOs’ 
compensation and pointed out that CEO compensation incentives formed one set of 
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economic determinants of benchmark beating behaviour.9 Using a sample of 
ExecuComp 1,311 publicly traded firms with 18,623 quarterly data during 1992 to 
1998, the study showed that the probability of reporting small earnings increases is 
higher for CEOs with high equity-based compensation (measured by stock options 
and direct stock ownership), low future growth opportunities, low analysts pressure 
and low debt covenant constraints. Moreover, the duration of consecutive earnings 
increases is longer for CEOs with high equity-based compensation and bonus, low 
future growth opportunities, and low debt covenant constraints. Hence, Ke (2001) 
suggested that CEO compensation incentives, especially equity incentive, are 
important determinants of benchmark beating behaviour.  
 
Baker et al. (2003) suggested if managers are rewarded with large portion of options 
relative to other forms of compensation, one way they could increase the value of the 
options would be to take actions to reduce the exercise price. This lower exercise 
price increases the likelihood that options would be ‘in the money’ in the future. They 
found firms that compensate their executive with greater shares of options relative to 
other forms of pay manage earnings downwards through negative discretionary 
accruals before the award date to reduce reported earnings and thus reduce the 
exercise price.  
 
The two latest studies provide more evidence that tying management compensation to 
the stock price has the perverse effect of encouraging earnings management. 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) found that option holdings, option exercises and 
other insiders sell stocks that are associated with discretionary accruals. They 
suggested that stock and option holdings create strong incentives for CEOs to 
manipulate earnings upward. McAnally et al. (2006) reported that managers with 
larger option grants are more likely to miss earnings benchmarks by reporting small 
losses and small year-over-year earnings declines. As missing an earnings benchmark 
can lead to stock price decline which gives CEOs a lower strike price on option 
grants, they suggested that option grants create strong incentives for CEOs to miss 
earnings benchmarks via downward earnings management.  
 
The above studies investigated management compensation contracts. These studies 
                                                 
9 The second set of economic determinants is capital markets’ expectation on future growth opportunities, analyst 
pressure, and debt covenant constraints. 
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claimed that compensation contracts create incentives for earnings management. 
Earnings management, for compensation maximization purpose, is often classified as 
contract-driven earnings management. Earnings management can be driven by capital 
market motives as well. In the following section, studies of capital market-driven 
earnings management, particularly, the behaviour of benchmark beating is reviewed.   
 
2.5.2 Capital market-driven earnings management 
 
Since 1990s, given the overall increase in stock-market valuation and the large 
increase in the value of equity-based compensation, researchers have noticed the 
importance of the capital market and its impact on earnings management. They started 
to depart from contractual agreements and shifted to capital-market incentives. 
Capital markets are found to create incentives for earnings management as short-term 
stock prices could be influenced by manipulated earnings. Dechow and Skinner 
(2000) summarized that there are four sets of earnings management studies that focus 
on capital markets: (1) analysis of whether managers meet or beat earnings 
benchmarks, (2) analysis of earnings management around equity offerings, (3) tests of 
whether investors are “fooled” by earnings management, and (4) tests of what is the 
capital market consequences after earnings management. In this section, analysis of 
incentives provided by stock market participants for managers to meet relatively 
simple earnings benchmarks is particularly focused.  
 
2.5.2.1 Benchmark beating behaviour 
 
One stream of research on earnings management focuses on whether managers 
exercise discretion to meet or beat relevant earnings benchmarks (see Appendix 4). 
This stream of study suggested that earnings benchmarks induce earnings 
management because the stock prices normally would fall if a certain benchmark 
cannot be met (Bartov et al., 2000; Skinner and Sloan, 2002). Two earnings 
benchmarks, zero earnings and prior year’s earnings, are first examined by 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997). They found that managers have incentives to avoid 
reporting losses and earnings declines. Beatty et al. (2002) further explained that 
markets will pay a premium to firms who show consistent earnings growth strings. 
Burgstahler and Eames (1998) added in evidence that analysts’ consensus forecast is 
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another benchmark that managers would consider to meet. Two Australian studies 
investigated benchmark beating. Holland and Ramsay (2003) suggested that managers 
manipulate earnings to report profits and to sustain last year’s earnings. However, 
Coulton et al (2005) did not take the view that benchmark beating behaviour is caused 
by earnings management.  
 
In studying earnings benchmarks, earnings discontinuities in the distribution of 
earnings have been widely interpreted as evidence of benchmark beating. Hayn 
(1995) first observed there is a point of discontinuity around zero in the distribution of 
the earnings-to-price ratio with unusually high frequency firms just above zero and 
unusually low frequency firms just below zero. Based on the observation of 
discontinuity at zero earnings, she suggested that firms are expected to manage 
earnings upward to convert small losses to small profits because the earnings of 
profit-reporting firms are more strongly linked with current stock prices than the 
earnings of loss-reporting firms and that the magnitude of current losses is not related 
to stock price. Such a finding implies that managers of higher profit firms should have 
greater market-based incentives than those of low profit firms to manage earning to 
meet relevant earnings benchmarks. 
 
Using two large samples, 64,466 and 75,999 observations covering the period from 
1976 to 1994, one for testing profits benchmark and the other for testing the prior 
year’s earnings benchmark, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) showed the distributions 
of report earnings (changes) have less frequencies of firms report small losses 
(earnings decreases) and more frequencies of firms report small profits (earnings 
increases) compared to that of normal distribution. The unusually low frequencies of 
small losses (earnings decrease) and unusually high frequencies of small profits 
(earnings increases) result in a discontinuity around the benchmark in the distributions 
of earnings (change). Such discontinuities are interpreted as evidence on earnings 
management to report profits and earnings increases. Moreover, they quantify that 
30%-44% (8%-12%) of the firms beat profits benchmark (prior year’s earnings 
benchmark) when pre-managed earnings fall short of the benchmarks.10  These 
estimates imply that the magnitudes of earnings management to avoid losses and 
earnings decreases are pervasive.  
                                                 
10 Pre-managed earnings are true earnings prior to earnings manipulation.  
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Degeorge et al. (1999) developed an optimizing model on how earnings are managed 
to reach thresholds based on executive incentives. The presumption of the model is 
that earnings management arises from management wealth maximization incentive. In 
order to maximize their wealth, managers tend to manage earnings upwards when 
earnings falling just short of thresholds. When earnings are far from thresholds, 
whether below or above, managers tend to manage earnings downwards to make 
thresholds more attainable in the future.11 Three thresholds are identified to help drive 
earnings management: to report profits, to sustain recent performance, and to meet 
analysts’ expectations.  
 
Using quarterly data on 5,387 firms over the 1974-1996 period, the distributions of 
change in earnings per share and the level of earnings per share both showed big 
jumps in density at two benchmarks, with too few observations falling just below it 
and too many at or just above it. Degeorge et al. (1999) interpreted the big jumps as 
evidence that executives manage earnings to sustain performance that is comparable 
with that of four quarters ago and to report strictly positive earnings. Moreover, the 
third big jump is found at the distribution of analysts’ forecast error for earnings per 
share, suggesting analysts’ consensus forecast is also an important threshold for 
managers. They inferred that the thresholds are hierarchically ordered: managers first 
consider to avoid losses, then to report increases, and finally to meet analysts’ 
earnings forecasts.  
 
Brown and Caylor (2005) acknowledged that the threshold hierarchy of Degeorge et 
al. (1999) has reversed since the mid-1990s. Meeting analysts’ earnings forecasts has 
become predominant as firms that missed analysts’ forecasts have been penalized 
more by the capital markets than those that missed profits and earnings increases 
benchmarks. In a survey of 401 financial executives, Graham et al. (2005) showed 
that managers view accounting earnings as a more important benchmark than cash 
flows and they want to meet or beat earnings benchmarks because they are concerned 
about subsequent effects on stock prices, their careers, and any benefits to external 
reputations.  
                                                 
11 The underlying rationale of this model is similar to that of Healy’s (1985) bonus maximization hypothesis; 
however, two studies test this model in an essentially different way. Healy (1985) relies on discretionary accruals, 
while Degeorge et al. (1999) use distribution method. 
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In a recent study, Daniel et al. (2008) represented a dividend benchmark that will also 
induce earnings management. As reported earnings is an important determinant of 
dividends, they suggested that managers should have the incentive to manage earnings 
upwards to avoid dividend cuts when managers anticipate that pre-managed earnings 
would otherwise fall short of the expected dividend levels.12 They found there is a 
large discontinuity in the distribution of earning per share minus dividend per share 
for dividend payers, showing an unusually high frequency of dividend payers 
reporting earnings at a level just above the expected dividend benchmark. This study 
has implication for market research as well, because dividends are of first-order 
importance to investors and any dividend reductions are found to follow large 
negative stock price reactions.  
 
2.5.2.2 Economic consequences for benchmark beating 
 
The foregoing demonstrations indicate that managers are more likely to engage in 
earnings management to meet or beat certain earnings benchmarks. There will be 
different economic consequences for a firm when either beats or misses an earnings 
benchmark. First, Barth et al. (1999) found that firms reporting continuous growth in 
annual earnings are priced at a premium, further, such a premium increases with the 
length of the string and reduces when the string disappears. Second, Skinner and 
Sloan (2002) found that high growth firms tend to avoid disappointing analysts. Even 
a small deviation from earnings expectations, growth firms’ stock prices would fall 
sharply. Skinner and Sloan (2002) described this as the “torpedo effect” and they 
invoked the idea in Lakonishok et al. (1994) to explain it: investors tend to bid prices 
up of “growth” or “glamour” stocks as they are overly optimistic about the future 
earnings prospects of these stocks and these stocks’ prices subsequently will fall when 
investors correct their over-optimism.  
 
 Dechow et al. (2000) found firms that meet analysts’ forecasts are high growth and 
high market capitalization firms; however, those firms tend to show positive abnormal 
returns in the following year. This implies that benchmark beaters with high growth 
tend to avoid the “torpedo effect” by avoiding disappointing analysts. In a similar 
                                                 
12 In this study, pre-managed earnings is measured as operating cash flows plus non-discretionary accruals minus 
preferred dividends, representing true income in the absence of earnings management. 
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vein, firms have a tendency to report several years of consecutive increases earnings. 
Taken a time-series approach, Myers and Skinner (2006) found that 746 U.S. firms 
reported at least 20 quarters of consecutive increases in quarterly earnings per share 
since 1962. More importantly, these firms consistently enjoyed abnormally strong 
stock market performances that averaged over 20% per year during the period in 
which they reported earnings strings, while these market premium disappeared once 
the strings ended.  
 
The forementioned studies suggested that earnings benchmark beating behaviour has 
an economic consequence because market price movements are sensitive to a firm’s 
earnings performance. Further, managers are assumed to be wealth-maximizers who 
recognize that their wealth is adversely impacted when their firms’ stock prices drop 
if they fail to achieve benchmarks. This negative impact is especially strong when 
managers are compensated largely by stocks or options. As such, they will take steps 
to avoid reporting bad earnings news and try to meet or beat certain benchmarks. 
Earnings benchmarks, therefore, provide incentives for earnings management in 
attempt to drive capital markets up.  
 
2.5.2.3 Methods in beating benchmarks 
 
Dechow et al. (2000) investigated this issue by using two separate samples, 44,913 
firm-years observations that reporting small profits and 32,732 observations that just 
meet analysts’ forecast. For the sample of firms that just beat the zero earnings 
benchmark, they found that these firms tend to exhibit higher working capital, 
discretionary accruals and positive special items compared to other firms. For the 
sample of firms that just meet analysts’ forecasts, results showed that these firms have 
higher working capital and discretionary accruals relative to firms that just miss 
analysts’ forecasts. These findings suggested that working capital, accruals and 
special items could be the mechanisms used to achieve earnings targets. 
 
For a set of firms that are suspected of managing earnings upward to meet or slightly 
beat analysts’ forecasts, Plummer and Mest (2001) found these firms either manage 
sales upward or manage operating expense downward. Nevertheless, there was no 
evidence to suggest that nonoperating expenses or depreciation expenses were 
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decreased in an attempt to manage earnings upward. This study also documented that 
firm characteristics were more likely to affect benchmark beating earnings 
management. These firms were more likely to have high levels of current assets and 
operating profit margin.   
 
Phillips et al. (2003) detected earnings management to beat benchmarks through 
examining tax expense, total accruals and discretionary accruals. Deferred tax 
expenses were found to be associated with benchmark beating behaviour of reporting 
profits and earnings increases; whereas total accruals were found to be associated with 
benchmark beating behaviour of meeting analysts’ earnings forecasts.  The finding on 
deferred tax expenses suggested that managers manipulated earnings upwards 
primarily through generating book-tax differences of reported earnings.  
 
Other studies have documented that managers are more likely to beat benchmarks 
when pre-managed earnings are below benchmarks. Payne and Robb (2000) found 
when pre-managed earnings were below market expectation managers will increase 
earnings toward analysts’ forecasts; while when pre-managed earnings are above 
analysts’ forecasts, managers will reduce income to reduce forecast errors. They 
explained that managers have conflicting incentives with respect to the use of 
discretionary accruals when pre-managed earnings exceed analyst’ forecasts. On one 
hand, there is incentive for managers to employ income-decreasing accruals in order 
to ‘store up’ some income for future periods. On the other hand, managers may 
choose to preserve a positive earnings surprise in expectation of a favorable stock 
price reaction. Their findings supported the first prediction.  
 
Nevertheless, Skinner (1994) pointed out that the incentive to minimize analysts’ 
forecast errors may not apply to settings where pre-managed earnings are above 
analysts’ forecasts. He argued that when pre-managed earnings are above analysts’ 
forecasts, managers can choose to report higher earnings to increase stock prices now, 
or reduce earnings to the forecasted level. Economic penalties do not exist when the 
market is pleasantly surprised. However, the reverse nature of accrual accounting may 
support that when pre-managed earnings are above analysts’ forecasts, managers tend 
to decrease income as they want to reserve some income for the future.  
 
Barua et al. (2006) studied two benchmarks—analysts’ forecasts and prior year 
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earnings and examined whether firm profitability is associated with earnings 
management to achieve these two benchmarks. They argue that the differential 
incentives as well as the propensity to manage earnings by profitable and non-
profitable firms should be considered. Indeed, logistic regression shows that firms 
with profits before accruals management are more likely than firms with losses before 
accruals management to use accruals to meet or beat analysts’ forecast and prior 
year’s earnings when pre-managed earnings are below the benchmarks. This view is 
consistent with that of the earlier study of Hayn (1995). 
 
2.5.2.4 The relation between benchmark beating and earnings management 
 
Earnings discontinuities are interpreted as evidence of benchmark beating. But 
whether those discontinuities are caused by earnings management is not clear. Many 
researchers thus try to investigate the connection between benchmark beating and 
earnings management. Dechow et al. (2003) combined the distribution method with 
the accrual-based approach in order to examine whether firms that just met 
benchmark of zero earnings and last year’s earnings (zero changes in earnings) 
achieved these benchmarks through discretionary accruals. However, they failed to 
confirm that earnings discontinuities are caused by boosting of discretionary accruals. 
Further, they argued that the observed discontinuities are more likely due to managers 
taking real actions to improve a firm’s performance or to meet earnings targets rather 
than earnings management itself.  
 
Holland (2004) pointed out that pooled cross-sectional distribution of reported 
earnings may not provide statistically reliable results, if the peak of the distribution is 
adjacent to a threshold. The symmetric assumption used to test the frequency of 
earnings observation may not be justified and the choice of interval width is sensitive 
to the result.  Beaver et al. (2007) documented another two factors of the asymmetric 
tax treatment of profit and loss firms and special items that may drive earnings 
discontinuity around these earnings benchmarks. They asserted that two-thirds of the 
discontinuity should be attributable to tax treatment and special items.  
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Deflators could be responsible for observed discontinuity around benchmarks as 
well.13  Durtschi and Easton (2005) showed a discontinuity at zero in the distribution 
of market value of common equity deflated net income. However, such discontinuity 
disappeared when using un-deflated net income. They also failed to find earnings 
discontinuity when total assets or revenues were used as a deflator. They argued that 
first, a larger proportion of loss firms do not have a beginning of year price which 
could result in a deflator selection bias. Second, beginning of year prices for small 
loss firms are systematically lower than that of small profit firms. When net income is 
deflated by beginning of year price (market value of common equity), it will move 
small loss firms away from zero and small profit firms towards zero and thus induce 
an artificial discontinuity at zero.  
 
The most recent studies lend strong support to the previous finings of earnings 
management to meet or beat single benchmarks. Jacob and Jorgensen (2007) argued 
that managers are particularly concerned about fiscal year earnings.  Managers are 
also more likely to manage income for the fiscal year other than any other annual 
period because many bonuses and compensation schemes are based on fiscal year 
earnings; capital market considerations and other contractual motives for earnings 
management may be more salient at the end of the fiscal year; the fourth quarter 
affords managers the last opportunity during the year to achieve profitability and to 
obtain the most information about the amount of earnings needed to meet their targets. 
In order to support these arguments, they construct distributions for annual earnings 
measured over alternative periods, periods ending at the first, second, and third 
quarters of the fiscal year, and found the discontinuity around zero is visually 
apparent for fiscal year earnings but not for annual earnings computed for the 
alternative periods.      
 
Another study that yields insights into the connection between benchmark beating and 
earnings management is Kerstein and Rai (2007). They used quarterly data and 
examined the change in the cumulative earnings distribution from the beginning to the 
end of the firm’s fourth fiscal quarter. They argued that firms with either small profits 
or small losses at the end of the first three quarters are close to the zero-profit line of 
                                                 
13 Common used deflators in the accounting and finance literature include market value of common equity, book value of 
common equity, sales, or total assets.  
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the cumulative earnings distribution, they will have lower costs of earnings 
management than firms further from the zero-profit line. As such, those firms are 
more likely to shift to the right of the distribution that leads to small annual profits. 
They chose firms with smallest cumulative losses or profits after three quarters as the 
treatment group and formed their control group by using the firms next to the 
treatment group. They found that treatment group firms in the smallest loss interval by 
the end of the third quarter shifted at a higher rate than the control firms into the 
smallest annual profit interval. Also, treatment firms in the smallest cumulative profits 
interval at the end of the third quarter have a higher rate than the control firms to 
remain in the smallest annual profit interval, rather than falling into the smallest 
annual loss interval. Therefore, they interpreted such abnormal shifts by treatment 
firms into the smallest annual profit interval as evidence of upward earnings 
management to report small annual profits.   
 
In contrast to previous end-of-year earnings focus, Jacob and Jorgensen (2007) and 
Kerstein and Rai (2007) examined the change in the cumulative earnings distribution 
from the beginning to the end of the firm’s fourth fiscal quarter. They lent strong 
support to the view that benchmark beating is caused by earnings management by 
identifying the abnormal movements—firms shift abnormally within the fourth-
quarter earnings distribution to achieve annual profits. The merit of these two studies 
is also that investors and analysts can use quarterly data to unravel a part of a 
manager’s earnings management in the fiscal year earnings by choosing to analyze a 
firm’s performance reported on a different annual basis than the one reported in the 
annual financial statements. However, the limitation is that firms may also manage 
non-fiscal year period earnings since some contracts, for example, debt contracts, are 
based on earnings for rolling annual periods. If earnings were managed during a non-
fiscal year period, the patterns induced by earnings management to meet fiscal-year 
targets would therefore become less distinct.    
 
In Australia, Holland and Ramsay (2003) first detected earnings management to 
achieve earnings targets. They examined earnings distribution at two benchmarks of 
zero earnings and sustained last year’s earnings by using a sample of approximately 
480 firms each year covering the period of 1990 to 1997. They found more small 
profits and small earnings increased than expected and conversely, fewer small losses 
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and small earnings decreased than expected. Holland and Ramsay (2003) interpreted 
observed discontinuities as the evidence of Australian firms practicing earnings 
management in order to report positive earnings, and to sustain last year’s earnings 
performance. However, Coulton et al. (2005) suggested that caution is required in 
interpreting earnings discontinuity as evidence of earnings management. Although 
they showed evidence comparable to Holland and Ramsay (2003) of an unusually 
large number of Australian firms reporting a small profit or small increase in earnings 
by using a sample of 6,436 firm-years observation for the period 1993 to 2002, they 
did not find significant differences between discretionary accruals for the benchmark 
beating and just miss groups.   
 
2.6 Review of Australian studies 
 
The review of Australian studies of earnings management in the appendix 1 shows 
that there are 17 published articles are related to earnings management during the 
period of 1998 to 2008. Earnings management evidences have been documented in 
the setting of income-smoothing (Black et al., 1998); price control and political 
concerns (Lim and Matolcsy, 1999; Godfrey and Jones, 1999; Monem, 2003); 
takeover (Eddey and Taylor, 1999); CEO changes (Wells, 2002; Godfrey et al., 2003); 
benchmark beating (Holland and  Ramsay, 2003; Coulton et al.,2005); corporate 
governance and Institutional investor type (Koh, 2003; Hsu and Koh, 2005; Davidson 
et al., 2005; Koh, 2007); economic setting of  Australia’s ‘Old’ and ‘New’ economies 
(Jones and Sharma, 2001); banking industry (Anandarajan et al.,2007); and earnings 
restatements (Ahmed and Goodwin, 2007). The review of Australian research not 
only shows that research on earnings management is limited within the Australian 
context, but also reveals the gaps within existing studies. For example, the executive 
compensation incentives have not yet been well examined in the Australian context. 
 
2.7 Chapter Summary 
 
To date, researchers have questioned whether and why earnings management takes 
place. The literature review in this chapter is structured to surround these two issues—
the detection of earnings management and earnings management incentives. Various 
approaches in detecting earnings management are first reviewed with the emphasis on 
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the accrual approach. Knowing which industries and what kind of firms are more 
likely to engage in earnings management enhances the detection of earnings 
management behaviour. So, studies of how earnings management activities vary 
across industries and firm characteristics are also reviewed. Various incentives that 
drive earnings management are then reviewed with the emphasis on executive 
compensation and benchmark beating behaviour.  In general, the literature shows that 
empirical findings are mixed and inconsistent. Given the dynamic nature of earnings 
management behaviour, this thesis extends prior research by using more relevant, 
recent, and large-scale data to detect earnings management, capture earnings 
management behaviour from both industry sectors and firms. Also, this study 
examines the levels and mix of compensation incentives and benchmark beating 
incentives and their impacts on earnings management.  
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Chapter3  
Research and Investigation Issues 
 
 
 
3. 1 Introduction 
 
Many empirical studies of earnings management investigate whether earnings 
management takes place. Since the mid-1980s, the investigation has focused primarily 
on accruals. Empirical studies of earnings management also focus on in which 
settings earnings management is more likely to take place. The first setting is 
executive compensation. Extensive literature has emerged to test the relationship 
between executive compensations and earnings management and many studies have 
documented the way compensation contracts create strong incentives for earnings 
management. The second setting is earnings benchmarks. As capital markets exert 
pressure on managers, managers have incentives to avoid disappointing the markets, 
and thus manage earnings upward to beat or meet relevant earnings benchmarks. 
However, the various methodological issues and inconsistent results of prior studies 
suggest that the detection of earnings management has as yet not been conclusively 
determined. Moreover, the relation between executive compensation and earnings 
management and the relation between benchmark beating and earnings management 
has not as yet been well understood.  
 
Extensive prior research is drawn upon to formulate the research and investigation 
issues in this chapter. First, it critically evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of 
using accruals in detecting earnings management. Second, it takes a comprehensive 
view of the executive compensation contract, discussing the relation between 
executive compensation incentives and earnings management based on both total 
compensation and its decomposed individual components. Third, it demonstrates why 
benchmark beating creates incentives for earnings management and under what 
circumstance managers are more likely to exercise discretion to beat benchmarks. The 
discussion on how to detect earnings management through accruals will be the 
foundation for the subsequent investigation of the executive compensation and 
benchmark beating incentives.  
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3.2 The detection of earnings management 
 
In order to detect potential earnings management, researchers first need to understand 
a firm’s accounting practices because there are a variety of options that managers can 
use to either increase or decrease earnings. In the 1970s and early 1980s, a large 
number of studies found that managers can exercise discretion through the choice of 
accounting methods or polices. For example, managers can choose different 
accounting methods or policies, such as inventory valuation policy, depreciation 
method, and the treatment of bad-debt provision. Since the mid-1980s, studies of 
earnings management have focused primarily on the investigation of accruals. Many 
researchers in this field have tried to detect earnings management by disentangling 
accruals into discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals. Managers are expected to 
use discretionary accruals, shifting revenue between periods or deferring recognition 
of expenditures. Specific accrual, real transactions, income-smoothing, and 
benchmark beating are also used in detecting earnings management.  
 
3.2.1 Detecting earnings management through discretionary accruals 
 
Fundamentally, more management discretions are made through accruals. More 
accruals are in place simply because the accounting system creates accruals in order 
to recognize revenues when they are earned and match expenses to those revenues, 
irrespective of whether cash has been received or paid. This matching principle makes 
accounting earnings a better economic measure of firm performance than cash flows.  
 
Since the mid-1980s, there has been explosive growth in using accruals to detect 
earnings management. Healy (1985) noticed the fact that accruals modify the timing 
of reported earnings and thus enable managers to transfer earnings between periods. 
So, he broke down earnings into cash flow from operations and total accruals and 
estimated the discretionary proportion of accruals by using total accruals. The method 
of accrual proxy has been widely applied in detecting earnings management. For 
example, DeAngelo (1986) detected that managers systematically understate earnings 
prior to the buyouts through the changing of total accruals. Jones (1991) found that 
discretionary accruals are used to reduce income during import relief investigations. 
McNichols (2000) found that, between the periods of 1993 to 1999, the greatest 
number of studies used the accruals approach based on the Jones Model. She also 
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suggested discretionary accruals are widely accepted as a proper proxy for earnings 
management based upon the large number of published studies. Moreover, the review 
of executive compensation indicates many studies, for example, Holthausen et al. 
(1995), Gaver et al. (1995), Balsam (1998), Guidry et al. (1999) Gao and Shrieves 
(2002), and Shuto (2007) rely on the accrual method and focus on whether 
discretionary accruals are consistent with the incentive provided by executive 
compensations.  
 
In terms of the perspective of manipulators, managers may prefer to use accruals in 
manipulating earnings. Under the accrual accounting system, managers are allowed to 
make adjustments to cash flows through accruals. Healy (1985) suggested that 
changing a firm’s accounting policies is more costly. Managers are more likely to 
exploit the flexibility of accruals to shift earnings between periods by changing 
accruals. Managers are also more likely to exercise discretion through accruals rather 
than the cash flow component of earnings. Healy (1985) suggested that managers 
observe cash flows from operations at the end of each year and selects accruals to 
maximize their personal wealth.  
 
Second, managers may prefer to use accruals because they find them to be more 
subtle and do not require disclosure. Accruals include many estimates and 
transactions, whose total effect on accounting earnings is neither disclosed nor easily 
estimable. In contrast, any change in accounting choices or real transactions must be 
disclosed, which makes managers’ discretion easy to monitor. Gaver et al. (1995) 
pointed out that discretionary accruals are the prime measures for earnings 
management because the level of discretionary accruals is difficult to be monitored by 
outsiders.  Holthausen et al. (1995) also explained that the reason why executives 
prefer to manipulate earnings through accruals instead of changing accounting 
methods is that auditors look for consistency in the accounting policy for each 
reporting period; therefore, any manipulation through a change to accounting policy 
would be easily detected.   
 
From the perspective of detectors, researchers (or regulators) can understand earnings 
management better because accruals measure earnings management in a more 
comprehensive manner. First, earnings management does not always have to be 
related to changes in accounting policies, it goes beyond accounting choice. For 
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instance, managers can simply speed up sales by providing customers with attractive 
discounts and more flexible credit terms without changing any accounting policies or 
methods. Although some accounting choices are made to achieve a goal that is 
consistent with earnings management, not all accounting choices involve earnings 
management.  
 
Second, the likelihood of detecting earnings management is increased since accruals 
aggregate the net effect of numerous accounting decisions and choices. Managers may 
exercise discretion through multiple accounting choices to accomplish a specific goal. 
In this case, examining accruals can capture the net effect of all accounting choices 
that a firm made during the period under consideration. In the context of executive 
compensation, for example, Healy (1985), Gaver et al. (1995), Holthausen et al. 
(1995) and Guidry et al. (1999) investigated the use of discretionary accruals to 
manage earnings to increase bonus payments. The research design in all these papers 
overcomes, at least partially, the problem of multiple accounting choices because they 
consider discretionary accruals in total.  As a result, the aggregate measure increases 
the power of the tests, making it more likely to detect the existence of earnings 
management. 
  
Third, researchers found it is difficult to detect earnings management through real 
actions, because there is no benchmark to determine the right actions that managers 
have taken. With business environment uncertainty, managers are protected by law. It 
is difficult to judge whether managers’ actions in response to business environment 
uncertainty are right or wrong, thus making it difficult to found them liable for bad 
business decisions, if any. For example, Ball and Shivakumar (2008) are unable to 
detect real earnings management in their sample of IPO firms because the shadow 
financial statements do not disclose the benchmark against real actions.  
 
Fourth, earnings management is more likely to be detected through discretionary 
accruals than through a specific accrual because, most of the time, managers tend to 
exercise discretion through different accruals. Moreover, the number of firms using a 
specific accrual to manipulate earnings may be relatively small compared to the 
number of firms using various accruals. Therefore, the specific accrual approach may 
preclude detection of earnings management behaviour if a specific accrual is not 
sufficiently sensitive. In addition, a specific accrual approach has often been applied 
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to banking industries where some particular accrual accounts are very material, due to 
the specific nature of the business. However, the aim of this thesis is to detect the 
magnitude and the direction of earnings management in the broader context of the 
Australian market. Discretionary accruals, therefore, offer a more general approach. 
 
Finally, income-smoothing and earnings distribution are two methods of detecting 
specific forms of earnings management. For instance, the income-smoothing approach 
is useful in detecting earnings management which has a clear objective of reducing 
the temporal volatility of earnings and to produce a steadily growing stream of profits. 
The earnings distribution approach is useful in detecting the benchmark beating type 
of earnings management. Both methods have narrower applications in detecting 
earnings management. The approach of income-smoothing has lost its popularity 
while earnings distribution is relatively new.  
 
Based on the discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the accrual approach, this 
thesis advocates discretionary accruals, as proxies for the aggregate effect of earnings 
manipulation are more desirable than accounting choices, real transactions, income-
smoothing and specific accrual. Therefore, the level of discretionary accruals is a 
prime candidate for earnings management. This thesis detects earnings management 
that is mainly focused on discretionary accruals.14  Discretionary accruals, defined as 
the estimation error from various models, are the proxy for earnings management. 
Firms are hypothesized to engage in upwards earnings management if discretionary 
accruals are positive and significantly different from zero; while firms are 
hypothesized to engage in downwards earnings management if discretionary accruals 
are negative and significantly different from zero. Therefore, this study first 
hypothesizes that Australian firms use discretionary accruals to manipulate earnings. 
 
H1: Australian firms engage in earnings management via discretionary accruals 
 
3.2.2 Earnings management and industry setting  
 
Prior studies suggest that it is probable that industry has an effect on a firm’s earnings 
management decisions. First, earnings management behaviour may vary across 
                                                 
14 Discretionary accruals are used for broad detection. Earnings distribution is also used to detect earnings 
management to beat specific benchmarks.  
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industries because different industries may have different accounting procedures. For 
example, manufacturers and retailers often have a higher level of inventories and 
account receivables. Managers of those firms thus can easily shift earnings through 
inventory valuation and bad debt provisions. Managers of banking firms are more 
likely to exercise discretion through issuing credit risks and interest rates while 
managers of the airline industry prefer to use depreciation policies. Different 
accounting policies also determine the level of flexibility managers can exploit in 
exercising discretions. In some industries, managers may have greater flexibility and 
thus have a greater propensity to manipulate earnings, while in other industries with 
restrictive accounting rules, managers may have less opportunities to engage in 
earnings management.  For example, regulations are more restrictive in regulated 
industries than unregulated industries, which reduce the manager’s discretion over 
accruals and limits the flexibility to manage earnings. Therefore, accounting 
procedures and regulations differences are expected to cause the variability of 
accruals and, thus, the variability of earnings management behaviour. 
 
Second, the business cycle may differ among industries and this affects managers’ 
decisions in exercising discretions. Eckel (1981) pointed out those managers’ 
decisions are influenced by the environment of the firm and a model of functioning 
should imply certain operational practices and some accounting choices. Rajgohal et 
al. (2007) found that macro economic incentives, for example GDP, drive earnings 
management incentives. Hayn (1995) suggested the earnings response coefficients are 
smaller for firms reporting losses than for firms reporting profits. Investors’ slow 
response may encourage firms in the industry during recession to decrease income 
further in order to reserve some income for the recovery phase of the business cycle.  
After the recession period, they will release those earnings reserves and report 
stronger earnings recovery than their peers. The implication is that firms within the 
same industry and in the same fiscal year may have similar incentives to engage in 
earnings management. Moreover, individual firms’ earnings management activities in 
the same industry are expected to be highly correlated because of similar market 
conditions and business operating cycles. 
 
Third, industry growth prospects may also influence earnings management behaviour. 
Prior studies provide evidence that industry prospects affect a firm’s financial 
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decisions and capital structure (Harford, 2005; Mackay and Phillips, 2005). High 
growth industries, for example, information technology, are more likely to exhibit a 
fluctuating income stream. In Australia, fast growth industries tend to show lower 
average corporate profits while slow growth industries tend to exhibit higher average 
corporate profits (Jones and Sharma, 2001). Hence, financial variables may be more 
volatile in these fast growing industries, allowing good camouflage for more earnings 
manipulations. 
 
Fourth, earnings management may vary over time. Various measures of earnings 
quality suggest the quality of financial reporting has declined over time. As Levitt 
(1998) stated there was a trend showing that the quality of financial reporting is on the 
decline and earnings management is on the rise. The issue of whether earnings 
management has increased over time is important for investors, researchers and 
regulatory bodies. If earnings management has indeed increased over time, a time-
series analysis of financial statement is necessary and adjustments are required for 
varying levels of earnings quality. If earnings management varies across industries, 
auditors must take this into consideration in analyzing financial statements. Likewise, 
investors should take this into consideration in firm valuations.   
 
Therefore, an industry-wide and time-series analysis of earnings management can 
shed light on the debate of whether or not earnings management takes place. 
Investigating earnings management across several industries and over time will be 
helpful, especially considering the backdrop of recent accounting scandals involving 
corporate collapses. Therefore, this thesis proposes the aggregate level and directions 
of earnings management varies across industries and time during the sample periods. 
 
H2: The Australian firms’ earnings management behavior varies across industries 
and years 
 
3.2.3 Earnings management and firm characteristics  
 
Earnings management behaviour is not independent from the firm’s performance. 
Although firms in the same industry face similar market conditions and growth 
prospects, managers’ decisions towards earnings management may vary across firms 
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because of different firm characteristics. Thus, it is expected that earnings 
management behaviour will vary across different firms. 
 
3.2.3.1 Firm size  
 
Firm size is one of the most important firm characteristics that have been examined in 
the earnings management literature. Large firms are more likely to operate in a mature 
stage of the business cycle. They tend to enjoy more benefits of economy of scale 
than small firms and they tend to take fewer risks. Operating volatilities can be 
diversified through different business sectors. All this implies that large firms have 
lower overall operating volatility which consequently leads to lower variability of 
accruals. In addition, large firms are more politically sensitive, scrutinized more by 
analysts and institutional investors. Thus, they will have fewer incentives to manage 
earnings than small firms.  Bathke et al. (1989), Sloan (1996), Koh (2003) Holland 
and Jackson (2004), Sanchez-Ballesta and Garcia-Meca (2007) all confirmed that firm 
size is negatively related to the earnings management. The exception is Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978) who suggested that, because large firms are more politically 
sensitive and bear high political costs, they will use income-decreasing earnings 
management to reduce political costs. Therefore, this thesis first hypothesizes that a 
firm’s size has an effect on earnings management behaviour. 
 
H3.1: The Australian firms’ earnings management behavior is associated with firm 
size   
 
3.2.3.2 Growth opportunities  
 
A firm’s growth opportunities may come from two channels of external financing and 
internal operating. Financing from institutions can affect a firm’s earnings 
management behaviour as a high level of debt may induce either upwards earnings 
management to avoid technical default (DeFond and Jimbalvo, 1994) or downwards 
earnings management to obtain better terms in the contract renegotiation (DeAngelo 
et al., 1994). Aggressive earnings management is also evidenced in capital raising 
through IPOs or SEOs (Teoh et al., 1998a, 1998b). When a firm’s growth opportunity 
comes from internal operating results, that is, retained profits, Dechow et al. (1995) 
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showed that accruals are correlated with a firm’s earnings performance. Others, 
Beaver et al. (1968), Dechow et al. (1998), Young (1999), McNichols (2000), Skinner 
and Sloan (2002), Pincus and Rajgopal (2002), and Firth et al. (2007) all suggested a 
positive association between a firm’s growth level and earnings management. 
Therefore, this study also hypothesizes that earnings management levels will be 
higher when a firm’s growth rate is higher.  
 
H3.2: The Australian firms’ earnings management behavior is positively associated 
with growth opportunity 
 
3.2.3.3 Profitability 
 
The variability of accruals also depends on a firm’s profitability. There are two sides 
of the arguments. On one hand, it is expected to be higher for firms suffering a loss, 
than for firms enjoying a profit, as firms suffering a loss will normally have a cash 
flow squeeze problem and therefore demand more from external finance (Wang, 
2004), and external financing is found to trigger earnings management, as previously 
discussed. The variability of accruals is also higher when a firm is making a loss 
because losses indicates more transitory components of earnings as a result of 
accounting conservatism (Basu, 1997), and a part of transitory earnings components is 
accruals. On the other hand, earnings management is more likely to be present in a 
profit making firm. Hayn (1995) demonstrated that profitable firms have greater 
incentives than less profitable firms to manage earnings to meet earnings benchmarks, 
since their earnings are more responsive to market valuation than the earnings of loss-
reporting firms.  Barua et al. (2006) suggested the propensity to manage earnings by 
profitable and non-profitable firms should be considered. Therefore, this study 
expects that a firm’s profitability has an impact on earnings management behaviour.   
 
H3.3: The Australian firms’ earnings management behavior is associated with 
profitability 
 
3.2.3.4 Leverage 
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Leverage is found to be associated with the level of earnings management. Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978), Press and Weintrop (1990), DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), and 
Dechow et al. (2000) suggested that the higher a firm’s leverage, the more likely the 
manager will be able to select upward earnings management to prevent covenant 
violation or to prevent adverse affects on their debt rating. However, DeAngelo & 
Skinner (1994) argued that managers of financially troubled firms would highlight the 
firm’s financial difficulties by reducing the reported earnings so that they could obtain 
better terms in their contract renegotiations. Charitou et al. (2007) suggested that 
firms decrease earnings before bankruptcy because they can blame the ‘old’ 
management for the firm’s distressed condition. Despite the two opposing arguments, 
a firm’s leverage provides incentives for earnings management.  In addition to 
providing the incentive, the higher debt level also gives managers more flexibility to 
exercise discretion through short-term liabilities. Therefore, this study also expects the 
behaviour of earnings management is affected by a firm’s leverage level.  
 
H3.4: The Australian firms’ earnings management behavior is associated with 
leverage 
 
3.2.3.5 Book-to-market 
 
Previous studies found the book-to-market ratio is a good indicator of the markets’ 
expectation on future growth opportunities. High book-to-market ratio indicates value 
stocks while low book-to-market ratio indicates growth stocks (Fama and French, 
1992; Smith and Watts, 1992). Several studies document how firms manage earnings 
to increase stock prices, so as to meet the market’s expectation. Subraranyam (1996) 
found managers of low book-to-market firms tend to have greater incentives to 
engage in earnings management to beat earnings targets because stock prices in such 
firms are more sensitive to reported earnings. Bath et al. (1999) and Skinner and 
Sloan (2002) found that firms with low book-to-market ratio will suffer a 
disproportionately large decline in market value when they report an earnings 
disappointment. Sawichi and Shrestha (2008) also found that firms with low book-to-
market ratio have income-increasing discretionary accruals. Therefore, this study 
proposes that earnings management behaviour will be negatively associated with a 
firm’s book-to-market ratio. 
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H3.5: The Australian firms’ earnings management behavior is negatively associated 
with book-to-market ratio 
 
3.2.3.6 Capital intensity 
 
When a firm operates in an environment with a long operating cycle, larger working 
capitals are required for a given level of operating activity. Working capital (or 
current) accruals are also demonstrated to be more important for mitigating timing 
and matching problems in cash flows than long-term operating accruals (Dechow, 
1994). So, firms with longer operating cycles are expected to have more working 
capital, and more working capital accruals are utilized to reduce the timing and 
matching problems of cash flows. This is reflected in low capital intensity with a 
higher proportion of current assets/liabilities relative to noncurrent (fixed) 
assets/liabilities. Hence, low capital intensity is expected to provide more room for 
managers to exercise discretion through working capital accruals (Burgstahler and 
Dichev, 1997). Therefore, this study hypothesizes the capital intensity has a negative 
effect on earnings management behaviour.  
 
H3.6: The Australian firms’ earnings management behavior is negatively associated 
with capital intensity 
 
3.2.3.7 Lagged total accruals 
 
The mean reverting feature of accruals suggests that a high (low) level of lagged total 
accruals will reduce (increase) a manager’s ability to manage earnings upward in the 
current year. In examining equity offering, Teoh et al. (1998c) found that managers 
increase accruals and thus overstate earnings in periods prior to initial public offers 
followed by a reversal of accruals in the year after issuing. In Australia, Koh (2003) 
found lagged total accruals are not associated with current year discretionary accruals. 
However, in a later study, Hsu and Koh (2005) suggested that lagged total accruals 
are negatively significant for most discretionary accrual models, which is consistent 
with the view that large prior year accruals reduce accounting flexibility for later 
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years. Therefore, lagged total accruals are expected to be negatively associated with a 
firm’s earnings management behaviour.  
 
H3.7: The Australian firms’ earnings management behavior is negatively associated 
with lagged total accruals 
 
3.3 Earnings management incentives 
 
The detection of earnings management has been linked also to management 
incentives. Since it is difficult to detect the existence of earnings management, 
management incentives provide researchers with conditions under which earnings 
management activities are more likely to be detected. Many explicit and implicit 
contractual arrangements between a firm and its stakeholders are identified to provide 
incentives to managers to engage in earnings management. Researchers also have 
noticed the importance of the capital market and its impact on earnings management. 
They started to depart from contractual agreement and to shift to capital-market 
incentives.  
 
3.3.1 Executive compensation incentives 
 
According to the agency theory, agency conflicts between managers and shareholders 
occur when a firm’s ownership and operation are separated and when managers can 
better access a firm’s information than shareholders (Jenson and Meckling, 1976). 
Managers may seek to maximize their own utility at the expense of corporate 
shareholders or debtholders (Jenson and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). Firms therefore design contracts “to motivate a rational agent 
(manager) to act on behalf of a principal (shareholder) when the agent’s interests 
would otherwise conflict with those of the principal” (Scott, 1997, p.287). Two 
particular contracts that firms have designed to restrict managers’ actions are 
management compensation contracts between the firm and its managers and debt 
contracting between the owners/managers and the debtholders.  
 
Executive compensation contracting is a setting where earnings management 
behaviour is most likely to be detected. First, compensation contracts are often tied to 
reported earnings. Sibson and Company’s (1991) survey indicates that earnings are 
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almost universally used in executive compensation contracts. It is also well 
established that accounting earnings directly affect CEOs bonuses and indirectly 
affect CEOs equity compensation through stock prices. As Bath et al. (1999) and 
Skinner and Sloan (2002) state, the market highly values stocks with future growth, 
and accounting earnings are viewed as an important signal for future growth 
opportunities. Peng and Roell (2004) found that the likelihood of litigation is 
associated with earnings management, and such correlation is at least partly driven by 
earnings management induced by executive incentive pay.  
 
Second, earnings management may take place in the compensation contracting 
because it is costly for compensation committees and debtholders to “undo” earnings 
management. Sloan (1996) and Xie (2001) documented evidences that outsider 
investors are often fooled by managers’ manipulation. Bradshaw et al. (2001) found 
evidence that investors do not appear to anticipate problems associated with high 
accruals and thus fail to see through the management’s opportunistic behaviour. Even 
if investors can see through earnings manipulation, managers may still myopically 
manage earnings as long as investors use earnings information to evaluate the firm. 
This is why Shivakumar (2000) argued that even though capital markets are not 
fooled by earnings management, managers will engage in earnings management prior 
to equity offerings. 
 
Third, compensation contracts create incentives for earnings management also 
because those contracts may not always be optimal. While initially firms may contract 
with their managers optimally, over time, managers’ incentives could become 
misaligned with optimal levels. For example, when a firm is growing, more 
investment opportunities are emerging. Equity-based compensation in a fast growing 
firm tends to induce managers to take risky projects, which may lead to an increase in 
short-term stock prices and thus an increase in personal gain. The firm or shareholders 
may not be able to reduce equity-based compensation or re-contract with CEOs 
because managers may not work as hard as before, or shareholders themselves prefer 
the risky investments.  
 
Given the above reasons, extensive literature has emerged testing the relationship 
between executive compensations and earnings management, and many studies have 
demonstrated that compensation contracts create strong incentives for earnings 
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management. Further, researchers point out that empirical analysis must consider the 
interplay between the components of total compensation since different components 
have different risk and incentive profiles (Anderson et al., 2000). Therefore, instead of 
focusing on only one compensation component, contemporary studies tend to 
examine compensation incentives through studying a mixed compensation package. 
To this researcher’s best knowledge, no studies in Australia exist that assess earnings 
management in the context of executive compensation incentives and total CEO 
compensation packages. Therefore, this thesis takes a comprehensive view of the 
compensation contract and provides evidence on the executive compensation mix and 
earnings management.  
 
3.3.1.1 Total compensation  
 
Modern executive total compensation packages contain main five components: salary, 
bonus, options, shares and long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). In Australia, total 
executive remuneration packages include salary, fees, benefits, bonuses, 
superannuation contributions, termination payments, shares, options granted, and 
long-term incentive plans. Although as total compensation increases, salary, bonus, 
options, shares, and LTIPs increase, creating different incentives for earnings 
management, the level of total compensation matters from the perspective of the 
CEO’s personal wealth realization. Managers will exploit linear and non-linear payoff 
structures derived from different components of the compensation structure and tend 
to realize the largest gain from total compensation. For the components that are 
determined by accounting performance, managers will focus on reported earnings. For 
the components determined by stock performance, managers will focus on stock 
prices. Both reported earnings and stock prices can be influenced by accruals 
manipulation. Total compensation induces managers participation in accruals 
manipulation towards a high overall level of executive payment.  
 
It is predicted that CEOs who receive relatively large sums of total compensation will 
engage in earnings management in a great magnitude, in particular, the direction of 
earnings management is more likely to be upwards and less likely to be downwards. 
Thus, this thesis first hypothesize that earnings management is associated with total 
executive compensation. 
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H4.1: The Australian firms’ earnings management behavior is positively associated 
with executive total compensation 
 
3.3.1.2 Fixed compensation  
Earnings management, per se, carries costs. It is well-documented that firms that need 
to restate their financial statements experience a decrease of about 10% in firm value 
(Palmrose et al., 2004). Also, the likelihood of litigation increases with the extent of 
earnings management. Karpoff et al. (2006) provided the outcome of such litigation in 
detail: $13.6 billion in fines and $100 billion in reputational penalties and lawsuit 
damages for companies involved in financial misrepresentations during the period of 
1978 to 2002.  CEOs may also lose their jobs or reputations if aggressive earnings 
management leads to allegations of accounting fraud.  Therefore, given that earnings 
management is costly, managers’ decisions in exercising discretion depends on 
whether there is a favourable tradeoff between personal wealth realizations and 
earnings management costs. 
 A CEO who is compensated largely by fixed compensation should have less 
incentive to engage in earnings management because personal wealth gain may not 
exceed the costs significantly.  Fixed compensation (for example, salary) is set at 
levels that are competitive within the market and is relatively insensitive to earnings 
change and price movement. When a manager’s compensation is fixed, it is unlikely 
that the managers will scarify their reputations and jobs to be involved in earnings 
management practices, since any manipulation will not result in a dramatic increase in 
fixed compensation. In fact, when earnings management induces a high cost or a 
litigation risk, managers whose compensation is highly fixed would have an incentive 
to reduce the degree of earnings management in order to reduce the cost and risk.  
Australian CEOs’ fixed remuneration is made up of base salary, superannuation 
contributions, retirement and other benefits.  This current study proposes fixed 
compensation will create disincentives for earnings management. Australian CEOs 
who receive relatively large amounts of fixed compensation will engage in earnings 
management of a lesser magnitude, including both upwards and downwards direction 
of earnings management.  
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H4.2: The Australian firms’ earnings management behavior is negatively associated 
with executive fixed compensation 
 
3.3.1.3 At-risk compensation  
 
A typical structure of executive compensation consists of not only base salary, but 
also of incentive compensations, including both short-term and long-term incentive 
compensations. Short-term incentive plans mainly consist of cash bonuses, which are 
determined by a company’s financial performance, such as reported earnings. Long-
term incentive compensation is often made up of options, shares, and LTIPs and those 
components are tied to stock performance. The wealth of CEOs who receive incentive 
compensations is sensitive to either accounting earnings (i.e. bonuses) or stock prices 
(i.e. options, shares and LTIPs). In Australia, both short-term and long-term incentive 
compensations are classified as at-risk compensation. At-risk compensation of a CEO 
is a mix of cash bonus, options, shares, and LTIPs. Although the literature has 
documented important trends in the changing executive compensation structure, with 
equity-based compensation increasing substantially in the last decade, options, shares 
and LTIPs still remain a small proportion of Australian CEOs pay. Bonuses appear to 
dominate other incentive compensations.15 
 
Theoretically, incentive compensation is designed as a mechanism to align managers’ 
incentives with those of shareholders’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Managers should 
be motivated by the incentive compensation to put real efforts to improve earnings 
performance and shareholders’ values. However, incentive compensation can also 
induce managers to fixate on earnings figures and short-term stock prices, which can 
lead to opportunistic behaviour of earnings management to increase their incentive 
payments. Watts and Zimmerman (1978), Healy (1985), Holthausen et al. (1995), and 
Gao and Shrieves (2002) have demonstrated how managers have incentives to 
manage earnings upwards to maximize their bonus rewards. Cheng and Warfield 
                                                 
15 In Table 6.1, the descriptive statistics show that during the sample period of 2000 to 2006, 29.52% of CEOs 
received option grants, the average dollar value accounts for 10.55% of total compensation; 5.53% and 5.02% of 
CEOs received shares and LTIPs, fairly small proportions, the dollar values account for 2.25% and 2.91% of total 
compensation; 31.12% of CEOs received bonuses, the average amount is 14.29% of total compensation. 
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(2005) and Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) found that CEOs are more likely to 
engage in earnings management when they receive high equity-based compensation.   
 
Given the relatively large proportion of bonuses that Australian CEOs receive, it is 
predicted that the effect of at-risk compensation on earnings management will mainly 
attribute to short-term incentive bonus compensation.  Therefore, it is predicted that 
CEOs who receive relatively large amounts of at-risk compensation will engage in 
earnings management to a great magnitude, in particular, the direction of earnings 
management is more likely to be upwards and less likely to be downwards.  
 
H4.3: The Australian firms’ earnings management behavior is positively associated 
with executive at risk compensation 
 
3.3.1.4 Salary  
Many researchers have explored whether incentive compensation drives earnings 
management without considering salaries (for example, Healy, 1985). Some of the 
researchers investigated the association between cash compensation, the sum of fixed 
salary and bonus, and earnings management, and drew conclusions without 
considering that these two components may have different effects (for example, 
Balsam, 1998). Gao and Shrieves (2002), who differentiated fixed compensation from 
other components, found that salary is significantly negatively associated with the 
aggregate magnitude of earnings management. They interpreted this result as the 
evidence that fixed compensation creates a disincentive for earnings management.  
The argument that salary will reduce executives’ incentive for earnings management 
is similar to that of fixed compensation. Salary, as the major component of executive 
fixed compensation, is determined at an average level within the industry. It is less 
fluctuated to the changes of reported earnings and stock prices.  A CEO who is 
compensated largely by salaries is expected to have less incentive to engage in 
earnings management activities because such activities will not dramatically increase 
their salary payment; meanwhile, they may face a high cost in violating accounting 
regulations.  
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In Australia, salary is the single most important component in the executive 
compensation package.16  As Australian CEOs receive relatively large amounts of 
salaries, this study proposes salary will create disincentives for earnings management. 
Australian CEOs who receive relatively large amounts of salary will engage in 
earnings management of lesser magnitude, including both upwards and downwards 
directions of earnings management.   
 
H4.4: The Australian firms’ earnings management behavior is negatively associated 
with executive salary 
 
3.3.1.5 Bonus  
 
The link between bonuses and earnings management is one of the most thoroughly 
investigated areas of empirical research in earnings management. Bonuses create 
incentives for earnings management because a cash bonus plan is directly linked to 
accounting earnings. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested that managers would 
benefit from income-increasing manipulation when such manipulation transfers 
wealth from stakeholders to managers via higher bonuses. Watts and Zimmerman 
(1978) were among the first to propose that managers have incentives to maximize the 
value of their bonus awards by always selecting income-increasing accounting 
policies. In contrast to Watts and Zimmerman’s positive accounting choice theory, 
Healy (1985) developed a competing bonus plan maximization hypothesis. He 
suggested that managers will select income-decreasing accruals in the years when pre-
managed earnings are either far below the lower bound or well above the upper bound 
defined by the bonus plan. In all other years, managers are expected to select income-
increasing accruals. However, Holthausen et al. (1995) did not support Healy’s bonus 
plan hypothesis. They found no evidence that managers engage in downward earnings 
management when earnings are below the lower bonus bound. In fact, Gaver et al. 
(1995) found that managers select income-increasing accruals even when earnings fall 
below the lower bonus bound.  
In Australia, bonuses represent the second largest fraction of the total executive 
compensation package.  Bonuses are set, based on meeting or exceeding company 
                                                 
16 In Table 6.1, the descriptive statistics show that above 90% of CEOs received salaries during the period from 
2000 to 2006, the mean value accounts for 54.05% of total compensation. 
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profit targets, and eligibility for payment only exists when the company’s after tax 
profit meets or exceeds the budget approved by the Board. As Australian CEOs 
receive relatively large levels of cash bonuses and bonuses are tied to earnings 
performance, this study proposes that Australian CEOs who receive relatively large 
amounts of cash bonuses will engage in earnings management in a large magnitude, in 
particular, the direction of earnings management is more likely to be upward and less 
likely to be downward.   
 
H4.5: The Australian firms’ earnings management behavior is positively associated 
with executive bonus pay 
 
3.3.1.6 Options  
 
CEOs compensation generally includes some equity in order to encourage risky 
investments in order to increase firm value. However, if a CEO has too much wealth 
tied to stock prices then he/she will take action to artificially inflate reported earnings. 
Jensen and Meckling (2005) suggested the root of aggressive accounting is equity-
based compensation, especially options. When compensation is tied to stock price, 
managers are motivated to use aggressive accounting to increase short-term stock 
prices and thus maintain the overvaluation of their equity holdings.  
 
Prior studies show that option compensation creates bidirectional incentives. On the 
one hand, Cheng and Warfield (2005), and Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) found 
that option holdings and exercises create incentives to manage earnings upward. The 
values of option holdings and exercises are their intrinsic values. Since the intrinsic 
value is measured as the difference between the strike price and the exercise-date 
market price, ceteris paribus, the values of option holdings and exercises increase as 
the firm’s stock price increase before the exercise date. Evidences from Cheng and 
Warfield (2005), and Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) thus suggested that managers 
use income-increasing discretionary accruals to increase stock prices surrounding the 
option exercise date. When CEOs receive option compensation, their wealth becomes 
a convex function of stock price; that is, they benefit from an increase in the stock 
price associated with earnings manipulation, whereas they do not lose much if the 
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stock price declines. Therefore, earnings management which increases the stock price 
will positively affect the value of the CEO’s option holdings.  
 
 In contrast, Baker et al. (2003) and McAnally et al. (2008) demonstrated how option 
grants create incentives to lower current earnings. As the value of option grants is 
determined by the strike price which is the grant-date market price, the values of 
option grants can be increased by decreasing the stock price on or before the grant 
date. Findings from Baker et al. (2003) and McAnally et al. (2008) suggested that 
high option compensation is associated with downward earnings management, which 
temporarily depress as the firm’s stock price prior to the option grant date, thereby 
lowering the options strike price. 
 
Due to the availability of option grants data, this present study proposes that option 
grants create incentives for downwards earnings management. Australian CEOs who 
receive option grants will have a greater propensity to engage in earnings 
management, and in particular, the direction of earnings management is more likely to 
be downwards than upwards.   
 
H4.6: The Australian firms’ earnings management behavior is positively associated 
with executive option grants 
 
3.3.1.7 Shares  
 
Share grants also tie CEO wealth to stock price and may create incentives for earnings 
management. However, CEOs’ share grants have not been identified in the literature 
as an important determinant of earnings management (Cheng and Warfield, 2005). 
This is because, unlike options, share grants generate payoffs which have a symmetric 
relation to stock price. Unless CEOs can sell their equity prior to the earnings 
management, those shares expose CEOs to price declines. This implies that CEOs 
may not be associated with a higher magnitude of earnings management.  Also, share 
grants are less frequently used and have a relatively smaller proportion than other 
components. Therefore, share grants do not create incentives for earnings 
management. This study examines share grants and proposes there is no association 
between Australian CEOs’ share grants and earnings management.  
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H4.7: The Australian firms’ earnings management behavior is not associated with 
executive share grants 
 
3.3.1.8 Long-term incentive plans  
 
Long-term incentive plans are often based on a three to five-year moving average of a 
firm’s performance, making CEO wealth a function of long-term firm value. Hence, 
LTIPs are likely to mitigate incentives of CEOs to manage earnings to boost short-
term stock prices. Similar to shares, LTIPs are less frequently used and have a 
relatively smaller proportion in the total compensation. Therefore, LTIPs do not 
create incentives for earnings management. This study proposes there is no 
association between Australian CEOs’ LTIPs and earnings management.  
 
H4.8: The Australian firms’ earnings management behavior is not associated with 
executive LTIPs 
 
3.3.2 Benchmark beating incentives 
 
Apart from compensation contract driven earnings management, capital markets also 
create incentives for earnings management. One stream of research on capital market 
incentive focuses on benchmark beating behaviour. This stream of studies suggests 
that earnings benchmarks provide a strong incentive for earnings management; and, a 
new approach, the earnings distribution approach has been introduced to detect 
benchmark beating behaviour.   
 
3.3.2.1 Earnings distribution approach 
 
The earnings distribution method was introduced by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997). 
They hypothesized that managers have incentives to achieve some benchmarks, such 
as positive or a prior year’s earnings, and they expect to observe a discontinuity in 
earnings distributions around zero earnings and zero changes in earnings. This 
approach assumes that if there is no earnings management, the distribution of earnings 
around these benchmarks should be smooth. This is because for a given region, the 
expected frequency is the average of the observed frequencies in the adjacent regions 
 
 
79
of the earnings distribution and this is not valid for the distribution of earnings after 
manipulation. After manipulation, the distribution of earnings is no longer smooth. 
There will be fewer observations than expected just below the benchmarks, and more 
observations than expected just above the benchmarks. This occurs because the 
adjacent regions around the hypothesized benchmarks may be affected by manager 
manipulation. As a result, a discontinuity would be observed in the distributions of 
earnings and earnings changes. They interpret such discontinuity in the distributions 
as the evidence on managers manipulating earnings to report profits and to sustain last 
year’s earnings.  
 
A noteworthy feature of studies by Burgsthler and Dichev (1997) is that they make 
predictions based on the distribution of earnings after management without modeling 
discretionary and non-discretionary components of accruals. In other words, they infer 
earnings management while avoiding the measurement error and model 
misspecification problem inherent in the accrual approach.  McNichols (2000) pointed 
out that the distribution method is an effective way in detecting earnings management 
as it allows the researcher to make a strong prediction from the frequency of earnings 
realizations rather than from a measure of discretionary accrual component of 
earnings.  
 
Despite the merit of the distribution approach in detecting earnings management, 
recent studies question whether the observed discontinuities around zero earnings, last 
year’s earnings and analysts’ forecasts of earnings per share are caused by earnings 
management. This is indeed problematic since this approach detects earnings 
management from an ex post perspective.  Beneish (1997, p.275) stated: “A firm’s 
financial reporting strategy depends on its business strategy and should be evaluated 
ex-ante, not ex-post”. So, findings relying on the distribution approach to detect 
earnings management are not conclusive, for the reasons outlined below.   
 
Although earnings discontinuities after earnings management are observable, normal 
earnings levels in the absence of managerial manipulation are not defined. Kerstein 
and Rai (2007) pointed out that a key weakness in the distribution method is the 
absence of a well-specified earnings level prior to managerial manipulation. In fact, 
managers exercise discretion to beat earnings targets depending on the true nature of 
earnings. For example, managers may increase earnings to reach targets when pre-
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managed earnings are below benchmarks; while managers can also decrease earnings 
when pre-managed earnings are well above benchmarks in order to save some income 
to beat benchmarks in the future (known as ‘cookie jar’ accounting). Also, managers 
may decrease earnings when pre-managed earnings levels are far below targets that 
management discretion is insufficient to reach (known as ‘big bath taking’). Thus, all 
these circumstances could contribute to the ex post of earnings discontinuities that 
have been observed and researchers have not yet fully examined.  
 
This study applies the distribution approach to detect capital market driven earnings 
management. The power of the distribution approach in detecting earnings 
management is expected to be increased if the compensation motive could be 
determined in the first place as compensation structure is also designed to achieve 
earnings targets. 
 
3.3.2.2 Benchmark beating 
 
Among possible earnings targets, empirical studies suggest that executives have 
concerns about three benchmarks when they report earnings: to report profits (above 
zero positive earnings); to report a sustained performance (at least have last year’s 
earnings); and to meet analysts’ consensus earnings forecasts. There are possible 
reasons for managers to inflate earnings to beat those benchmarks.  
 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) invoked two theories to explain why managers avoid 
reporting earnings losses and decreases. First, they used the transaction cost theory 
from Cornell and Shapiro (1987) and Conlisk (1996). A firm reporting losses or 
earnings decrease tends to face higher costs in transactions between the firm and its 
stakeholders as those stakeholders favour positive earnings information. Second, they 
borrowed the prospect theory from Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and postulated that 
decision makers may value losses and gains differently and so a firm may realize the 
largest value increase when it turns a loss into a profit. Thus, a firm is expected to 
report higher earnings to reduce transaction costs and to realize the largest value gain. 
 
Moreover, there is close association between stock returns and earnings increases. 
The market penalizes firms that break a string of earnings increases. Barth et al. 
(1999) found that a company with consistently increasing earnings is priced at a 
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premium. However, the premium declines substantially when the earnings increase 
string is broken. DeAngelo et al. (1996) reported 14% negative abnormal stock 
returns for companies in the year when an earnings increase pattern ceased. Myers 
and Skinner (2006) found that firms smooth earnings to achieve earnings increase 
strings through quarterly earnings data.  
 
Finally, shareholders’ implicit contracts with management are defined in terms of 
these benchmarks. Previous studies document how shareholders increase their 
monitoring when a firm fails to meet their benchmarks, and managers are punished in 
the form of reduced compensation and an increased probability of dismissal 
(Matsunaga and Park, 2001). In Australian annual reports, corporate earnings figures 
are widely used as a key indicator of business performance. Earnings is one of the 
first measures highlighted and most executive reviews compare this year’s earnings 
performance with those of previous years (Holland and Ramsay, 2003).  Target Based 
Incentive Plans are the most common incentive schemes used in determining 
Australian CEOs compensation levels. Meeting or surpassing the previous year’s 
earnings thus becomes an important trigger for earnings management (Hay 
Management Consultants, 1998). 
 
Therefore, it is predicted that Australian firms beat benchmarks. If this is the case, 
there will be a lower frequency of firms reporting small losses and earnings decreases 
and a higher frequency of firms reporting small profits and earnings increases. As a 
result, earnings levels and changes will be distributed with a discontinuity at zero. 
Since the discontinuity would be consistent with, but not necessarily caused by 
earnings management to achieve benchmarks, the removal of discretionary accruals is 
expected to reduce the discontinuity around the benchmarks.  
 
H5.1: The frequency of small losses (earnings decreases) is lower than expected and 
the frequency of small profits (earnings increases) is higher than expected frequencies 
under a smooth distribution 
 
H5.2: The frequency of small pre-managed loss (earnings decrease) and the 
frequency of small pre-managed profits (earnings increases) are equal to the expected 
frequencies under a smooth distribution 
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3.3.2.3 The condition of benchmark beating 
 
Current theory states that managerial discretion is expected to reduce income 
fluctuation at some predetermined earnings targets and the propensity of managers to 
increase (decrease) current reported earnings depends on pre-managed earnings levels 
around earnings targets (Schipper, 1989).  
 
Healy (1985) postulated that executives are rewarded by earnings-based bonuses and, 
therefore, they have strong incentives to inflate earnings to meet or beat relevant 
earnings targets. However, if pre-managed earnings are insufficient to reach any 
relevant earnings targets necessary to earnings bonuses, managers are expected to 
decrease earnings (also called ‘earnings bath taking’) to create reserves for future use.  
 
Peasnell et al. (2000) examined the association between the composition of the board 
of directors and accrual management in two contrasting governance regimes, pre- and 
post-Cadbury periods in the UK. Managers use income-increasing discretionary 
accruals when pre-managed earnings undershoot target earnings; while less income-
increasing accruals are used when the proportion of non-executive directors is high in 
the post-Cadbury period. Later, Peasnell et al. (2005) found that firms with a higher 
proportion of outside directors have a lower probability of inflating pre-managed 
earnings to avoid reporting losses and earnings declines. They also found weak 
evidence that outside directors influence income-decreasing earnings management 
when pre-managed earnings are well above benchmarks.  
 
Barua et al. (2006) used pre-managed earnings rather than reported earnings and 
investigated whether profitable firms have different incentives in beating earnings 
benchmarks than loss marking firms. They found when pre-managed earnings are 
below both analysts’ forecasts and prior period earnings, firms with profits before 
accruals management are more likely than firms with losses before accruals 
management to meet or beat earnings benchmarks.  
 
Koh (2007) found that long-term institutional investors constrain earnings 
management to beat benchmarks. Benchmark beaters were defined as those firms with 
pre-managed earnings lower than their earnings targets, but with reported earnings 
greater than earnings targets through the use of positive discretionary accruals. 
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Likewise, non-benchmark beaters were defined as firms with pre-managed earnings 
greater than earnings targets and thus were unlikely to use accruals to meet/beat 
earnings benchmarks. 
 
Finally, in Spain, Albornoz & Alcarria (2003) and Arnedo et al. (2007) found that 
income-increasing accounting policies were used when a firm’s current pre-managed 
earnings exceeds target earnings. Therefore, the conditions under which managers are 
more likely to increase income to either report profits or earnings increases are also 
examined.  
 
H6: When pre-managed earnings are below zero (last year’s earnings), managers 
will increase income to report profit (earnings increase) 
 
3.4 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter presents the research and investigation issues. The forming of the 
research and investigation issues is based on a critical review of the literature. 
Specifically, the detection of earnings management behaviour addresses the issue of 
whether Australian firms engage in earnings management; the examination of the 
executive compensation incentives and benchmark beating behaviour is developed to 
answer the question why Australian firms engage in earnings management, both 
contract-driven and capital market driven earnings management. The next chapter will 
discuss the research design and methodology used in examining these issues.   
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Chapter 4  
Research Design, Methodologies and Data 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses research design and methodologies. The empirical tests are 
structured into three steps. First, test for general evidences on earnings management 
across Australian firms. Second, test for the relation between earnings management 
and executive compensations. Third, test for the relation between earnings 
management and benchmark beating behaviour.  The sample selection procedure and 
the data sources used for these tests are also described.  
 
4.2 Tests for earnings management evidences 
 
Earnings management is measured by discretionary accruals. To obtain the 
discretionary accruals for a given firm, this study uses the Jones Model, Modified 
Jones Model, Modified Jones Cash Flow Model and Performance Adjust Technique. 
The financial variables for estimating earnings management and earnings 
management proxy are summarised in Table 4.1- Panel A and B, respectively. 
 
4.2.1 Jones model 
 
First, estimate coefficients α1, α2, α3 by using an estimation sample.  
 
itititititititit APPEaAREVaAaATA   )/()/()/1(/ 1312111                               (4.1) 
 
Where    
TAit = Total accruals for firm i at year t 
Ait-1 = Total assets for firm i at beginning of year t 
∆REVit = Change in revenues for firm i between year t-1 and t  
PPEit = Gross property plant and equipment  for firm i at year t 
α1, α2, α3 = Industry year specific estimated coefficients 
εit = Error term 
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An OLS regression of total accruals is regressed on the change in sales and gross 
property, plant and equipment.  All variables are deflated by beginning year total 
assets to control for heteroscedasticity. Using an estimation sample with 5,947 
observations, with nine combined GICS industry groups over the period from 1999 to 
2006, the model is estimated for each combined GICS industry group and year with a 
minimum of 10 observations (see Section 4.7). 
 
Second, estimate non-discretionary accruals (NDAit) for the testing sample.  
)/()/()/1( 131211 




  itititititit APPEAREVANDA                          (4.2) 
 
Estimating the Jones model on the estimation sample, yields industry-year specific 
parameters that can be used to estimate non-discretionary accruals for the testing 
firms. Non-discretionary accruals are estimated as the fitted value from the Jones 
model. The testing sample has 3,326 observations, with each firm assigned to one of 
the nine combined industry groups based on GICS17 code and the fiscal year over the 
period from 2000 to 2006. The estimation and testing samples are derived in the 
section 4.7.  
 
Third, estimate discretionary accruals (DAit) for the testing firms. 
            
  ititit NDATADA                                                                           (4.3) 
 
The discretionary accruals component of testing firms is finally estimated as the 
difference between actual total accruals and the estimated non-discretionary accruals. 
Since all the variables are deflated by lagged total assets, the magnitude of a firm’s 
discretionary accruals is indicated as a percentage of the total assets of a firm.                
 
There are two methods in computing total accruals, the balance sheet approach versus 
the cash flow statement approach. Under the balance sheet approach, total accruals are 
derived from balance sheets and income statements. To analyse data prior to 1988, 
this method is necessary as cash flow information is not available (Sloan, 1996). The 
detailed calculation of total accruals from balance sheet is:  
 
1/)(  ititititititit ADEPSTDCashCLCATA                           (4.4) 
                                                 
17 Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) was introduced to Australian Stock Exchange in June 2001. 
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Where 
TAit = Total accruals for firm i in year t  
∆CAit = The change in current assets for firm i during period t 
∆CLit = The change in current liabilities for firm i during period t 
∆Cashit = The change in cash and cash equivalents for firm i during period t 
∆STDit = The change in short-term debt for firm i during period t 
DEPit = Depreciation expense for firm i during period t 
Ait-1 = Lagged total assets for firm i 
 
From 1988, firms were required to report cash flow from operations. Hence, total 
accruals are able to be calculated directly from cash flow statements, as the difference 
between earnings and operating cash flows. Hribar and Collins (2002) examined these 
two methods of measuring total accruals and suggested that the direct cash flow 
approach avoids the substantial errors that the balance sheet approach has in accrual 
estimation.  This study computes total accruals from cash flow statements. 
 
1/)(  itititit ACFETA                                                                            (4.5) 
 
Where 
 
TAit = Total accruals for firm i in year t  
Eit = Net income before extraordinary items for firm i in year t 
CFit = Cash flows from operating activities  for firm i in year t 
Ait-1 = Lagged total assets for firm i 
 
4.2.2 Modified Jones model 
 
The following Modified Jones model is very similar to the Jones model. All variables 
are defined in the Jones model (see Section 4.2.1) except ∆ARit, which is the change 
in account receivables for firm i between year t-1 and t. The cross-sectional estimation 
procedure is the same as that of the Jones model.  
 
itititititititititit APPEAARAREVAATA    )/()//()/1(/ 13112111      (4.6) 
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4.2.3 Cash Flow Modified Jones model 
 
Despite the popularity of the Jones (1991) and the Modified Jones model, empirical 
studies have pointed out that these discretionary accrual estimation models suffer 
from omitted variables problems and therefore are potentially misspecified (See 
Section 3.2.1).  In particular, there are two sources identified that contribute to model 
misspecification. First, McNichols and Wilson (1988) found that discretionary 
accruals are negatively associated with operating cash flows. Second, Dechow et al. 
(1995) found that the measurement error in estimation of discretionary accruals is 
correlated with firm extreme earnings performances—firms with low (high) earnings 
tend to have negative (positive) discretionary accruals.  
 
In order to control the effect of operating cash flows, this study estimates 
discretionary accruals by using the following variation of the Modified Jones model 
with an additional variable, the change of operating cash flows, ∆CFit, which is 
consistent with Kasznik (1999).  ∆CFit is the change in operating cash flows for firm i 
between year t-1 and t; other variables are defined as the Modified Jones model. 
 
ititititititititititit CFAPPEAARAREVAATA    41312111 )/()//()/1(/      (4.7) 
 
4.2.4 Performance adjusted technique 
 
In the spirit of Kasznik (1999), the performance adjusted technique is employed to 
control the effect of earnings performances. First, estimate discretionary accruals from 
the Cash Flow Modified Jones model. This generates estimates of unadjusted 
discretionary accruals. Second, rank the unadjusted discretionary accruals into 
percentile groups by their return on assets (ROA), defined as operating income 
deflated by lagged total assets. Finally, compute the median unadjusted discretionary 
accruals for each percentile and subtract it from each observation’s unadjusted 
discretionary accruals in that percentile. The rational for standardizing the residuals in 
this way is that the firms identified as having higher-than-median residuals are in fact 
managing earnings at a rate higher than the median performance firm. By using the 
performance adjusted technique, omitted variables of a firm’s earnings performances 
in the discretionary accruals estimation are likely to be addressed. Given a concern for 
controlling for performance on measured discretionary accruals, the alternative 
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method is Kothari et al (2005) performance matched or controlled model. The reason 
for using Kasznik (1999) method but not Kothari et al (2005) is that the former one 
imposes less data requirement while Kothari et al (2005) method required more data 
to form control firms in matching treatment firms. Nevertheless, Kothari et al (2005) 
method is worthwhile for future research. 
 
          ptitit DAMedianDAADJDA )(_                                                              (4.8)                            
 
Where 
itADJDA_  = Adjusted discretionary accruals for firm i at year t   
itDA  = Raw discretionary accruals for firm i at year t obtained as 
residual from equation (4.7)  
ptDAMedian )(  = Median value of the discretionary accruals for a portfolio, and p 
is  the percentile ranking of raw discretionary accruals based on 
firm’s ROA  
 
 
4.3 Tests for executive compensation incentives 
 
After examining whether earnings management takes place, the test then focused on 
why earnings management takes place. This section describes the methodology and 
models used to test whether earnings management behaviour is driven by executive 
compensation incentives. 
 
4.3.1 The structure of Australian executive pay 
 
In Australia, the Corporations Law, s300A, dictates that the remuneration packages of 
all listed companies’ directors and the five highest paid executives must be disclosed 
in the annual report. These disclosures include a total reward (TR) which comprises 
fixed remuneration (which is total employment cost or TEC) and at-risk remuneration 
which is made up of short term incentives (STI) and long term incentives (LTI). Each 
of these components are: salary, fees, benefits (including motor vehicles and 
accommodation), fringe benefits tax, bonuses, superannuation contributions, 
termination payments, the value of shares and options granted and long-term incentive 
plans (Corporations Act, 2001). A typical CEO compensation structure takes the 
following form: 
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(Source: Annual Reports, Connect4 (2008), retrieved from http://www.connect4.com.au.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/ 
cgi-bin/subs/login.cgi) 
 
(1) Fixed remuneration  
Fixed remuneration for the CEO/Managing Director is defined in terms of total 
employment cost (TEC). Fixed remuneration is made up of base salary, 
superannuation contributions, retirement and other benefits.  
Base salary: is set at levels that are competitive within the market; it enables the 
company to attract and retain high calibre employees. External market data is used to 
benchmark salary levels within similar industries as well as the general market within 
Australia. It is documented that firm size determines the level of fixed salary 
(Murphy, 1999) and fixed salary is insensitive to stock price movement (Gao and 
Shrieves, 2002).  
(2) At-risk remuneration 
At-risk remuneration is made up of short-term and long-term incentives. Budgeted 
accounting profits and total shareholder returns are selected as the appropriate 
measure for triggering incentive payments. 
 (a) Short Term Incentive 
Short term incentive is measured against the individual’s Key Performance Indicators 
(KPIs), which is a combination of measures that include financial, strategic, customer 
service, cost and process improvement. The short term incentive is mainly referred to 
cash bonuses.  
Bonus: is set based on meeting or exceeding company profit and eligibility for 
payment only exists when the company’s after tax profit meets or exceeds the budget 
approved by the Board. The budget standards are highly firm-specific as to bonus 
plans.   
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(b) Long Term Incentive 
The Long Term Incentive is designed to align the interests and values of CEOs with 
those of shareholders. So, this component has an equity nature, comprising options, 
shares and long-term incentive plans, in order to encourage employee retention and 
share ownership. 
Options, Shares and LTIPs: The payment of options and shares are subject to two 
performance measures, total shareholders return (TSR) and earnings per share (EPS). 
The TSR performance is assessed by comparing the company’s TSR ranking with the 
TSR performance of the comparator group of companies (S&P/ASX index) over the 
same period. The EPS performance is assessed as the average compound growth rate 
in the company’s EPS, which requires an increase in the company’s basic EPS. Long-
term incentive plans are often based on a three to five-year moving average of a 
firm’s performance. 
4.3.2 The measures of executive pay 
 
Early studies of compensation incentives typically use a single dummy variable 
measure to capture the impact of a short-term bonus plan on the choice of accounting 
policies (see Section 2.5.1.1). Later, researchers use bonus plan details as a measure 
of executive pay in testing a bonus maximization hypothesis (see Section 2.5.1.2). To 
date, these researchers have gone beyond the focus of bonus plans. They use actual 
compensation paid, and examine the potential influence of different components on 
earnings management behaviour (see Section 2.5.1.3 and 2.5.1.4). Furthermore, given 
a growing complex representations of the nature of executive compensation 
structures, simply using the percentage of total compensation may not be able to 
capture various aspects of compensation motives. Consistent with the most recent 
approach, this study uses actual compensation data in testing the relation between 
earnings management and compensation incentives. There is no consensus in research 
on executive compensation on whether and how to normalize pay measures to reduce 
heteroskedasticity related to differences in firm sizes. In this study, all compensation 
variables are measured in millions of dollars in order to make regression coefficients 
easily interpretable (see Table 4.1-Panel C).  
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4.3.3 Model specification 
 
Based on the nature of the Australian executive compensation structure, this study 
uses a three tier approach to test the relation between earnings management and 
compensation incentives. First, the impact of executive total compensation on 
earnings management is examined. So, the first measure of compensation is the 
aggregate level of executive compensation (TCOMP) which is the sum salary, fees, 
benefits, fringe benefits tax, bonuses, superannuation contributions, termination 
payments, the value of shares and options granted and long-term incentive plans. 
Second, the total executive compensation is decomposed into fixed and at- risk 
remuneration and these two components are examined to see if they provide different 
incentives for earnings management. The second measure is fixed compensation (FIX) 
versus at-risk compensation incentive (ATRISK). Third, the at-risk components are 
decomposed into bonus, options, shares and LTIPs. Each individual component of at-
risk remuneration plus salary is examined to see whether these components play a 
different role in determining earnings management behaviour. The third measure is 
salary (SALARY), bonus (BONUS), options (OPTION), shares (SHARE) and LTIPs 
(LTIP). Firm characteristics such as size, growth, profitability, leverage, book-to-
market ratio, capital intensity and lagged total accruals are controlled as previous 
Chapter 3 suggests that firm characteristics may have a impact on earnings 
management (see Section 3.2.3). 
 
The dependent variable is adjusted discretionary accruals (DA_ADJ).  Earnings 
management can be measured by Jones model, Modified Jones model, Cash flow 
Modified Jones model and Performance Adjust Technique. Among all the models, the 
Performance Adjust Technique is suggested to be a more reliable measure of earnings 
management when discretionary accruals are found to be correlated with extreme 
earnings performance (see Section 5.3 Paragraph 12; Section 6.2 Paragraph 7). 
Therefore, DA_ADJ which incorporates the adjustment for earnings performance is 
suggested to yield a more reliable measure of earnings management when a firm is 
experiencing extreme earnings performance. This study uses DA_ADJ as proxy for 
earnings management in testing the executive compensation incentives and the 
equations are expressed as: 
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DA_ADJit= β0+β1TCOMPit+β2SIZEit+β3GROWTHit+β4ROEit+β5LEVit 
                  +β6BMit+β6CIRit+β7LAGTAit+ΣαjINDj+εit                                                                    (4.9) 
 
DA_ADJit=β0+β1FIXit+β2 ATRISKit+β3SIZEit+Β4GROWTHit+β5ROEit+β6LEVit 
                   +β7BMitt+β9LAGTAit+ΣαjINDj+εit                                                                                       (4.10) 
 
DA_ADJit = β0+β1SALARYit+β2BONUSit+β3OPTIONit+β4SHAREit+β5LTIPit 
                   +β6SIZEit+β7GROWTHit+β8ROEit+β9LEVit+β10BMit+β11CIRit 
                   +β12LAGTAit+ΣαjINDj+εit                                                                                                          (4.11) 
 
Where  
 
  
DA_ADJit = Adjusted discretionary accruals for firm i at year t, measured from 
equation (4.8) 
TCOMPit = Dollar value of total compensation earned by CEOs in firm i at fiscal 
year t, measured in millions of dollars 
FIXit = Dollar value of fixed compensation earned by CEOs in firm i at fiscal 
year t,  measured in millions of dollars 
ATRISKit = Dollar value of at-risk compensation earned by CEOs in firm i at 
fiscal year t, measured in millions of dollars 
SALARYit = Dollar value of base salary earned by CEOs in firm i at fiscal year t, 
measured in millions of dollars 
BONUSit = Dollar value of bonus earned by CEOs in firm i at fiscal year t, 
measured in millions of dollars 
OPTIONit = Dollar value of options granted to CEOs in firm i at fiscal year t, 
measured in millions of dollars 
SHAREit = Dollar value of shares granted to CEOs in firm i at fiscal year t, 
measured in millions of dollars 
LTIPit = Dollar value paid out to CEOs under the company’s long term 
incentive plan in firm i at fiscal year t, measured in millions of dollars 
SIZEit   = Firm size for firm i for year t, measured by the logarithm of the total 
assets at year t 
GROWTHit = Growth opportunity for firm i for year t,  measured by the change of 
sales between year t and t-1  divided by total assets at year t 
ROEit = Profitability, measured by net operating income divided by total 
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equity for firm i at year t 
LEVit = Leverage, measured by total debt to total assets for firm i in year t 
BMit = Book-to-market effect ratio, measured by book value of common 
equity to market value of common equity for firm i in year t 
CIRit = Capital intensity, measured as gross property, plant and equipment 
divided by total assets for firm i in year t 
LAGTAit = Lagged total accruals, measured as the total accruals for firm i in year 
t-1 
ΣINDj = Industry effects, 1 if firm i is from industry j, based on GICS 
industrial codes and 0 otherwise 
β0 to β12 = Estimated coefficients on compensation variables and control 
variables  
αj = Estimated coefficients on industry dummy variables 
ε = Error term 
 
4.4 Tests for benchmark beating incentives 
 
After examining executive compensation incentives, this study further examines 
earnings management to see if it is driven by benchmark beating motives. This section 
describes the methodology and models used in testing benchmark beating behaviour. 
The methodology in testing benchmarking beating behaviour is consistent with that of 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997). First, histograms are used graphically to represent the 
pooled cross-sectional reported earnings, and to identify the discontinuities at zero for 
both earnings and change in earnings. Then, the number of observations reporting 
small positive earnings or earnings changes is tested to see whether it is significantly 
greater than expected while the number of observations reporting small negative 
earnings or earnings changes is also tested to see if it is significantly smaller than 
expected. If discontinuities are identified in the distributions of earnings; and, if the 
discontinuities are statistically significant, then the findings would be that Australian 
firms beat benchmarks — to either report more profits and/or sustain last year’s 
earnings. The variables for testing benchmark beating behaviour are listed in Table 
4.1- Panel D. 
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4.4.1 Earnings distribution method 
 
First, empirical histograms of the earnings and change of earnings distributions are 
constructed. Income before extraordinary items was used as a measure of earnings. 
Scaled earnings level (Eit) is income before extraordinary items deflated by the 
beginning total assets, and scaled earnings change (∆Eit) is the difference of income 
before extraordinary items between current year and last year deflate by the beginning 
total assets. Silverman (1986, pp.43-48) and Scott (1992, pp.72-80) suggested that 
“the interval width of a histogram should positively related to the variability of the 
data and negatively related to the number of observations”. The interval width of 
histograms was calculated as 2(IQR)n-1/3 , where IQR is the sample inter-quartile 
range and n is the number of observations. This returns an interval width of 0.04 for 
both earnings level and earnings change distributions. 18  
 
Second, observed discontinuities were tested to ascertain if they are significant. 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) assumed a smoothed normal distribution of earnings 
levels (changes) under the null where no earnings management takes place. In testing 
the null hypothesis, the Z-statistic is computed as the difference between the actual 
and expected number of observations in an interval divided by the estimated standard 
deviation of the difference. The Z-statistic represents the difference between the 
actual frequency in an interval and the expected frequency in that interval divided by 
the standard deviation of the difference, defined as: 
 
         Z  = 
Var
nEn )(
                                                                                                       (4.12) 
    
Where 
 
Z = represents the difference between the actual frequency in an interval and 
the expected frequency in that interval divided by the standard deviation 
of the difference 
n = the actual number of observations in the interval 
E(n) = the expected number of observations in the interval, defined as the 
                                                 
18 Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) use interval widths of 0.005 for scaled earnings and 0.0025 for scaled changes in 
earnings. Holland and Ramsay (2003) use 0.01 for scaled net profit after tax and 0.005 for scaled changes in net 
profit after tax. 
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average of the number of observations in the intervals immediately 
adjacent to the interval  
Var
 
= the estimated standard deviation of the difference, calculate as: 
)1()()4/1()1( 1111   iiiiii ppppNppNVar  
N  = the total number of observations 
pi = the probability that an observation will fall into interval i 
      
 
Under the null hypothesis with smooth earnings distribution, the standardized 
difference of each interval with respect distribution should be equal to zero. If 
managers exercise positive discretionary accruals to report profits or earnings 
increase, it would be expected that the standardized difference is significantly 
negative for the interval immediately below zero and significantly positive for the 
interval immediately above zero.  
 
4.4.2 The measure of pre-managed earnings  
 
This study further examines the link between adjusted discretionary accruals and pre-
managed earnings below earnings benchmarks. The prediction is that firms are more 
likely to engage in income-increasing earnings management when pre-managed 
earnings undershoot zero earnings and/or last year’s earnings. Consistent with 
Peasnell et al. (2000), Payne and Robb (2000), Barua et al. (2006), and Koh (2007), it 
was estimated that pre-managed earnings level (PMEit) and pre-managed earnings 
change (∆PMEit) as reported earnings minus adjusted discretionary accruals and 
reported earnings change minus adjusted discretionary accruals respectively.  
 
                         itPME =  itit ADJDAE _                                                                                       (4.13) 
 
                       itPME = itit ADJDAE _                                                                                     (4.14) 
 
Where 
 
itPME  = Pre-managed earnings for firm i for year t  
itPME  = Pre-managed earnings change for firm i for year t 
itE  = Reported earnings for firm i for year t, measured as income before 
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extraordinary items deflated by the beginning total assets 
itE  = Reported earnings change for firm i for year t, measured as the 
difference of income before extraordinary items between year t 
and year t-1 deflated by the beginning total assets 
itADJDA_  = Adjusted discretionary accruals obtained from equation (4.8) 
 
 
4.4.3 Model specification 
 
The impact of benchmark beating motives was tested on the extent of earnings 
management condition on pre-managed earnings level by estimating four regions for 
each of earnings benchmarks, where 1) pre-managed earnings (change) below zero; 2) 
pre-managed earnings (change) below zero but reported earnings (change) above 
zero; 3) pre-managed earnings (change) fall in the interval [−0.04,0]; and 4) pre-
managed earnings (change) fall in the interval [ −0.04,0] but reported earnings 
(change) are within [0, +0.04]. It was predicted when pre-managed earnings are below 
benchmarks, managers will inflate earnings to report profits and earnings increase. 
Therefore, the coefficient on BELOW_N will be positive due to upward earnings 
management behaviour and this should hold for four different regions. The dependent 
variable is adjusted discretionary accruals (DA_ADJ) and the rationale is provided in 
Section 4.3.3 Paragraph 2.  
 
 
DA_ADJit= β0+β1BELOW_Nit+β2SIZEit+β3GROWTHit+β4ROEit+β5LEVit 
                  +β6BMit+β6CIRit+β7LAGTAit+ΣαjINDj+εit                                                                       (4.15)                 
 
Where 
 
DA_ADJit = Adjusted discretionary accruals scaled by total asset at year t-1, 
estimated  from equation (4.8) 
BELOW_Nit    
            
             
= Indicator variable equals to 1 if pre-managed earnings are below 
relevant benchmarks and zero otherwise. The test differentiated 
four regions for each earnings benchmark: 
BELOW_1 equals to 1 if pre-managed earnings (change) below 
zero  and zero other wise 
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BELOW_2 equals to 1 if pre-managed earnings (change) below 
zero but reported earnings (change) above zero; equals to 0 if both 
pre-managed earnings (change) and reported earnings (change) 
are below zero 
 BELOW_3 equals to 1 if pre-managed earnings (change) less than 
zero but greater than −0.04; and zero if pre-managed earnings 
(change) greater than zero but less than +0.04 
BELOW_4 equals to 1 if pre-managed earnings (change) less than 
zero but greater than −0.04 and at the same time reported earnings 
(change) greater than zero but less than +0.04; and equals to zero 
if both pre-managed earnings (change) and reported earnings 
(change) are less than zero but greater than −0.04 
SIZEit   = Firm size for firm i for year t, measured by the logarithm of the 
total assets at year t 
GROWTHit = Growth opportunity for firm i for year t,  measured by the change 
of sales between year t and t-1  divided by total assets at year t 
ROEit = Profitability, measured by net operating income divided by total 
equity for firm i at year t 
LEVit = Leverage, measured by total debt to total assets for firm i in year t 
BMit = Book-to-market effect ratio, measured by book value of common 
equity to market value of common equity for firm i in year t 
CIRit = Capital intensity, measured as gross property, plant and equipment 
divided by total assets for firm i in year t 
LAGTAit = Lagged total accruals, measured as the total accruals for firm i in 
year t-1 
ΣINDj = Industry effects, 1 if firm i is from industry j, based on GICS 
industrial codes and 0 otherwise 
Β2 to β7 = Estimated coefficients on compensation variables and control 
variables 
αj = Estimated coefficients on industry dummy variables 
ε = Error term 
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4.5 Control variables 
 
In the previous chapters, it is suggested that firm characteristics such as size, growth, 
profitability, leverage, book-to-market ratio, capital intensity and lagged total accruals 
may impact on earnings management (see Section 3.2.3). Therefore, these firm 
characteristics are controlled in testing both the executive compensation and 
benchmark beating incentives. The control variables are listed in Table 4.1- Panel E. 
 
Firm Size: Firm size (SIZE) is measured as logarithm of total assets. Previous studies 
either found large firms are more likely to engage in earnings management to reduce 
political costs (for example, Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; Manzon, 1992; Das et al., 
1998) or smaller firms are more likely to engage in earnings management because 
they tend to be neglected by regulators (for example, Sloan, 1996; Koh, 2003; 
Holland and Jackson, 2004; Sanchez-Ballesta and Garcia-Meca, 2007). This study 
predicts that firm size is associated with earnings management, but the predicted sign 
on size is not clear.  
 
Growth opportunities: Growth opportunity (GROWTH) is measured as sales growth 
ratio. As previous studies found a firm’s growth rate is positively associated with 
discretionary accruals and earnings management behaviour (see Dechow et al., 1998; 
Young, 1999; McNichols, 2000; Skinner and Sloan, 2001; Richardson et al., 2002; 
Pincus and Rajgopal, 2002; and Firth et al., 2007), this study predicts that a firm’s 
growth opportunities will have a positive association with earnings management. So, 
the predicted sign on growth is positive.  
 
Profitability: Profitability (ROE) is measured as return on equity, which is net income 
before extraordinary items over total equity.19 Previous studies found either lower 
accounting profits provide motivation for firms to manipulate earnings as lower profit 
firms usually suffer from cash flow squeeze and demand for more external finance 
(for example, White, 1970; Ashari et al., 1994; Wang, 2004); or, higher profit firms 
have greater incentives to manage earnings as those firms face more market pressure 
                                                 
19 A firm’s profitability can be measured by both returns on assets (ROA) and returns on equity (ROE). ROE is 
used as a control variable rather than ROA because ROA has been already used in adjusting the impact of earnings 
performances on discretionary accruals (see Section 4.2.4).   
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to beat or meet earnings targets relative to loss making firms (for example, Hayn, 
1995; Degeorege et al., 1999). This study predicts that profitability is associated with 
earnings management, but the predicted sign is unclear.  
 
Leverage: Leverage is measured as total liability to total assets ratio (LEV). Previous 
studies show that high leverage firms tend to manipulate earnings either upwards in 
order to avoid being in technical default (for example, Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; 
Press and Weintrop, 1990; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Dechow et al., 2000); or, 
downwards to highlight the firm’s financial difficulties and thus obtain better terms in 
contract renegotiations (for example, DeAngelo and Skinner 1994; and Charitou et al., 
2007). So, the leverage is controlled but the predicted sign is unclear.  
 
Book-to-market: Book-to-market effect (BM) is measured as the ratio of book value to 
market value of common equity. Previous studies found that low book-to-market 
firms tend to have greater incentives to engage in earnings management to beat 
earnings targets because stock prices in such firms are more sensitive to reported 
earnings (see Subraranyam, 1996; Bath et al., 1999; Skinner and Sloan, 2002; Beaver, 
2002; and Sawichi and Shrestha, 2008). So, the sign on book-to-market is predicted to 
be negative.  
 
Capital intensity: Capital intensity ratio (CIR) is measured as gross property, plant and 
equipment over total assets. Previous studies suggest that capital intensity indicates 
the ability of managers in earnings management activities: lower capital intensity 
enhances managers’ abilities in exercising discretions while higher capital intensity 
constrains managers’ abilities in exercising discretions (see Burgstahler and Dichev, 
1997; Francis et al., 1999; Bradshaw et al., 1999; and Young, 1999). Thus, a negative 
association is expected between earnings management and a firm’s capital intensity. 
 
Lagged total accruals: Lagged total accruals (LAGTA) is used as a proxy for 
accounting flexibility. Because the time series of a firm’s discretionary accruals is 
mean reverting, a higher level of lagged total accruals will constrain a manager’s 
ability to manage earnings in any current year (see Dechow, 1994; Dechow et al., 
1995; sloan, 1996). Therefore, the sign on lagged total accruals is predicated to be 
negative.  
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Industry effects:  Industry effects (IND) are controlled as sample firms are likely to 
concentrate on a small number of industries. IND takes a value of 1 if firm i is from 
GICS industry. Nine broad industry classifications are used, including Energy, 
Material, Metals & Mining, Industries, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, 
Health Care, Information Technology, and Telecommunication & Utilities. To avoid 
perfect collinearity with the intercept term,20  the dummy variable representing the 
first sector—Energy—sector is omitted.  
 
4.6 Estimation method of panel data structure 
 
In testing the association between earnings management and executive compensation 
incentive; and, the association between earnings management and benchmark beating 
incentive, panel data are used. This section discusses the problem of OLS estimators 
within a panel data structure and the method employed in thesis in generating 
consistent estimators for a panel data set.  
 
4.6.1 Review of estimation method used in panel data structure 
 
Panel data are characterized by pooling data that combines cross-sectional data on N 
spatial units (firms) and T time periods (years) to produce a data set of NxT 
observations. This study chooses panel data for two reasons. First, the pooled panel 
data provide a rich amount of information. The panel data set can increase the number 
of data points and decrease the likelihood of an omitted-variable problem. The panel 
design has a higher quality and quantity data than that of either cross-sections or time 
series design as the latter two research designs only consider one dimension (Gujarati, 
2003); the panel data capture the variation of these two dimensions simultaneously 
(Pennings et al., 1999).  Second, the pooled time series cross sectional design allows 
for testing the impact of a large number of predictors of the level and changing in the 
dependent variable within the framework of a multivariate analysis (Schmidt, 1997). 
Also, panel data allows for both variations of a single industry/firm over time and 
variations of all sampled industries/firms at a given point of time (Pindyck & 
Rubinfeld, 1991).  
                                                 
20 Failure to omit one dummy variable will lead to the problem of dummy variable trap and OLS will not be able to 
estimated (Hill et al., 2001).  
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It is well known that OLS standard errors are correct when the error terms are 
independent and identically distributed (iid). However, within panel data structure, 
variables of interest are often cross-sectionally and serially correlated. For example, 
industry-specific shocks may induce correlation between firms in a given industry. 
Firm-specific shocks may be persistent and induce correlation across time. Moreover, 
some shocks maybe persistent and common among firms: business cycles will induce 
correlations between different firms across different years.  
 
If this is the case, errors generated from OLS with panel data are more likely to be 
correlated across firms, such that errors in firm i at year t are correlated with errors in 
firm j at year t. At the same time, errors are more likely to be correlated from one 
period to the next, in such a way that errors in firm i at year t are correlated with 
errors in firm i at year t+1. Therefore, the OLS assumption of independence in 
regression error term is generally violated by the presence of both cross-sectional and 
time-series dependence (Greene, 2002).  
 
Moreover, for OLS to be optimal it is important that all the errors have the same 
variance (homoschedasticity). However, there is a risk of producing a regression with 
heteroschestiastic in the pooled time-series cross-sectional setting because it is 
assumed that the level of the dependent variable is homogenous across firms and time 
periods while in the case of panel data the dependent variable may differ between 
firms (Beck and Katz, 1995). In fact, errors for individual firms belonging to the same 
group may be correlated, with heteroskedasticity and correlation.  
 
Therefore, OLS standard errors would be biased when panel data are used in the 
regression analysis. Econometric researchers have worked out several solutions to this 
problem. First, the simplest way is to include dummy variables for each cluster, for 
example, use firm dummy variables and year dummy variables to account for cross-
sectional dependence and time-series dependence. Second, use one-way cluster-robust 
standard errors (also known as Rogers or Huber-White standard errors) to adjust 
possible correlations within a cross-sectional dimension or a time-series dimension 
depending on which dimension is clustered (Huber, 1967; Rogers, 1993; Williams, 
2000). The one-way cluster-robust standard errors generalize the heteroscedasticity 
robust standard errors of White (1980) with observations grouped into several 
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clusters. Third, use Fama-MachBeth procedure to adjust possible correlations between 
observations on different firms in the same year, but not to account for correlations 
between observations on the same firm in different years (Fama-MacBeth, 1973). 
Fourth, the Newey-West procedure traditionally is used to account for serial 
correlations of unknown form in the residuals of a single time-series (Newey and 
West, 1987). Now it has been modified for use in a pooled time-series cross-sectional 
data set by estimating correlations between lagged residuals in the same cluster (See 
Bertrand et al., 2004; and Doidge, 2004).  
 
Although the above procedures to some extent correct either cross-sectional 
correlation or serial correlation, none is designed to deal with correlations in two 
dimensions (across firms and across time). This is because those techniques often 
cluster by firm and assume independence across time; or cluster by time and assume 
independence across firms. Unfortunately, with panel data structure, correlations are 
more likely to appear in two dimensions with both firm effects and time effects.  
 
Recently, a new approach — two-way cluster-robust standard errors, was introduced 
to panel regressions in an attempt to fill this gap. Cameron et al. (2006b) and 
Thompson (2006) proposed an extension of one-way cluster-robust standard errors to 
allow for clustering along two dimensions. In this case, the variance estimate for an 
OLS estimator is whiteyearfirm VVVV )ˆ()ˆ()ˆ()ˆ(   , where firmV )ˆ( and 
yearV )ˆ( are the estimate variances that cluster by firm and year (Huber, 1967; 
Rogers, 1983; and Williams, 2000), respectively, and whiteV )ˆ( is the estimate 
variance for the ‘intersection’ clusters — the within firm variance. Essentially, the 
two-way clustering method first obtains three different cluster-robust variance 
matrices for the OLS estimator from one-way clustering in, the firm dimension, the 
time dimension, and the intersection of the firm and time, respectively. Then, the first 
two variance matrices, clustering by firm and year are added together and the third 
intersection matrix is subtracted in order to correct for double-counting the within-
firm variance. In this manner, two-way clustering is robust to both cross-sectional and 
time-series dependence. 
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In this study, panel data with repeated observations of enough cross-sections are used 
to examine the dynamics of change with short time series. Further, following 
Cameron et al. (2006b) and Thompson (2006) the two-way cluster-robust standard 
errors approach is adopted in an attempt to correct both cross-sectional correlation and 
serial correlation. The following section mathematically describes the estimation 
procedures of two-way cluster-robust regression estimation. 
 
4.6.2 Estimation procedures of two-way cluster-robust regression 
 
Consider a typical panel regression is expressed as: 
 
           yit=Xit β + єit      for                    i = 1,…, N 
                                                      t = 1,…, T 
 
where yit is a T × 1 vector of observations on the dependent variable in the ith group, 
Xit denotes a T × k matrix of observations on the explanatory variables; β is the 
unknown K × 1 vector of regression parameters and εit is a T × 1  vector of error 
terms; and ε~N(0,σ2). So the OLS estimator is: 
 
yXXXOLS  1)(ˆ  
 
And the variance of the OLS estimator is: 
 
11 ))(()()ˆ(   XXXXXXV OLS  
 
Where Ω is the unknown error variance matrices, which can be written as: 
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The classical OLS specifies that: 
 
E [εit] = 0, 
 
 
104
Var [εit] = σ2, 
Cov [εit, εjs] = 0   if t ≠ s or i ≠ j. 
 
Then  the error variance is NTI
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The above is the inference of an OLS estimator for a classical linear model. Now 
consider if errors for individuals belonging to the same group may be correlated, with 
general heteroscedasticity and correlation across firms or across times. If errors for 
individuals belonging to the same group are correlated across firms and times, then 
the method of two-way robust cluster estimation is robust. The estimation procedure 
of two-way robust cluster regression can be described in three steps: 
 
1. OLS regression of y on X with variance matrix estimate computed using clustering 
by firms i, with i in {1,…N}, assigning each observation to firm cluster yields the 
White (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent estimator which is robust to correlation 
across firms at a moment in time.  
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2. OLS regression of y on X with variance matrix estimate computed using clustering 
on years t, with t in {1,…T}, assigning each observation to year cluster yields the 
White (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent estimator which is robust to correlation 
within a firm across time.  
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3. OLS regression of y on X with variance matrix estimate computed using clustering 
on both firms and years (i, t), with (i, t) in {(1,1),…(N,T)}. This is the usual White 
OLS standard error: 
11 ))(()()ˆ( 
  XXXXXXV white  
 
Ω is estimated by White’s heteroscedastic-consistent covariance matrix by squaring 
OLS residuals of eit. 
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Thus, a two-way cluster-robust variance matrix by firm and by year is estimated as: 
whiteyearfirm VVVV )ˆ()ˆ()ˆ()ˆ(    
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4.7 Data and sample selection 
 
The starting point for the sample is the population of all ASX listed firms in the 
DataStream database including active file, suspended file and dead file with necessary 
annual accounting and market data from the period of 1999 to 2006. The initial 
sample includes 3,914 firms with 31,312 observations. This study excludes all firms 
in the financial sector with GICS code (4010-4040) since their financial statements 
are subject to special accounting regulations. They include 45 banks, 194 equity 
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investment instruments, 228 general financial, 5 life insurance, 44 nonequity invest 
instruments, 19 nonlife insurance, 276 real estates, altogether 811 firms and 6,488 
observations. Regulated firms from Utilities sector have not been eliminated as the 
number is relatively few in Australia. Also excluded are 1,832 firm observations 
whose industry codes are unclassified by DataStream. A further 16,910 firm 
observations are omitted since necessary data for accrual estimation is missing: this 
includes the loss of observations for 1999 as lagged variables of total assets and first 
differencing taken for the variables of revenue, account receivables, and operating 
cash flows are required in equations (4.1), (4.6), and (4.7). Firms involved in 
restructuring activities with 10 observations are excluded. The entire ASX covers very 
large companies from the Top 200 ASX index, also included are many very small 
listed companies. Thus, the top and the bottom 1 % observations by extreme values of 
total assets are trimmed, including 125 observations. These sampling criteria resulted 
in a sample with necessary data for 5,947 firm-year observations for accrual 
estimation.21  
 
Since the estimation of the cross-sectional accrual model requires at least ten firms 
per industry-year combination, industry groups with fewer than ten observations in a 
given sample year are combined if they have closer GICS codes. As Australian 
markets are dominated by gold and mining industries, the Metals & Mining sector is 
extracted from the Material sector to see whether this sector has an industry cluster 
effect on earnings management practices. Both Metals & Mining and Material sectors 
use the same code (GICS 1510). This procedure results in nine GICS industry groups, 
that is, Energy (1010), Material (1510), Metals & Mining (1510), Industrials (2010-
2030), Consumer Discretionary (2510-2550), Consumer Staples (3010-3030), Health 
Care (3510-3520), Information Technology (4510-4530), and Telecommunication & 
Utilities (5010-5510). Each of the firm-year observations in the estimation sample is 
assigned into one of the nine combined industry groups according to the GICS code.  
 
Executive compensation data are obtained from the Connect4 databases. First, there 
was a search conducted for all Chief Executives and/or Managing Directors 
(CEOs/MDs) from the Board position list. Some CEOs and MDs are not members of 
                                                 
21 Note that not all the firms in the sample have data for all years. Untabulated statistics suggest that firm coverage 
varies from 335 firms in 2000 to 1,142 in 2006.   
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the company’s Board of Directors, an additional search was made from the executive 
position list. Remuneration details are searchable under both director and executive 
lists. The detailed disclosure includes total compensation, directors fees, bonus, super, 
salary, allowances, non-cash benefits, retirement payment, motor, committee fees, 
long-term incentive plans (LTIP), options ($), shares ($) and consulting fees. The 
status of CEOs/MDs was “current” in the position of that particular fiscal year. 
Finally, all active, suspended, and dead firms from year 2000 to year 2006 were 
selected.  
 
This searching procedure yielded an initial executive compensation data set of 7,672 
firm-year observations. In order to obtain financial data needed to compute 
discretionary accruals, executive compensation data (from Connect4) was merged 
with the accrual estimation sample (from DataStream) by company code and by year. 
The merged data set contains 10,053 firm-year observations. In order to extract the 
data that contains both executive compensation and financial information, this study 
deleted 2,859 observations from which total executive compensation was missing, 9 
observations of options, shares and LTIPs that had negative value. Also, 3,723 
observations with missing financial data for accruals estimation were deleted. To 
ensure that the results are not sensitive to extreme outliers, observations in the top and 
bottom 1% of total compensation and discretionary accruals were eliminated. The 
intersection of these two databases and the selection process yielded a testing sample 
of 3,326 firm-year observations covering the period of 2000 to 2006.22  Details of the 
sampling procedure are reported in Table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.3 shows both industry-wise and year-wise distribution of the estimation 
sample. Nine GICS industry groups are represented in the estimation sample, 
containing a high proportion of Metals & Mining (1510), Consumer Discretionary 
(2510-2550), and Information Technology (4510-4530), 30.94%, 16.46%, and 
13.05% respectively. Industry-wise distribution of the sample presents some evidence 
of industry clustering.  Indeed, the industry clustering reflects the nature of the 
Australian economy. The Australian economy is dominated primarily by resource and 
consumer services. However, in recent years, Australia has experienced an explosive 
growth in the so-called ‘new economy’, comprising firms in information technology. 
                                                 
22 Untabulated statistics indicate that firm coverage varies from 129 firms in 2000 to 864 in 2006. 
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As of March 2001, 214 companies are listed under ‘new economy’ industry 
classifications of the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), contributing to more than 
60% of the total market capitalization of the ASX (Jones and Sharma, 2001). This 
current study spans seven years from 2000 to 2006 and in general, the firm-year 
observations have steadily increased each year. Higher frequencies of firm-year 
distribution occur after the year 2002 (from 9.11% in 2001 to 15.62% in 2002), 
indicating the improvement of the disclosure environment in Australia with more 
companies disclosing their financial reports.   
 
For the distribution of testing sample, Table 4.4 shows a very similar pattern that has 
been described in the estimation sample. The majority of the testing sample is 
comprised of firms in Metals & Mining (1510), Consumer Discretionary (2510-2550), 
and Information Technology (4510-4530), 30.64%, 16.48%, and 13.02% respectively. 
The firm-year observations have steadily increased from 2000 to 2006 with a big 
jump occurring in the year 2002 (from 5.56% in 2001 to 10.58% in 2002).  
 
4.8 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter discusses the methodologies and the empirical models, which are 
designed for testing overall evidences on earnings management in the Australian 
context; the relation between earnings management and executive compensations 
incentives; and the relation between earnings management and benchmark beating 
behaviour. Also, the sample selection procedure and the data sources used for these 
tests are described. In the next chapter, the results of first investigation issue—the 
overall detection of earnings management will be presented and discussed in detail.  
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Chapter 5  
Empirical Analysis-Detection of Earnings Management 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the detection of earnings management in the Australian context. 
The detection is based upon analyzing the behaviour of discretionary accruals which 
is the proxy for earnings management. In the following sections, it first provides 
descriptive statistics on selected variables used for testing earnings management. 
Then, the estimation procedures of discretionary accruals based on the Jones model, 
the Modified Jones Model, the Cash Flow Modified Jones Model, and the 
Performance Adjusted Technique are described. Finally, evidences on earnings 
management behaviour across industry sectors and time are presented; also, the way 
earnings management behaviour varies across firm characteristics is analyzed.  
 
 
5.2 Descriptive statistics (estimation sample) 
 
Table 5.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the estimation sample. The estimation 
sample is defined as the sample with necessary data 5,947 firm-year observations for 
accrual estimation from the period of 1999 to 2006. Over the entire sample period, 
mean and median total assets are approximately $341 million and $24 million 
respectively, whereas standard deviation is relatively big ($1,064 million) reflecting 
that Australian firms are quite different in term of size even after the sample has been 
trimmed by extreme value of total assets. All other variables are deflated by 
beginning-of-period total assets. The estimation sample firms tend to be loss making 
firms. The income before extraordinary items as a portion of total assets (Eit) is 
negative (−0.2040). This is further confirmed by the overall operating cash flows 
(CFit) being negative as a proportion of total assets (−0.1362). Mean total accruals 
(TAit), calculated as the difference between incomes before extraordinary items and 
operating cash flows, are negative as well. The distribution is also skewed by some 
large companies as can be seen from the difference between the mean and the median 
values of sales, account receivables and property, plant and equipments.  
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5.3 Estimation of discretionary accruals 
 
Table 5.2 reports summary statistics for cross-sectional OLS regressions based on the 
Jones model, the Modified Jones Model, and the Cash Flow Modified Jones Model. 
Discretionary accruals are estimated as residuals from these three models. Each of the 
three models is estimated cross-sectionally for nine GICS industry groups in each year 
from 2000 to 2006. So, the mean (median) coefficient estimates are the average 
values for 63 industry-year pairs. Mean (median) coefficients are in the upper line 
with t-statistics (Wilcoxon z-scores) and p-values in parentheses below. One sample t-
test and Wilcoxon signed rank test are applied to test whether mean and median 
coefficients are significantly different from zero.  
 
In concept, the predicted sign of the change in sales (∆REVit) usually is ambiguous. A 
given change in sales can associate with either income-increasing accruals or income-
decreasing accruals, depending on the relative change of current assets and current 
liabilities associated with operations. Property, plant, and equipment (PPEit) should 
have a negative relationship with total accruals since the level of property, plant and 
equipment is linked to the income-decreasing accruals such as depreciation, depletion 
and amortization (Jones, 1991).  
 
For the Jones Model, both mean and median coefficient estimates on REV are 
positive, and 61.91% of the coefficient estimates are positive. The Wilcoxon signed 
rank test shows that the median coefficient on REV is significant different from zero 
at 5% level. The mean and median coefficients on PPE are significantly negative at 
less than 1% level under both the t-test and the Wilcoxon signed rank test, further, 
79.37% of the coefficient estimates are negative (which is equivalent to 20.63% 
positive). 
 
For the Modified Jones Model, the sign on ( ARREV  ) is unclear. Both mean and 
median coefficients are negative and insignificantly different from zero. Dechow et al. 
(1995) argued that it is easier for managers to exercise discretion over credit sales 
than cash sales. So, they modified the original Jones model by removing all the credit 
sales from revenue. This model implicitly assumes that all changes in credit sales 
result from earnings management, however, the ambiguous and insignificant 
 
 
111
coefficient sign indicates that in an Australian context, earnings management 
activities may be carried out through accounts other than credit sales.  
 
For the Cash Flow Modified Jones Model, Kasznik (1999) included the change in 
operating cash flows in the Modified Jones Model to control the effect of operating 
cash flows. This modification seems to improve the accrual estimation. Both mean 
and median coefficient estimates on (∆REVit−∆ARit) are positive; with 69.84% of the 
coefficient estimates being positive. Moreover, the t-test and the Wilcoxon signed 
rank test show that both mean and median coefficients are significantly different from 
zero at less than 1% level. The mean and median coefficients on PPEit are 
significantly negative at less than 1% level with 76.19% of the coefficient estimates 
being negative (which is equivalent to 23.813% positive). As expected, the variable 
∆CFit has a predominantly negative relationship with total accruals. The mean and 
median coefficients on ∆CFit are significantly negative at less than 1% level, with 
80.95% of the coefficients being negative (this means only 19.05% of the coefficient 
estimates are positive). This is consistent with the view that a change in cash flow 
from operations is negatively correlated with total accruals (Dechow et al., 1995; 
Kasznik, 1999; Baruat et al., 2006; and Shuto, 2007).  
 
Comparing these three models, the mean adjusted R-square for the Jones Model and 
the Modified Jones Model are very close, 35.27% and 35.38% respectively. While the 
mean adjusted R-square for the Cash Flow Modified Jones Model is 46.80%, 
explaining more of the variation in total accruals than the Jones and the Modified 
Jones Model. Therefore, the Cash Flow Modified Jones Model from Kasznik (1999) 
is more reliable in estimating discretionary accruals with generally intuitive sign and 
higher explanatory power.  
 
After obtaining discretionary accruals from the Jones model, the Modified Jones 
model and the Cash flow Modified Jones model respectively, this study further 
examines whether these discretionary accrual estimates are correlated with earnings 
performance. As Kaszink (1999) showed that firms with higher (lower) earnings 
exhibit significantly positive (negative) discretionary accruals, this study examines 
this possibility by analysing the empirical distribution of discretionary accruals 
estimates relative to the earnings levels.  
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First, based on the Cash Flow Modified Jones model, discretionary accruals are 
ranked on the level of earnings deflated by lagged total assets and assigned into 
percentiles according to their rank orders. Percentile 1 and 100 contain 59 
observations respectively with the lowest and highest levels of earnings among the 
5,947 observations. Figure 5.1 Panel A plots the mean discretionary accruals of the 
100 percentiles. The pattern indicates that discretionary accruals are correlated with 
earnings performance. Most observations of mean discretionary accruals, from 19th 
percentile to 82th percentile, lie stable between 0.1 and −0.1.  However, when earnings 
performance is increased (decreased), the distribution of discretionary accruals shows 
a clear upward (downward) trend. The mean discretionary accruals are positive and 
steadily increase from 91th percentile to 100th percentile; while the mean discretionary 
accruals are negative and drop from 10th percentile to 1st percentile.  
 
Discretionary accruals can be used to either increase or decrease earnings. Positive 
discretionary accruals suggest income-increasing earnings management while 
negative discretionary accruals suggest income-decreasing earnings management. 
Large values of discretionary accruals are conventionally interpreted as evidence of 
earnings management. Under the null hypothesis of no earnings management, 
discretionary accruals are expected to be zero. In order to examine whether there is a 
systematic rejection of the null hypothesis of zero discretionary accruals, one sample 
t-test is conducted and p-values for the rejection of null hypothesis are plotted against 
100 percentiles.  
 
Figure 5.2 Panel A displays that the null hypothesis of zero discretionary accruals is 
rejected at a below 5% level for percentiles representing lower and higher levels of 
earnings.  It clearly shows that the percentiles with lower earnings are more likely to 
exhibit negative discretionary accruals and significantly at or less than 5% level, 
while the percentiles with higher earnings are more likely to exhibit positive 
discretionary accruals at or less than 5% level. This graphic evidence is further 
confirmed by Table 5.3. 
 
 Table 5.3 shows the mean discretionary accruals are significantly negative at 5% 
level for 18 out of the lowest 20 percentiles; while the mean discretionary accruals is 
significantly positive at 5% level for 16 out of the highest 20 percentiles. However, 
for the rest of 60 percentiles, the null hypothesis of zero discretionary accruals is 
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rejected for only 10 percentiles. The finding suggests that estimation sample firms 
with low (high) earnings levels have, on average, negative (positive) discretionary 
accruals.  
 
The above analysis implies that discretionary accruals yields biased metrics if 
measurement error in the proxy is correlated with earnings performance. If this 
measurement error is associated with the subsequent testing variable of interest, for 
example, the executive compensation, then findings will be biased. Therefore, well-
specified models must include an adjustment for earnings performance. Consistent 
with Kasznik (1999), the performance adjust technique is employed to control for this 
potential bias. The median discretionary accruals for each percentile are assumed to 
reflect measurement error that is correlated with that level of earnings performance. In 
the estimation sample, the median discretionary accrual for each percentile is 
subtracted from the original discretionary accrual in that percentile. By doing that, 
measurement error in the discretionary accruals correlated with earnings performance 
is largely removed. 
 
In table 5.4, Spearman correlation of discretionary accruals and earnings performance 
further shows the effect of applying performance adjusted technique. Before 
adjusting, the mean discretionary accruals are significantly correlated with the current 
earnings (p<0.0001), past earnings (p<0.0001), the absolute value of current earnings 
(p<0.0001) and return on assets (p<0.0001). After adjusting, the discretionary accruals 
are insignificantly correlated with the current earnings (p=0.8817), past earnings 
(p=0.1913), the absolute value of current earnings (p=0.7100), and return on assets 
(p=0.1030). Therefore, to some extent much of the measurement error that correlated 
with earnings performance is removed.  
 
The Performance Adjusted Technique is suggested to yield a more reliable measure of 
earnings management when a firm is experiencing extreme earnings performance. 
While this is true for the estimation sample, the testing sample may not have this 
problem. In order to assess whether there is similar concern that discretionary accruals 
are correlated with extreme earnings performance for the testing sample firms, the 
analysis of the empirical distribution of discretionary accruals estimates relative to the 
earnings levels for the testing sample is thus repeated.  
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Using discretionary accruals from the Cash Flow Modified Jones Model, the testing 
sample also presents a pattern that discretionary accruals are correlated with extreme 
earnings performance. Figure 5.1Panel B indicates although the pattern is not as clear 
as that of the estimation sample, the mean discretionary accruals are positive and 
increased from 91th percentile to 100th percentile; while the mean discretionary 
accruals are negative and decreased from 10th percentile to 1st percentile.  
 
Figure 5.2 Panel B displays that the null hypothesis of zero discretionary accruals is 
rejected at a below 5% level for percentiles representing lower and higher levels of 
earnings for the testing sample. Similarly, the percentiles with lower earnings are 
more likely to exhibit negative discretionary accruals and significantly at or less than 
5% level; while the percentiles with higher earnings are more likely to exhibit positive 
discretionary accruals at or less than a 5% level.  
 
Table 5.3 further confirms for the testing sample, the mean discretionary accruals are 
significantly negative at a 5% level for 15 out of the lowest 20 percentiles; while the 
mean discretionary accruals are significantly positive at a 5% level for 10 out of the 
highest 20 percentiles. However, for the rest of 60 percentiles, the null hypothesis of 
zero discretionary accruals is rejected for only 9 percentiles. Therefore, there is a 
similar concern for the testing sample firms where firms with low (high) earnings 
levels have, on average, negative (positive) discretionary accruals.  
 
Table 5.4 Spearman correlation of discretionary accruals and earnings performance 
further shows the effect of applying the Performance Adjust Technique. Before 
adjusting, the mean discretionary accruals are significantly correlated with the current 
earnings (p<0.0001), past earnings (p<0.0001), the absolute value of current earnings 
(p<0.0001) and return on assets (p<0.0001). However, after adjusting, the 
discretionary accruals are insignificantly correlated with the current earnings 
(p=0.5151), the absolute value of current earnings (p=0.1897), and return on assets 
(p=0.9123). Nevertheless, the correlation between discretionary accruals and past 
earnings still presents some correlation (p=0.0696).  To some extent, much of the 
measurement error that was correlated with earnings performance is removed.  
 
Since discretionary accruals are also found to be correlated with extreme earnings 
performance in the testing sample, this study suggests that adjusted discretionary 
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accruals should be used as proxy for earnings management in testing the executive 
compensation incentives and benchmark beating in the latter chapters 6 and 7. 
 
5.4 Evidences on industry and year 
 
Industry classification has proved to be of considerable significance in prior research 
in the area of earnings management. Previous research has also documented earnings 
management evidences across individual industries. In this section, earnings 
management behaviour is first examined across Australian industries. Under the null 
hypothesis that an industry does not engage in earnings management, one should 
expect to see the discretionary component of accruals to be zero. This proposition is 
tested by examining the mean, median and proportion of discretionary accruals being 
positive. This study employs Student’s t-test for the mean, the non-parametric 
Wilcoxon signed rank test for median and the binomial sign test for proportional 
differences.  
 
5.4.1 The magnitude of earnings management  
 
Table 5.5 Panel A presents the overall magnitude of earnings management for each 
industry by using the Jones model. The overall magnitude of earnings management is 
measured by the absolute value of discretionary accruals as a percentage of beginning 
total assets, Abs (DA_J). In general, the average magnitude of earnings management 
activity is 0.1654, indicating the average magnitude of earnings management that 
occurred among Australian industries is approximately around 17% of total assets 
which is relatively significant.   
 
Specifically, the highest magnitude occurs in the Energy with mean (median) absolute 
discretionary accruals of 0.2593 (0.1087).  Information Technology, Metals & 
Mining, and Telecommunication & Utilities show a relatively high magnitude of 
earnings  management activity, with mean (median) absolute discretionary accruals of 
0.2052 (0.1209), 0.2032 (0.0967), and 0.1806 (0.0976),  respectively. The lowest 
magnitude of earnings management occurred in the Industrials with mean (median) 
absolute discretionary accruals of 0.0806 (0.0521). A bar graph displays the overall 
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magnitude of earnings management of the nine GICS industries (See Figure 5.3 Panel 
A).  
 
Table 5.5 Panel B shows the overall magnitude of earnings management for each year 
by using the Jones model. In general, the overall magnitude of earnings management 
tends to increase from the year 2000 to the year 2006. The mean (median) absolute 
value of discretionary accruals is 0.1236 (0.0696) for the year 2000, which has been 
increased to 0.2153 (0.1001) of the year 2006. A line graph shows the increase trend 
of the overall magnitude of earnings management from the year 2000 to the year 2006 
(See Figure 5.4 panel A).  
 
 Table 5.6 Panel A presents the overall magnitude of earnings management for each 
industry by using the Modified Jones model. In general, the Modified Jones model 
displays very similar results as that of the Jones model. The mean (median) total 
absolute value of discretionary accruals, Abs (DA_MJ), shows the average magnitude 
of earnings management activity to be 0.1679 (0.0830) which is around 17% of total 
assets.  Specifically, Energy, Information Technology, Metals & Mining, and 
Telecommunication & Utilities also show a relatively high magnitude of earnings 
management activity. The lowest magnitude of earnings management also occurs in 
the Industrials.  A bar graph further displays the overall magnitude of earnings 
management of the nine GICS industries (See Figure 5.3 Panel B).  
 
Table 5.6 Panel B shows the overall magnitude of earnings management for each year 
by using the Modified Jones model. In general, the overall magnitude of earnings 
management tends to increase from the year 2000 to the year 2006. The mean 
(median) absolute value of discretionary accruals is 0.1278 (0.0681) for the year 
2000, which has been increased to 0.2180 (0.0980) by the year 2006. A line graph 
shows the increase trend of the overall magnitude of earnings management from the 
year 2000 to the year 2006 (See Figure 5.4 Panel B).  
 
Table 5.7 Panel A presents the overall magnitude of earnings management for each 
industry by using the Cash Flow Modified Jones model. It shows the average 
magnitude of earnings management activity to be lower than that of the Jones Model 
and the Modified Jones model.  The mean (median) total absolute value of 
discretionary accruals, Abs (DA_CFO), is 0.1457 (0.0772). This average magnitude, 
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15% of total assets, is lower than the 17% of total assets from the Jones model and the 
Modified Jones model.  This indicates that the Cash Flow Modified Jones model 
results in a low absolute measure of discretionary accruals.  
 
Specifically, the highest magnitude of earnings management takes place in  
Information Technology  with mean (median) absolute discretionary accruals of 
0.1882 (0.1084). Followed by Metals & Mining and Telecommunication & Utilities, 
with mean (median) absolute discretionary accruals of 0.1824 (0.0872) and 0.1632 
(0.1080), respectively. The magnitude of Energy has dropped into the fourth place, 
which was the first place in the Jones Model and the Modified Jones Model. The 
lowest magnitude of earnings management, however, still takes place in the 
Industrials, with the lowest mean (median) absolute discretionary accruals of 0.0740 
(0.0453).  A bar graph further displays the overall magnitude of earnings management 
of the nine GICS industries (See Figure 5.3 Panel C).  
 
Table 5.7 Panel B shows the overall magnitude of earnings management for each year 
by using the Cash Flow Modified Jones model. Although the magnitudes from year to 
year are also lower compared to those of the Jones Model and the Modified Jones 
Model, the upwards trend remains during the period of 2000 to 2006. The mean 
(median) absolute value of discretionary accruals is 0.1162 (0.0638) for the year 
2000, which has been increased to 0.1774 (0.0909) by the year 2006. A line graph 
shows the increase trend of the overall magnitude of earnings management from the 
year 2000 to the year 2006 (See Figure 5.4 Panel C).  
 
Table 5.8 Panel A presents the overall magnitude of earnings management for each 
industry by using the Performance Adjusted Technique. It shows the average 
magnitude of earnings management activity has been further decreased as opposed to 
that of the Jones Model, the Modified Jones model and the Cash Flow Modified Jones 
Model. The mean (median) total absolute value of discretionary accruals, Abs 
(DA_ADJ), is 0.1324 (0.0696). This average magnitude, 13% of total assets, is lower 
than the results from all previous three models. The decline in magnitude of earnings 
management suggested the measurement error in the discretionary accruals correlated 
with earnings performance is largely removed. Industries that are identified to have 
large negative discretionary accruals in the Jones model, the Modified Jones Model 
and the Cash Flow Jones Model may be influenced by a firm’s extreme poor earnings 
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performance in a particular industry. Likewise, industries that are identified to have 
large positive discretionary accruals in the Jones model, the Modified Jones Model 
and the Cash Flow Jones Model may be influenced by a firm’s extreme good earnings 
performance in a particular industry.  
 
Specifically, the highest magnitude of earnings management takes place in the Metals 
& Mining and Information Technology, with mean (median) absolute discretionary 
accruals of 0.1694 (0.0834) and 0.1664 (0.0983), respectively, followed by Energy 
and Telecommunication & Utilities, with mean (median) absolute discretionary 
accruals of 0.1558 (0.0864) and 0.1512 (0.1014), respectively. The lowest magnitude 
of earnings management is very stable, remaining in the Industrials, with the lowest 
mean (median) absolute discretionary accruals of 0.0699 (0.0438).  A bar graph 
further displays the overall magnitude of earnings management of the nine GICS 
industries (See Figure 5.3 Panel D).  
 
Table 5.8 Panel B shows the overall magnitude of earnings management for each year 
by using the Performance Adjusted Technique. The magnitudes from year to year are 
also reduced as opposed to those of the Jones Model, the Modified Jones Model, and 
the Cash Flow Modified Jones Model. But the upwards trend is not mitigated during 
the period of 2000 to 2006. The mean (median) absolute value of discretionary 
accruals is 0.1064 (0.0561) for the year 2000, which has been increased dramatically 
to 0.1618 (0.0807) by the year 2006. A line graph shows the increase trend of the 
overall magnitude of earnings management from the year 2000 to the year 2006 (See 
Figure 5.4 Panel D).  
 
 
5.4.2The directions of earnings management  
 
In this section, the tests focus on the directions of earnings management—whether 
managers engage in upward (income-increasing) or downward (income-decreasing) 
earnings manipulations. Table 5.9 Panel A reports the results from using the Jones 
model. It shows that five out of nine GICS industries (Metals & Mining, Industrials, 
Health Care, Information Technology, and Telecommunication & Utilities) have 
signed discretionary accruals DA_J significantly different from zero. For each of the 
five industries, the mean, median and equal proportion of positive and negative values 
is statistically significant from zero under standard p values.  
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Specifically, the mean, median and proportion of negative discretionary accruals of 
Metals & Mining, Industrials, Health Care, and Information Technology are −0.0416, 
−0.0245 and 58% (1059 out of 1840), −0.0153, −0.0067 and 56% (173 out of 307), 
−0.0357, −0.0268 and 59% (333 out of 560), and −0.0628, −0.0459 and 60% (468 out 
of 776), respectively. In contrast, the mean, median and proportion of positive 
discretionary accruals of Telecommunication & Utilities are 0.0361, 0.0303 and 59% 
(106 out of 179). Two additional industries, Energy and Consumer Discretionary, 
exhibit discretionary accruals to be significantly different from zero when only 
Wilcoxon and Binomial tests are used. The Wilcoxon test suggests that the median 
value of discretionary accruals of Consumer Discretionary is 0.0211, significantly 
positive at less than 1% level. Also, the Binomial test shows that the proportion of 
positive discretionary accruals of Consumer Discretionary is 58% (569 out of 979) 
and significantly different from that of negative discretionary accruals. Finally, the 
Binomial sign test suggests that Energy has a large proportion of negative 
discretionary accruals 55% (234 out of 429), significantly different from the 
proportion of positive discretionary accruals.  
 
Panel B indicates that year 2004 and 2005 have discretionary accruals significantly 
different from zero. For each of the two years, the mean, median and equal proportion 
of positive and negative values is statistically significant from zero under standard p 
values. Specifically, the mean, median and proportion of negative discretionary 
accruals of year 2004 and 2005 are −0.0262, −0.0096 and 54% (522 out of 965) and 
−0.0711, −0.0478 and 62% (669 out of 1078), respectively. When only the Wilcoxon 
test is used, year 2001, 2004 and 2005 show significantly negative median 
discretionary accruals. Binomial sign tests further indicate that the proportions of 
negative discretionary accruals are significantly different from the proportion of 
positive discretionary accruals for year 2001, 2002, 2004  and 2005; while only year 
2000, shows a significantly proportion of positive discretionary accruals.  
 
Table 5.10 reports the results from the Modified Jones model. Panel A also indicates 
that five out of nine GICS industries (Metals & Mining, Industrials, Health Care, 
Information Technology, and Consumer Discretionary) have signed discretionary 
accruals, DA_MJ, significantly different from zero. Different from the Jones model, 
the Modified Jones model shows the Consumer Discretionary is a significant industry. 
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In particular, the mean, median and proportion of positive discretionary accruals of 
Consumer Discretionary are 0.0130, 0.0255 and 59% (581 out of 979). Energy 
becomes insignificant in the binomial test. Finally, Telecommunication & Utilities is 
only significant in the Wilcoxon and Binomial tests. The Wilcoxon test suggests that 
the median value of discretionary accruals of Telecommunication & Utilities is 
0.0337, significantly positive at less than 5% level. The Binomial test shows that the 
proportion of positive discretionary accruals of Telecommunication & Utilities 59% 
(105 out of 179) is significantly different from that of negative discretionary accruals. 
 
These differences imply that fewer industries are detected to engage in earnings 
management when the Modified Jones Model is used in measuring discretionary 
accruals. As previously stated, the Modified Jones Model removes the change in 
account receivables from the change in revenues. The purpose for such modification 
is to eliminate the tendency of the Jones model to measure discretionary accruals with 
error when discretion is exercised through account receivables which are related to 
credit sales. In the situation that earnings manipulation is done through credit sales, 
the modified Jones model exhibits more power in detecting earnings management 
(Dechow et al., 1995). 
 
Panel B indicates that years 2004 and 2005 have discretionary accruals significantly 
different from zero among all three tests. This is statistically similar to the Jones 
model. If only the Wilcoxon test is considered, the years 2000, 2001, 2004 and 2005 
show significantly negative median discretionary accruals. If only the Binomial sign 
test is considered, the proportions of negative discretionary accruals are significantly 
different from the proportion of positive discretionary accruals for the years 2001, 
2002, 2004 and 2005; while only the year 2000, shows a significant proportion of 
positive discretionary accruals.  
 
Table 5.11 reports the results from the Cash Flow Modified Jones model. The 
improvement of the Cash Flow Modified Jones Model is that this model considers 
cash flows from operation could be a possible omitted variable in estimating 
discretionary accruals. Panel A shows when operating cash flows is taken into 
account in modeling discretionary accruals, four out of nine GICS industries (Metals 
& Mining, Consumer Discretionary, Health Care, and Information Technology) retain 
significant results from all t-test, Wilcoxon test and Binomial sign test. Different from 
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that of Jones model and Modified Jones Model, Industrials is only significant in t-test; 
Telecommunication & Utilities is only significant in Binomial sign test; and 
Consumer Staples become significant in Binomial sign test.  
 
Panel B exhibits three years, 2002, 2005 and 2006 that have discretionary accruals 
significantly different from zero among all three tests. If the Wilcoxon test only is 
considered, year 2001, 2002, 2005 and 2006 show significant median discretionary 
accruals. If the Binomial sign test only is considered, the proportions of negative 
discretionary accruals are significantly different from the proportion of positive 
discretionary accruals for year 2002 and 2005; while only year 2006, shows a 
significant proportion of positive discretionary accruals.  
 
Table 5.12 reports the results by using the Performance Adjust Technique. Panel A 
indicates that after adjusting earnings performance, five out of nine GICS industries 
(Energy, Industrials, Health Care, and Telecommunication & Utilities) have 
discretionary accruals significantly different from zero. For each of the five industries, 
the mean, median and equal proportion of positive and negative values is statistically 
significant from zero under standard p values. In contrast to the Jones model, the 
Modified Jones model and the Cash Flow Modified Jones model, discretionary 
accruals after adjusting earnings performance tend to shift from negative values to 
positive values. For example, Health Care now displays positive mean and median 
values of discretionary accruals and the proportion of positive discretionary accruals 
are larger than the proportion of negative discretionary accruals.  
 
The shift from more negative discretionary accruals to more positive discretionary 
accruals implies that a firm’s earnings performance has added noise in discretionary 
accruals estimation. Industries that are identified to have large negative discretionary 
accruals in the Jones model, the Modified Jones Model and the Cash Flow Jones 
Model may be influenced by a firm’s extreme poor earnings performance in a 
particular industry. Likewise, industries that are identified to have large positive 
discretionary accruals in the Jones model, the Modified Jones Model and the Cash 
Flow Jones Model may be influenced by a firm’s extreme good earnings performance 
in a particular industry. The possibility that discretionary accruals are correlated with 
earnings performances has been already shown in the previous discussion of the use 
of the Performance Adjust Technique (see Section 5.3).  
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After adjusting earnings performance, Telecommunication & Utilities remains 
significantly positive mean and median value of discretionary accruals. Also, the 
proportion of positive discretionary accruals is significant. The mean, median and 
proportion of positive discretionary accruals of Telecommunication & Utilities are 
0.0517, 0.0576 and 64% (114 out of 179). Industrials remains significantly negative 
mean, median and proportion of negative value of discretionary accruals.  The mean, 
median and proportion of negative discretionary accruals of Industrials are −0.0159, 
−0.0165 and 59% (182 out of 307). These two industry groups are robust even after 
adjusting earnings performance.  
 
In contrast, the mean, median and proportion of positive discretionary accruals of 
Health Care are 0.0248, 0.0199 and 57% (321 out of 560). This suggests that previous 
results of negative means, medians and larger proportions of negative discretionary 
accruals from the Jones model, the Modified Jones Model and the Cash Flow 
Modified Jones model could stem from the measurement error in the estimates of 
discretionary accruals which is correlated with a firm’s earnings performance. The 
Wilcoxon test and Binomial sign test suggest that Information Technology is 
significant. The median value of discretionary accruals of Information Technology is 
−0.0178, significantly negative at less than 10% level. The proportion of negative 
discretionary accruals is 56% (437 out of 776), significantly at less than 1% level.  
 
A similar implication is found in testing year-wise earnings management evidence. 
Panel B shows that the year 2002 has significantly positive mean and median 
discretionary accruals and the year 2003 exhibits significantly positive mean and 
larger proportion of positive values of discretionary accruals. These results are 
contradictory to the Jones model, the Modified Jones Model and the Cash Flow 
Modified Jones mode, which show negative mean, median and larger proportion of 
negative values of discretionary accruals in the years 2002 and 2003, respectively. 
Such shifts indicate that some years that have been reported to have significantly 
negative discretionary accruals in the previous models may be driven by extremely 
poor earnings performance. Discretionary accruals tend to shift and display more 
positive mean values.  
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The year 2006 shows significantly positive discretionary accruals in all three tests 
with the mean, median and proportion of negative discretionary accruals being 
0.0411, 0.0236 and 58% (625 out of 1078). The year 2005 shows significantly 
negative results with the mean, median and proportion of negative discretionary 
accruals being −0.0378, −0.0279 and 67% (653 out of 965).  
 
Taken together, there is an industry wide variation in the practice of earnings 
management during the sample period of 2000 to 2006. Based on the performance 
adjusted discretionary accruals, this study suggests that earnings management is 
prevalent in five industries: Energy, Industrials, Health Care, Information Technology 
and Telecommunication & Utilities. The dual economy approach about earnings 
management posits that periphery sector firms are exposed to higher degrees of 
business uncertainty and a more restricted opportunity structure and are more likely to 
be exhibit higher frequency of earnings management than the core sector (Belkaoui 
and Picur, 1984). The Australian economy is dominated primarily by consumer 
service and in recent periods has experienced considerable growth in the so-called 
‘new economy’, comprising firms in information technology, biotechnology and 
healthcare and Telecommunication. Overall, the evidence suggests that the periphery 
sector is more likely to engage in earnings management than the core sector.  
Moreover, earnings management activities are found in the years 2002, 2003, 2005 
and 2006, with particularly strong earnings management occurring in the years 2005 
and 2006. Although this is beyond the scope of this study, one possible reason could 
be that given the sample period coincides with the recent boom in resource sector in 
Australia and predominance of resource based firms in the sample, the firms may be 
engaging in earnings management.  Given CLERP 9 is to improve financial reporting 
quality, one would expect a decline in earnings management behaviour after the 
introduction of CLERP 9 in 2002 and enactment in 2004. However, the findings in 
Chapter 5 show a upward trend which yields a very interesting insight and leave  
room for future research. 
 
5.5 Evidences on firm characteristics 
 
Above investigation shows that earnings management behaviour varies across 
Australian industry sectors. This section examines earnings management behaviour at 
 
 
124
the individual firm level through several characteristics known to be associated with 
the magnitude and directions of earnings management. These characteristics are firm 
size, growth opportunities, profitability, leverage, book-to-market, capital intensity, 
and lagged total accruals.  
 
5.5.1 The magnitude of earnings management 
 
Previous analysis demonstrates the detection of earnings management relies upon the 
models used in estimating discretionary accruals. Evidence on earnings management, 
for example, the practices of earnings management across industries and years are 
presented to be different when the Jones Model, the Modified Jones Model, the Cash 
Flow Modified Jones Model and the Performance Adjusted Technique are used 
respectively (see Section 5.4). In order to remain consistent in interpreting the 
findings, the following analysis will focus on adjusted discretionary accruals only 
because the previous section illustrates that the Performance Adjusted Technique 
tends to yield a more reliable measure of earnings management (see Section 5.3)  
 
First, ten portfolios were constructed according to the decile ranking of the absolute 
values of adjusted discretionary accruals to examine the magnitude of earnings 
management attributed to a firm’s characteristics.  Table 5.13 presents the average 
size, growth opportunity, profitability, leverage, book-to-market, capital intensity, and 
lagged total accruals within each portfolio constructed by the absolute value of 
adjusted discretionary accruals from the Performance Adjusted Technique. By 
construction, firms in the extreme decile portfolios are interpreted to possess the 
highest and lowest magnitude of earnings manipulation. The lowest decile portfolio-1 
(Low) has mean absolute adjusted discretionary accruals, Abs (DA_ADJ), of 0.0042 
and the highest decile portfolio-10 (High) has mean Abs (DA_ADJ) of 0.6093.   
 
It is observed that as the absolute adjusted discretionary accruals increase, the firm 
size (SIZE) decreases. Portfolio-10 (High), with the highest mean absolute adjusted 
discretionary accruals, seems to be comprised of smallest firms with a mean logarithm 
of total assets being 9.0633 while the portfolio-1 (Low), with the lowest  mean  
absolute adjusted discretionary accruals , has the largest firms with mean logarithm of 
total assets of 11.0206. The relationship between size and absolute discretionary 
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accruals appears to be negatively monotonous by portfolios. The difference of firm 
sizes between two extreme portfolios is significant (t= −17.17, p<0.0001).  
 
When growth opportunity (GROWTH) is examined, the relationship also appears to be 
related to high Abs (DA_ADJ) with high growths tending to occur in the portfolios 
that are above median portfolio 5. This indicates that firms with above median 
magnitude of earnings management are likely to exhibit faster growth rates than firms 
whose earnings management activity are below median magnitude. However, the 
relationship between growth and the absolute adjusted discretionary accruals is likely 
to be non-linear since the difference between portfolio 1 and 10 is insignificant (t= 
0.18, p=0.8566).   
 
Profitability (ROE) tends to become poorer when absolute adjusted discretionary 
accruals are of increasing nature.  It is also interesting to note that ROE has negative 
means across most the portfolios, indicating a strong association of earnings 
management with low profitable firms. The High Abs (DA_ADJ) portfolio is making a 
loss while the Low Abs (DA_ADJ) portfolio is making a small profit. The High Abs 
(DA_ADJ) portfolio has a much lower profitability measure (−0.8501) than the Low 
Abs (DA_ADJ) portfolio (0.0596). This difference is significant at less than 1% level 
(t=−2.56, p=0.0108).  
 
As regards the book-to-market ratio (BM), the relationship appears to be related to 
low Abs(DA_ADJ) with high book-to-market ratio firms tending to occur in the 
portfolios with lower mean absolute adjusted discretionary accruals.  It is observed 
that as the absolute adjusted discretionary accruals increase, the book-to-market ratio 
decreases. The difference of book-to-market between two extreme portfolios is 
significant (t= −5.99, p<0.0001). This is expected as firms with high book-to-market 
ratios are more likely to have lower growth opportunities; these stocks are referred as 
value stocks. Therefore, the relationship between BM and Abs (DA_ADJ) should be 
opposite from the relationship observed from GROWTH.  
  
There is no specific association between the magnitude of earnings management and 
leverage (LEV) and lagged total accruals (LAGTA). No pattern for changes was 
observed in LEV and LAGTA. The t-test for the difference of leverage between High 
Abs (DA_ADJ) and Low Abs (DA_ADJ) does not show any significant difference. 
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LAGTA has negative means across the majority portfolios. This is consistent with the 
mean-reverting nature of accruals as the majority parts of the current period accruals 
will be mean reverted in the next year.  Nevertheless, the change of LAGTA is 
somewhat irregular across the portfolios with no significant difference between High 
and Low Abs (DA_ADJ) groups. Although no specific pattern was observed for 
changes in capital intensity (CIR), the difference between portfolio 1 and 10 is 
significant, with Low Abs (DA_ADJ) portfolio having higher capital intensity than 
High Abs (DA_ADJ) portfolio. 
 
5.5.2 The directions of earnings management 
 
The previous section reports that there were some firm characteristics that had an 
impact on the magnitude of earnings management. This section examines whether 
firm characteristics affect the direction of earnings management.  In order to examine 
the direction of earning manipulation attributed to firm characteristics, discretionary 
accruals were split into positive and negative groups and ten portfolios were 
constructed according to the decile ranking of signed adjusted discretionary accruals. 
So, the portfolio formation procedure is conducted for upward (income-increasing) 
and downward (income-decreasing) earnings management respectively.  
 
Table 5.14 presents the mean of the same firm characteristics (size, growth 
opportunity, profitability, leverage, book-to-market, capital intensity, and lagged total 
accruals) of decile portfolios of two groups of positive and negative discretionary 
accruals by using the Performance Adjusted Technique. In panel A, when the income-
increasing adjusted discretionary accruals are considered (+DA_ADJ), it is observed 
that small size and lower book-to-market ratio firms are more likely to be involved in 
income-increasing earnings manipulation. The average size of the portfolio decrease 
as +DA_ADJ increases with the smallest size being 8.8459 for the highest +DA_ADJ 
portfolio (portfolio-10).  The pattern for book-to-market is as monotonous as firm 
size, the mean BM for high +DA_ADJ portfolios are lower than those of the low 
+DA_ADJ portfolios.  Testing for the extreme decile, the differences are statistically 
significant for both SIZE (t=−13.32, p<.0001) and BM (t=−7.09, p<.0001). Further, as 
+DA_ADJ increases, the profitability (ROE) tends to decrease. The mean ROE is 
positive for the lowest +DA_ADJ portfolio (portfolio-1) whereas the mean ROE is 
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negative for the highest +DA_ADJ portfolio (portfolio-10). The difference between 
these two extreme portfolios is significant at 10% level. Finally, the differences are 
also presented between extreme portfolios for CIR and LAGTA, but neither shows a 
clear pattern across the decile portfolios. 
 
Panel B examines income-decreasing discretionary accruals (−DA_ADJ) and confirms 
the role of size and book-to-market in determining the directional effect of earnings 
manipulation. Consistent with earlier evidence, smaller size and lower book-to-market 
firms tend to be associated with income-decreasing earnings management. The 
evidence is particularly strong with the size factor, with the average size steadily 
decreasing as the –DA_ADJ becomes more negative.  The average size in extreme 
deciles are significantly different (t=−10.43, p<.0001).  The evidence regarding BM 
shows that, most high income-decreasing accruals are concentrated in firms with low 
BM.  The mean BM of portfolio - 10, a decile portfolio of extreme –DA_ADJ, is 
0.5262 and statistically different from that of the portfolio - 1 (t=−2.79, p=0.0055).  In 
addition to size and book-to-market, there is evidence that high growth firms and 
poorer profitable firms tend to engage in more income-decreasing earnings 
management. Differences of GROWTH and ROE between highest negative DA_ADJ 
firms (portfolio - 10) and lowest negative DA_ADJ firms (portfolio - 1) are significant 
at 10% and 5% level, respectively. Although difference is present between extreme 
portfolios for CIR and LAGTA as well, the pattern is much less clear across the decile 
portfolios. 
 
Overall, this study suggests that size and book-to-market ratio play significant roles in 
the earnings management behaviour of Australian firms between 2000 and 2006. 
Moreover, smaller size and lower book-to-market ratio firms are associated with both 
income-increasing and decreasing earnings management activities.  Smaller firms and 
lower book-to-market firms in fact have a higher overall magnitude of earnings 
manipulation. The results regarding size are quite strong and are consistent with 
evidence of U.S. firms by Sloan (1996). The implication is firm size is generally 
correlated with industry. So, it is possible that earnings management is industry-
specific rather than firm-specific. In terms of firm profitability, the results are 
consistent with Kinney and McDaniel (1989) who found that firms who restate their 
earning figures are likely to be less profitable. Profitability tends to become poorer 
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when the magnitude of earnings management is of an increasing nature. Moreover, 
lower profitability firms are particularly associated with income-decreasing earnings 
management. According to the taking-a-bath theory, when operating performance is 
poor, managers tend to increase earnings; however, if the operating performance is 
extremely poor, some firms may decrease income further. If managers attempt to take 
an opportunity of negative earnings in any particular period to depress earnings 
further then the negative earnings are likely to be clustered. Therefore, results from 
profitability provide some indirect evidence to support this conjecture.  
 
5.6 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter provides a comprehensive analysis for earnings management practices 
within the Australian context.  First, this study found that earnings management was 
prevalent among Australian industries during the sample period. Based upon 
discretionary accruals that estimated from the Performance Adjusted Technique, 
earnings management activities are detected in the industry sectors of Energy, 
Industrials, Health Care, Information Technology and Telecommunication & Utilities. 
Moreover, the variability of accruals that increased from the years 2000 to 2006, 
stayed at the high level in the year 2006. Results also show there is a firm wide 
variation in the practice of earnings management, with small size, low book-to-market 
ratio, and low profitability firms engaging in more earnings management. In the next 
chapters, the reasons why earnings management occurred in the Australian context 
will be analyzed. The industry effects and individual firm characteristics will be taken 
into account in the analysis as well.  
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Chapter 6  
Empirical Analysis-Executive Compensation Incentives 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, it was detected that earnings management took place in 
Australia. From this chapter, the analysis will focus on why earnings management 
takes place. The first setting this study will investigate is executive compensation 
incentives. This chapter first provides descriptive statistics on the selected variables in 
the testing sample. The testing sample is the intersection of two databases of 
Connect4 and DataStream with 3,326 firm-year observations covering the period of 
2000 to 2006. The analysis of executive compensation incentives is able to be 
conducted given both the executive compensation data and accounting data are 
available in the testing sample. 
 
Then, it analyzes the relationship between earnings management and executive 
compensations. The layout of the analysis is based on examining earnings 
management, both in magnitude and direction, and its association with executive 
compensation incentives, where executive compensations are decomposed into three 
tiers: total compensation; fixed remuneration versus at-risk remuneration; and salary, 
bonus, options, shares and LTIPs. The objective is to investigate to what extent the 
aggregate level of earnings management is driven by the executive compensation 
incentive and in which direction; and, whether different forms of executive pay will 
play different roles in shaping earnings management behaviour in terms of its overall 
magnitude and direction.  
 
6.2 Descriptive statistics (testing sample) 
 
In order to extract the data that contains both executive compensation and financial 
information, this chapter uses a testing sample with the intersection of two databases 
of Connect4 and DataStream. The intersection of these two databases and the 
selection process yields a testing sample of 3,326 firm-year observations covering the 
period of 2000 to 2006 (see Table 4.2). The analysis of executive compensation 
 
 
130
incentives (Chapter 6) and the benchmark beating behavoiur (Chapter 7) are based on 
this testing sample. The variables in the testing sample include discretionary accruals, 
executive compensations, and control variables. Table 6.1 Panel A reports the 
absolute value of adjusted discretionary accruals,  Abs (DA_ADJ),  has a mean 
(median) of 0.1114 (0.0643). The mean (median) signed adjusted discretionary 
accrual (DA_ADJ) is −0.0038 (0.0000). Distribution of adjusted discretionary accruals 
is symmetric with equal frequency of positive and negative values and median value 
of signed discretionary accruals is centred.  
 
Table 6.1 Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the CEO compensation structure 
in the testing sample. The average total compensation for Australian CEOs is $0.54 
million. The total compensation consists of fixed remuneration and at-risk 
remuneration. The average fixed component is $0.35 million, which is higher than the 
at-risk component $0.16 million. Most of CEOs in the sample firms (about 94%) 
receive fixed remuneration while only 31% receive at-risk pay. Further, a large 
proportion in the fixed compensation is cash salary; the average CEO salary is $0.29 
million. Cash bonuses represent the second largest fraction of the total compensation 
package with $78,000, with 31.12% of firms having a bonus plan in the compensation 
package. The average stock option grant has a fair value of $57,600, valued using the 
Black-Scholes option pricing model (Black and Scholes, 1973). A majority of 29.52% 
of firms have an option scheme in place. Shares and Long-term incentive plans are 
fairly small, the proportion of firms providing shares and Long-term incentive plans 
to the CEO are 5.53% and 5.02%, respectively. CEOs receive share grants having an 
average market value of $12,300. The average Long-term incentive plan is $15,900. 
This is consistent with Izan et al. (1998) and Matolcsy and Wright (2007) who 
document that Australian CEOs are more commonly remunerated with cash than with 
equity-based compensation. This differs from US firms that typically offer options.23  
 
The characteristic of Australian CEOs compensation structure is further confirmed in 
Figure 6.1.  It shows the decomposition of the dollar value of the CEO compensation 
year by year from 2000 to 2006. In Australia, the salary is the single most important 
                                                 
23 Murphy (1999) reports that since 1990s, stock options have replaced base salary and became the single largest 
component of compensation in almost all US industries. The reason for the popularity of option-based 
compensation is because there is income tax deduction for non-qualified options available in US.  
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component in the executive compensation package. Above 60% of the total executive 
compensation is from salary for all of the seven years. The bonus components, in 
general, are above 15% of the total compensation except in the year 2002 when it 
declined to 14.61%. Option grants were 11.31% of the total compensation in the year 
2000, and declined to below 10% level between years 2001 and 2003. Until 2006, 
options grants have largely increased to 16.05%.  Matolcsy and Wright (2007) 
provided some explanation for the drop in the options between years 2001 and 2003. 
They viewed these three years as the period of market uncertainty following the dot-
com and NASDAQ crashes. In the period of market uncertainty, CEOs have less 
ability to influence a firm’s stock price and therefore it would be less efficient for 
shareholders to tie CEO compensation to stock options.  Finally, long-term incentive 
plans and shares components are all a small fraction below 10%.  
 
In all, the Australian compensation market is dominated by fixed salaries and there 
has been less herding in the market. The lack of herding exhibited in the Australian 
compensation market could be influenced by the tax regulations since there is no 
formal tax deduction for equity-based compensation. As such, options and shares as a 
component of CEO compensation have not had significant importance in the 
Australian market.  
 
Table 6.1 Panel C reports descriptive statistics for the control variables used in the 
empirical tests. The control variables indicate that firms vary in terms of size and 
growth. The mean and median firm sizes (SIZE) are 10.6360 and 10.2476 with a 
standard deviation of 2.0585. Testing sample firms also show a high growth rate 
(GROWTH), with mean and median of 1.4637 and 0.1006. This indicates that the 
distribution of growth rates is positively skewed which can be further predicted from 
the maximum growth rate of 547.0775. The standard deviation is also large 16.4156, 
implying some Australian firms have been rapidly growing during this period. In 
general, the profitability (ROE) is low, with mean and median values of −0.1290 and 
−0.0298, respectively. Firms are leveraged (LEV) to a considerable degree with means 
(median) of 0.1557 (0.0712), indicating approximately 16% (7%) of total assets is 
from debt. The mean book-to-market ratio (BM) is 0.6406 and the mean capital 
intensity ratio (CIR) is 0.3383.The distribution of lagged total accruals (LAGTA) is 
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skewed by some negative value as can be seen from the difference between the mean 
and the median values and relatively large standard deviation.  
 
6.3 Executive compensation and the magnitude of earnings management 
 
The following analysis is decomposition structured, with executive compensations 
decomposed into three tiers: total compensation; fixed remuneration versus at-risk 
remuneration; and salary, bonus, options, shares and LTIPs. The association between 
the magnitude of earnings management and each tier of compensation is examined 
respectively.  
 
6.3.1 Total compensation 
 
The results of the association between the magnitude of earnings management and 
executive compensation incentives (Equation 4.9) are presented in Table 6.2. The first 
tier regression reports the association between the magnitude of earnings management 
and total executive compensations. Results show the coefficient for total 
compensation (TCOMP) is negative but insignificant, suggesting there is no 
association between the magnitude of earnings management and total executive 
compensation. The associations between absolute value of adjusted discretionary 
accruals and control variables show some significance. The coefficient on firm size 
(SIZE) is negative, significant at less than 1% level. The coefficient on sales growth 
(GROWTH) is positive, significant at less than 1% level as well. As expected, the 
coefficient on book-to-market ratio (BM) is significantly negative because higher 
book-to-market indicates lower growth rate, which should have the opposite effect on 
discretionary accruals from sales growth. The coefficient on profitability (ROE) is 
negative, significant at 5% level. In terms of industry effects, Material, Industrials, 
Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Health Care, Information Technology 
show significant negative association with the absolute value of adjusted discretionary 
accruals. This suggests these industries engage in less magnitude of earnings 
management that induced by executive compensation incentive. The regression has an 
adjusted R-square of 10.34%, F-statistic is 8.82.  
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So, there is no clear evidence to suggest that executive total compensation is a 
significant factor that determines the aggregate magnitude of earnings management 
behaviour.  Although in Chapter 3, it is predicted that CEOs who receive relatively 
large amounts of total compensation will engage in earnings management in a great 
magnitude, the result does not support the prediction. The total compensation may not 
be a strong indicator in reflecting earnings management incentive because different 
compensation components may provide managers with different incentives and thus 
dilute the effect of total compensation on earnings management.  
 
6.3.2 Fixed compensation versus at-risk compensation 
 
In Table 6.2, the second tier reports results from the regression of absolute value of 
discretionary accruals on fixed compensation versus at-risk compensation 
components. The association between absolute value of adjusted discretionary 
accruals and executive compensation becomes clear when total compensation is 
decomposed into fixed components and at-risk components. The coefficient on fixed 
compensation (FIX) is negative and significant at less than 1% level. In contrast, the 
coefficient on at-risk compensation, including bonus, options, shares and long-term 
incentive plans (ATRISK), is positive and significant at 5% level after controlling firm 
characteristics and industry effects. As previously stated the dependent variable is the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals scaled by total assets. The coefficient on FIX 
therefore suggests that for every one million dollar increase in CEOs’ fixed 
compensation, the magnitude of adjusted discretionary accruals as percentage of total 
assets will be reduced by 4.67%. Likewise, the coefficient on ATRISK suggests that 
for every one million dollar increase in CEOs’ at-risk compensation, the magnitude of 
adjusted discretionary accruals as a percentage of total assets will increase by 2.46%. 
 
In terms of control variables, the coefficient on firm size (SIZE) is negative, 
significant at less than 1% level. The coefficient on sales growth (GROWTH) is 
positive, significant at less than 1% level as well. The coefficient on book-to-market 
ratio (BM) has a negative sign and significant at 5% level. The coefficient on 
profitability (ROE) is negative, significant at 5% level. In addition, Material, 
Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Health Care, Information 
Technology show significant negative association with the absolute value of adjusted 
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discretionary accruals. This suggests these industries engage in less magnitude of 
earnings management induced by executive fixed and at-risk compensations. The 
regression has an adjusted R-square of 10.92%, F-statistic is 9.26.  
 
These results suggest a negative association between the aggregate magnitude of 
earnings management and executive fixed compensation. This is consistent with the 
prediction and Gao and Shrieves (2002) view that the overall magnitude of earnings 
management decrease as the level of fixed compensation increases, because earnings 
management is costly. Managers’ incentives to engage in earnings management will 
be diminished when their compensation is fixed. Nevertheless, the positive 
association for at-risk compensation suggests that the overall magnitude of earnings 
management increases as the level of at-risk compensation increases. This indicates 
that at-risk compensation induces managers to engage in earnings management to 
increase their at-risk compensation. This finding is consistent with Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978), Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979), and Zmijewski and Hagerman 
(1981) who found that the existence of incentive compensation plans induces 
managers choice of accounting policies that will increase reported earnings.  
 
6.3.3 Individual components - salary, bonus, options, shares and LTIPs 
 
In Table 6.2, the third tier reports results from the regression of absolute value of 
adjusted discretionary accruals on each compensation component. In this stage, fixed 
compensation is further decomposed to salary;24 and, at-risk compensation is further 
decomposed into bonus, options, shares and long-term incentive plans. Now the 
results show some dynamic relations between the aggregate level of earnings 
management and individual compensation components. First, the coefficient on salary 
(SALARY) is negative and significant at less than 1% level. Second, among at-risk 
component, the coefficients on bonus (BONUS) and options (OPTION) are positive, 
significant at 5% and 10% level, respectively. The positive coefficients suggest that 
for every one million dollar increase in CEOs’ bonus and option grants, the magnitude 
of adjusted discretionary accruals as a percentage of total assets will increase by 
3.07% and 1.65%, respectively.  
                                                 
24 Since salary is the major component of the fix remuneration, other components such as super and retirement pay 
are not examined in the study.  
 
 
135
 
In terms of control variables, the coefficient on firm size (SIZE) is negative, 
significant at less than 1% level. The coefficient on sales growth (GROWTH) is 
positive, significant at less than 1% level as well. As expected, the coefficient on 
book-to-market ratio (BM) is significantly negative because higher book-to-market 
indicates a lower growth rate, which should have the opposite effect on discretionary 
accruals from sales growth. The coefficient on profitability (ROE) is negative, 
significant at 5% level. Consistently, Material, Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, 
Consumer Staples, Health Care, Information Technology show significant negative 
association with the absolute value of adjusted discretionary accruals, suggesting 
these industries engage in less magnitude of earnings management induced by 
executive salary, bonus, options, shares and LTIP. The regression has an adjusted R-
square of 11.11%, F-statistic is 10.10. This means the explanatory power of the model 
is also increased when compensation is further decomposed.  
 
The above results, first, suggest a negative association between the aggregate 
magnitude of earnings management and executive fixed salary. This finding is 
consistent with the result from the previous regression where the absolute value of 
adjusted discretionary accruals is regressed on fixed compensations. Salary shows a 
similar implication as fixed compensation—the overall magnitude of earnings 
management decreases as the level of salary increases because earnings management 
is costly. 
 
Second, there is a positive association between absolute value of adjusted 
discretionary accruals and bonus, suggesting that the overall magnitude of earnings 
management is an increasing function of executive bonus compensation. This finding 
is consistent with the bonus maximization hypothesis that managers increase reported 
earnings to maximize their bonus pay (See Healy, 1985; Robbins et al., 1993; 
Skinner, 1993; Gaver et al, 1995; Balsam, 1998; Guidry et al., 1999; Gao and 
Shrieves, 2002; and Shuto, 2007). 
 
Third, the results show there is a positive association between the absolute value of 
adjusted discretionary accruals and option grants, reflecting the overall magnitude of 
earnings management increases as the level of option grants increases. The underlying 
reason might be that managers expect a nonlinear payoff from stock options and the 
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nonlinear payoff induces greater earnings management. This is suggested by Gao and 
Shrieves (2002). Alternatively, greater magnitude of earnings management may 
attribute to large downward manipulations. Baker et al. (2003) and McAnally et al. 
(2008) suggested that option grants create incentives for managers to decrease 
earnings as low earnings can lead to stock price decline which gives managers a lower 
strike price on option grant date.  
 
Fourth, there is no evidence to suggest that executive shares awards and long-term 
incentive plans affect the aggregate magnitude of earnings management. The 
coefficients on shares (SHARE) and long-term incentive plans (LTIP) are positive but 
insignificant. Only a minority of companies in the sample issue shares and LTIP to 
compensate executives (See Table 6.1- Panel B). The weak relationship found could 
be attributable to this reason. Nevertheless, these findings are inconsistent with Gao 
and Shrieves (2002) who documented a weak evidence on a positive association 
between the absolute value of discretionary current accruals and executive restricted 
shares.  
 
Finally, there is a contradiction on the controlled variables used in testing the 
association between the magnitude of earnings management and executive 
compensation. Recall in Table 5.13, results of portfolio method do not show a clear 
relationship between growth and the absolute adjusted discretionary accruals  with the 
difference between portfolio 1 and 10 is insignificant (t= 0.18, p=0.8566). However, 
the regression result of Table 6.2 shows a significant positive association between the 
magnitude of earnings management and growth in testing total compensation, fixed 
versus at-risk compensations and individual components of compensation. One 
possible explanation for this statistical significance is that the growth opportunities 
affect executive compensation through the demand for skill and the premium paid to 
compensate for risk (Clinch, 1991; Gaver and Gaver, 1993; Anderson et al., 2000; 
Ittner et al., 2003). Thus, it is possible that some of the effect of compensation 
variables has been shifted to the growth variable when these two independent 
variables tend to move together. Kenkel (1989, p700) suggested that in economic 
models some degree of multicollinearity is always present and it is not an error in a 
regression model.  
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6.4 Executive compensation and the directions of earnings management 
 
Having obtained the results regarding the overall magnitude of earnings management, 
this section further examines the separate effects of compensation structure variables 
that might have on upward (income-increasing) earnings management and downward 
(income-decreasing) earnings management. Recall, in testing the association between 
executive compensation and the aggregate magnitude of earnings management, the 
absolute value of adjusted discretionary accruals is used as proxy for aggregate 
earnings management magnitude. The value of absolute adjusted discretionary 
accruals is an unsigned measure of earnings management which captures the 
aggregate earnings manipulation (Reynolds and Francis, 2000). However, it does not 
show the direction, whether managers engage in earnings management upwards or 
downwards. Moreover, the aggregate measure may get diluted if both upward and 
downward earnings manipulations take place. For these reasons, in the following 
section, signed adjusted discretionary accruals are used as a dependent variable to 
further examine if executive compensations are associated with specific direction’s 
earnings manipulation.  
 
The sample is now divided into two subsamples according to the signs of the adjusted 
discretionary accruals, and for each subsample, models are estimated by regressing 
the signed adjusted discretionary accruals on the compensation structure variables and 
control variables. Firms with positive adjusted discretionary accruals are considered 
to have upward (income-increasing) earnings management while firms with negative 
adjusted discretionary accruals are assumed to engage in downward (income-
decreasing) earnings management. By construction, two subsamples with positive 
adjusted discretionary accruals (1,647 observations) and negative adjusted 
discretionary accruals (1,649 observations) are approximately equal because of the 
mean standardization procedure of the Performance Adjusted Technique (Kasznik, 
1999).  
  
6.4.1 Executive compensation and upward earnings management 
 
 In the context of executive compensation, upward earnings management is 
documented by Healy (1985), Robbins et al.(1993), Skinner (1993), Holthausen et al. 
(1995), Balsam (1998), Guidry et al., (1999), and Gao and Shrieves (2002). The 
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notion of managers use of income-increasing earnings management is consistent with 
management opportunistic behaviour of maximization of their personal wealth at the 
expense of other stakeholders. If managerial opportunism is the dominant driver of 
accounting discretion, then income-increasing earnings management is expected to be 
positively associated with executive compensation structure variables.  
 
Table 6.3 shows that all models are improved in predicting income-increasing 
earnings management behaviour. The adjusted R-squares from regressions of positive 
adjusted discretionary accruals on total compensation (tier 1), on fixed compensation 
and at-risk compensation (tier 2), and on individual components (tier 3) are increased 
to 18.52%, 18.57% and 18.36% respectively. Also, F-statistics are improved to 15.97, 
15.14 and 12.85 respectively, all significant at less than 1% level.  
 
6.4.1.1 Total compensation  
 
Table 6.3, the first tier, presents the results from the regression of positive adjusted 
discretionary accruals on total executive compensation. The results show the 
coefficient on total compensation (TCOMP) is positive and significant at 10% level. 
The coefficient on firm size (SIZE) is negative, significant at less than 1% level. The 
coefficient on sales growth (GROWTH) is positive, significant at 5% level. The 
coefficient on leverage (LEV) is positive and significant at less than 1% level. 
Compared to the OLS results where the absolute value of adjusted discretionary 
accruals is modeled, both control variables of book-to-market ratio (BM) and 
profitability (ROE) become insignificant in the positive discretionary accruals model. 
This means some firm characteristics have different impacts on the direction of 
earnings manipulation. The coefficients on capital intensity (CIR), and lagged total 
accruals (LAGTA) remain insignificant. In terms of industry effects, Material, Metals 
& Mining, Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, and Health Care 
show significant negative association with the positive adjusted discretionary 
accruals. This suggests these industries engage in less upward earnings management 
when total compensation is examined. 
 
As expected, the result shows that total executive compensation has an effect on 
positive discretionary accruals. Positive discretionary accruals increase as the level of 
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total compensation increases. The notion is that as total compensation increases, 
managers’ motivations to use upwards earnings management to maximize their 
incentive payments increases.  Although Australian CEOs are mainly remunerated by 
fixed salaries, executives still have the desire to improve incentive payments and 
improve the level of total compensation. So, when the opportunity that inflating 
reported earnings can increase their total compensation appears, managers will choose 
to do so even though there is a conflicting incentive from executive fixed 
compensation.  
 
6.4.1.2 Fixed compensation versus at-risk compensation 
 
Table 6.3, the second tier, presents the results from the regression of positive adjusted 
discretionary accruals on fixed compensation and at-risk compensation. After total 
executive compensation is decomposed into fixed and at-risk components, the 
coefficient on fixed component (FIX) is negative but insignificant while the 
coefficient on at-risk compensation (ATRISK), which is the sum of bonus, options, 
shares and long-term incentive plans, is positive and significant at less than 1% level. 
In terms of control variables and industry effects, the results are very similar to the 
prior regression where total compensation is used as an explanatory variable.  
The result from the fixed compensation shows that the fixed compensation component 
is not associated with upward earnings management. In Chapter 3, CEOs who receive 
relatively large amounts of fixed compensation are predicted to engage in earnings 
management of lesser magnitude, including both upwards and downwards direction of 
earnings management. The underlying reason for such prediction is that the fixed 
form of compensation will not increase as earnings levels increase during the fiscal 
year: given there is cost of earnings management, the fixed compensation should 
constrain upward earnings management. This actually implies a significantly negative 
association between fixed compensation and earnings management. Although the 
result shows the coefficient on fixed compensation is negative, it is not significant.  
 
In contrast, the result from at-risk compensation shows there is a significantly positive 
association between at-risk compensation and positive adjusted discretionary accruals.  
At-risk compensations (ATRISK), including bonus, options, shares and long-term 
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incentive plans, are rewarded base upon either earnings performance or stock 
performance. Although options, shares and long-term incentive plans may not have an 
effect on upward earnings management, the increasing function embodied in at-risk 
compensation is expected to dominate and create a strong incentive for income-
increasing earnings management since bonuses account for the majority part of at-risk 
compensation. Chapter 3 predicts that CEOs who receive relatively large amounts of 
at-risk compensation will engage in earnings management to a great magnitude, in 
particular, the direction of earnings management is more likely to be upwards and less 
likely to be downwards. So, the finding is consistent with the prediction in Chapter 3; 
and, it is also consistent with Watts and Zimmerman (1978), Hagerman and 
Zmijewski (1979), and Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981) who found that the existence 
of  incentive compensation plans induce managers choice of  accounting policies that 
will increase reported earnings.  
 
6.4.1.3 Individual components-salary, bonus, options, shares and LTIPs 
 
Table 6.3, the third tier, presents the results from the regression of positive adjusted 
discretionary accruals on fixed salary, bonus, options, shares, and LTIP. First, the 
results show that the coefficients on fixed salary (SALARY), bonus (BONUS), shares 
(SHARE) and long-term incentive plans (LTIP) have predicted signs. However, they 
are not significant at any level. As such, the predictions that fixed salary will constrain 
upward earnings management while bonuses will induce upward earnings 
management behaviour are not supported. This is somewhat surprising because 
previous studies have found that the bonus component provides a strong incentive for 
upwards earnings management (See Healy, 1985; Skinner, 1993; Gaver et al, 1995; 
Balsam, 1998; Guidry et al., 1999; and Shuto, 2007). 
 
Second, the results show a marginally significant positive association between 
positive adjusted discretionary accruals and options grants (OPTION). In Chapter 3, 
Australian CEOs who receive option grants are expected to engage in earnings 
management downwards. Previous studies of Baker et al. (2003) and McAnally et al. 
(2008) suggest that option grants create incentives for managers to decrease earnings 
as low earnings can lead to stock price decline which gives managers a lower strike 
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price on option grant date. However, this result is inconsistent with the prediction as 
well as findings from previous studies.  
 
Third, shares and LTIPs are not correlated with upward earnings management. This is 
consistent with the prediction that shares and LTIPs do not create incentives for 
earnings management. In terms of control variables and industry effects, the results 
are very similar to the prior regression where fixed and at-risk compensation are used 
as an explanatory variable. 
 
In all, the results from examining executive compensations and upward earnings 
management are somewhat surprising. Especially, the results on bonuses and option 
grants are inconsistent with the predictions. One concern for such inconsistency is that 
the model may have endogeneity problems. This concern will be addressed and 
examined later in the sensitivity analysis of Chapter 8. 
 
6.4.2 Executive compensation and downward earnings management 
 
The traditional way of testing earnings management and executive compensation 
incentives assumes that managers maximize their wealth by always selecting income-
increasing accounting discretions. However, earnings management does not always 
have to mean upwards manipulation. Downwards earnings management also could be 
triggered when the lower limit of the bonus bound cannot be reached efficiently. 
Healy (1985) referred to the reduction of current earnings to ensure that future bonus 
boundary can be reached as the ‘taking bath’ strategy.25 Also, option grants are found 
to create incentives to lower earnings (Baker et al., 2003; and McAnally et al., 2008). 
 
In this section, the association between executive compensations and income-
decreasing earnings management is also examined. Table 6.4 shows that, in general, 
negative discretionary accruals models have lower exploratory power relative to 
positive discretionary accruals models. The adjusted R-squares from regressions of 
negative discretionary accruals on total compensation (tier 1), on fixed and at-risk 
compensation (tier 2), and on individual components (tier 3) are 9.26%, 9.99% and 
                                                 
25 This study does not conduct a direct test for ‘bath taking’ type of earnings management as bonus formulas with 
upper and lower bounds are required and I couldn’t obtain such data.   
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10.07%, respectively. F-statistics are 8.62, 8.80 and 7.69, respectively, all significant 
at less than 1% level.   
 
6.4.2.1 Total compensation  
 
Table 6.4, the first tier, presents the results from the regression of negative adjusted 
discretionary accruals on total executive compensation. The results show the 
coefficient on total compensation (TCOMP) is positive but insignificant. In terms of 
control variables, the results from the negative adjusted discretionary accruals model 
have shown some dramatic changes. First, the coefficient on firm size (SIZE) now 
becomes positive, significant at 5% level. Second, the coefficient on sales growth 
(GROWTH) turns to negative, significant at 5% level. Third, the coefficient on book-
to-market ratio (BM) becomes positive, significant at 10% level. Nevertheless, the 
coefficient on leverage (LEV) remains positive and significant at less than 1% level. 
The coefficients on capital intensity (CIR), and lagged total accruals (LAGTA) are still 
insignificant.  
 
In terms of industry effects, Consumer Discretionary shows a significantly positive 
association whereas Telecommunication & Utilities shows a significantly negative 
association with the negative adjusted discretionary accruals. This indicates the two 
industries have different impacts on downward earnings management, while 
Consumer Discretionary encourages, Telecommunication & Utilities discourages 
downward earnings manipulation.  
 
It is predicted that CEOs who receive relatively large amounts of total compensation 
will engage in less downward earnings management. This prediction is based on the 
logic that CEOs total compensation increases as incentive (at-risk) proportion 
increases; and, managers will ultimately choose to report higher earnings to increase 
incentive compensations and therefore oppose income-decreasing earnings 
management. Though, the result shows there is no association between the total 
compensation and downward earnings management, it appears that income-
decreasing earnings management is more likely to be explained by the control 
variables rather than main interest variable of total compensation. 
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6.4.2.2 Fixed compensation versus at-risk compensation 
 
Table 6.4, the second tier, presents the results from the regression of negative adjusted 
discretionary accruals on fixed versus at-risk compensation. The results show 
executive fixed compensation (FIX) is positively associated with negative adjusted 
discretionary accruals and significant at less than 1% level. Meanwhile, at-risk 
(ATRISK) compensation is negatively associated with negative adjusted discretionary 
accruals and significant at 5% level. In terms of control variables, the results show a 
very similar statistics to those of total compensation in the same table. In addition, 
Telecommunication & Utilities has a significantly negative association with the 
negative adjusted discretionary accruals, suggesting this industry discourages 
downward earnings management. 
 
This result shows that managers with high fixed compensation would engage in more 
downwards earnings manipulations. One possible explanation that this study could 
offer is that managers with higher fixed compensation are often representing larger 
and multinational firms. These firms are more likely to attract public scrutiny and 
political attention. Previous evidences indicate that large firms use income-decreasing 
earnings management as a plausible and sustainable earnings management strategy to 
minimize the likelihood of adverse political attention and reduce political costs (See 
Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; Jones, 1991).  
 
Moreover, managers can benefit from the reduced political costs. Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978) suggested that management incentive compensation is not the 
only factor determining accounting choices towards higher earnings. In fact, managers 
are more likely to choose accounting standards to report lower earnings that will 
result in lower tax, regulatory and political costs and thereby increase management 
wealth. This means when compensation is fixed, managers will be motivated to 
exploit other sources to increase their wealth.  
 
As previously discussed, the overall magnitude of earnings management decreases as 
the level of fixed compensation increases because fixed compensation creates a 
disincentive for managers to engage in earnings management in the face of costly 
earnings management (see Section 6.3.2). These two settings are not mutually 
exclusive. An executive could be removed from the office if the remuneration is 
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deemed to be opportunistic; while shareholders are more likely to accept managers’ 
action to reduce political costs or tax payment. This explanation is further evident 
from the control variable of firm size (SIZE). Firm size is generally used to proxy for 
political cost exposure (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). It can be seen from testing the 
total compensation (Table 6.4 tier 1), fixed versus at-risk compensation (Table 6.4 tier 
2), and individual compensation components (Table 6.4 tier 3), firm sizes are all 
significantly positive associated with negative adjusted discretionary accruals.  
The result from at-risk compensation suggests that managers with high at-risk 
compensation would reduce downward earnings manipulations. When managers are 
remunerated by at-risk compensation, a counter-effect to the political cost motivation 
for income-decreasing earnings management probably occurs. They tend to be 
myopic and thus avoid any adverse effects on their incentive awards by reducing 
income-decreasing earnings management even though sometimes downwards 
earnings manipulation may bring lower tax payments and political costs to the firm. 
Therefore, a trade-off exists between direct wealth gain from the increased 
compensation and indirect wealth improvement from the reduction of political costs 
and taxes. Such trade-off determines managers’ decision in exercising discretions.     
 
6.4.2.3 Individual components - salary, bonus, options, shares and LTIPs 
 
Table 6.4 tier 3 presents the results from the regression of negative adjusted 
discretionary accruals on salaries, bonuses, options, shares, and LTIP. The fixed 
salary (SALARY) has a positive association with negative adjusted discretionary 
accruals, significant at 5% level. Among at-risk compensation components, only 
bonuses (BONUS) show a negative relation with negative adjusted discretionary 
accruals, significant at 5% level while the coefficients on option grants (OPTION), 
shares (SHARE) and long-term incentive plans (LTIP) are all insignificant. The results 
on the control variables are generally consistent with previous results in the same 
table. In addition, Telecommunication & Utilities has a significantly negative 
association with the negative adjusted discretionary accruals, suggesting this industry 
discourages downward earnings management. 
 
This result from salary suggests that managers with high salary pay would engage in 
more downward earnings management. This is consistent with fixed compensation 
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incentives. The result from bonuses, however, suggests that managers with high 
bonuses pay would engage in less downward earnings management. The reasons have 
been demonstrated in the previous section of 6.4.2.2, which is similar to those of at-
risk compensation. Possibly, bonus is the component that contributes to the 
significance of at-risk pay. Finally, shares and LTIPs are not correlated with 
downward earnings management. This is consistent with the prediction that shares 
and LTIPs do not create incentives for earnings management.  
6.5 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter examines executive compensation incentives. Results show that 
executive compensation creates incentives for earnings management behaviour. 
Moreover, different compensation structures embody different incentives for earnings 
management. The theoretical model works better when executive compensation is 
decomposed; each tier of decomposition reveals a dynamic relation between executive 
pay and earnings management, both in magnitude and in direction. The findings 
indicate a variety of compensation-related incentive effects, with some features 
encouraging earnings management, and others, discouraging it. Particularly, fixed 
compensation and salary are more likely to constrain earnings management. However, 
at-risk compensation and bonuses induce managers to engage in earnings 
management because at-risk compensation is usually based on earnings performance 
and managers would opportunistically use discretionary accruals to exploit the 
nonlinearity in the payoffs on compensation which is tied to earnings performance. 
Therefore, a trade-off exists between the costs of earnings management and the 
benefits of wealth gain and such trade-off determines managers’ decisions in 
exercising discretions. Option grants are found to be positively associated with the 
aggregate level of earnings management and upward earnings management. This is 
inconsistent with the expectation. Finally, no evidence is found that shares and long-
term incentive plans are associated with earnings management, either the aggregate 
magnitude or the directions. In the next chapter, benchmark beating incentives will be 
examined. 
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Chapter 7  
Empirical Analysis-Benchmark Beating Incentives 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the second earnings management incentive—the benchmark 
beating incentive. First, it provides descriptive statistics on the selected variables in 
testing the benchmark beating incentive. Then, it examines whether Australian firms 
beat two earnings benchmarks—reporting profits and sustaining last year’s earnings. 
The examination is based on studying the distribution of reported earnings and 
earnings changes. It also analyzes to what extent the benchmark beating behaviour is 
caused by earnings management—the shifting of firms from below benchmarks to 
above benchmarks; the behaviour of adjusted discretionary accruals; and the 
relationship between earnings management and benchmark beating. In addition, 
‘cookie jar’ and/or ‘big bath’ accounting are investigated to address the dynamic 
nature of earnings management surrounding the benchmarks.  
 
7.2 Descriptive statistics (testing sample) 
 
The sample used in testing benchmark beating incentives is the same as that of testing 
executive compensation incentives. There are 3,326 firm-year observations covering 
the period of 2000 to 2006. The sample selection procedure is presented in Table 4.2. 
Basic descriptive statistics of the sample are presented in Table 7.1. Mean (median) 
reported earnings (E) and earnings change (ΔE) are −0.1242 (−0.0291) and 0.0396 
(0.0033), respectively. Mean (median) pre-managed earnings (PME) and pre-
managed earnings change (ΔPME) are −0.1261 (−0.0409) and 0.0378 (−0.0011) 
respectively. Mean (median) adjusted discretionary accruals (DA_ADJ) is −0.0038 
(0.0000). The reason for using adjusted discretionary accruals has been demonstrated 
in the previous chapter - section of 6.2, Paragraph 7.   
 
7.3 Analysis of benchmarks beating behaviour 
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Empirical studies suggest that executives are concerned about two benchmarks when 
they report earnings, that is, to report profits (positive earnings) and to report earnings 
increases (sustain last year’s earnings). The possible reasons for managers to inflate 
earnings to report positive income and income increase are to reduce the costs in 
transactions between the firm and its stakeholders as those stakeholders favour 
positive earnings information (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997); to turn a loss to a profit 
because a loss (earnings decrease) may  negatively affect firms’ credit ratings and 
their cost of capital (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997); the market penalizes firms who 
break a string of earnings increase (Myers and Skinner, 2006);  and,  meeting or 
surpassing previous year’s earrings is an important trigger for executives to receive 
high incentive compensations (Holland and Ramsay, 2003). Hence, profits and last 
year’s earnings are the two important thresholds that managers would target. In the 
following sections, whether Australian firms beat these two benchmarks is first 
examined.  
 
7.3.1 Evidence on reporting profits 
 
In Chapter 3 Section 3.3.2.2, it is predicted that empirical distribution of earnings 
level will be discontinuous around zero, consistent with firms managing earnings to 
avoid small loss and report small profits. Figure 7.1 Panel A is a histogram of 
earnings levels scaled by beginning total assets with an interval width of 0.04 and 
range of −1 to +1. The scaled earnings levels greater than +1 or less than −1 are not 
shown here. The histogram of earnings levels shows a single-peaked, bell-shaped 
distribution with a distinct discontinuity at zero. It is observed there is less frequency 
of observation immediately below zero and more frequency of observation 
immediately above zero relative to expected frequencies under the assumption of 
smooth distribution. Positive values of earnings level consist of the firms reporting 
profits while negative values of earnings level consist of loss making firms. Such 
discontinuity indicates that small earnings losses occur less frequently and small 
earnings profits occur more frequently than would be expected in the smooth 
distribution.  
 
The significance of this discontinuity around zero is confirmed by the statistical test. 
Applying Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) Z-statistics, Table 7.2 Panel A reports that 
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the z-statistic for the standardized differences for the interval immediately below 
(above) zero are −2.89 (5.52), both significant at 1% level. Therefore, by visual 
inspection and formal test, the discontinuity around zero earnings level is statistically 
significant, leading to a rejection of the null hypothesis that the distribution is 
relatively smooth in the absence of earnings management. This finding, to some 
extent, is consistent with previous studies using Australian data. Holland and Ramsay 
(2003) used an interval width of 0.01 for the range −0.25 to +0.24, and their test 
statistics are −2.83 for the interval immediately below zero and 3.85 for the interval 
immediately above zero. Coulton et al. (2005) used 0.01 interval width for the range 
of −0.24 to +0.24. The Z-statistic for the interval immediately above zero is 2.57. 
However, they did not report the Z-statistics immediately below zero.  
 
It is also predicted that discontinuity at zero will disappear in the distribution of pre-
managed earnings level. Following prior studies (for example, DeFond and Park, 
1997), pre-managed earnings are computed as net income before extraordinary items 
minus adjusted discretionary accruals (both variables are scaled by beginning year 
total assets). Pre-managed earnings represent income in the absence of earnings 
management.  The histogram for pre-managed earnings is generated in the same 
manner as that for reported earnings. Figure 7.1 Panel B displays that there is no 
discontinuity in the distribution of pre-managed earnings. The distribution of pre-
managed earnings levels is relatively smooth around zero. There is little disparity 
between the frequencies immediately below and above zero. Further, Table 7.2 Panel 
B reports Z-statistics to be immediately below (−1.88) and above (1.90) zero, 
indicating that the frequency of the interval to report small losses and small profits are 
not significantly different from the expected frequency in the distribution of pre-
managed earnings level.  
 
7.3.2 Evidence on sustaining last year’s earnings 
 
Chapter 3 Section 3.3.2.2 also proposes that earnings are managed to sustain last 
years’ earnings performance. Figure 7.2 Panel A shows the distribution of earnings 
changes scaled by beginning total assets with an interval width of 0.04 and a range of 
−1 to +1. Compared to the distribution of reported earnings, there is stronger 
statistical support for the argument that firms manage earnings to report income 
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increases. This is in contrast to Holland and Ramsay (2003) who documented weaker 
statistical support for earnings management to sustain the previous year’s earnings, as 
opposed to reporting profits.  
 
 The histogram reveals a discontinuity at zero, with a lower than expected number of 
observations at the interval immediately below zero and higher than the expected 
number of observations at the interval immediately above zero. In Table 7.2 Panel A, 
the Z-statistics test the smoothness of earnings changes distributions in the intervals 
immediately below (at) zero are −6.15 (13.60), both significant at 1% level. Not 
surprisingly, in benchmark 1, managers are predicted to report small profits; earnings 
discontinuity thus occurred in the interval slightly above zero [0, 0.04]. However, if 
the purpose of earnings management is to sustain last year’s earnings, which is 
proposed in the second benchmark, then the discontinuity of earnings change 
distribution would occur just at zero and, therefore, Z-statistics show significant 
positive value only for the zero interval rather than the interval slightly above zero. 
This implies that managers manipulate earnings to report the same earnings as the 
previous year. 
 
Figure 7.2 Panel B shows a bell-shaped distribution of pre-managed earnings change 
without an outstanding discontinuity. It is observed to be a relatively symmetrical 
distribution with similar frequencies at immediately below and above zero. Table 7.2 
Panel B reports that Z-statistics in the interval immediately below (above) zero is 1.19 
(1.13), which is insignificantly different from the expected frequency in the 
distribution of pre-managed earnings change. 
 
The above analysis shows there are visible and statistically significant discontinuities 
around zero in the distribution of earnings levels and earnings changes. It is observed 
that there is an unusually higher frequency for the interval immediately above zero 
and unusually lower frequency for the interval immediately below zero for each of 
these distributions. However, the distributions of pre-managed earnings levels and 
changes are not discontinuous around zero with indistinguishable frequency of 
observations for the interval immediately above (below) zero. This implies that 
adjusted discretionary accruals or earnings management may be the factor that 
contributes to the discontinuities in the distribution of earnings levels and changes, 
since pre-managed earnings levels and changes are constructed as reported earnings 
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levels and changes subtract adjusted discretionary accruals. Therefore, this study 
suggests that managers may exercise discretion through accruals to meet/beat the 
benchmarks.  
 
7.4 Analysis of firms’ shifting when true earnings below benchmarks 
 
If managers are expected to meet/beat earnings targets through the use of adjusted 
discretionary accruals, adjusted discretionary accruals should have an effect on 
increasing the frequency of observations in reporting profits and earnings increases. 
So, in this section, it is examined if adjusted discretionary accruals increase the 
frequency of firm-year observations in reporting positive earnings levels and changes. 
The examination first focuses on broad intervals. Then, small intervals surrounding 
benchmarks are examined to test whether adjusted discretionary accruals increase the 
frequency of small positive earnings levels and changes.  
 
Table 7.3 Panel A reports that adjusted discretionary accruals have the effect of 
significantly increasing the frequency of positive earnings levels from 42.29 % (1,407 
observations) before earnings management to 45.36 % (1,509 observations) after 
earnings management. Further, 8.11 % of the total sample (270 observations) shifts 
from pre-managed earnings losses (PMEit < 0) to report post-earnings profits (Eit ≥ 0). 
These firms are suspected of using positive adjusted discretionary accruals to 
transform earnings losses to profits. There is another 5.04 % (167 observations) 
allocated in the interval of pre-managed earnings making profits but reporting 
earnings losses (PMEit ≥ 0 and Eit < 0). One potential reason for those firms to move 
from pre-managed earnings profits to reported earnings losses is the use of adjusted 
discretionary accruals to smooth earnings, which reduces the fluctuations in earnings. 
 
Following Kanji (1993), the Z test is applied to evaluate significant changes in the 
frequency before and after a particular intervention.26  Given that managers 
                                                 
26 The Z statistics are consistent with Kanji (1993) who test for correlated proportions and evaluate the significant 
change in the frequency before and after a given intervention. If the number of observations shifts from pre-
managed earnings losses interval to the reported earnings profits interval denoted by b, the number of observations 
shifts from pre-managed earnings profits to the reported earnings losses is denoted by c, and the total number of 
observations is denoted by N, then z-statistic is computed as:  
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manipulate earnings through accruals, there should be a significant change in the 
frequency before and after such intervention. The frequency of firms that shift from 
pre-managed earnings losses to reported profits is higher than the frequency of firms 
that shift from pre-managed earnings profits to reported losses. The difference is 3.09 
% (103 observations).  Kanji Z-statistics confirm that such difference is significant (z-
statistic = 5.87, p-value = 0.001) at the one percent level.27  This indicates there are 
more firms shifting from pre-managed earnings losses to reporting profit rather than 
shifting from pre-managed earnings profits to reporting losses.  
 
Adjusted discretionary accruals also significantly increase the frequency of firms 
reporting small profits. Table 7.3 Panel A shows within the small intervals of [−0.04, 
0.04], the frequency of firm reporting small earnings profits increases from 12.59% 
(419 observations) to 16.86 % (561 observations). Further, 3.48 % (116 firm-year 
observations) shifts from pre-managed small earnings losses (−0.04 ≤ PMEit < 0) to 
report small earnings profits (0 ≤ Eit < 0.04), and 57 firm-years observations shift from 
pre-managed small earnings profits (0 ≤ PMEit < 0.04) to report small earnings losses 
(−0.04 ≤ Eit < 0). The Kanji test (z-statistics = 4.49, p-value = 0.001) confirms that the 
difference between two correlated proportions of pre and post earnings management 
is significant; moreover, the stimulus of managers’ manipulations has produced a 
significant change in the proportion of reported small earnings profits.  
 
Table 7.3 Panel B reports the impact of adjusted discretionary accruals on the 
frequency of firms reporting positive earnings changes. The frequency of observations 
reporting earnings is increased from 49.68% (1,652 observations) to 52.19% (1,736 
observations). Moreover, there was an 11.61% (387) observations that shift from 
negative pre-managed earnings changes to reporting positive earnings changes; while 
there was an 9.1% (303) observations that shift from positive pre-managed earnings 
changes to report negative earnings changes. The frequency of firms shifting from 
pre-managed earnings decreases to reporting earnings increases is higher than the 
frequency of firms shifting from pre-managed earnings increases to reporting earnings 
decreases. The difference is 2.52 % (84 observations). Kanji Z-statistics confirm that 
such difference is significant (z-statistics = 3.81, p-value = 0.001) at one percent level. 
This finding is consistent with the argument that managers inflate earnings to 
                                                 
27 Significant levels reported are two-tailed against the standardized normal distribution. 
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transform lower than previous year’s earnings to report an earnings level which is 
higher than or at least equal to last year’s earnings level.  
 
In the small intervals of [−0.04, 0.04], adjusted discretionary accruals also 
significantly increase the frequency of firms to report small positive earnings changes. 
Table 7.3 Panel B shows that the frequency of firms reporting small earnings changes 
increases from 16.03 % (533 observations) before earnings management to 29.79 % 
(991 observations) after earnings management. Further, 5.53 % (184) observations 
shifts from pre-managed small earnings decrease (−0.04 ≤ ∆PMEit < 0) to report small 
earnings increase (0 ≤ ∆Eit < 0.04), and 136 firm-year observations shift from pre-
managed small earnings increase (0 ≤ ∆PMEit < 0.04) to report small earnings 
decrease (−0.04 ≤ ∆Eit < 0). The Kanji test confirms that such changes in the 
proportion is significant before and after managers’ manipulation (z-statistics= 2.68, 
p-value=0.01). Thus, adjusted discretionary accruals are used to manage earnings to 
transform small earnings decreases into small earnings increases or at least report the 
same earnings levels as the previous year.  
 
In all, the results also show that adjusted discretionary accruals significantly increase 
the frequencies of observations reporting positive earnings levels and changes. 
Moreover, adjusted discretionary accruals significantly increase the frequencies of 
firms reporting small profits and small earnings increases. Therefore, this study 
suggests that adjusted discretionary accruals have the effect of increasing the 
frequency of observation in reporting profits and earnings increases. 
 
7.5 The behaviour of discretionary accruals for true earnings below benchmarks 
 
Previous sections of 7.3 and 7.4 suggest that adjusted discretionary accruals may have 
the effect of shaping discontinuities in the distribution of reported earnings levels and 
changes; and, the shifting of observations from pre-managed earnings below the 
benchmarks to above the benchmark. However, neither of them directly examine the 
behaviour of discretionary accruals. So, this section directly focuses on adjusted 
discretionary accruals, and its role, that allows managers to inflate earnings to meet 
relevant benchmarks when true earnings fall short of corresponding benchmarks.  
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Table 7.4 presents that 62.91 % of pre-managed earnings loss making firms (PMEit < 
0) have positive adjusted discretionary accruals. In contrast, only 32.34 % of pre-
managed earnings profits making firms (PMEit ≥ 0) have positive adjusted 
discretionary accruals. Moreover, 69.14 % of pre-managed earnings lower than the 
previous year’s earnings firms (∆PMEit < 0) have positive adjusted discretionary 
accruals, while only 30.58 % of pre-managed earnings higher than or equal to the 
previous year’s earnings firms (∆PMEit  ≥  0) show positive adjusted discretionary 
accruals.  
 
Nevertheless, 37.09 % (30.86 %) pre-managed earnings loss making firms (lower than 
last years’ earnings) exhibit negative adjusted discretionary accruals, possibly, these 
firms ‘take a bath’ when pre-managed earnings deficits are too large to be covered by 
adjusted discretionary accruals. There are also 67.66 % (69.42 %) of pre-managed 
earnings profits making firms (pre-managed earnings higher than or equal to last 
years’ earnings) are identified with negative adjusted discretionary accruals. This is 
consistent with the argument that managers will decrease earnings to create some 
slack for future periods when current pre-managed earnings are well above 
benchmarks.   
 
Table 7.5 Panel A reports mean (median) adjusted discretionary accruals for the 
intervals that show a large shift in observations. If adjusted discretionary accruals 
have an effect on a firm’s shift when pre-managed earnings are below benchmarks, it 
is expected that the mean (median) value of adjusted discretionary accruals would be 
significantly different between pre and post managed earnings intervals. Results show  
that firms with pre-managed earnings below zero have significant positive mean 
(median) adjusted discretionary accruals, 0.0273 (0.0311); while firms with pre-
managed earnings above zero exhibit significant negative mean (median) adjusted 
discretionary accruals with  −0.0329 (−0.0292). Moreover, two-sample t tests show 
that adjusted discretionary accruals are significantly different between two sample of 
pre-managed earnings below and above zero firms (t-statistic = 25.96, p <.0001). 
These results support the prediction that a firm manages earnings conditional on pre-
managed earnings level which predicts income-increasing (income-decreasing) 
earnings management when the firm’s pre-managed earnings performance under-
shoots (exceeds) the benchmark.  
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Within the small interval [-0.04, 0.04], firms with pre-managed earnings making 
small losses are found to engage in income-increasing earnings management. Mean 
(median) adjusted discretionary accruals of firms with −0.04 ≤ PMEit < 0 are positive 
0.0154 (0.0260) and significantly different from zero. Further, mean (median) 
adjusted discretionary accruals of firms with 0 ≤ PMEit < 0.04 are insignificant which 
makes sense as no earnings management will take place when pre-managed earnings 
are already meeting the benchmark. Two sample t tests show pre-managed earnings 
with small losses firms have significantly higher positive adjusted discretionary 
accruals than pre-managed earnings make small profit firms (t-statistic=2.98, p-
value=0.0029).   
 
Table 7.5 Panel B reports that firms with negative pre-managed earnings change show 
higher positive adjusted discretionary accruals than firms with positive pre-managed 
earnings change. Mean (median) adjusted discretionary accruals for firms with 
negative pre-managed earnings change is 0.0336 (0.0349), significant positive. While 
mean (median) adjusted discretionary accruals for firms have positive pre-managed 
earnings change is significant negative −0.0303 (−0.0334). Two-sample test for the 
difference shows adjusted discretionary accruals are significantly different between 
two samples of pre-managed earnings change below and above zero firms (t-statistic= 
27.36, p<.0001). These results support the prediction that managers use positive 
adjusted discretionary accruals to report earnings increase when pre-managed 
earnings are below previous year’s earnings.   
 
Within the interval [-0.04, 0.04], firms with pre-managed earnings just below last 
year’s earnings are found to manipulate earnings upward to report an earnings 
increase or sustain previous year’s earnings.  Mean (median) adjusted discretionary 
accruals of firms within −0.04 ≤ ∆PMEit < 0 are positive 0.0099 (0.0129) and 
significantly different from zero; while mean (median) adjusted discretionary accruals 
of firms within 0 ≤ ∆PMEit < 0.04 are negative −0.0073 (−0.0090). Two-sample t tests 
indicate that pre-managed earnings with a small decrease has higher positive adjusted 
discretionary accruals compared with pre-managed earnings with a small increase or 
the same as previous year’s earnings (t-statistic = 4.84, p-value <.0001).  
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Therefore, these results show that firms are more likely to exercise discretionary 
accruals to manage earnings upwards with a higher frequency and amount of positive 
discretionary accruals when the true earnings are below the benchmarks.  
 
7.6 The relation of discretionary accruals and true earnings below benchmarks 
 
This section extends above analysis, and tests whether adjusted discretionary accruals 
are associated with the extent to which pre-managed earnings would otherwise fall 
short of a particular benchmark. Firm characteristics and industry effects are 
controlled. The estimated coefficients and t statistics are White (1980) estimates in 
two-way cluster robust regression.  
 
In Table 7.6 Panel A, Model (1) considers firms with pre-managed earnings are below 
zero (loss-making firms). The indicator variable BELOW_1 equals one if a firm has 
pre-managed earnings below zero (PMEit < 0) and zero if above zero. This is a 
baseline regression testing general association between adjusted discretionary accruals 
and pre-managed earnings levels. The positive and significant coefficient estimates on 
BELOW_1 in model 1 are consistent with the hypothesis that managers make positive 
adjusted discretionary accruals when pre-managed earnings are negative.  
 
Since all firms may not manipulate earnings upward when their pre-managed earnings 
are below zero, the focus is further narrowed to those firms with pre-managed 
earnings that are below zero but reported earnings are above zero.  So, in Model (2), 
the sample is restricted to ex post profits reporting firms only (Eit ≥ 0).  The 
coefficient on BELOW_2 is significantly positive, indicating for those post profits 
reported firms, and managers, there is a tendency to use positive discretionary 
accruals when pre-managed earnings are negative.  
 
The results are insensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of control variables. As 
predicted, the coefficients on SIZE are negative for both Model (1) and (2). However, 
the coefficient on SIZE is significant in Model (2) while insignificant in Model (1), 
this implies that small size firms are more likely to inflate earnings when pre-
managed earnings are below zero but reported earnings are above zero. In both model 
(1) and (2), ROE, LEV and CIR are significantly positive, suggesting that earnings 
management is more likely to occur in higher profit, highly leveraged and capital 
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intensity firms when pre-managed earnings are less than zero. GROWTH, BM and 
LAGTA are insignificant and have no effect on discretionary accruals.  
 
In terms of industry effects, Material, Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer 
Staples, Health Care, Telecommunication & Utilities show a significant positive 
association with adjusted discretionary accruals in model (1), suggesting firms of 
these industries have a tendency to inflate earnings to beat the benchmarks when pre-
managed earnings are below zero. While in model (2), the significantly positive 
association holds only in the industry of Telecommunication & Utilities. The 
restriction of the sample to ex post profits reporting firms increase the adjusted R2 
from 20% to 35%. In other words, the restricted sample improves the model power in 
explaining cross-sectional variation in earnings management relative to earnings 
benchmark.  
 
In Table 7.6 Panel A, Model (3) considers the intervals just around benchmark [-0.04, 
0.04].  The indicator variable BELOW_3 equals one if the firm has pre-managed 
earnings just below zero (−0.04 ≤ PMEit < 0) and zero if just above zero (0 ≤  PMEit < 
0.04). The coefficient on BELOW_3 is significantly positive which is consistent with 
the view that when firms’ pre-managed earnings are slightly below zero, managers 
use income increasing adjusted discretionary accruals to inflate reported earnings to 
report small profits. In the small intervals surrounding the benchmarks, coefficients 
are significant for control variables ROE, BM and LAGTA and insignificant for SIZE 
GROWTH, LEV and CIR.  
 
Model (4) considers whether the results will be sensitive when ex post earnings are 
taken into account. The sample is restricted to firms with pre-managed earnings just 
below zero but reported earnings just above zero (0≤ Eit < 0.04). The coefficients on 
BELOW_4 is still significantly positive which is consistent with the view that when 
firms pre-managed earnings are slightly below zero, managers use income increasing 
discretionary accruals to inflate reported earnings to report small profits. Surprisingly, 
the coefficient on SIZE turns positive and significant, suggesting that larger firms 
have a stronger effect than smaller firms in beating the benchmark to make small 
profits. This is inconsistent with the prediction of this researcher. In the small 
intervals surrounding the benchmarks, coefficients are significantly positive for 
control variables ROE and LAGTA. In terms of industry effects, Material, Industrials, 
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Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Health Care show a significant, positive 
association with adjusted discretionary accruals in Model (3), suggesting firms of 
these industries have a tendency to inflate earnings to report small profits when pre-
managed earnings are below zero. While in Model (4), the industry effects are 
insignificant among all sectors. Adjusted R2 are 56% and 64% for Model (3) and (4) 
respectively. It shows the predictive ability of a model has substantially increased as 
testing intervals move from a big region to a small and more specific region that 
surrounding the benchmarks.  
 
In Table 7.6 Panel B, Model (1) tests firms with pre-managed earnings which are 
below last year’s earnings (income decrease firms). The indicator variable BELOW_1 
equals one if a firm has pre-managed earnings below last year’s earnings (∆PMEit < 0) 
and zero otherwise. The positive and significant coefficient on BELOW_1 supports 
the view that managers use positive adjusted discretionary accruals to inflate earnings 
when pre-managed earnings are below last year’s earnings. In Model (2), the sample 
is restricted to firms with reported earnings above last year’s earnings (∆Eit ≥ 0). The 
coefficient on BELOW_2 is still significantly positive. This means that managers tend 
to use positive discretionary accruals to report income increases or at least sustain the 
previous year’s earnings when pre-managed earnings fall short of the prior year’s 
level.  
 
In both Model (1) and (2), SIZE is significantly negative while LEV and CIR are 
significantly positive. GROWTH has no effect on earnings management behaviour. 
ROE has a positive association with discretionary accruals but is only significant for 
the sample where pre-managed earnings are less than those of the previous year. 
LAGTA only has a significantly positive association with discretionary accruals for 
the sample with pre-managed earnings less than that of the previous year and post 
earnings greater than the previous year’s.  The restriction of this study’s sample to 
post earnings greater than last year’s firms increase the adjusted R2 from 17% to 30%. 
In terms of industry effects, Metals & Mining, Health Care and Telecommunication & 
Utilities show significant positive association with adjusted discretionary accruals in 
both Model (1) and (2), suggesting that firms of these industries have a tendency to 
inflate earnings to report earnings increases when pre-managed earnings are below the 
previous year’s earnings.  
 
 
158
In Table 7.6 Panel B, Models (3) and (4) test the intervals just around benchmark [-
0.04, 0.04].  The indicator variable BELOW_3 equals one if the firm has pre-managed 
earnings just below the previous year’s earnings (−0.04 ≤ ∆PMEit < 0) and zero if just 
above the previous year’s earnings (0 ≤  ∆PMEit < 0.04).  In model 4, this thesis 
considers whether the results will be sensitive when ex post earnings are taken into 
account. The sample is restricted to firms with pre-managed earnings just below the 
previous year’s earnings but reported earnings just above the previous year’s earnings 
(0 ≤ ∆Eit < 0.04). Both coefficients on BELOW_3 and BELOW_4 are significantly 
positive which is consistent with the view that when firms pre-managed earnings is 
slightly below last year’s earnings, managers use income increasing discretionary 
accruals to inflate reported earnings to report earnings slightly above the previous 
year’s earnings or at least equal to the previous year’s level.  
 
As smaller firms face lower costs and are subject to less monitoring if earnings 
management is brought to light, the coefficient on SIZE is negative and significant for 
both Model (3) and (4). There is some weak evidence to suggest that high growth 
firms are associated with discretionary accruals when pre-managed earnings are 
below the previous year’s earnings. The coefficient on ROE is positive and 
significant. This is consistent with Brown (2001) and Barua et al. (2006) who argue 
that the propensity for achieving benchmarks is systematically higher in profit-
reporting firms compared to loss-reporting firms. LEV, CIR and LAGTA are all 
insignificant. In terms of industry effects, Telecommunication & Utilities is 
significant in Model (3); and, Material, Industrials, Consumer Staples, Health Care 
and Telecommunication & Utilities are significant in Model (4). These industries have 
a tendency to inflate earnings to report earnings increases when pre-managed earnings 
are below the previous year’s earnings. Adjusted R2 are improved in Model (4) 
relative to that of Model (3).  
 
In summary, the analysis from sections 7.3 to 7.6 shows that adjusted discretionary 
accruals cause the discontinuities observed in the distributions of reported earnings. It 
has an effect on shifting the observations from pre-managed earnings below the 
benchmarks to across the benchmarks. Moreover, there is a significantly positive 
association between adjusted discretionary accruals and pre-managed earnings below 
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benchmarks, suggesting that managers inflate earnings to beat relevant benchmarks 
when true earnings would otherwise fall short of a particular benchmark.  
 
7.7 Analysis of ‘cookie jar’ and/or ‘big bath’ type of earnings management 
 
Prior research also documents income-decreasing earnings management in the 
situations when pre-managed earnings exceed targets by a substantial amount; and, 
when pre-managed earnings fall far below targets and accounting reserves are not 
sufficient to reach targets.  These two situations are well known as ‘cookie jar’ and 
‘big bath’ earnings management. So, this section is an additional analysis which 
examines whether these two situations hold.  
 
In Table 7.6 Panel A and B, Model (5) replaces BELOW variables with two other 
variables HIGH (LOW) which are an indicator variable taking the value of one if the 
proxy for pre-managed earnings exceed (fall short) earnings benchmarks by a large 
margin and zero otherwise. Following Peasnell et al. (2005), the large margin is 
defined as pre-managed earnings for firm i in year t exceeding (falling short) of either 
of the two benchmarks, and, it is above (below) 75th (25th) percentile of the 
distribution of the exceeding (deficit) part. Specifically, HIGH is equal to one if 1) 
PMEt >0 and PMEt – 0>75th percentile of the exceeding part, 2) PMEt > Et-1 and, 
PMEt – Et-1 > 75th percentile of the exceeding part, respectively.  LOW is equal to one 
if 1) PMEt <0 and PMEt – 0<25th percentile of the deficit part, 2) PMEt < Et-1 and, 
PMEt – Et-1 <25th percentile of the deficit part, respectively. Managers are expected to 
manipulate earnings downwards when pre-managed earnings are well above (below) 
earnings benchmarks and therefore the coefficients on both HIGH and LOW will be 
negative.  
 
      Panel A shows the result for pre-managed earnings benchmarked against zero while 
Panel B provides findings for pre-managed earnings benchmarked against the 
previous year’s earnings. Results are similar for both earnings benchmarks. The 
coefficients on HIGH are significantly negative for both benchmarks, indicating 
income-decreasing earnings management when pre-managed earnings are well above 
targets. This is consistent with the first argument of ‘cookie jar’ accounting—firms 
reduce current earnings in order to save some income for the future. However the 
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coefficients on LOW are significantly positive for both earnings benchmarks, which 
contradict the prediction. The results show that Australian firms increase income even 
when pre-managed earnings are far below targets. The theory of ‘big bath’ is not 
supported with the testing sample and investigation period.   
 
Recall in Table 5.13, there is no specific association between the magnitude of 
earnings management and leverage and lagged total accruals. The t-test for the 
difference of leverage between High Abs (DA_ADJ) and Low Abs (DA_ADJ) does not 
show any significant difference. The change of LAGTA is somewhat irregular across 
the portfolios with no significant difference between High and Low Abs (DA_ADJ) 
groups. However, the regression results of Table 7.6 in Panel A and B show the 
leverage and lagged total accruals variables have generated some significant 
coefficients. For example, the coefficients on leverage are significant in Model (1), 
(2) and (5) of Panel A and B; and, the coefficients on lagged total accruals are 
significant in Model (3) and (4) of Panel A, Model (2) of Panel B. The reason for this 
contradiction on the controlled variables is that signed discretionary accruals which 
incorporate both income-increasing and income-decreasing earnings management are 
used in testing the benchmark beating behaviour whereas Table 5.13 focuses on the 
magnitude of earnings management which is measured as the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals. Therefore, the dependent variables in two tables are different.  
 
7.8 Chapter summary  
 
The chapter examines the second earnings management incentive—the benchmarks 
beating incentive. First, it provides descriptive statistics on the selected variables in 
testing the benchmarks beating incentive. Then, it examines whether Australian firms 
beat two earnings benchmarks—reporting profits and sustaining the previous year’s 
earnings. The examination is based on studying the distribution of reported earnings 
and earnings changes. It also analyzes to what extent the benchmark beating 
behaviour is caused by earnings management—the shifting of firms from below 
benchmarks to above benchmarks; the behaviour of adjusted discretionary accruals; 
and the relationship between earnings management and benchmarks beating. In 
addition, ‘cookie jar’ and/or ‘big bath’ accounting are investigated to address the 
dynamic nature of earnings management surrounding benchmarks.  
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Chapter 8  
Sensitivity Analysis 
 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
Previous chapters found that earnings management takes place in the Australian 
context. Further, it is more likely to be driven by managerial incentives to maximize 
their compensations and to beat relevant earnings benchmarks.  
 
Chapter 6 has reported that earnings management behaviour is motivated, at least 
partly, by executive compensations. One immediate concern is that executive 
compensation could be jointly determined with earnings management behaviour. 
While compensation induces managers to engage in opportunistic earnings 
management, earnings manipulation may enable managers to increase their 
compensations. If executive compensation is jointly determined with earnings 
management, previous results in testing the association between earnings management 
and executive compensations would be biased. 
 
Chapter 7 has reported that managers have incentives to beat two earnings 
benchmarks: to report profits and to sustain the previous year’s earnings. Moreover, 
managers are more likely to inflate income to beat benchmarks when the true earnings 
are below the benchmarks.  True earnings are defined as pre-managed earnings and 
measured as reported earnings minus adjusted discretionary accruals. However, this 
method could induce a spurious association between earnings management and pre-
managed earnings below the benchmarks, which is known as the backing-out problem 
(Lim and Lustgarten, 2002).  
 
This thesis, therefore, is aware of the potential endogeneity issues in examining the 
association between earnings management and executive compensations; and, the 
backing-out problem in examining the association between earnings management and 
benchmark beating incentives.  The examination of these two issues will be the main 
focus of the sensitivity analysis in this chapter.  
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8.2 The endogeneity problem  
 
Previous studies have addressed a potential simultaneity problem that may exist 
between discretionary accruals and the compensation structure. There are two schools 
of thought. On one hand, Healy (1985), Gaver et al. (1995), Holthausen et al. (1995), 
Guidry et al. (1999), Gao and Shrieves (2002), Baker et al. (2003), Cheng and 
Warfield (2005), and Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) view earnings management as 
driven by executive compensation contracting. Managers’ incentives for personal 
wealth maximiziation induce opportunistic earnings management behaviour to occur. 
This line of research typically models earnings management behaviour as a function 
of executive compensations.  
 
On the other hand, some researchers investigate the effect of earnings management on 
executive compensations. Balsam (1998), Matsunaga and Park (2001), and Shuto 
(2007) explored whether positive discretionary accruals are positively associated with 
CEO cash compensation; they interpret such a relationship as evidence of pay for 
performance. The underlying economic reason is that the compensation committee 
distinguishes between the components of earnings and reward managers when they 
use upward earnings management to achieve the firms’ earnings targets. In their 
models, executive compensation is modeled as a function of discretionary accruals. 
 
The two streams of studies raise an issue of executive compensation being jointly 
determined with earnings management, that is, the incentives for high compensation 
leading to the use of income-increasing accruals, which then can result in additional 
compensation pay if the firms’ earnings targets are achieved. If this is the case, 
compensation structure variables will be endogenous.  
 
It is well known that one of the key assumptions of standard linear regression analysis 
is that the regressors (explanatory variables) are statistically independent of the error 
component of the model. Given a standard linear regression model Y= X β + є, where 
Y denotes the 1n vector of observations on the dependent variable, X denotes the 
kn matrix of observations on the explanatory variables (regressors), β is the 
unknown 1k vector of regression parameters and є is 1n  vector of unobserved 
disturbance, it follows that the OLS estimator, XXXOLS  1)(ˆ  є, is a consistent 
estimator of the true coefficient when E (є | X) = 0.  Regressors in this case are said to 
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be exogenous, which means they are determined outside the model. However, if this 
assumption is not true—if the regressors vary systematically with the error term—
then OLS estimated coefficients are inconsistent and biased. Regressors might fail to be 
independent because they are simultaneously determined along with the dependent 
variables. Simultaneity occurs when there is a feedback relationship between one or 
more of the explanatory variables and the dependent variable (Greene, 2002). 
 
One immediate concern for the OLS bias is the endogeneity of executive 
compensation which could be jointly determined with earnings management 
behaviour. In the presence of a simultaneity problem, regressors are said to be 
endogenous as E (є | X) ≠ 0 and therefore lead to  OLSˆ . One solution to this 
problem is to use two-stage least squares or 2SLS, or more generally as the 
instrumental variables method (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981). This method requires 
replacing the endogenous variable on the right-hand side of the equations with a 
predicted value and such predicted value is constructed by regressing endogenous 
variable on a set of instrumental variables.  
 
An instrumental variable must have two properties: it must be uncorrelated with the error 
term, and must explain part of the variability in the endogenous regressor. The best 
choice for instruments of the variables could be any independent variables useful for 
predicting the dependent regressors. Assume Zit represents instruments, so the 2SLS 
estimator for β is ZZIV PXXPX  1)(ˆ  є, where ZZZZPZ  1)( , Z is an 
qn matrix containing the instrumental variables. 2SLS estimator IVˆ is a consistent 
estimator of β when the endogenous regressor is replaced by a fitted value that is 
constructed from a set of instrumental variables, since these instruments should be 
uncorrelated with the error term, i.e.  E (є | Z) = 0.  
 
Baker et al. (2003) were among the first to test for, and found evidence of, 
endogeneity in their models due to the variable of option compensation. They used 
two-stage least square approach (2SLS) to alleviate this problem. In the first stage, 
they regressed options on a set of instrumental variables including CEOs tenure, 
return on assets, the change in stock price, the market-to-book ratio, and an indicator 
variable for CEOs in their final year, plus all other exogenous variables in the 
discretionary accruals model. In the second stage, the fitted value of option was used 
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to replace the original option variable in the discretionary accruals model. They 
argued that the main advantage of this method is that discretionary accruals are 
modelled on the expected rather than realized option. Since the expected option is 
predicted from all exogenous variables, such measure should be exogenous or 
independent from discretionary accruals and therefore mitigate potential endogeneity 
problem.   
 
This thesis considers that although in Chapter 6, the analysis of executive 
compensation incentives, the two-way cluster-robust regressions were adopted in an 
attempt to correct both cross-sectional correlation and serial correlation, estimators 
maybe still biased. This is because compensation structure variables TCOMP, FIX, 
ATRISK, SALARY, BONUS, OPTIONS, SHARES, LTIP on the right-hand side of the 
equations (4.9), (4.10), and (4.11) maybe endogenous and correlated with the error 
term. 
 
Using COMP denotes various compensation structure variables. COMP is composed 
of a systematic part, which is its expected value E(COMP), and a random part, which 
is the reduced form random error, that is, 
 
itit COMPECOMP  )(                                                                                         (8.1) 
 
It is vit that causes compensation structure variables to be correlated with the error 
term it . If the expected compensation is known, compensation structure variables in 
the equations (4.9), (4.10), and (4.11) could be replaced by equation (8.1) to obtain, 
 
itjjitititit INDCONTROLCOMPEADJDA   210 ])([_  
       )()( 1210 ititjjitit INDCONTROLCOMPE                              
itjjitit INDCONTROLCOMPE   210 )(                      (8.2) 
 
In equation (8.2), the regressor on the right-hand side is the expected compensation 
E(COMP), which is predicted from instrumental and exogenous variables. Following 
Baker et al. (2003), since the expected compensation is predicted from instrumental 
and exogenous variables, it should not be correlated with the error term it  and 
therefore mitigate the endogeneity problem. So, given the equation is identified, its 
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parameters can be estimated in two steps: (1) estimate the parameters of the reduced 
form equations by OLS and obtain the predicted values of compensation structure 
variables, see equation (8.3); (2) replace the compensation structure variables on the 
right-hand side of the equation (4.9), (4.10), and (4.11) by their predicted values from 
(8.3) and estimate the parameters by OLS, see equation (8.4).  
 
     itjjititit INDCONTROLZCOMP   210                                         (8.3) 
     itjjititit INDCONTROLCOMPADJDA  

210_                     (8.4) 
 
Where COMPit = compensation structure variables, including total compensation, 
fixed pay (salary), at-risk pay, bonus, options, shares, and long-term incentive plans 
respectively; Zit = instrumental variables to estimate compensation, including total 
shareholder returns, firm values, the volatility of firms’ stock price, dividend dummy 
variable, and tax dummy variable; DA_ADJit = adjusted discretionary accruals, 
including absolute adjusted discretionary accruals, positive and negative adjusted 
discretionary accruals, respectively; CONTROLit = control variables including size, 
growth, firm performance, book-to-market, capital intensity, and lag total accruals; all 
are assumed to be exogenous except lag total accruals; itCOMP

= fitted value of 
compensation structure variables predicted from first-stage regression; INDj = 
industry dummy variables; it  and it = error terms; i, j and t denote firm, industry 
and year subscripts, respectively.  
 
So, in the first stage regression, the expected total compensation and its components 
are estimated from the instrumental variables. These variables are documented as 
determinants of executive compensation but are arguably not directly related to 
discretionary accruals. Also, the other independent variables in modelling 
discretionary accruals are included with the exception of lag total accruals (LAGTA) 
because lag total accruals might reverse and affect current year discretionary accruals 
(see Dechow et al., 2003). The estimation procedure is repeated for total 
compensation, fixed compensation, at-risk compensation, salary, bonus, options, 
shares and long-term incentive plans, respectively.  In the second stage, the fitted 
values of these compensation structure variables are used to estimate the effects of 
executive compensation components on discretionary accruals.  
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8.3 The instrumental variables approach 
 
The choice of instruments is based on the following studies.28 Agency theory has long 
suggested that the executive compensation is designed to align managers’ interests to 
shareholders to maximize firm value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Changes in CEO 
pay are found to be positively associated with changes in shareholder wealth and such 
positive association is commonly referred to as the pay-performance sensitivity 
(Coughlan and Schmidit, 1985; Murphy, 1985; Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Prior 
studies suggests that higher volatility of stock prices makes the stock price an 
imprecise measure of managerial performance and so will be associated with lower 
levels of equity-based compensation (Iyengar and Zampelli, 2008). Researchers argue 
that firms substitute equity compensations options and shares for straight cash salary 
in their CEOs’ pay packages when firms have financial liquidity constraints (Mehran, 
1995; Yermack, 1995). Finally, from the tax reduction standpoint, equity-based 
compensations offer tax advantages to executives since they do not pay income tax 
until the year of exercise. However, cash-based compensations offer tax advantages to 
corporations because cash compensations are immediately tax deductible from 
corporation income. So the equilibrium compensation structure is to achieve net tax 
savings between a corporation and its managers (Scholes and Wolfson, 1992).  
 
Therefore, this study chooses total shareholder returns and firm values as instrumental 
variables to estimate the expected total compensation, fixed salary, and bonus. Total 
shareholder returns (TSR) is defined as one year total return to shareholders plus 
dividends. Firm value is measured by Tobin’s Q (TBQ), calculated as the book value 
of assets plus the difference between the market and book values of common stock 
and divided by the book value of assets (Yermack, 1995).  Positive associations 
between compensation and total shareholder returns and firm value are expected. In 
predicting equity-based compensation such as options, shares, LTIPs, and total 
compensation and at-risk compensation which contain equity incentives, the volatility 
of firm’s stock price, financial liquidity constraint, and tax losses carried forward are 
used as instrumental variables, in addition to total shareholder returns and firm values. 
The volatility of a firm’s stock price (VOL) is defined as the standard deviation of the 
                                                 
28 Since the major purpose of thesis is detecting earnings management, the literature about executive compensation 
is not reviewed in detail. Only a few studies that document the determinants of the compensation are listed here in 
order to support the decision in choosing instrumental variables for compensation.  
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previous five years of stock returns. A negative coefficient is expected for this 
variable. Financial liquidity constraint is measured by using a dividend dummy 
variable (DIV_DUMMY) equal to one if a firm pays zero dividends during the year; a 
positive sign is expected for this coefficient. Firms having tax losses carried forward 
generally have lower marginal tax rates. Following Clinch (1991) and Yermack 
(1995), a tax dummy variable (TAX_DUMMY) set equal to one when firms have non-
zero tax losses carried forward is used ; a positive coefficient is expected for this 
variable. The instrumental variables are summarised in Table 4.1- Panel F. 
 
Besides the instrumental variables, some of the exogenous variables in equation (4.9), 
(4.10), and (4.11) are also used as control variables in estimating executive 
compensations (see Chapter 4). Firm size is controlled as larger and more complex 
firms hire better managers who, in turn, command higher levels of compensation (e.g. 
Ke et al., 1999; Anderson et al., 2000; Merhebi et al., 2006). A positive association 
between firm size and compensation structure variables is expected. Firm 
performance is controlled as prior studies suggest that executive compensation is 
positively correlated with accounting performance (e.g. Sloan, 1993; Core et al., 
1999; Ke et al., 1999; Anderson et al., 2000; Bushman and Smith, 2001; Merhebi et 
al., 2006). Firm performance is expected to be positively associated with 
compensations. A firm’s investment or growth opportunities are included based on the 
considerable evidence from prior research (e.g. Clinch, 1991; Gaver and Gaver, 1993; 
Anderson et al., 2000; Ittner et al., 2003). The investment opportunities affect 
executive compensation through the demand for skill and the premium paid to 
compensate for risk. A positive association between sales growth and the 
compensation incentives is predicted. In a similar manner, book-to-market ratio 
should be negatively correlated with compensation. Leverage is controlled, as debt 
holders may make a demand for a higher risk premier for supplying capital if 
managers are rewarded heavily by equity-based compensations. High equity-based 
compensation provides managers with strong incentives to maximize the value of 
equity which in turn transfers wealth from debt holders to shareholders (John and 
John, 1993). An inverse association between leverage and the compensation 
incentives is predicted. Erkens (2007) recently found that compensation arrangements 
are influenced by the mechanisms firms use to protect their intellectual property 
(intangible assets such as R&D). CEOs at firms that are more R&D intensive receive 
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more compensation than those at firms that are more capital intensive with larger 
tangible assets.29 So, an inverse association between capital intensity and the 
compensation incentives is predicted. Finally, industry effects are controlled as many 
factors that influence individual firms’ compensation structures may be common 
within organizational structures and industrial groupings. For example, in Australia, 
fixed remuneration is set at levels that are competitive within the market. External 
market data is used to benchmark salary levels within similar industries as well as the 
general market within Australia (Connect4, 2008).  
 
8.4 Test for compensation endogenity 
 
Before conducting 2SLS, Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) is first used to test for 
compensation endogeneity. Under the assumption of the appropriateness of the 
instruments, the Hausman test compares the performance of the least squares 
estimator OLSˆ  to an instrumental variable estimator IVˆ  and thus determines the 
existence of an endogeneity problem. If the Hausman test rejects the null that 
compensation and error term are uncorrelated, then compensation is endogeneous. 
Hence, the least squares estimator is not consistent, but the instrumental variables 
estimator is consistent. However, if the null hypothesis cannot be rejected so that 
compensation and error terms are uncorrelated, then compensation does not have an 
endogenity problem. In this case, both the least squares estimator and the instrumental 
variables estimator are consistent and the least squares estimator is the more efficient 
estimator.  
 
Also, 2SLS estimation requires a necessary condition for identification. Identification 
means that instruments must come from those exogenous variables omitted from the 
equation in question; and the number of omitted exogenous variables is at least as 
large as the number of right-hand-side endogenous variables. This ensures that the 
equation is identified and its parameters can be estimated consistently (Greene, 2002). 
In this study, the number of instrumental variables and exogenous variables satisfies 
the necessary condition for identification. However, this might introduce another 
                                                 
29 The reason is that innovating firms are concerned about CEOs leaving to use their R&D related information to 
exploit inventions on their own or with competitors. Those firms discourage CEOs from leaving the firm by 
providing them with sufficient compensation incentives. Capital intensive firms, however, are less concerned about 
intellectual property (Erkens, 2007).  
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problem of over-identification since there are multiple instruments and in some of the 
models the number of instruments exceeds the number of endogenous regressors. The 
Basmann (1960) test is used to test the over-identifying restrictions—to see if some of 
the instrumental variables are correlated with the error term.  The null hypothesis of 
this test is the instrumental variables not appearing in any equation have zero 
coefficients with error. The alternative hypothesis is that at least one of the assumed 
zero coefficients is nonzero. If the Basmann test is rejected, then the instruments are 
not appropriated and thus the Hausman test should not proceed (Godfrey and Hutton, 
1994).  
 
Table 8.1 reports the results of the first-stage OLS estimation of the reduced form 
equations for the total compensation.  The estimated coefficients on TSR, TBQ, 
DIV_DUMMY, and TAX_DUMMY are statistically significant with expected signs, 
indicating that instrumental variables represented by total shareholder returns, firm 
values, financial liquidity constraint, and tax losses carried forward affect the total 
compensation, TCOMP. Thus, they are useful in estimating expected value of the total 
compensation. The adjusted R-square of this first-stage model is 54.23% and the 
overall F-statistic is 84.25, which has a p-value of less than 0.0001.30  Although these 
results imply a good fit of the reduced form equation to the data in the first stage, they 
might overstate the true explanatory power of the instruments as the control variables 
also contribute to this result. After removing the contribution of the control variables, 
the partial adjusted R-square is reduced to 30.28% and the partial F-statistic is 
increased to 144.42 with a p-value of less than 0.0001.   
 
In testing endogeneity, the Hausman (1978) test shows that total compensation, 
TCOMP, is not endogenous. The test does not reject the hypothesis that TCOMP is 
exogenous in all three models of absolute discretionary accruals, positive 
discretionary accruals, and negative discretionary accruals. Also, the Basmann (1960) 
test for overidentifying restrictions does not reject the exogeneity of the instruments in 
                                                 
30 F-test is a joint test of the overall significance of a model. The F-test statistic is given by
)/(
)1/()(
KTSSE
KSSESSTF 
 , 
where SST is the total sum of squares from the unconstrained model; SSE is the sum of squared errors from the unconstrained 
model; K is number of explanatory variables and T is sample size. The F-distribution has K−1 numerator degrees of freedom and 
T−K denominator degrees of freedom (Greene, 2003). Partial F-statistic is bigger compared to F-statistic because K becomes 
smaller when control variables are excluded from the model.  
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all three models of absolute discretionary accruals, positive discretionary accruals, 
and negative discretionary accruals. Thus, the total compensation is not endogenous.  
Table 8.2 reports the results of the first-stage OLS estimation of the reduced form 
equations for the fixed compensation and at-risk compensation. For the fixed 
compensation, the estimated coefficients on TSR and TBQ are statistically significant 
with expected signs, indicating that total shareholder returns and firm values are the 
determinants of executive fixed compensation. The adjusted R-square of the first-
stage model in estimating expected fixed compensation is 51.65% and the overall F-
statistic is 92.35, which has a p-value of less than 0.0001. After removing the 
contribution of the control variables, the partial adjusted R-square is dropped to 
20.59% and the partial F-statistic is 44.93 with a p-value of less than 0.0001. This 
implies that control variables contribute to the explanatory power as well. 
Particularly, firm size (SIZE) plays a significant role in determining executives’ fixed 
compensation with large t-statistic of 29.99 and p-value of less than 0.0001.  
 
For at-risk compensation, five instrumental variables are used in estimating expected 
value of at-risk compensation since equity components of at-risk compensation may 
be affected by stock price volatility, financial liquidity constraint, and tax loss in 
addition to total shareholder returns and firm values. Nevertheless, Table 8.2 shows 
that only total shareholder returns (TSR) and firm values (TBQ) are statistically 
significant with expected signs. Although the coefficients on stock price volatility 
(VOL), financial liquidity constraint (DIV_DUMMY), and tax losses carried forward 
(TAX_DUMMY) have expected signs, they are not significant. The adjusted R-square 
of the first-stage model in estimating expected at-risk compensation is 36.23% and the 
overall F-statistic is 40.99, which has a p-value of less than 0.0001. After removing 
the contribution of the control variables, the partial adjusted R-square is 21.68% and 
partial F-statistic is 92.42 with a p-value of less than 0.0001. 
 
The Hausman (1978) test is a joint test of endogenity when both fixed compensation 
and at-risk compensation are included in one equation. Table 8.2 shows that fixed 
compensation and at-risk compensations are jointly endogenous to positive 
discretionary accruals. The Hausman joint tests do not reject the hypothesis that fixed 
compensation and at-risk compensation are jointly exogenous in the absolute 
discretionary accruals model and negative discretionary accruals model, while the test 
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rejects that fixed compensation and at-risk compensation are jointly exogenous in the 
positive discretionary accruals model with a 10% significance level. The Basmann 
(1960) tests do not reject the over-identifying restrictions so the instruments are 
appropriated. The underlying notion for fixed compensation and at-risk compensation 
endogeneity could be that firm owners use high level of fixed pay as a mechanism to 
mitigate or constrain management opportunistic behaviour; firm owners could also 
reward managers with high at-risk payment if managers use upward earnings 
management to achieve the firms’ earnings targets. Therefore, the outcomes of the 
tests suggest that to some extent income-increasing earnings management is jointly 
determined with executive fixed compensation and at-risk compensation. Fixed and 
at-risk compensation are endogenous to positive discretionary accruals.  
 
In a similar vein, the endogenity problem is examined for individual compensation 
components. Table 8.3 shows for salary, the first-stage estimation result of expected 
salary is very close to that of fixed compensation.  For bonus, both the coefficients of 
total shareholder returns (TSR) and firm values (TBQ) are statistically significant with 
expected signs. The adjusted R-square of the first-stage model in estimating expected 
bonus is 30.39% and the overall F-statistic is 38.27, which has a p-value of less than 
0.0001. After removing the contribution of the control variables, the partial adjusted 
R-square drops to 11.65% while partial F-statistic increases to 112.70 with a p-value 
of less than 0.0001. This implies that control variables have explanatory power in 
predicting bonuses.  
 
For options, shares and LTIPs, five instrumental variables are used in estimation since 
these components are equity based and stock price volatility, financial liquidity 
constraint and tax loss are expected to affect these payment, in addition to total 
shareholder returns and firm values. Table 8.3 shows weak results in estimating the 
expected value of options, shares and LTIPs. It appears that options can be explained 
by total shareholder returns (TSR) and firm values (TBQ) and shares and LTIPs can be 
explained by total shareholder returns (TSR) only. Although stock price volatility 
(VOL), financial liquidity constraint (DIV_DUMMY), and tax losses carried forward 
(TAX_DUMMY) have expected signs, they are not significant. Moreover, the adjusted 
R-squares of the first-stage model in estimating options, shares and LTIPs are low, 
9.04%, 5.89%, and 12.69%, respectively. The overall F-statistics of options, shares, 
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and LTIPs models are 7.86, 11.39 and 11.56, respectively. Although after removing 
the contribution of the control variables, the partial F-statistics are significant for all 
three models, the partial adjusted R-squares decline to 3.95%, 5.44% and 6.72%, 
respectively. Low partial adjusted R-squares indicate that the reduced form equations 
in estimating options, shares and LTIPs do not have a good fit. This might be due to 
the weak instrumental variables selected for options, shares and LTIPs as one cannot 
determine whether an executive has an appropriate level of options compensation and 
stock granted in a given year (Yermack, 1995). Also, a survey shows that research on 
equity-based compensation and incentives has produced many contradictory findings 
with many fundamental questions remaining unanswered (Core et al., 2003).   
 
The Hausman (1978) test is also a joint test of endogenity when salary, bonus, 
options, shares and LTIPs are included in one equation. Table 8.3 shows the Hausman 
joint tests do not reject the hypothesis that salary, bonus, options, shares and LTIPs 
are jointly exogenous in the absolute discretionary accruals model and negative 
discretionary accruals model. However, the Hausman joint test rejects that salary, 
bonus, options, shares and LTIPs are jointly exogenous in the positive discretionary 
accruals model, significant at less than 1% level. As previously stated, the Hausman 
test in testing total compensation endogeneity shows that total compensation 
(TCOMP) is not endogenous; here the joint test of salary, bonus, options, shares and 
LTIPs suggests that at least some individual components are endogenous to positive 
discretionary accruals. The Basmann (1960) test for over-identification is not required 
since the total number of instruments (TSR, TBQ, VOL, DIV_DUMMY, and 
TAX_DUMMY) equals the number of endogenous variables (SALARY, BONUS, 
OPTION, SHARE, and LTIP) in the equation and the model is said to be just 
identified. The outcomes of the Hausman tests suggest that income-increasing 
earnings management is jointly determined with some components of executive 
compensation, with some individual components possibly being endogenous to 
positive discretionary accruals.   
 
 8.5 Two-stage least squares estimation  
 
The Hausman tests suggest that income-increasing earnings management is jointly 
determined with fixed compensation, at-risk compensation and some individual 
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components. Thus, 2SLS estimation is further used to model the relation between 
positive adjusted discretionary accruals (+DA_ADJ) and compensation components.  
Table 8.2 shows the coefficient on the expected fixed compensation (E_FIX) is 
negative and becomes significant at 5% level. This is somewhat different from robust 
regression results which show an insignificant negative association between positive 
adjusted discretionary accruals and realized fixed compensation (see Table 6.3). This 
means where endogeneity is concerned, managers tend to reduce opportunistic 
earnings management behaviour as their fixed compensation increases, which is 
consistent with the argument that fixed compensation provides disincentives for 
managers to practice aggressive earnings management given the cost of earnings 
management. It also shows that positive adjusted discretionary accruals are positively 
associated with expected at-risk compensation (E_ATRISK), significant at the 5% 
level. This implies that management opportunistic behaviour, using income-increasing 
discretionary accruals to inflate reported earnings and thus maximize the level of at-
risk compensation remains when endogeneity is addressed.  This is consistent with 
robust regression results (see Table 6.3).   
 
Table 8.3 reports the results for the second-stage regression where positive 
discretionary accruals is regressed on the expected (fitted) values of salary 
(E_SALARY), bonus (E_BONUS), options (E_OPTION), shares (E_SHARE), and 
LTIPs (E_LTIP) those are predicted from the first-stage instrumental variable 
regressions and control variables. Results from 2SLS show that positive discretionary 
accruals are negatively associated with expected salary (E_SALARY) and positively 
associated with expected bonus (E_BONUS), both are significant at less than 1% 
level. The coefficients on expected options (E_OPTION) and expected LTIPs 
(E_LTIP) have the positive sign while the coefficient on expected shares (E_SHARE) 
has the negative sign. All three equity-based compensations are not significant in the 
second-stage regression.   
 
The findings suggest that when endogeneity is concerned, expected salary is 
negatively associated with income-increasing earnings management while expected 
bonus is positively associated with income-increasing earnings management. This is 
inconsistent with robust regression results which show insignificant associations 
between positive adjusted discretionary accruals and realized salaries and bonuses 
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(see Table 6.3). Nevertheless, the implications are consistent with the theory. On one 
hand, the negative association between expected salary and positive discretionary 
accruals suggests that fixed salary provides disincentives for managers to practice 
aggressive earnings management as earnings management behaviour is costly. 
Managers tend to reduce opportunistic earnings management behaviour as their fixed 
salary increase. On the other hand, the positive association between expected bonus 
and positive adjusted discretionary accruals suggests that bonuses induce managers to 
engage in upward earnings management as bonuses are tied to accounting earnings 
performance. Managers would opportunistically use income-increasing discretionary 
accruals to exploit the nonlinearity in the payoffs on bonuses.  
 
Further, the findings suggest that when endogeneity is concerned, expected options 
are not associated with income-increasing earnings management. This is inconsistent 
with the robust regression which shows that options (OPTION) are marginally 
significant and have a positive association with positive adjusted discretionary 
accruals (see Table 6.3). There are two possible explanations. First, option 
compensation is endogenous to opportunistic earnings management behaviour. 
Significant coefficient on realized options (OPTION) in robust regression probably 
stems from failure to properly consider the endogeneity problem. Therefore, positive 
adjusted discretionary accruals and expected options (E_OPTION) are no longer 
significant in the 2SLS. Second, insignificant coefficient on expected options 
(E_OPTION) in 2SLS probably results from the weak instruments used in estimating 
options. Option compensation per se may not be endogenous to opportunistic earnings 
management behaviour.  If this is the case, then the robust regression result is valid. 
As current theory suggests that option grants create incentives for managers to 
decrease earnings, as low earnings can lead to a stock price decline which gives 
manager a lower strike price on option grant date (Baker et al., 2003; McAnally et al., 
2008), the first explanation is thus supported.  
  
8.6 The backing-out problem 
 
Whereas the endogeneity issue is the major concern in examining the association 
between earnings management and executive compensations, there needs to be an 
awareness of the backing-out problem in testing benchmark beating behaviours. The 
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research design used in examining the link between earnings management and true 
earnings below certain benchmarks involves the contraction of pre-managed earnings 
(true earnings). The method of calculating pre-managed earnings essentially is to back 
out (deduct) estimates of adjusted discretionary accruals from reported earnings. Error 
in estimating adjusted discretionary accruals will lead automatically to equal error in 
the estimation of pre-managed earnings. This in turn could induce a spurious 
association between earnings management and pre-managed earnings below or above 
earnings benchmarks, which is known as the backing-out problem (Kang and 
Sivaramakrishnan, 1995; Lim and Lustgarten, 2002; and Peasnell et al., 2005).   
 
The implicit argument about the backing out problem is provided as follows. 
Researchers typically use equation (a) to model benchmark beating earnings 
management.  itDA  is discretionary accruals for firm i at year t. BELOWit is an 
indicator variable equal to one if true earnings before earnings management is lower 
than relevant benchmarks, and zero otherwise. A positive regression coefficient 
indicates that managers use positive discretionary accruals to manipulate earnings 
upward when true earnings before manipulation is below earnings targets.  
 
ititit BELOWDA   10                                                                                   (a) 
 
Equation (a) can be further decomposed into (b) where itPME  is true earnings before 
manager’s manipulation; Bit denotes relevant benchmarks that managers try to meet.  
 
itititit BPMEDA   )(10                                                                             (b) 
 
Since itDA  cannot be directly observed, researchers usually estimate itDA  by using 
Jones (1991) model as follows:   
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
itDA  is estimated as a proxy for itDA . Recognizing measurement error related to the 
Jones model, the true value of discretionary accruals thereby is equal to the estimated 
discretionary accruals plus an error term:  
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ititit DADA 

 
where it  represents measurement error in estimating the true discretionary accruals. 
Also in theory, reported earnings ( itE ) should be equal to pre-managed earnings plus 
true discretionary accruals: 
 
ititit DAPMEE   
 
So, the regression model (b) can be expressed as:  
 
ititititititit BDAEDA  

][10                                                        (c) 
 
Since ititit BDAE 

 is equivalent to BELOWit , the model finally would be: 
 
ititititit BELOWDA  

][10                                                                (d) 
 
As we know, the sample correlation coefficient is related to the slope of the sample 
regression line. If ( ititDA 

) denotes x and ( ititBELOW  ) denotes y, the 
coefficient 1  is determined as: 
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The above equation (f) shows the numerator determines the sign of coefficient 1 , 
assuming that the it is pure noise and is uncorrelated with either itDA

 or itBELOW .
31 
Moreover, when it is true that earnings management does not exist, it is expected that 
itDA

 and itBELOW  are unrelated and thus ),cov( itit BELOWDA

disappear. Thus: 
 
)var(1 it   
 
Given the null hypothesis (H0) that managers do not use discretionary accruals to 
inflate earnings when pre-managed earnings are below relevant benchmarks, the 
claim that null hypothesis is false and thus rejecting the null is equivalent to claiming 
that coefficient 1  is not equal to zero; this is likely to be the case from the above 
derivation. The it   on both sides of the regression with opposite signs simply 
introduces a negative bias to the coefficient 1 . As )var( it is always positive, the sign 
of coefficient 1  will always be negative. This is known as the “backing-out” 
problem. Although the above argument is based on discretionary accruals, this thesis 
proposes that the backing-out problem may exist in testing adjusted discretionary 
accruals.  
 
If this is the case, a negative coefficient indicates that adjusted discretionary accruals 
and BELOW are inversely related: adjusted discretionary accruals will become more 
positive (negative) when pre-managed earnings is below (above) benchmarks. Lim 
and Lustgarten (2002) pointed out that researchers tend to reject the H0 when it is true 
and interpret that managers manipulate earnings upward (downward) when pre-
managed earnings are below (above) benchmarks. This is Type   error and can be 
resolved unless the term it becomes zero. However, Dechow et al. (1998) suggested 
that estimation errors are likely to be present as long as discretionary accruals are 
estimated.  
 
Lim and Lustgarten (1998) further argued that the artificial correlation between pre-
managed earnings and accounting discretion would be significant by construction, 
                                                 
31 Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) and Lim and Lustgarten (2002) all assume that the middle two terms in 
expression (f) are zero. 
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even in the absence of earnings manipulation. To support their prediction, they used 
non-discretionary accruals to replace discretionary accruals in testing accounting 
discretion to smooth earnings when pre-managed earnings are below (above) targets 
and found similar results using either non-discretionary accruals or discretionary 
accruals. They pointed out that the results using non-discretionary accruals should 
differ from those using discretionary accruals since non-discretionary accruals are not 
supposed to involve earnings management and therefore they concluded that previous 
findings are simply a consequence of the mechanical association between 
discretionary accruals and pre-managed earnings.  
 
To assess the extent to which the findings in Chapter 7 are being driven by the 
backing-out problem, Lim and Lustgarten’s method is first used in the sensitivity 
analysis and all the tests are repeated by using non-discretionary accruals. Pre-
managed earnings are re-defined as net income before extraordinary items minus non-
discretionary accruals ( ititit NDAEPME  ). If the backing-out problem is the 
reason that drives empirical results in Table 7.6, this sensitivity analysis would expect 
similar results in the models after redefining itPME  variable.  
 
 Table 8.4 Panel A and B shows that main testing variables BELOWit are negative in 
all the four models and significantly in Models (1) and (2) using NDA to define 
whether pre-managed earnings are below or above earnings benchmarks of either 
reporting profits or in sustaining previous years’ earnings. Moreover, in Model (5),  
HIGHit is significantly positive while LOWit is negative and insignificant for 
benchmark 1 and significant for benchmark 2. This is inconsistent with the 
expectation that managers will increase earnings when pre-managed earnings are 
below benchmarks. Also, it is not consistent with income-decreasing earnings 
management when pre-managed earnings are well above benchmarks.  
 
Peasnell et al. (2005) suggested that the solution to the backing-out problem is to use 
a measure of pre-managed earnings which is not mechanically related to discretionary 
accruals. In their research design, they used operating cash flow as an instrumental 
variable to substitute for pre-managed earnings. The underlying assumption is that 
operating cash flows are expected to be correlated with a firm’s true earnings 
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performance, but they are not affected by the measurement error that results from the 
estimation of discretionary accruals.  
 
Thus, this sensitivity analysis further checks the backing-out problem by using 
operating cash flows as the proxy for pre-managed earnings. Table 8.5 Panel A shows 
for benchmark 1, reporting profits, the results remain unchanged to those reported in 
the main text. Panel B shows in examining benchmark 2, sustaining last year’s 
earnings, the results are qualitatively similar. These results suggest there is an 
association between earnings management and pre-managed earnings below or above 
earnings benchmarks when operating cash flows are used as a proxy for the true 
earnings. Therefore, the sensitivity analysis suggests that initial results are not simply 
a consequence of the backing-out problem.  
 
8.7 Re-estimate the model by including year dummy 
 
Chapter 5 reports evidence for variations in earnings management across different 
industries and years. Recall this thesis uses the two-way clustering method to estimate 
the models in Chapters 6 and 7 where first obtains three different cluster-robust 
variance matrices for the OLS estimator from one-way clustering in, the firm 
dimension, the time dimension, and the intersection of the firm and time, respectively. 
Although the models estimated in Chapters 6 and 7 control only for the industry 
effects, the two-way estimation method assigns each observation to year cluster yields 
the White (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent estimator which is robust to correlation 
within a firm across time. Nevertheless, to avoid the possibility that findings of 
significant coefficient may arise from the effects of common year-specific factors, the 
section re-estimates all the regression models by including year dummy variables for 
six years.   
 
Table 8.6 shows the results of re-estimating the association between the magnitude of 
earnings management and executive compensation by controlling year effects. The 
first tier, executive total compensation remains insignificant; the second tier, the 
coefficient on the fixed compensation remains significantly negative while the 
coefficient on the at-risk compensation becomes insignificant; the third tier, bonus is 
the only component has significantly positive coefficient. All the year dummy 
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variables are significantly negative indicating the managers may reduce income 
during the sample period.  
 
Table 8.8 shows the results of re-estimating the association between the upward 
earnings management and executive compensation by controlling year effects. The 
first tier, executive total compensation becomes insignificant; the second tier, the 
fixed compensation remains insignificant and at-risk compensation remains 
significantly positive association with the upward earnings management; the third tier, 
the only component that is significant is bonus, remaining significantly positive 
association with upward earnings management after controlling the year effects.  
 
Table 8.10 shows the results of re-estimating the association between the downward 
earnings management and executive compensation by controlling year effects. The 
first tier, executive total compensation remains insignificant; the second tier, the 
coefficient of fixed compensation remains significantly positive while the coefficient 
of at-risk compensation becomes insignificant; the third tier, the coefficient of bonus 
is significantly negative while the coefficients of other components are insignificant.  
 
Table 8.12 shows the results of re-estimating the association between adjusted 
discretionary accruals and pre-managed earnings below benchmarks by controlling 
year effects. Panel A and B reports the results of pre-managed earnings level and pre-
managed earnings change respectively. The basic results remain the same after 
controlling year effects. Some year dummy variables are found to be significant such 
as year 2004, 2005 and 2006.  
 
8.8 Re-estimate the model by using alternative measure of discretionary accruals 
 
While this current study relies on the performance adjusted technique to estimate 
discretionary accruals, prior research also used Jones or Modified Jones Model to 
estimate discretionary accruals. In order to examine the degree to which differences in 
accruals estimation affect inferences about CEO compensation and earnings 
benchmarks, the section re-estimates the models by using alternative estimates of 
discretionary accruals from Modified Jones Model.  
 
 
 
181
Table 8.7 shows the results of re-estimating the association between the magnitude of 
earnings management and executive compensation by using discretionary accruals 
from Modified Jones Model. The first tier, executive total compensation remains 
insignificant; the second tier, the fixed compensation remains significantly negative 
while the at-risk compensation becomes insignificant; the third tier, the coefficients of 
salary and bonus remain significantly negative and positive respectively.  
 
Table 8.9 shows the results of re-estimating the association between the upward 
earnings management and executive compensation by using discretionary accruals 
from Modified Jones Model. The first tier, the total compensation remains 
significantly positive association with upward earnings management; the second tier, 
the coefficients of the fixed compensation and at-risk compensation remain 
significantly negative and positive respectively; the third tier, the coefficient of salary 
becomes significantly negative while the coefficient of bonus remains significant 
positive.  
 
Table 8.11 shows the results of re-estimating the association between the downward 
earnings management and executive compensation by using discretionary accruals 
from Modified Jones Model. The first tier, the total compensation remains 
insignificant; the second tier, both coefficients of fixed compensation and at-risk 
compensation become insignificant; the third tier, the bonus component is 
significantly negatively associated with downward earnings management. 
 
Table 8.13 shows the results of re-estimating the association between adjusted 
discretionary accruals and pre-managed earnings below benchmarks by using 
discretionary accruals from Modified Jones Model. Panel A and B reports the results 
of pre-managed earnings level and pre-managed earnings change respectively. The 
main findings remain the same by using Modified Jones Model. Some year dummy 
variables are found to be significant such as year 2001, 2003, 2005 and 2006.  
 
8.9 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter examines the potential endogeneity between earnings management and 
executive compensations. First, the Hausman specification tests show that fixed 
compensation and at-risk compensations in the second tier; and, salary, bonus, 
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options, shares and LTIPs in the third tier, are jointly endogenous to upward earnings 
management. 2SLS results further confirm that managers decrease upward earnings 
management as their fixed compensation increases. Likewise, managers increase 
upward earnings management as their at-risk compensation and bonuses increase. 
However, 2SLS results do not support that equity-based compensations, option grants, 
shares and LTIPs create incentives for earnings management. Also, the sensitivity 
analysis shows that the previous finding that managers are more likely to inflate 
income to beat benchmarks when the true earnings are below the benchmarks, and 
this is not simply a consequence of the backing-out problem. The finding is robust 
when alternative methods in measuring pre-managed earnings have been used.  
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Chapter 9  
Conclusions 
 
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter summarizes the study regarding the evidence of earnings management in 
the Australian context. It discusses the main findings of this study as well as their 
implications. Also, it identifies the limitations of this study, suggesting further 
research directions.  
 
9.2 Conclusions 
 
This study uses a joint approach to investigate whether and why Australian firms 
engage in earnings management. Such investigation is motivated by increasing 
concerns expressed by the public that financial reporting quality has been declining in 
recent years. Thus, the objective of this study is to detect earnings management in the 
Australian context. The detection is conducted in three stages: first, detection of the 
overall earnings management evidence based on industry sectors and firm 
characteristics (Chapter 5); second, examination of the executive compensation 
incentives (Chapter 6); third, examination of the benchmark beating incentives 
(Chapter 7).  
 
In Chapter 5, this study found that Australian firms engage in earnings management. 
Using a estimation sample of 5,947 firm-year observations with broad industry 
representation including all ASX listed firms, significant industry effects were found, 
with Metals & Mining, Consumer Discretionary, Industrials, Health Care, Information 
Technology, and Telecommunication & Utilities showing higher earnings 
management activities. Moreover, the magnitude of earnings management which 
increased from 2000 to 2006, remained at the high level throughout 2006. 
 
Further, several firm-level characteristics explain significant variation in earnings 
management behaviour. This study suggests that size played a significant role in 
shaping earnings management behaviour of Australian firms between 2000 and 2006. 
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It was revealed that smaller firms have a higher overall magnitude of earnings 
manipulation; smaller firms are associated with both income-increasing and 
decreasing earnings management activities. The results regarding size are quite strong 
and consistent with evidence of U.S. from Sloan (1996). This is also consistent with 
the view that large firms have less need to manage earnings as large firms have 
sufficient financial resources to diversify risk and to stabilize growth (Bathke et al., 
1989; Koh, 2003; Holland and Jackson, 2004; Sanchez-Ballesta and Garcia-Meca, 
2007).  
 
Low book-to-market ratio firms are also found to be correlated with the overall 
magnitude of earnings management. It appears that low book-to-market firms are 
associated with both income-increasing and decreasing earnings management 
activities. This is consistent with Subraranyam (1996) who found that managers of 
low book-to-market firms tend to have greater incentives to engage in earnings 
management to beat earnings targets because stock prices in such firms are more 
sensitive to reported earnings. It is also consistent with Sawichi and Shrestha (2008) 
who found that firms with low book-to-market ratio have income-increasing 
discretionary accruals. 
 
Earnings management is also found to be correlated with poor profitability. This is 
consistent with Kinney and McDaniel (1989) who found that firms who restate their 
earning figures are likely to be less profitable. Profitability tends to become poorer 
when the magnitude of earnings management is of an increasing nature.  Moreover, 
lower profitability firms are particularly associated with income-decreasing earnings 
management. According to the taking-a-bath theory, when operating performance is 
poor, managers tend to increase earnings; however, if the operating performance is 
extremely poor, some firms may decrease income further. If managers attempt to take 
an opportunity of negative earnings in any particular period to depress earnings 
further then the negative earnings are likely to be clustered. Therefore, results from 
profitability provide some indirect evidence to support this conjecture.  
 
Although previous studies document firms with higher growth, higher leverage, lower 
capital intensity and larger lagged total accruals exhibit higher variability of accruals, 
there is no evidence to support that growth, leverage, capital intensity and lagged total 
accruals affect earnings management behaviour.  
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In Chapter 6, this study found that earnings management over the period of 2000 to 
2006 was associated with CEO’s compensation.  Using a subsample with 3,326 firm-
year observations, this study examines that relationship between earnings 
management and executive compensations based on a three tiers’ design: total 
compensation; fixed remuneration versus at-risk remuneration; and salary, bonus, 
options, shares and LTIPs. Each tier of decomposition reveals a dynamic relation 
between executive pay and earnings management, both in magnitude and in direction. 
The findings indicate a variety of compensation-related incentive effects, with some 
features encouraging earnings management, and others, discouraging it. Particularly, 
fixed compensation (salary) is more likely to constrain earnings management as 
earnings management is costly. At-risk compensation, however, would induce 
managers to engage in earnings management because at-risk compensation is usually 
based on earnings performance and managers would opportunistically use 
discretionary accruals to exploit the nonlinearity in the payoffs on compensation. This 
prediction also holds in the third level of testing when at-risk compensation is 
decomposed into bonus, options, shares and long-term incentive plans. Therefore, this 
study suggests that a trade-off exists between costs of earnings management and 
benefits of wealth gain and such trade-off determines managers’ decisions in 
exercising discretions.  
 
In Chapter 7, this study found that Australian firms beat earnings benchmarks. Using 
the same subsample of 3,326 observations from the period of 2000 to 2006, the study 
found there were visible and statistically significant discontinuities around zero in the 
distributions of earnings levels and earnings changes, with unusually high frequencies 
for the interval immediately above zero and unusually low frequency for the interval 
immediate below zero for each of these distributions. Further, the distributions of pre-
managed earnings levels and changes are not discontinuous around zero with 
indistinguishable frequency of observations for the interval immediate above (below) 
zero.  This study also found that discretionary accruals significantly increase the 
frequencies of observations reporting positive earnings levels and changes. The 
results suggest that 8.11% of the firms shift from pre-managed earnings losses to 
report post-earnings profits; with 2.44% of the firms shifting from pre-managed small 
earnings losses to report small earnings profits. Similarly, 11.61% of firms shift from 
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pre-managed earnings declines to report earnings increases; with 3.88% shifts from 
pre-managed small earnings decrease to report small earnings increase. Further, this 
study found that the significantly positive associations between discretionary accruals 
and below benchmark pre-managed earnings hold for both benchmarks and both big 
and small regions. Therefore, this study suggests that earnings are managed through 
discretionary accruals relative to earnings benchmarks of reporting profits and 
sustaining previous year’s earnings.  
 
In Chapter 8, the endogeneity of executive compensation and the backing-out problem 
are examined. The results suggest that fixed compensation and at-risk compensations 
are jointly endogenous to upwards earnings management. Moreover, salary, bonus, 
options, shares and LTIPs are jointly exogenous to upwards earnings management.  
2SLS results show a significantly negative association between expected fixed 
compensation (expected salary) and upwards earnings management.  2SLS results 
also show a significantly positive association between expected at-risk compensation 
(expected bonuses) and upwards earnings management.  However, three equity-based 
compensations, option grants, shares and LTIPs are not significant in 2SLS. These 
findings suggest that when endogeneity is concerned, fixed compensation and salaries 
still provide disincentives for managers to practice aggressive earnings management. 
Moreover, managers are more likely to use income-increasing discretionary accruals 
to inflate reported earnings and thus to maximize the level of at-risk compensation 
and bonuses. 
 
In testing benchmark beating incentives, the backing-out problem is the major 
concern. The research design involves the contraction of pre-managed earnings and 
the method of calculating pre-managed earnings essentially is to back out (deduct) 
estimates of adjusted discretionary accruals from reported earnings. Error in 
estimating adjusted discretionary accruals may lead automatically to equal error in the 
estimation of pre-managed earnings. So, the sensitivity analysis further examines if 
there is a spurious association between earnings management and pre-managed 
earnings below or above earnings benchmark. Nevertheless, the result shows that the 
previous finding is robust. Managers are more likely to inflate income to beat 
benchmarks when the true earnings are below the benchmarks, and this is not simply 
a consequence of the backing-out problem.  
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9.3 Implications and limitation 
 
The evidence presented in this study has several implications. First, it will be of 
interest to academia as the comprehensive investigation conducted by this study 
provides a better understanding of earnings management in terms of whether firms are 
engaging in earnings management, why they do so, what the characteristics of these 
firms are, and what the contracting incentives and capital market incentives are? 
 
Second, this study contributes to investors who rely on financial statements in 
evaluating firm performance. This study reports the prevalence and the direction of 
earnings management that varies across macro-industry settings and micro-firm 
characteristics. The level of pervasiveness of earnings management practices in 
specific industries and the association of these practices with firm characteristics can 
help investors assess the overall quality of financial reporting.   
 
Third, regulators who want to strengthen scrutiny or establish the public’s trust will 
know the sources or where to start.  The industry-wide analysis and firm-by-firm 
analysis suggest that the aggregate and direction of earnings management can be 
predicted from both industries and firms. Therefore, increased vigilance on the part of 
policy makers and regulators should be directed toward both the macro and micro 
economies. 
 
Fourth, compensation committees may gain some insight in designing compensation 
structures that balance the incentive to improve a firm’s performance with the 
incentive to earnings manipulation. This study found that executive compensation 
plays a role in determining earnings management activities. Executives may distort 
financial reporting to maximize their personal wealth if their incentives are not fully 
aligned with those of shareholders. Compensation committees, therefore, may 
consider what is the optimal compensation structure that can possibly reach the full 
alignment.  
 
Finally, earnings management may be detected ex post when the financial statements 
are submitted. However, it maybe in standard-setters best interests if they can identify 
the ex ante condition that may induce the managers to exercise discretion. This study 
exploits the distributional properties of ex post earnings after management and links 
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such properties with ex ante pre-managed earnings to identify behaviour consistent 
with earnings management to beat benchmarks. Therefore, standard-setters may 
pronounce an effective way to detect earnings management based on ex ante 
condition under which firms seek to beat benchmarks. 
 
There are several limitations of this study.  First, the model misspecification problem 
may stem from incorrectly decomposing total accruals between discretionary accruals 
and non-discretionary accruals components. This leads to biased results contenting 
two possible situations: documents earnings management evidence when none 
actually takes place (type І errors); or there is earnings management but discretionary 
accruals are not statistically significant to support the evidence (type ІІ error). Since 
the economic determinants of non-discretionary accruals are not always or completely 
considered in the empirical research design, researchers’ findings widely suffer from 
omitted correlated variables problem. The conclusion that certain management 
incentives lead to earnings management may be erroneous if the estimation model has 
omitted correlated variables. In all, the research method in detecting earnings 
management becomes crucial for this field study. Researchers tend to follow or 
replicate existing statistical methods just because they are commonly accepted. A 
greater effort to develop new methodologies and more refined econometric techniques 
could advance the field.  
 
Second, the role of corporate governance in constraining earnings management has 
been well documented in the literature. Several corporate governance mechanisms are 
found to be associated with the magnitude of earnings management, for example, the 
audit committee independence (Klein, 2002); board of director independence (Cornett 
et al, 2009); the proportion of the executive subject to an interlocked relation 
(Peasnell et al, 2005); Institutional ownership (Hand, 1990); CEO shareholdings 
(Warfield et al, 1995); CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity (Bergstresser and 
Philippon, 2006); CEO/chair duality (Jensen, 1993); number of board meetings per 
year (Vafeas, 1999). In this thesis, the testing of the relation between executive 
compensation and earnings management did not control for these corporate 
governance variables because the data are not available. This limitation is recognized 
and will be addressed in the future research.  
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Third, the primary objective of this thesis is to investigate whether earnings 
management takes place across Australian industries, whether executives manipulate 
earnings to increase their compensation and beat several earnings benchmarks. There 
are other areas including accounting regulations and auditing are also important to 
earnings management research. Monem (2003) found a downward earnings 
management by Australian gold-mining firms to reduce income tax prior to the 
introduction of the Australian Gold Tax on gold mining sector in 1991. Lim and 
Matolcsy (1999) investigate product price controls established by the Australian 
government in the early1970s, and find Australian firms reduced reported net income 
to increase the likelihood of approval of the requested price increase. These studies 
suggest that the introduction of a new law or any regulation changes may create 
incentives for earnings management.  
 
Moreover, there is an increasing concern has expressed by practitioners, regulators, 
and standard setters over the quality of earnings during the past decades. Australian 
regulator recognized the importance to strengthen an effective disclosure regime to 
ensure timely and reliable information, ethical practices and legislative standards. One 
of the milestones in accounting regulation change is the introduction of the 
Government’s Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP) in 2002 and the 
enactment at 2004. To further strengthen the financial reporting framework of 
Australia, a range of rules have been covered including auditing profession, audit 
services, auditor independence, auditor liability, accounting standards, requirement 
for accounts to be true and fair, analyst independence, shareholder participation and 
information. Given the sample period of this thesis covers years 2000 to 2006, it is 
possible that the introduction of CLERP may have an impact on the earnings 
management behaviour. One would expect that managers are less likely to engage in 
earnings management post CLERP 9. This current study is aware of the limitation of 
not incorporating the regulation change and its impact on earnings management 
behaviour. However, areas such as auditing profession, audit services, auditor 
independence, and accounting standards are not the primary focuses of this thesis. 
Results in Chapter 5 imply that earnings management has increased over time from 
years 2000 to 2006 in Australia. Given CLERP 9 is to improve financial reporting 
quality, the findings in Chapter 5 yield a very interesting insight and leave a room for 
future research.  
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9.4 Future research directions 
 
There are several possible avenues for future research. First, the opportunistic 
hypothesis holds that managers seek to mislead investors, while the advocates of the 
information approach believe that earnings management can actually help investors. 
Although this thesis identifies that opportunistic behaviour of earnings management 
does exist in Australia, it has not distinguished between the opportunistic and 
signalling forms of earnings management. The interpretation of an association 
between accounting discretion and contracting incentives as evidence of opportunistic 
earnings management is premature unless one can show such discretion has negative 
economic consequences for shareholders’ wealth. Therefore, future research will be 
necessary to differentiate the two forms of earnings management.  
 
Second, this study examines two earnings management incentives, executive 
compensation and benchmarking beating, separately. However, managers may seek a 
result that could be due to the combined effects of several motivations. For example, 
compensation agreement also provides managers with economic incentives to beat 
earnings benchmarks because managers are remunerated based upon firm 
performance. Beating an earnings benchmark simply sends a signal of good firm 
performance to the firm’s compensation committee who might reward managers 
accordingly (Matsunaga and Park, 2001).  In Australia, earnings figures are the first 
measures highlighted in annual reports and widely used as a key performance indictor 
in evaluating executives. If executive compensation plays a role that connects 
earnings management and benchmark beating behaviour, a further examination of this 
triangulate relationship between them may help to reveal the hidden dynamic of 
earnings management practices in Australia.  
 
Third, this study investigates earnings management based on the detection of overall 
evidence and managerial incentives without evaluating the underlying impact on 
capital markets. In fact, there is an economic role for earnings management in the 
capital markets. Researchers have found evidence of profitable trading strategies to 
earn abnormal returns by capturing the accrual anomaly which leads them to conclude 
that the market is inefficient (Sloan 1996; Subramanyam 1996; Xie 2001). Beneish 
(2001) called a new focus for future research to link earnings management contracting 
incentives and its effect; market reactions and prices effects of different earnings 
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components. Therefore, this study could go beyond the general evidence and cause of 
earnings management and further explore the economic consequences of this 
phenomenon in the context of market efficiency.  
 
Finally, it was previously shown that the misspecification problem is common to all 
earnings management studies. To make further progress in developing more 
compelling tests of earnings management, this study suggests that future research 
designs should focus on financial statements in modelling. Researchers may use 
accounting expertise to pick up any multi-dimensional accounts discretion directly via 
financial statements. The structure of financial statements is still the first place that 
modelling should focus on as these are the infrastructure through which accounts 
discretions are manipulated.    
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Tables 
Table 4.1: Variable Definitions 
 
Panel A-Financial variables for estimating earnings management  
 
Variable Definition DataStream Data item 
TAit Total accruals for firm i at year t, defined as the difference between 
net income before extraordinary items and operating cash flows 
WC01551 
WC04860 
Ait-1 Total assets for firm i at beginning of year WC02999
∆REVit Change in revenues for firm i between year t-1 and t WC01001 
PPEit Gross property plant and equipment  for firm i at year t WC02301 
∆CAit The change in current assets for firm i at year t WC02201 
∆CLit The change in current liabilities for firm i at year t WC03101 
∆Cashit The change in cash and cash equivalents for firm i at year t WC02001 
∆STDit The change in short-term debt for firm i at year t WC03051
DEPit Depreciation expense for firm i during period t WC01151 
Eit Net income before extraordinary items for firm i in year t WC01551 
CFit Cash flows from operating activities  for firm i in year t WC04860 
∆CFit Change in operating cash flows for firm i between year t-1 and t WC04860 
∆ARit Account Receivables WC02051 
 
 
Panel B-Earnings management proxy (discretionary accruals)  
 
Variable Definition Equation 
DA_J Discretionary accruals, estimated from Jones (1991) model  
 
Eq.(4.1) 
Abs (DA_J) Absolute value of discretionary accruals from Jones  (1991) model  
DA_MJ Discretionary accruals, estimated from Modified Jones (1995) model 
 
Eq.(4.6) 
Abs (DA_MJ) Absolute value of discretionary accruals from Modified Jones (1995) 
model  
 
DA_CFO Discretionary accruals, estimated from Cash flow Modified Jones 
(1999) model  
Eq.(4.7) 
Abs (DA_CFO) Absolute value of discretionary accruals from Cash flow Modified 
Jones model   
 
DA_ADJ Adjusted discretionary accruals, estimated from Kasznik (1999) 
performance adjusted technique 
Eq.(4.8) 
Abs (DA_ADJ) Absolute value of adjusted discretionary accruals, estimated from 
Kasznik (1999) performance adjusted technique 
 
 
 
Panel C-Executive compensation variables 
 
Variable Definition Connect4 Data item  
TCOMPit Dollar value of total compensation earned by CEOs during the fiscal 
year, measured in millions of dollars 
Total 
FIXit Dollar value of fixed compensation earned by CEOs during the fiscal 
year, which is the sum of salary, superannuation contributions, 
allowances, retirement and other benefits, measured in millions of 
dollars 
Salary+Super 
+Allowances 
+Retirement 
+Other 
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ATRISKit Dollar value of at-risk compensation earned by CEOs during the fiscal 
years, which is the sum of bonus, options grants, shares grants and 
long-term incentive plans, measured in millions of dollars   
Bonus+Options+
Shares+LTIP 
SALARYit Dollar value of base salary earned by CEOs during the fiscal year, 
measured in millions of dollars 
Salary 
BONUSit Dollar value of bonus earned by CEOs during the fiscal year , measured 
in millions of dollars 
Bonus 
OPTIONit Dollar value of options granted to CEOs during the fiscal year, 
measured in millions of dollars 
Options 
SHAREit Dollar value of shares granted to CEOs during the fiscal year, measured 
in millions of dollars 
Shares 
LTIPit Dollar value paid out to CEOs under the company’s long term incentive 
plan. These plans measure company performance over a period of more 
than one year (generally three years), measured in millions of dollars.  
LTIP 
 
 
Panel D-Benchmark variables  
Variable Definition 
DataStream 
data item & 
Equation 
PMEit   Pre-managed earnings for firm i for year t, calculated as Eit−(DA_ADJ)it,      Eq. (4.13)
∆PMEit Pre-managed earnings change for firm i for year t, calculated as ∆Eit−(DA_ADJ)it 
Eq.(4.14) 
Eit Reported earnings for firm i for year t, measured as income before 
extraordinary items deflate by the beginning total assets 
WC01551 
∆Eit Reported earnings change for firm i for year t, measured as  the difference 
of income before extraordinary items between year t and year t-1 deflate 
by the beginning total assets 
WC01551 
BELOW_Nit     
            
             
Indicator variable equals to 1 if pre-managed earnings below benchmarks 
and zero otherwise. Four regions  are tested for each earnings benchmark: 
BELOW_1 equals to 1 if pre-managed earnings (change) below zero  and 
zero otherwise; 
BELOW_2 equals to 1 if pre-managed earnings (change) below zero but 
reported earnings (change) above zero; equals to 0 if both pre-managed 
earnings (change) and reported earnings (change) are below zero; 
 BELOW_3 equals to 1 if pre-managed earnings (change) less than zero 
but greater than −0.04; and zero if pre-managed earnings (change) greater 
than zero but less than +0.04; 
BELOW_4 equals to 1 if pre-managed earnings (change) less than zero but 
greater than −0.04 and at the same time reported earnings (change) greater 
than zero but less than +0.04; and equals to zero if both pre-managed 
earnings (change) and reported earnings (change) are less than zero but 
greater than −0.04  
− 
HIGHit Indicator variable taking the value of 1 if pre-managed earnings exceed 
earnings benchmarks by a large margin and zero otherwise. Large margin 
for HIGH is defined as: 
1)  PMEt >0 and PMEt – 0>75th percentile of the exceed part for 
benchmark 1  
2) PMEt > Et-1 and, PMEt – Et-1 > 75th percentile of the exceed part for 
benchmark 2 
− 
LOWit Indicator variable taking the value of 1 if pre-managed earnings fall short 
earnings benchmarks by a large margin and zero otherwise. Large margin 
for LOW is defined as: 
1)  PMEt <0 and PMEt – 0<25th percentile of the deficit part for 
benchmark 1 
2) PMEt < Et-1 and, PMEt – Et-1 <25th percentile of the deficit part for 
benchmark 2 
− 
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Panel E-Control variables 
 
Variable Definition DataStream  data item 
SIZEit Firm size for firm i for year t, measured by the logarithm of the total 
assets at year t 
 
WC02999 
GROWTHit Growth opportunity for firm i for year t,  measured by the change of 
sales between year t and t-1  divided by total assets at year t 
WC01001 
WC02999 
ROEit Profitability, measured by net operating income divided by total equity 
for firm i at year t 
WC01551 
WC03501 
LEVit Leverage, measured by total debt (long term debt + short term debt) to 
total assets for firm i in year t 
WC03251 
WC03051 
BMit Book-to-market effect ratio, measured by book value of common equity 
to market value of common equity for firm i in year t 
WC03501 
WC08001 
CIRit Capital intensity, measured as gross property, plant and equipment 
divided by total assets for firm i in year t 
WC02301 
WC02999 
LAGTAit Lagged total accruals for firm i in year t-1, measured as the difference 
between net income before extraordinary items and operating cash flows 
WC01551 
WC04860 
ΣINDj Industry effects, 1 if firm i is from industry j other than Energy, based 
on GICS industrial codes and 0 if firm is from Energy 
WC06010 
 
 
Panel F-Instrumental variables 
 
Variable Definition DataStream  data item 
TSRit One year total  shareholders returns for firm i, calculated as the 
change in share price between year t and year t-1, plus dividends  
P 
WC05101 
TBQit Tobin’s Q, calculated as the book value of assets plus the difference 
between the market and book values of common stock and divide by 
the book value of assets for firm i at year t 
WC02999 
WC08001 
WC03480 
VLOit The volatility of firm’s stock price at year t, calculated as the 
standard deviation of the previous five years of stock returns   
p 
DIV_DUMMYit Dividend dummy variable, equals to one if a firm pays zero 
dividends during the year  t and zero otherwise 
WC05101 
TAX_DUMMYit Tax dummy variable, equals  to one when a firm has nonzero tax loss 
carry-forwards  in year t and zero otherwise 
WC01451 
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Table 4.2:  Sample Selection 
 
 
The sample comprises DataStream equity files including all ASX active, suspended, and dead equity 
firms from year 1999 to year 2006.  
 
 
Criteria                                                                                                                                    Firm-years 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
Initial financial data from DataStream (1999-2006):                                                                   31,312 
Less: Financial firms                                                                                           (6,488) 
         Industries are not classified                                                                        (1,832)                                                          
         Missing data for accruals estimation                                                        (16,910) 
         Firms involved in restructuring activities                                                       (10)      
         Extreme data (trimmed firm size at 1% and 99% levels)                              (125) 
Estimation sample (2000-2006):                                                                                                       5,947 
 
Initial executive compensation data from Connect4 (2000-2006):                                               7,672 
Merge two data bases by ASX code and by year:                                                                       10,053                                  
Less: Missing compensation data                                                                         (2859) 
         Negative options, shares and LTIP                                                                    (9)                     
         Missing data for accruals estimation                                                            (3723) 
         Extreme data (trimmed total compensation at 1% and 99% levels)                 (69) 
         Extreme data (trimmed discretionary accruals at 1% and 99% levels)            (67)       
Testing sample (2000-2006):                                                                                                       3,326 
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Table 4.3:  Sample Distribution (Estimation sample) 
 
 
 
Panel A-by Industry 
 
GICS      Industry Frequency Percent Cumulative Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1010 Energy  429 7.21              429             7.21 
1510 Material 428 7.20 857 14.41 
1510 Metals & Mining 1840 30.94 2697 44.90 
2010-2030 Industrials 307 5.16 3004 50.06 
2510-2550 Consumer Discretionary 979 16.46 3983 66.52 
3010-3030 Consumer Staples 449 7.55 4432 74.07 
3510-3520 Health Care 560 9.42 4992 83.49 
4510-4530 Information Technology 776 13.05 5768 96.54 
5010-5510 Telecommunication & Utilities 179 3.01 5947 100.00 
 
 
 
Panel B-by Year 
 
Year Frequency Percent Cumulative Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
2000 335 5.63 335 5.63 
2001 542 9.11 877 14.75 
2002 929 15.62 1806 30.37 
2003 957 16.09 2763 46.46 
2004 965 16.23 3728 62.69
2005 1078 18.13 4806 80.81 
2006 1141 19.19 5947 100.00 
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Table 4.4:  Sample Distribution (Testing Sample) 
 
 
 
Panel A-by Industry 
 
GICS      Industry Frequency Percent Cumulative Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1010 Energy 210 6.31 210 6.31 
1510 Material 237 7.13 447 13.44 
1510 Metals & Mining 1019 30.64 1466 44.08 
2010-2030 Industrials 185 5.56 1651 49.64 
2510-2550 Consumer Discretionary 548 16.48 2199 66.12 
3010-3030 Consumer Staples 274 8.24 2473 74.36 
3510-3520 Health Care 335 10.07 2808 84.43 
4510-4530 Information Technology 433 13.02 3241 97.45 
5010-5510 Telecommunication & Utilities 85 2.56 3326 100.00 
 
 
 
Panel B-by Year 
 
Year Frequency Percent Cumulative Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
2000 129 3.88 129 3.88 
2001 185 5.56 314 9.44 
2002 352 10.58 666 20.02 
2003 310 9.32 976 29.34 
2004 672 20.20 1648 49.55 
2005 815 24.50 2463 74.05 
2006 863 25.95 3326 100.00 
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Table 5.1:  Descriptive Statistics (Estimation sample) 
 
 
 
 
Panel A-Financial variables for estimating earnings management 
 
Variable     N      Mean Median          S.D.    Min      Max 
Eit 5947 −0.2040 −0.0602 1.4657 −70.5625 25.6167 
CFit 5947 −0.1362 −0.0164 1.2249 −38.7803 30.4333 
TAit 5947 −0.0678 −0.0382 0.7495 −39.4063 18.3716 
REVit 5947 0.9837 0.4988 4.4185 0.0000 318.9833 
ARit 5947 0.1947 0.0871 0.6267 0.0000 21.7824 
PPEit 5947 0.6188 0.3644 1.8035 0.0000 54.8312 
At-1 ($millions) 5947 340.8630 23.6650 1063.5990 404.0000 9341.2000 
 
 
 
Panel B-Estimated discretionary accruals from various models  
 
Variable     N Mean Median        S.D.           Min       Max 
        DA_J 5947 -0.0226 -0.0083   0.3791 -7.8048 11.1034 
Abs (DA_J) 5947 0.1654 0.0835 0.3418 0.0000 11.1034 
        DA_MJ 5947 -0.0217 -0.0084 0.3788 -7.4080 11.0166 
Abs (DA_MJ) 5947 0.1670 0.0830 0.3407 0.0000 11.0166 
        DA_CFO 5947 -0.0124 -0.0020 0.2946 -5.9325 6.0573 
Abs (DA_CFO) 5947 0.1457 0.0772 0.2563 0.0000 6.0573 
        DA_ADJ 5947   0.0060 0.0000 0.2776 -5.6319 6.3579 
Abs (DA_ADJ) 5947   0.1324 0.0696 0.2441 0.0000 6.3679 
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Table 5.2:  OLS Estimations of Accruals Models 
 
 
 
Jones Model (Jones, 1991):  
itititititititit APPEaAREVaAaATA   )/()/()/1(/ 1312111  
 
Modified Jones model (Dechow, 1995): 
itititititititititit APPEAARAREVAATA    )/()//()/1(/ 13112111   
 
Cash Flow Modified Jones model (Kasznik, 1999) 
ititititititititititit CFAPPEAARAREVAATA    41312111 )/()//()/1(/  
 
All variables are defined in Table 4.1. To obtain meaningful estimates, industries with less than 10 
observations are combined based upon the GICS code. This procedure results into 9 GICS industry 
groups. So, the three models are estimated for each industry group in each year. N refers to 63 industry-
year pairs regressions associated with the 5,947 firm-year observations. Mean (median) coefficients are 
reported with t-statistics (Wilcoxon z-scores) and p-values in parentheses below. Both parametric t-test 
and non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test are applied to test whether mean and median coefficients 
are significantly different from zero. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively (two tailed). Q1 and Q3 are the first and third quartiles of the distribution. %Positive 
indicates the proportion with positive signs. Adj-R2is the average adjusted R-squares of 63 industry-
year pairs regressions.  
 
 
 
Model 
 
Coef. 
 
Pred. 
Sign 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
S.D. 
 
Q1 
 
Q3 
 
% 
Positive 
 
Adj.R2  
Jones  
 
α1 
 
? 63 -216.4423 
(-2.72) 
(0.0084)*** 
-203.1500 
(-622) 
(<0.0001)*** 
631.0616 -402.4707 -40.2367 19.05% 0.3527 
 
 
α2 
 
+/− 63 
 
0.0276 
(1.44) 
(0.1537) 
0.0142 
(329) 
(0.0231)** 
0.1516 -0.0214 0.1094 61.91%  
 
 
α3 
 
− 63 
 
-0.0971 
(-3.63) 
(0.0006)*** 
-0.0627 
(-749) 
(<0.0001)*** 
0.2121 -0.1520 -0.0182 20.63%  
Modified 
Jones  
α1 
 
?  
63 
-206.1356 
(-2.47) 
(0.0161)** 
-201.7600 
(-597) 
(<0.0001)*** 
661.2156 -364.8328 -24.6774 23.81% 0.3538 
 α2 
 
+/− 63 
 
-0.0036 
(-0.12) 
(0.9036) 
0.0104 
 (142) 
(0.3350) 
0.2346 -0.0452 0.1030 53.97%  
 α3 
 
− 63 
 
-0.0824 
(-3.39) 
(0.0012)*** 
-0.0597 
(-745) 
(<0.0001)*** 
0.1923 -0.1380 -0.0112 20.63%  
Cash Flow 
Modified 
Jones  
α1 
 
?  
63 
-287.1323 
(-5.31) 
(<0.0001)*** 
-217.4920 
(-747) 
(<0.0001)*** 
429.0845 -426.7885 -72.0463 14.29% 0.4680 
 α2 
 
+/− 63 
 
0.0461 
(2.76) 
(0.0075)*** 
0.0372 
(528) 
(0.0002)*** 
0.1324 -0.0156 0.1141 69.84%  
 α3 
 
− 63 
 
-0.0827 
(-6.07) 
(<0.0001)*** 
-0.0588 
(-818) 
(<0.0001)*** 
0.1079 -0.1153 -0.0034 23.81%  
 α4 
 
− 63 
 
-0.2798 
(-5.57) 
(<0.0001)*** 
-0.2868 
(-760) 
(<0.0001)*** 
0.3984 -0.4769 -0.0849 19.05%  
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Table 5.3: Frequency of rejection discretionary accruals equal to zero based on 
earnings ranks 
 
 
 
DAit is discretionary accruals, calculated as the accruals prediction error, the difference between total 
accruals and estimated non-discretionary accruals that estimated from Cash Flow Modified Jones 
Model in equation (4.7). DAs are ranked on the level of earnings deflated by lagged total assets and 
assigned into percentiles according to their rank orders. Null hypothesis is no systematic earnings 
management occurred (i.e. mean discretionary accruals equal to zero).   Frequency of rejection 
represents the frequency of percentiles for which the null hypothesis of no earnings management is 
rejected at 5% level using a two-tailed test. The estimation sample contains 5,947 observations. The 
testing sample contains 3,326 observations.  
 
 
Null Hypothesis          Estimation sample (N=5947)      DA=0 
       Testing Sample (N=3326) 
      DA=0 
        Test level:5%         Test level:5% 
Percentile:         Frequency of rejection          Frequency of rejection 
Lowest 10 9 90% 7 70% 
20 9 90% 8 80% 
30 1 10% 2 20% 
40 0 0% 1 10% 
50 3 30% 1 10%
60 0 0% 1 10% 
70 0 0% 1 10% 
80 6 60% 3 30% 
90 6 60% 3 30% 
Highest 100 10 100% 7 70% 
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Table 5.4: Comparison on spearman correlations of discretionary accruals with 
earnings performances before and after adjustment 
 
 
DAit is discretionary accruals, calculated as the accruals prediction error, the difference between total 
accruals and estimated non-discretionary accruals that estimated from Cash Flow Modified Jones 
Model of equation (4.7). DAs are ranked on the level of earnings deflated by lagged total assets and 
assigned into percentiles according to their rank orders. For each observation, DA_ADJit  is the DAit 
minus the median DApt for corresponding percentile.  Eit and Eit-1 are net income before extraordinary 
items deflated by lagged total assets for year t and year t-1, respectively.  Abs(Eit) is absolute value of 
earnings in year t. ROAit is return on assets, calculated as operating income divided by total assets. 
Spearman correlations between discretionary accruals and earnings performance variables are reported 
for both before and after adjustment and p-values are shown in parentheses below. *, **, *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively (two tailed). 
 
 
Panel A - Estimation sample 
 
Variable Eit Eit-1 Abs(Eit) ROAit 
Before adjust:     
DAit 0.3092 
(<0.0001)***
0.2194 
(<0.0001)***
-0.1561 
(<0.0001)*** 
0.3146 
(<0.0001)***
After adjust:     
DA_ADJit -0.0019 
(0.8817) 
0.0169 
(0.1913) 
-0.0048 
(0.7100) 
0.0211 
(0.1030) 
 
 
Panel B - Testing sample 
 
Variable Eit Eit-1 Abs(Eit) ROAit 
Before adjust:     
DAit 0.4040 
(<0.0001)*** 
0.2529 
(<0.0001)*** 
-0.1473 
(<0.0001)*** 
0.4080 
(<0.0001)*** 
After adjust:     
DA_ADJit -0.0113 
(0.5151) 
-0.0315 
(0.0696)* 
-0.0227 
(0.1897) 
0.0019 
(0.9123) 
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Table 5.5:  Univariate tests of the magnitude of earnings management by Jones 
Model 
 
 
 
The magnitude of earnings management is measured as absolute value of discretionary accruals, Abs 
(DA_J). The direction of earnings management is measured as signed discretionary accruals, DA_J. 
Discretionary accruals are obtained as the residual from Jones model (see Equation 4.1). The null 
hypotheses for parametric t-test is that mean is zero, for the Wilcoxon signed rank test is that the 
median is zero, and for the binomial sign test is that proportion of positive and negative are equal.  
Reported p-values are from two-tailed tests. 
 
 
 
Panel A - The magnitude of earnings management by industry 
 
Industry Parametric t-test  Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test    Binomial Sign Test    
 Mean t-stat p  Median z-stat p  +/− t-stat p 
Energy 0.2593 8.89 0.0000  0.1087 46118 0.0000  429/0 215 0.0000 
Material 0.1128 11.97 0.0000  0.0604 45903 0.0000  428/0 214 0.0000 
Metals & Mining 
Industrials 
0.2032 19.54 
14.08 
0.0000  0.0967 846860 0.0000  1840/0 920 0.0000 
0.0806 0.0000  0.0521 23639 0.0000  307/0 154 0.0000 
Consumer Discretionary 0.1190 22.85 0.0000 
0.0000 
 0.0745 239855 0.0000  979/0 490 0.0000 
Consumer Staples 0.0972 18.93  0.0607 50513 0.0000  449/0 225 0.0000 
Health Care 0.1320 19.32 0.0000  0.0779 78540 0.0000  560/0 280 0.0000 
Information Technology 0.2052 17.38 0.0000  0.1209 150738 0.0000  776/0 388 0.0000 
Tele & Utilities 0.1806 11.39 0.0000  0.0976 8055 0.0000  179/0 90 0.0000 
Total  0.1654 37.31 0.0000  0.0835 8843189 0.0000  5947/0 2973 0.0000 
 
 
 
Panel B - The magnitude of earnings management by year 
 
 
       Year Parametric t-test  Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test    Binomial Sign Test    
 Mean t-stat p  Median z-stat p  +/− t-stat p 
2000 0.1236 15.65 0.0000 0.0696 28140 0.0000 
 
335/0 168 0.0000 
2001 0.1513 15.73 0.0000 0.0853 73577 0.0000 
 
542/0 271 0.0000 
2002 0.1295 20.59 0.0000 0.0708 215993 0.0000 
 
929/0 465 0.0000 
2003 0.1265 22.16 0.0000 0.0712 229202 0.0000 
 
957/0 479 0.0000 
2004 0.1648 15.39 0.0000 0.0753 233048 0.0000 
 
965/0 483 0.0000 
2005 0.1987 13.76 0.0000 0.1076 290791 0.0000 
 
1078/0 539 0.0000 
2006 0.2153 15.83 0.0000 0.1001 325756 0.0000 
 
1141/0 571 0.0000 
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Table 5.6:  Univariate tests of the magnitude of earnings management by 
Modified Jones Model 
 
 
 
The magnitude of earnings management is measured as absolute value of discretionary accruals, Abs 
(DA_MJ). The direction of earnings management is measured as signed discretionary accruals, DA_MJ. 
Discretionary accruals are obtained as the residual from Modified Jones model (see Equation 4.6). The 
null hypotheses for parametric t-test is that mean is zero, for the Wilcoxon signed rank test is that the 
median is zero, and for the binomial sign test is that proportion of positive and negative are equal.  
Reported p-values are from two-tailed tests. 
 
 
 
Panel A-The magnitude of earnings management by industry 
 
Industry Parametric t-test  Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test  Binomial Sign Test 
 Mean t-stat p  Median z-stat p  +/− t-stat p 
Energy 0.2658 9.41 0.0000  0.1069 46118 0.0000  429/0 215 0.0000 
Material 
Metals & Mining 
0.1139 12.08 0.0000  0.0609 45903 0.0000  428/0 214 0.0000 
0.2037 19.65 0.0000  0.0968 846860 0.0000  1840/0 920 0.0000 
Industrials 0.0809 14.58 0.0000  0.0552 23639 0.0000  307/0 154 0.0000 
Consumer Discretionary 0.1178 22.22 0.0000  0.0742 239855 0.0000  979/0 490 0.0000 
Consumer Staples 0.0965 18.81 0.0000  0.0599 50513 0.0000  449/0 225 0.0000 
Health Care 0.1334 19.43 0.0000  0.0785 78540 0.0000  560/0 280 0.0000 
Information Technology 0.2142 17.56 0.0000  0.1197 150738 0.0000  776/0 388 0.0000 
Tele & Utilities 0.1748 11.44 0.0000  0.1002 8055 0.0000  179/0 90 0.0000 
Total  0.1679 37.81 0.0000  0.0830 8843189 0.0000  5947/0 2973 0.0000 
 
 
Panel B- The magnitude of earnings management by year 
 
 
   
Year 
 
Parametric t-test 
  
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test   
  
Binomial Sign Test    
 Mean t-stat p  Median z-stat p  +/− t-stat  p 
2000 0.1278 13.68 0.0000 0.0681 28140 0.0000 
 
335/0 168 0.0000 
2001 0.1541 15.66 0.0000 0.0804 73577 0.0000 
 
542/0 271 0.0000 
2002 0.1305 20.43 0.0000 0.0712 215993 0.0000 
 
929/0 465 0.0000 
2003 0.128 22.09 0.0000 0.0726 229202 0.0000 
 
957/0 479 0.0000 
2004 0.1648 15.43 0.0000 0.0778 233048 0.0000 
 
965/0 483 0.0000 
2005 0.1999 13.91 0.0000 0.1063 290791 0.0000 
 
1078/0 539 0.0000 
2006 0.218 16.3 0.0000 0.098 325756 0.0000 
 
1141/0 571 0.0000 
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Table 5.7: Univariate tests of the magnitude of earnings management by Cash 
Flow Modified Jones Model 
 
 
 
The magnitude of earnings management is measured as absolute value of discretionary accruals, Abs 
(DA_CFO). The direction of earnings management is measured as signed discretionary accruals, 
DA_CFO. Discretionary accruals are obtained as the residual from Cash Flow Modified Jones model 
(see Equation 4.7). The null hypotheses for parametric t-test is that mean is zero, for the Wilcoxon 
signed rank test is that the median is zero, and for the binomial sign test is that proportion of positive 
and negative are equal.  Reported p-values are from two-tailed tests. 
 
 
 
Panel A-The magnitude of earnings management by industry 
 
Industry Parametric t-test  Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test         Binomial Sign Test  
 Mean t-stat p  Median      z-stat p  +/− t-stat p 
Energy 0.1605 15.38 0.0000  0.0851 46118 0.0000  429/0 215 0.0000 
Material 0.1042 11.82 0.0000  0.0571 45903 0.0000  428/0 214 0.0000 
Metals & Mining 0.1824 21.39 0.0000  0.0872 846860 0.0000  1840/0 920 0.0000 
Industrials 0.0740 13.71 0.0000  0.0453 23639 0.0000  307/0 154 0.0000 
Consumer Discretionary 0.1120 21.71 0.0000  0.0674 239855 0.0000  979/0 490 0.0000 
Consumer Staples 0.0818 19.42 0.0000  0.0528 50513 0.0000  449/0 225 0.0000 
Health Care 0.1303 19.38 0.0000  0.0785 78540 0.0000  560/0 280 0.0000 
Information Technology 0.1882 20.86 0.0000  0.1084 150738 0.0000  776/0 388 0.0000 
Tele & Utilities 0.1632 11.92 0.0000  0.1080 8055 0.0000  179/0 90 0.0000 
 
 
Panel B- The magnitude of earnings management by year 
 
   Year 
 
Parametric t-test  Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test     Binomial Sign Test    
 Mean t-stat p  Median z-stat p  +/− t-stat p 
2000 0.1162 13.86 0.0000 0.0638 28140 0.0000 
 
335/0 168 0.0000 
2001 0.1482 16.36 0.0000 0.0783 73577 0.0000 
 
542/0 271 0.0000 
2002 0.1165 24.73 0.0000 0.0719 215993 0.0000 
 
929/0 465 0.0000 
2003 0.1169 23.16 0.0000 0.0675 229202 0.0000 
 
957/0 479 0.0000 
2004 0.1507 16.25 0.0000 0.0687 233048 0.0000 
 
965/0 483 0.0000 
2005 0.1664 14.66 0.0000 0.0867 290791 0.0000 
 
1078/0 539 0.0000 
2006 0.1774 22.16 0.0000 0.0909 325756 0.0000 
 
1141/0 571 0.0000 
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Table 5.8: Univariate tests of the magnitude of earnings management by 
Performance Adjusted Technique 
 
 
 
The magnitude of earnings management is measured as absolute value of adjusted discretionary 
accruals, Abs (DA_ADJ). The direction of earnings management is measured as signed adjusted 
discretionary accruals, DA_ADJ. Discretionary accruals are obtained as the residual from Performance 
Adjusted Technique (see Equation 4.8). The null hypotheses for parametric t-test is that mean is zero, 
for the Wilcoxon signed rank test is that the median is zero, and for the binomial sign test is that 
proportion of positive and negative are equal.  Reported p-values are from two-tailed tests. 
 
 
Panel A-The magnitude of earnings management by industry 
 
Industry Parametric t-test  Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test  Binomial Sign Test 
 Mean t-stat p  Median     z-stat p  +/− t-stat p 
Energy 0.1558 15.64 0.0000  0.0864 45903 0.0000  429/0 214 0.0000 
Material 0.0939 12.56 0.0000  0.0532 45050 0.0000  428/0 212 0.0000 
Metals & Mining 0.1694 20.42 0.0000  0.0834 833113 0.0000  1840/0 913 0.0000 
Industrials 0.0699 14.37 0.0000  0.0438 23486 0.0000  307/0 153 0.0000 
Consumer Discretionary 0.0973 21.19 0.0000  0.0555 235953 0.0000  979/0 486 0.0000 
Consumer Staples 0.0709 18.98 0.0000  0.0441 49395 0.0000  449/0 222 0.0000 
Health Care 0.1136 18.93 0.0000  0.0688 75488 0.0000  560/0 275 0.0000 
Information Technology 0.1664 19.54 0.0000  0.0983 147648 0.0000  776/0 384 0.0000 
Tele & Utilities 0.1512 13.24 0.0000  0.1014 8055 0.0000  179/0 90 0.0000 
Total  0.1324 41.82 0.0000  0.0696 8686283 0.0000  5947/0 2947 0.0000 
 
 
Panel B- The magnitude of earnings management by year 
 
                 Year Parametric t-test  Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test     Binomial Sign Test    
 Mean t-stat p  Median z-stat p  +/− t-stat p 
2000 0.1064 13.39 0.0000 0.0561 27806 0.0000 
 
335/0 167 0.0000 
2001 0.1248 16.54 0.0000 0.0723 73035 0.0000 
 
542/0 270 0.0000 
2002 0.1089 24.17 0.0000 0.0677 212291 0.0000 
 
929/0 461 0.0000
2003 0.1101 23.13 0.0000 0.0623 223966 0.0000 
 
957/0 473 0.0000 
2004 0.1364 15.64 0.0000 0.0673 228245 0.0000 
 
965/0 478 0.0000 
2005 0.1494 13.61 0.0000 0.0769 286493 0.0000 
 
1078/0 535 0.0000 
2006 0.1618 20.77 0.0000 0.0807 318943 0.0000 
 
1141/0 565 0.0000 
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Table 5.9:  Univariate tests of directions of earnings management by Jones 
Model 
 
 
 
The direction of earnings management is measured as signed discretionary accruals, DA_J. 
Discretionary accruals are obtained as the residual from Jones model (see Equation 4.1). The null 
hypotheses for parametric t-test is that mean is zero, for the Wilcoxon signed rank test is that the 
median is zero, and for the binomial sign test is that proportion of positive and negative are equal.  
Reported p-values are from two-tailed tests. 
 
 
 
Panel A- The directions of earnings management by industry 
 
Industry Parametric t-test     Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test              Binomial Sign Test    
 Mean     t-stat p   Median      z-stat p   +/─    t-stat P 
Energy 0.0049 0.15 0.8775  -0.0125 -1193 0.6428  195/234 -19 0.0664 
Material -0.0049 -0.45 0.6490  0.0041 2206 0.3896  225/203  11 0.3101 
Metals & Mining -0.0416 -3.65 0.0003  -0.0245 -186819 <.0001  781/1059 -139 <.0001 
Industrials -0.0153 -2.09 0.0369  -0.0067 -2728 0.0797  134/173 -19 0.0299 
Consumer Discretionary 0.0080 1.24 0.2148  0.0211 31918 0.0003  569/410 79 <.0001 
Consumer Staples 0.0024 0.35 0.7254  0.0087 3869 0.1598  241/208 16 0.1309 
Health Care -0.0357 -4.11 <.0001  -0.0268 17565 <.0001  227/333 -53 <.0001 
Information Technology -0.0628 -4.58 <.0001  -0.0459 -41171 <.0001  308/468 -80 <.0001 
Tele & Utilities 0.0361 1.78 0.0823  0.0303 1859 0.0071  106/73 17 0.0165 
 
 
 
 
Panel B - The directions of earnings management by year 
 
 
                 Year Parametric t-test  Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test     Binomial Sign Test    
 Mean t-stat p  Median z-stat p  +/− t-stat p 
2000 0.0009 0.08 -0.933 0.0084 2617 -0.1404 186/149 18 -0.049 
2001 -0.0149 -1.28 -0.1995 -0.0078 -6196 -0.0894 251/291 -20 -0.0938 
2002 0.0026 0.34 -0.7309 -0.0068 -8119 -0.3212 433/496 -32 -0.0419 
2003 -0.0064 -0.92 -0.3594 0.0024 -2309 -0.7873 485/472 6 -0.6981 
2004 -0.0262 -2.19 -0.0282 -0.0096 -32798 -0.0001 443/522 -39 -0.012 
2005 -0.0711 -4.58 (<0.0001) -0.0478 -106139 (<.0001) 409/669 -130 (<0.0001) 
2006 -0.0185 -1.24 -0.271 0.0034 -7669 -0.4911 579/562 9 -0.6358 
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Table 5.10:  Univariate tests of directions of earnings management by Modified 
Jones Model 
 
 
 
The direction of earnings management is measured as signed discretionary accruals, DA_MJ. 
Discretionary accruals are obtained as the residual from Modified Jones model (see Equation 4.6). The 
null hypotheses for parametric t-test is that mean is zero, for the Wilcoxon signed rank test is that the 
median is zero, and for the binomial sign test is that proportion of positive and negative are equal.  
Reported p-values are from two-tailed tests. 
 
 
 
 
Panel A- The directions of earnings management by industry 
 
Industry        Parametric t-test     Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test            Binomial Sign Test  
 Mean     t-stat p     Median      z-stat p   +/─    t-stat p 
Energy 0.0152 0.49 0.6236  -0.0106 -785 0.7602  198/231 -17 0.1223 
Material -0.0036 -0.33 0.7363  0.0043 2514 0.3268  223/205  9 0.4113 
Metals & Mining -0.0420 -3.69 0.0002  -0.0243 -187464 <.0001  774/1066 -146 <.0001 
Industrials -0.0160 -2.23 0.0262  -0.0106 -3039 0.0507  136/171 -17 0.0521 
Consumer Discretionary 0.0130 2.00 0.0452  0.0255 42793 <.0001  581/398 92 <.0001 
Consumer Staples 0.0027 0.39 0.6897  0.0083 3888 0.1578  242/207 18 0.1085 
Health Care -0.0379 -4.33 <.0001  -0.0275 18271 <.0001  231/329 -49 <.0001 
Information Technology -0.0616 -4.32 <.0001  -0.0477 -40981 <.0001  306/470 -82 <.0001 
Tele & Utilities 0.0182 0.90 0.3673  0.0337 1434 0.0385  105/74 16 0.0274 
 
 
Panel B- The directions of earnings management by year 
 
 
                 Year Parametric t-test  Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test     Binomial Sign Test    
 Mean t-stat p  Median z-stat p  +/− t-stat p 
2000 
 
0.0008 0.69 -0.4904
 
0.0099 3317 -0.0614
 
184/151 17 -0.0802
2001 
 
-0.0139 -1.17 -0.2408 
 
-0.0072 -6549 -0.0725 
 
255/287 -16 -0.183 
2002 
 
0.0039 0.5 -0.6145 
 
-0.0073 -5683 -0.4212 
 
436/493 -28 -0.0661 
2003 
 
-0.0108 -1.53 -0.1281 
 
0.0028 -7706 -0.3678 
 
481/476 3 -0.8971 
2004 
 
-0.0232 -1.59 -0.0516 
 
-0.0096 -25849 -0.0028 
 
449/516 -33 -0.0336 
2005 
 
-0.0718 -4.65 (<0.0001) 
 
-0.0491 -106305 (<0.0001) 
 
413/665 -126 (<0.0001) 
2006 
 
-0.0155 -1.04 -0.2982 
 
0.0146 -5131 -0.6451 
 
578/563 8 -0.6786 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
225
Table 5.11: Univariate tests of directions of earnings management by Cash Flow 
Modified Jones Model 
 
 
 
The direction of earnings management is measured as signed discretionary accruals, DA_CFO. 
Discretionary accruals are obtained as the residual from Cash Flow Modified Jones model (see 
Equation 4.7). The null hypotheses for parametric t-test is that mean is zero, for the Wilcoxon signed 
rank test is that the median is zero, and for the binomial sign test is that proportion of positive and 
negative are equal.  Reported p-values are from two-tailed tests. 
 
 
 
Panel A- The directions of earnings management by industry 
 
Industry Parametric t-test  Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test         Binomial Sign Test   
 Mean  t-stat p  Median z-stat p  +/− t-stat p 
Energy 0.0166 1.28 0.2012  -0.0029 248 0.9231  208/221 -7 0.5624 
Material -0.0022 -0.21 0.8280  0.0043 2122 0.4079  220/208 6 0.5950 
Metals & Mining -0.0272 -2.85 0.0043  -0.0102 -78104 0.0006  851/989 -69 0.0014 
Industrials -0.0128 -1.88 0.0611  -0.0070 -1741 0.2642  140/167 -13 0.1377 
Consumer Discretionary 0.0124 1.98 0.0476  0.0259 46203 <.0001  597/382 107 <.0001 
Consumer Staples 0.0004 0.08 0.9389  0.0096 4611 0.0937  254/195 29 0.0061 
Health Care -0.0335 -3.90 0.0001  -0.0232 -16015 <.0001  231/329 -49 <.0001 
Information Technology -0.0279 -2.48 0.0133  -0.0371 -28458 <.0001  320/456 -68 <.0001 
Tele & Utilities 0.0112 0.61 0.5421  0.0246 1121 0.1066  105/74 16 0.0247 
 
 
 
Panel B- The directions of earnings management by year 
 
 
                 Year Parametric t-test  Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test     Binomial Sign Test    
 Mean t-stat p  Median z-stat p  +/− t-stat p 
2000 
 
0.0008 0.69 -0.4904 
 
0.0099 3317 -0.0614 
 
184/151 17 -0.0802 
2001 
 
-0.0139 -1.17 -0.2408 
 
-0.0072 -6549 -0.0725 
 
255/287 -16 -0.183 
2002 
 
0.0039 0.5 -0.6145 
 
-0.0073 -5683 -0.4212 
 
436/493 -28 -0.0661 
2003 
 
-0.0108 -1.53 -0.1281 
 
0.0028 -7706 -0.3678 
 
481/476 3 -0.8971 
2004 
 
-0.0232 -1.59 -0.0516 
 
-0.0096 -25849 -0.0028 
 
449/516 -33 -0.0336 
2005 
 
-0.0718 -4.65 (<0.0001) 
 
-0.0491 -106305 (<0.0001) 
 
413/665 -126 (<0.0001) 
2006 
 
-0.0155 -1.04 -0.2982 
 
0.0146 -5131 -0.6451 
 
578/563 8 -0.6786 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
226
Table 5.12: Univariate tests of directions of earnings management by 
Performance Adjusted Technique 
 
 
 
The direction of earnings management is measured as signed adjusted discretionary accruals, DA_ADJ. 
Discretionary accruals are obtained as the residual from Cash Flow Models then adjust for earnings 
performance (see Equation 4.8). The null hypotheses for parametric t-test is that mean is zero, for the 
Wilcoxon signed rank test is that the median is zero, and for the binomial sign test is that proportion of 
positive and negative are equal.  Reported p-values are from two-tailed tests. 
 
 
 
Panel A- The directions of earnings management by industry 
 
 
Industry Parametric t-test  Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test  Binomial Sign Test 
 Mean t-stat p Median     z-stat p  +/− t-stat p 
Energy 0.0274 2.21 0.0280  -0.0058 -76 0.9764  201/228 -13 0.2268 
Material -0.0038 -0.43 0.6638  -0.0024 -2090 0.4083  203/225 -9 0.4091 
Metals & Mining 0.0008 0.08 0.9285  0.0000 -5447 0.8089  913/927 -0.5 1.0000 
Industrials -0.0159 -2.55 0.0111  -0.0165 -4987 0.0012  125/182 -28 0.0016 
Consumer Discretionary 0.0055 0.99 0.3199  0.0033 9946 0.2554  508/471 22 0.2579 
Consumer Staples 0.0008 0.13 0.8970  0.0005 -341 0.8994  223/226 7 0.5060 
Health Care 0.0248 3.26 0.0012  0.0199 17427 <.0001  321/239   46 <.0001 
Information Technology 0.0377 0.36 0.7169  -0.0178 -11320 0.0656  339/437 -45 0.0013 
Tele & Utilities 0.0517 3.31 0.0011  0.0576 2881 <.0001  114/65 24 0.0003 
 
 
Panel B- The directions of earnings management by year 
 
                 Year Parametric t-test  Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test     Binomial Sign Test    
 Mean t-stat p  Median z-stat p  +/− t-stat p 
2000 
 
0.0008 0.69 -0.4904 
 
0.0099 3317 -0.0614 
 
184/151 17 -0.0802 
2001 
 
-0.0139 -1.17 -0.2408 
 
-0.0072 -6549 -0.0725 
 
255/287 -16 -0.183 
2002 
 
0.0039 0.5 -0.6145 
 
-0.0073 -5683 -0.4212 
 
436/493 -28 -0.0661 
2003 
 
-0.0108 -1.53 -0.1281 
 
0.0028 -7706 -0.3678 
 
481/476 3 -0.8971 
2004 
 
-0.0232 -1.59 -0.0516 
 
-0.0096 -25849 -0.0028 
 
449/516 -33 -0.0336 
2005 
 
-0.0718 -4.65 (<0.0001) 
 
-0.0491 -106305 (<0.0001) 
 
413/665 -126 (<0.0001) 
2006 
 
-0.0155 -1.04 -0.2982 
 
0.0146 -5131 -0.6451 
 
578/563 8 -0.6786 
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Table 5.13:  Firm characteristics by the magnitude of earnings management 
 
 
 
The magnitude of earnings management is measured as absolute values of adjusted discretionary 
accruals, Abs (DA_ADJ). Absolute value of adjusted discretionary accruals is estimated from 
Performance Adjusted Technique. Portfolio ranking is based on decile portfolios based on one of the 
measures of the magnitude of earnings management. Means of each characteristic within each portfolio 
are reported. Firm size (SIZE), growth rate (GROWTH), profitability (ROE), leverage (LEV), book-to-
market (BM), capital intensity (CIR), and lagged total accruals (LAGTA) are all defined in Table 4.1.  
 
 
Portfolio 
Ranking N 
Abs 
(DA_ADJ) 
SIZE GROWTH ROE LEV BM CIR LAGTA 
1 (Low) 594 0.0042 11.0206 3.6164 0.0596 0.1864 0.7230 0.3338 -0.0220 
2 595 0.0158 10.9569 0.7783 -0.0066 0.1855 0.7945 0.3345 -0.0506 
3 595 0.0288 10.8358 0.5287 -0.0937 0.1785 0.7788 0.3392 -0.0639 
4 595 0.0429 10.9754 4.5884 -0.0376 0.1985 0.7399 0.3474 -0.7111 
5 594 0.0601 10.7166 0.8271 -0.1303 0.1690 0.7777 0.3576 -0.4708 
6 595 0.0812 10.3109 1.3371 -0.1077 0.1583 0.7014 0.3748 -0.1450 
7 595 0.1086 10.2824 6.8756 -0.2227 0.1442 0.6970 0.3325 -3.0001 
8 595 0.1488 10.1419 2.7202 -0.4921 0.1773 0.6079 0.3694 -0.0960 
9 595 0.2244 9.7793 3.5491 -1.5115 0.1701 0.5356 0.3405 -0.1372 
10 (High) 594 0.6093 9.0633 4.2532 -0.8501 0.1757 0.4358 0.2720 0.0489 
t-test of  
Low=High  26.83 −17.17 0.18 −2.56 −0.44 −5.99 −3.87 0.30 
 (p-value)  <0.0001 <0.0001 0.8566 0.0108 0.6630 <0.0001 0.0001 0.7669 
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Table 5.14:  Firm characteristics by directions of earnings management 
 
 
The directions of earnings management is measured as signed value of adjusted discretionary accruals. 
Positive adjusted discretionary accruals, +DA_ADJ, indicate upward earnings management while 
negative adjusted discretionary accruals, −DA_ADJ, indicate downward earnings management. 
Adjusted discretionary accruals are estimated from Performance Adjusted Technique. Portfolio ranking 
is based on decile portfolios based on one of the measures of the directions of earnings management. 
Means of each characteristic within each portfolio are reported. Firm size (SIZE), growth rate 
(GROWTH), profitability (ROE), leverage (LEV), book-to-market (BM), capital intensity (CIR), and 
lagged total accruals (LAGTA) are all defined in Table 4.1.  
 
 
Panel A-Upward (income-increasing) 
Portfolio 
Ranking 
N + DA_ADJ SIZE GROWTH ROE LEV BM CIR LAGTA 
1 (Low) 298 0.0050 11.0502 7.0356 0.0459 0.1829 0.7326 0.3406 -0.0264 
2 298 0.0168 10.8507 1.0730 -0.0050 0.1793 0.8111 0.3475 -0.0476 
3 297 0.0299 10.7368 9.6551 0.0104 0.1784 0.7327 0.3253 -0.8893 
4 297 0.0434 10.6717 0.4498 -0.0219 0.2157 0.7710 0.3742 0.0021 
5 297 0.0609 10.4016 1.4830 -0.2145 0.1710 0.8200 0.3734 0.0111 
6 297 0.0829 10.2555 9.6449 -0.0711 0.1692 0.6835 0.3901 -0.0517 
7 297 0.1118 10.0029 2.1288 -0.0978 0.1477 0.7354 0.3722 0.0132 
8 297 0.1551 9.8158 4.3584 -0.4175 0.2028 0.6146 0.4005 -0.0084 
9 297 0.2409 8.9787 6.7278 -2.7407 0.1812 0.4591 0.3148 0.4041 
10 (High) 298 0.6502 8.8459 4.1026 -1.0444 0.1645 0.3759 0.3008 0.2279 
t-test of  
Low=High  19.07 −13.32 −0.43 −1.72 −0.53 −7.09 −1.66 2.14 
 (p-value)  <0.0001 <0.0001 0.6700 0.0859 0.5941 <0.0001 0.0976 0.0333 
 
 
Panel B-Downward (income-decreasing) 
Portfolio 
Ranking 
N − DA_ADJ SIZE GROWTH ROE LEV BM CIR LAGTA 
1 (Low) 298 -0.0050 11.1418 0.4910 0.0562 0.1678 0.7664 0.3301 -0.0159 
2 298 -0.0166 11.0949 0.4284 0.0133 0.2001 0.7917 0.3222 -0.0810 
3 297 -0.0296 10.9253 0.2665 -0.1710 0.2007 0.7873 0.3538 -0.0692 
4 297 -0.0441 11.2203 0.3519 -0.0927 0.1594 0.7437 0.3287 -0.5820 
5 297 -0.0611 10.9409 1.1434 -0.0566 0.1584 0.7107 0.3376 -0.9766 
6 297 -0.0815 10.4014 1.0554 -0.1369 0.1508 0.7408 0.3554 -0.2057 
7 297 -0.1076 10.4831 3.2797 -0.3354 0.1334 0.6886 0.3114 -6.1850 
8 297 -0.1451 10.5466 1.4832 -0.4726 0.1723 0.5282 0.3468 -0.1785 
9 297 -0.2129 10.3657 0.8928 -0.3241 0.1363 0.5945 0.3318 -0.2757 
10 (High) 298 -0.5723 9.4757 4.4890 -0.7642 0.2003 0.5262 0.2536 -0.5468 
t-test of  
Low=High  −18.67 −10.43 1.80 −2.41 0.97 −2.79 −3.64 −3.04 
 (p-value)  <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0735 0.0166 0.3328 0.0055 0.0003 0.0026 
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Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics (Executive Compensation Incentive) 
 
 
All variables are defined in Table 4.1. N is firm-year observations. Testing sample has total 
observations 3,326 covering the period 2000-2006. Mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, and 
maximum are reported. %a is percentage of observations having positive values. %b is the mean value 
of a particular form of compensation as a percentage of the mean total compensation. %c is the number 
of observations paying a particular form of compensation as a percentage of total observations.   
 
 
Panel A-Various discretionary accrual variables 
 
Discretionary 
Accruals 
(% of total assets) 
N Mean Median S.D. Min Max %a 
        DA_J 3326 -0.0427 -0.0126   0.2227 -1.0399 0.6294 46.14 
Abs (DA_J) 3326 0.1443 0.0837 0.1749 0.0000 1.0399  
        DA_MJ 3326 -0.0416 -0.0119 0.2250 -1.0392 0.6912 46.62 
Abs (DA_MJ) 3326 0.1455 0.0838 0.1766 0.0838 1.0392  
        DA_CF 3326 -0.0271 -0.0037 0.2068 -1.0520 0.6340 48.57 
Abs (DA_CF) 3326 0.1293 0.0766 0.1636 0.0002 1.0520  
        DA_ADJ 3326   -0.0038 0.0000 0.1826 -0.9745 0.7168 50.05 
Abs (DA_ADJ) 3326   0.1114 0.0643 0.1447 0.0000 0.9745  
 
 
Panel B - Compensation variables 
 
Compensation 
($millions) N Mean Median S.D. Min Max %
b %c 
          TCOMP  3326 0.5460 0.3023 0.6949 0.0195 4.7195 100% 100% 
          SALARY  3135 0.2951 0.2107 0.2992 0.0000 3.1061 54.05% 94.26% 
          BONUS  1035 0.0780 0.0000 0.2215 0.0000 2.4400 14.29% 31.12% 
          LTIP 167 0.0159 0.0000 0.1315 0.0000 2.1130 2.91% 5.02% 
         OPTION 982 0.0576 0.0000 0.2149 0.0000 3.1729 10.55% 29.52% 
         SHARE  184 0.0123 0.0000 0.1102 0.0000 3.6241 2.25% 5.53% 
         FIX 3135 0.3515 0.2488 0.3611 0.0000 3.4908 64.38% 94.26% 
        ATRISK 1035 0.1637 0.0040 0.3940 0.0000 3.9695 29.98% 31.12% 
 
 
Panel C- Control variables 
 
Control Variable N Mean Median S.D Min Max 
        SIZE 3326 10.6360 10.2476 2.0585 6.0615 16.0499 
         GROWTH 2546 1.4637 0.1006 16.4156 -1.0000 547.0775 
         ROE 3326 -0.1290 -0.0298 0.4658 -7.5223 1.6375 
         LEV 3326 0.1557 0.0712 0.2293 0.0000 4.3394 
        BM 3318 0.6406 0.5124 0.8185 -22.4270 10.3268 
        CIR 3326 0.3383 0.2770 0.2786 0.0000 0.9922 
        LAGTA 2954 -0.2276 -0.0326 4.8914 -202.4092 15.0385 
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Table 6.2:  Two-way cluster robust regression results for the association between the 
magnitude of earnings management and executive compensation 
 
This table reports two-way cluster robust regression results in testing the magnitude of earnings 
management and its association with executive compensations. The dependent variable is the magnitude of 
earnings management which is measured as absolute values of discretionary accruals. Absolute value of 
discretionary accruals is estimated from Performance Adjusted Technique - Abs (DA_ADJ). Explanatory 
variables are executive compensations which decomposed into three tiers: executive total compensation 
(TOMP); executive fixed remuneration (FIX) versus at-risk compensation (ATRISK); and, individual 
components including fixed salary (SALARY), bonuses (BONUS), options (OPTION), shares (SHARE), 
and long-term incentive plans (LTIP). Firm characteristics and industry effects are controlled. All variables 
are defined in Table 4.1. The estimated coefficients and t statistics are two-way cluster-robust adjusted with 
White (1980) method. T-statistics are given in parentheses, one-tailed tests when we have explicit 
predictions and two-tailed otherwise.*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
 
                
Variable Pred. 
Sign 
(1) Total Compensation (2)   Fixed v. At-risk (3) Individual Components 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Intercept ? 0.2646 (9.8818)*** 0.2481 (9.0049)*** 0.2467 (9.1625)*** 
TCOMP + -0.0004 (-0.0707)     
FIX −   -0.0467 (-4.5719)***   
ATRISK +   0.0246 (3.4720)**   
SALARY −     -0.0477 (-3.7910)*** 
BONUS +     0.0307 (3.3612)** 
OPTION +     0.0165 (2.1249)* 
SHARE ?     0.0534 (1.7515) 
LTIP ?     0.0044 (0.6541) 
Control Variables:        
SIZE ? -0.0123 (-5.2758)*** -0.0099 (-3.9231)*** -0.0098 (-4.1686)*** 
GROWTH + 0.0005 (5.9328)*** 0.0005 (6.2206)*** 0.0005 (6.2749)*** 
ROE ? -0.0342 (-3.2096)** -0.0358 (-3.4598)** -0.0355 (-3.4906)** 
LEV ? 0.0031 (0.2927) 0.0046 (0.4149) 0.0048 (0.4459) 
BM − -0.0071 (-2.1710)* -0.0076 (-2.5920)** -0.0076 (-2.5707)** 
CIR − 0.0173 (1.0823) 0.0159 (1.0111) 0.0167 (1.0735) 
LAGTA + -0.0001 (-0.8082) -0.0002 (-1.4490) -0.0001 (-1.2885) 
Industry Effects:        
Material  -0.0281 (-2.6587)** -0.0253 (-2.4657)** -0.0260 (-2.5708)** 
Metals & Mining  -0.0269 (-1.4948) -0.0269 (-1.5730) -0.0266 (-1.5168) 
Industrials  -0.0350 (-3.4036)** -0.0350 (-3.2397)** -0.0332 (-3.0215)** 
Consumer Discretionary  -0.0436 (-6.2751)*** -0.0404 (-6.2150)*** -0.0400 (-5.8618)*** 
Consumer Staples  -0.0439 (-4.5123)*** -0.0418 (-4.1139)*** -0.0413 (-3.9254)*** 
Health Care  -0.0377 (-4.8078)*** -0.0383 (-5.4727)*** -0.0376 (-5.5530)*** 
Information Technology  -0.0238 (-2.4076)* -0.0212 (-1.9877)* -0.0206 (-2.0021)* 
Tele & Utilities  0.0143 (0.7079) 0.0149 (0.7154) 0.0151 (0.7527) 
        
Adj. R-square  0.1034  0.1092  0.1111  
F  8.82 (<.0001) 9.26 (<.0001) 10.10 (<.0001) 
N  3326  3326  3326  
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Table 6.3:  Two-way cluster robust regression results for the association between the 
upward earnings management and executive compensation 
 
This table reports two-way cluster robust regression results in testing upward earnings management and its 
association with executive compensations. The dependent variable is the direction of earnings management, 
upward earnings management, which is measured as positive discretionary accruals. Positive discretionary 
accruals, +DA_ADJ, are estimated from Performance Adjusted Technique. Explanatory variables are 
executive compensations which decomposed into three tiers: executive total compensation (TOMP); 
executive fixed remuneration (FIX) versus at-risk compensation (ATRISK); and, individual components 
including fixed salary (SALARY), bonuses (BONUS), options (OPTION), shares (SHARE), and long-term 
incentive plans (LTIP). Firm characteristics and industry effects are controlled. All variables are defined in 
Table 4.1. The estimated coefficients and t statistics are two-way cluster-robust adjusted with White (1980) 
method. T-statistics are given in parentheses, one-tailed tests when we have explicit predictions and two-
tailed otherwise.*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 
Variable Pred. 
Sign 
(1) Total Compensation (2)   Fixed v. At-risk (3) Individual Components 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Intercept ? 0.3180 (9.2276)*** 0.3088 (9.2847)*** 0.3084 (9.2410)*** 
TCOMP + 0.0099 (2.2613)*     
FIX −   -0.0117 (-0.7739)   
ATRISK +   0.0202 (3.8473)***   
SALARY −     -0.0093 (-0.7504) 
BONUS +     0.0169 (1.6425) 
OPTION −     0.0238 (2.1343)** 
SHARE ?     0.0156 (0.7318) 
LTIP ?     0.0100 (0.5834) 
Control Variables:        
SIZE ? -0.0181 (-6.5293)*** -0.0167 (-5.9011)*** -0.0167 (-5.7710)*** 
GROWTH + 0.0005 (3.0349)** 0.0005 (3.0314)** 0.0005 (3.0203)** 
ROE ? -0.0152 (-1.6626) -0.0165 (-1.7543) -0.0167 (-1.7481) 
LEV ? 0.1167 (8.9578)*** 0.1160 (9.1593)*** 0.1158 (8.8948)*** 
BM − -0.0061 (-1.2993) -0.0063 (-1.3216) -0.0063 (-1.3520) 
CIR − 0.0037 (0.1535) 0.0030 (0.1238) 0.0030 (0.1226) 
LAGTA + 0.0207 (1.7326) 0.0209 (1.7821) 0.0210 (1.8006) 
Industry Effects:        
Material  -0.0601 (-3.0572)** -0.0598 (-3.0624)** -0.0598 (-3.0922)** 
Metals & Mining  -0.0451 (-2.5411)** -0.0461 (-2.5714)** -0.0465 (-2.5331)** 
Industrials  -0.0861 (-5.3662)*** -0.0863 (-5.2458)*** -0.0858 (-5.1232)*** 
Consumer Discretionary  -0.0680 (-4.1423)*** -0.0665 (-4.0574)*** -0.0667 (-4.0678)*** 
Consumer Staples  -0.0756 (-3.0199)** -0.0754 (-3.0201)** -0.0749 (-2.9116)** 
Health Care  -0.0418 (-2.8670)** -0.0426 (-2.8837)** -0.0431 (-2.8633)** 
Information Technology  -0.0307 (-1.5268) -0.0303 (-1.5023) -0.0304 (-1.5018) 
Tele & Utilities  -0.0467 (-1.3364) -0.0471 (-1.3430) -0.0473 (-1.3539) 
        
Adj. R-square  0.1852  0.1857  0.1836  
F  15.97 (<.0001) 15.14 (<0.001) 12.85 (<0.001) 
N  1647  1647  1647  
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Table 6.4:  Two-way cluster robust regression results for the association between the 
downward earnings management and executive compensation 
 
This table reports two-way cluster robust regression results in testing downward earnings management and 
its association with executive compensations. The dependent variable is the direction of earnings 
management, downward earnings management, which is measured as negative discretionary accruals. 
Negative discretionary accruals, −DA_ADJ, are estimated from Performance Adjusted Technique. 
Explanatory variables are executive compensations which decomposed into three tiers: executive total 
compensation (TOMP); executive fixed remuneration (FIX) versus at-risk compensation (ATRISK); and, 
individual components including fixed salary (SALARY), bonuses (BONUS), options (OPTION), shares 
(SHARE), and long-term incentive plans (LTIP). Firm characteristics and industry effects are controlled. 
All variables are defined in Table 4.1. The estimated coefficients and t statistics are two-way cluster-robust 
adjusted with White (1980) method. T-statistics are given in parentheses, one-tailed tests when we have 
explicit predictions and two-tailed otherwise.*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% respectively. 
 
 
Variable Pred. 
Sign 
(1) Total Compensation (2)   Fixed v. At-risk (3) Individual Components 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Intercept ? -0.2545 (-8.4355)*** -0.2320 (-7.8402)*** -0.2276 (-7.9449)*** 
TCOMP − 0.0059 (0.5915)     
FIX +   0.0661 (4.0395)***   
ATRISK −   -0.0277 (-2.7286)**   
SALARY +     0.0700 (3.0668)** 
BONUS −     -0.0456 (-3.3606)** 
OPTION +     -0.0082 (-0.3671) 
SHARE ?     -0.0551 (-1.6422) 
LTIP ?     0.0023 (0.2007) 
        
Control Variables:        
SIZE ? 0.0107 (3.5528)** 0.0076 (2.6088)** 0.0072 (2.5002)** 
GROWTH + -0.0005 (-3.4778)** -0.0005 (-3.3671)** -0.0005 (-3.3174)** 
ROE ? 0.0493 (3.9615)*** 0.0502 (4.1935)*** 0.0503 (4.4360)*** 
LEV ? 0.0813 (4.3736)*** 0.0766 (4.3160)*** 0.0761 (4.6070)*** 
BM − 0.0092 (2.3143)* 0.0102 (2.8719)** 0.0102 (2.9201)** 
CIR − -0.0308 (-1.1782) -0.0275 (-1.1072) -0.0295 (-1.2042) 
LAGTA + 0.0001 (0.3808) 0.0001 (0.9128) 0.0001 (0.5795) 
        
Industry Effects:        
Material  0.0003 (0.0231) -0.0041 (-0.2764) -0.0012 (-0.0826) 
Metals & Mining  0.0143 (0.5371) 0.0122 (0.4739) 0.0127 (0.4618) 
Industrials  0.0045 (0.3628) 0.0049 (0.3496) 0.0024 (0.1646) 
Consumer Discretionary  0.0276 (2.1089)* 0.0231 (1.7800) 0.0218 (1.6679) 
Consumer Staples  0.0194 (1.3529) 0.0154 (0.9981) 0.0167 (1.1516) 
Health Care  0.0403 (1.2695) 0.0406 (1.3518) 0.0411 (1.2888) 
Information Technology  0.0180 (1.1596) 0.0139 (0.8423) 0.0131 (0.8478) 
Tele & Utilities  -0.0944 (-2.1279)* -0.0972 (-2.1761)* -0.0965 (-2.1551)* 
        
Adj. R-square  0.0926  0.0999  0.1007  
F  8.62 (<.0001) 8.80 (<.0001) 7.69 (<.0001) 
N  1649  1649  1649  
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Table 7.1:  Descriptive Statistics (Benchmark Beating Incentive) 
 
 
 
All variables are defined in Table 4.1. N is firm-year observations. Testing sample has total observations 
3,326 covering the period 2000-2006. Mean, Median, standard deviation (S.D.), minimum (Min), and 
maximum (Max) are reported.  
 
 
Panel A-Benchmark and discretionary accrual variables 
 
Variables           N Mean Median             S.D.            Min         Max 
E 3326 -0.1242 -0.0291 0.3020 -1.6713 0.5340 
ΔE 3326 0.0396 0.0033 0.6166 -2.8276 17.9975 
PME 3326 -0.1261 -0.0409 0.3189 -1.8191 0.6650 
ΔPME 3326 0.0378 -0.0011 0.6169 -2.8641 17.8976 
 DA_ADJ 3326  -0.0038 0.0000   0.1826 -0.9745    0.7168 
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Table 7.2:  Frequency distribution of reported earnings and pre-managed earnings 
 
Reported earnings level (change) and pre-managed earnings level (change) are defined in Table 4.1. The 
actual frequencies, Freq (%), are expressed as percentage of the total sample. The expected frequency, Exp, 
is computed as the mean of the frequency in the two adjacent intervals. For the sake of the brevity, only 
intervals with earnings (changes) scaled by total assets ranging from −0.2 to 0.2 are presented in the table. 
The intervals are of width 0.04 of total asset.  The Z-statistics are computed against the standardized normal 
distribution using Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) method. The Z-statistic is expressed as: Z = 
  )1,0(~/)( NVarnEn   which is the standardized difference distributed approximately normal with 
mean 0 and standard deviation 1; n is actual number of observations in the interval; E(n) is Expected 
number of observations in the interval, defined as the average of the number of observations in the intervals 
immediately adjacent to the interval; and,  Var     is  the estimated standard deviation of the difference, 
calculate as: )1()()4/1()1( 1111   iiiiii ppppNppN Where N is the total number of 
observations and pi is the probability that an observation will fall into interval i; Significance levels 
reported are two-tailed at 1% or better for the test of the intervals immediately below (above) benchmarks.  
  
 
Panel A-Reported earnings level and change 
 
Intervals 
                                     E  ΔE 
    
  Freq (%) Freq-Exp       z-stat  Freq (%) Freq-Exp   z-stat 
−0.20  0.038 0.003 0.89  0.027 0.001 0.18 
−0.16  0.039 −0.006 −1.72  0.03 −0.006 −2.00 
−0.12  0.051 0.005 1.31  0.045 −0.001 −0.14 
−0.08  0.053 −0.001 −0.25  0.061 −0.014 −3.39 
−0.04  0.057 −0.013 −2.89***  0.105 −0.032 −6.15***
0  0.086 −0.008 −1.61  0.213 0.093 13.60***
0.04  0.131 0.070 5.52***  0.135 0.001 0.08 
0.08  0.112 0.019 3.53  0.056 −0.031 −7.06 
0.12  0.055 −0.017 −4.07  0.039 −0.002 −0.43 
0.16  0.032 −0.008 −2.48  0.025 −0.005 −1.74 
0.20  0.024 0.002 0.75  0.021 0.002 0.58 
 
 
Panel B-Pre-managed earnings level and change 
 
Intervals 
   PME     ∆PME  
 Freq (%) Freq-Exp z-stat   Freq (%) Freq-Exp z-stat 
−0.20   0.037 −0.002 −0.60   0.053 0.026 1.93 
−0.16   0.043 0.003 0.85   0.039 −0.017 −1.33 
−0.12   0.044 −0.007 −1.94   0.058 0.002 0.11 
−0.08   0.058 0.005 1.24   0.074 −0.001 −0.06 
−0.04   0.063 −0.008 −1.88   0.092 0.021 1.19 
0   0.083 0.006 1.26   0.068 −0.019 −1.19 
0.04   0.092 0.010 1.90   0.082 0.019 1.13 
0.08   0.081 0.004 0.83   0.058 −0.021 −1.41 
0.12   0.063 −0.002 −0.46   0.076 0.024 1.45 
0.16   0.049 0.003 0.77   0.047 −0.008 −0.58 
0.20   0.029 −0.006 −1.92   0.034 0.004 0.34 
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Table 7.3:  Frequencies of observations shift from pre-managed earnings (changes) 
below benchmarks to above benchmarks 
 
 
Reported earnings level (change) and pre-managed earnings level (change) are defined in Table 4.1. a, the 
total number of observations of which pre-managed earnings (change) belong to the interval [−0.04, 0]; b, 
the total number of observations of which pre-managed earnings (change) belong to the interval [0, 0.04]; 
c, the total number of observations of which reported earnings (change) belong to the interval [−0.04, 0]; d, 
the total number of observations of which reported earnings (change) belong to the interval [0, 0.04]. 
Significant levels reported are two-tailed against the standardized normal distribution. The Z statistics are 
consistent with Kanji (1993) who test for correlated proportions and evaluate the significant change in the 
frequency before and after a given intervention. If the number of observations shifts from pre-managed 
earnings losses interval to the reported earnings profits interval denoted by b, the number of observations 
shifts from pre-managed earnings profits to the reported earnings losses is denoted by c, and the total 
number of observations is denoted by N, then z-statistic is computed as: 
)1(
/)()(
/)(
2



NN
Ncbcb
NcbZ
 
 
Panel A-Pre-managed earnings level 
 
 Eit< 0 Eit ≥ 0 Total z-stat 
Firm-years with  
PMEit < 0
 1649  
49.60% 
270  
8.11% 
1919 
57.71% 
 
Firm-years with 
PMEit ≥ 0 
167  
5.04% 
1240  
37.25% 
1407  
42.29% 
5.87*** 
 
Total  1817 
54.64% 
1509 
45.36% 
3326 
100% 
 
 
     
 −0.04 ≤ Eit  < 0 0 ≤ Eit < 0.04   
Firm-years with  
−0.04 ≤ PMEit  < 0 
60 
1.80%  
116 
3.48%  
361a 
10.85%  
 
 
Firm-years with 
0 ≤ PMEit < 0.04 
57 
1.71% 
119 
3.57% 
419b 
12.59%  
4.49*** 
 
Total 302c
9.07%   
561d
16.86%  
3326 
100% 
 
 
 
Panel B-Pre-managed earnings change 
 
 ∆Eit < 0 ∆Eit ≥ 0 Total z-stat 
Firm-years with  
∆PMEit < 0 
1287  
38.71% 
387  
11.61% 
1674   
50.32% 
 
 
Firm-years with 
∆PMEit ≥ 0 
303  
9.10% 
1349  
40.58% 
1652  
49.68% 
 
3.81*** 
Total  1590 
47.81% 
1736  
52.19% 
3326 
100% 
 
 
     
 −0.04 ≤ ∆Eit  < 0 0 ≤ ∆Eit < 0.04   
Firm-years with  
−0.04 ≤ ∆PMEit  < 0 
147 
4.41%  
184 
5.53% 
527a 
15.84%  
 
 
Firm-years with 
0 ≤ ∆PMEit < 0.04 
136 
4.09%  
202 
6.07%  
533b 
16.03%  
 
2.68*** 
Total 712c
21.41%  
991d
29.79%  
3326  
100% 
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Table 7.4:  Frequencies of positive adjusted discretionary accruals when pre-
managed earnings (changes) below benchmarks 
 
 
This table evaluates whether firms with pre-managed earnings (changes) below benchmarks are more likely 
to exercise positive discretionary accruals to manage earnings upwards. PME is pre-managed earnings 
level, calculated as reported earnings minus adjusted discretionary accruals; ΔPME is pre-managed 
earnings change, calculated as reported earnings change minus adjusted discretionary accruals; DA_ADJ is 
adjusted discretionary accruals, estimated from performance adjusted technique.  
 
 
 DA_ADJit < 0 DA_ADJit ≥ 0 Total 
 
Firm-years with  
PMEit < 0
 
 
711  
37.09% 
 
1208  
62.91% 
 
1919  
100% 
Firm-years with 
PMEit ≥ 0 
952  
67.66% 
455 
32.34% 
1407 
100% 
    
Firm-years with  
∆PMEit < 0 
516 
30.86% 
1158  
69.14% 
1674  
100% 
Firm-years with 
∆PMEit ≥ 0 
1147 
69.42% 
505  
30.58% 
1652  
100% 
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Table 7.5:  Adjusted discretionary accruals comparing firms with pre-managed 
earnings below to above benchmarks 
 
 
This table evaluates whether mean (median) discretionary accruals are different between pre-managed 
earnings loss (decline) firms and pre-managed earnings profit (increase) firms. Two intervals are compared: 
1) pre-managed earnings loss (decline) versus pre-managed earnings profit (increase); and 2) small pre-
managed earnings loss (decline) versus small pre-managed earnings profit (increase). PME is pre-managed 
earnings level, calculated as reported earnings minus adjusted discretionary accruals; ΔPME is pre-
managed earnings change, calculated as reported earnings change minus adjusted discretionary accruals; 
DA_ADJ is adjusted discretionary accruals, estimated from performance adjusted technique. T-statistics are 
based on t-test for the difference in means across samples and p-values are two-tailed. 
 
 
Panel A-Pre-managed earnings level 
 
 
               PMEit < 0  PMEit ≥ 0  Test for difference     
DA_ADJit 
N Mean Median  N Mean Median  t-test p-value 
1919 0.0273*** 0.0311***  1407 −0.0329*** −0.0292***  25.96 <.0001
 
 
                  −0.04 ≤ PMEit  < 0  0 ≤  PMEit < 0.04  Test for difference     
DA_ADJit 
N Mean Median  N Mean Median  t-test p-value 
361 0.0154*** 0.0260***  419 0.0010 0.0073  2.98 0.0019 
 
 
 
 
Panel B-Pre-managed earnings change  
 
 ∆PMEit < 0  ∆PMEit ≥ 0  Test for difference    
DA_ADJit 
N Mean Median  N Mean Median  t-test p-value 
1674 0.0336*** 0.0349***  1652 −0.0303*** −0.0334***  27.36 <.0001 
 
 
 −0.04 ≤ ∆PMEit  < 0  0 ≤ ∆PMEit < 0.04  Test for difference    
DA_ADJit 
N Mean Median  N Mean Median  t-test p-value 
527 0.0099*** 0.0129***  533 −0.0073*** −0.0090***  4.84 <.0001 
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Table 7.6:  Two-way cluster robust regression results for the association between 
adjusted discretionary accruals and pre-managed earnings below benchmarks 
 
This table reports two-way cluster robust regression results in testing earnings management and its 
association with benchmark besting incentive. All variables are defined in Table 4.1. The dependent 
variable is signed discretionary accruals, DA_ADJ, estimated from Performance Adjusted Technique. Main 
testing variables are pre-managed earnings below benchmarks, BELOW_1 in Model (1) to BELOW_5 in 
Model (5) which indicates different intervals in the distribution of earnings (changes). N is number of 
observations. The estimated coefficients and t statistics are two-way cluster-robust adjusted with White 
(1980) method. T-statistics are given in parentheses, one-tailed tests when we have explicit predictions and 
two-tailed otherwise.*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
 
Panel A-Pre-managed earnings level 
 
Independent Variables Pred. Sign Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Intercept ? -0.0450 
(-3.45)*** 
-0.0381 
(-2.44)** 
-0.0052 
(-0.35) 
-0.0295 
(-3.03)*** 
0.0271 
(1.97)** 
BELOW_1 (PMEit < 0) + 0.0819 
(25.87)*** 
    
BELOW_2 (PMEit < 0, Eit ≥ 0) +  0.1126 
(29.39)*** 
   
BELOW_3 (−0.04 ≤ PMEit < 0) +   0.0268 
(8.41)*** 
  
BELOW_4 (−0.04 ≤ PMEit < 0, 0 ≤ Eit < 0.04) +    0.0403 
(19.29)*** 
 
HIGH −     -0.0802 
(-26.04)*** 
LOW −     0.0556 
(9.81)*** 
Control Variables:       
SIZE − -0.0012 
(-1.61) 
-0.0019 
(-2.28)** 
-0.0015 
(-1.50) 
0.0015 
(2.32)** 
-0.0026 
(-3.36)*** 
GROWTH + 0.0000 
(0.84) 
0.0000 
(0.84) 
-0.0003 
(-1.45) 
0.0002 
(0.18) 
0.0000 
(0.29) 
ROE ? 0.0856 
(14.10)*** 
0.0917 
(8.82)*** 
0.4518 
(25.67)*** 
0.0459 
(3.03)*** 
0.1222 
(10.69)*** 
LEV ? 0.0159 
(3.66)*** 
0.0425 
(4.48)*** 
0.0007 
(0.07) 
-0.0021 
(-0.29) 
0.0134 
(2.78)*** 
BM  0.0008 0.0026 -0.0168 0.0001 -0.0000 
  (0.30) (0.88) (-4.12)*** (0.16) -0.01 
CIR  0.0270 0.0465 0.0025 -0.0066 0.0345 
  (2.24)** (2.94)*** (0.17) (-1.00)   (2.90)*** 
LAGTA  -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 
  (-0.16) (0.12) (-2.43)** (-2.90)*** (0.44) 
Industry Effects:       
Material  0.0350 0.0053 0.0398 0.0095 0.0262 
  (2.38)** (0.25) (2.37)** (1.14) (1.86)* 
Metals & Mining  -0.0220 -0.0284 -0.0034 0.0117 -0.0218 
  (-1.61) (-1.47) (-0.17) (1.17) (-1.62) 
Industrials  0.0325 -0.0233 0.0326 0.0071 0.0205 
  (2.36)** (-0.94) (1.90)** (0.86) (1.52) 
Consumer Discretionary  0.0320 -0.0115 0.0288 0.0061 0.0273 
  (2.32)** (-0.57) (1.77)** (0.79) (2.00)** 
Consumer Staples  0.0295 -0.0127 0.0352 0.0052 0.0197 
  (2.01)** (-0.60) (2.07)** (0.68) (1.33) 
Health Care  0.0306 0.0039 0.0266 -0.0067 0.0194 
  (1.92)* (0.19) (1.34)** (-0.74) (1.25) 
Information Technology  -0.0043 -0.0181 0.0123 0.0133 0.0015 
  (-0.27) (-0.83) (0.56) (1.42) (0.09) 
Telecommunication & Utilities  0.0687 0.0597 0.0339 0.0131 0.0694 
  (3.78)*** (2.49)** (1.32) (1.06) (3.89)*** 
N  3326 1430 468 156 3326 
Adj. R2 0.2005 0.3521 0.5610 0.6437 0.2441 
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Table 7.6 (Contd.) 
 
 
Panel B-Pre-managed earnings change 
 
Independent Variables Pred. Sign Model( 1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Intercept ? 0.0071 
(0.55) 
0.0697 
(3.66)*** 
-0.0105 
(-0.58) 
-0.0056 
(-0.50) 
0.0493 
(3.29)*** 
BELOW_1 ( ∆PMEt <0) + 0.0612 
(23.20)*** 
    
BELOW_2 (∆PMEt < 0, ∆Et ≥ 0) +  0.1004 
(26.06)*** 
   
BELOW_3 (−0.04≤∆PMEt<0) +   0.0189 
(5.36)*** 
  
BELOW_4 (−0.04≤ ∆PMEt <0,  0≤ ∆Et <0.04) +    0.0354 
(21.09)*** 
 
HIGH −     -0.0407 
(-11.07)*** 
LOW −     0.0351 
(8.26)*** 
Control Variables:       
SIZE − -0.0052 
(-7.05)*** 
-0.0074 
(-8.13)*** 
-0.0036 
(-3.54)*** 
-0.0010 
(-2.05)** 
-0.0061 
(-7.22)*** 
GROWTH + 0.0000 
(1.04) 
0.0000 
(1.36) 
0.0002 
(2.82)** 
0.0002 
(0.51) 
0.0000 
(1.06) 
ROE ? 0.0402 
(7.03)*** 
0.0002 
(0.03) 
0.0877 
(7.9)*** 
0.0243 
(2.68)*** 
0.0415 
(5.37)*** 
LEV ? 0.0167 
(3.78)*** 
0.0408 
(4.86)*** 
0.0023 
(0.20) 
-0.0008 
(-0.13) 
0.0193 
(3.28)*** 
BM + 0.0038 0.0019 0.0020 0.0052 -0.0004 
  (1.57) (0.61) (0.36) (0.78) (-0.16) 
CIR  0.0364 0.0509 -0.0056 -0.0060 0.0353 
  (3.26)*** (3.35)*** (-0.37) (-0.48) (3.06)*** 
LAGTA  0.0001 0.0018 -0.0000 -0.0034 0.0000 
  (1.52) (1.97)** (-1.47) (-1.21) (0.44) 
Industry Effects:       
Material  0.0197 0.0114 0.0225 0.0374 0.0243 
  (1.40) (0.57) (1.19) (1.99)** (1.75)* 
Metals & Mining  -0.0244 -0.0361 0.0240 0.0147 -0.0234 
  (-1.81)* (-1.85)* (1.10) (0.62) (-1.73)* 
Industrials  0.0122 -0.0313 0.0263 0.0429 0.0192 
  (0.91) (-1.58) (1.48) (2.47)** (1.41) 
Consumer Discretionary  0.0186 -0.0180 0.0217 0.0269 0.0262 
  (1.38) (-0.91) (1.13) (1.33) (1.94)* 
Consumer Staples  0.0116 -0.0113 0.0216 0.0369 0.0158 
  (0.81) (-0.55) (1.13) (1.92)* (1.08) 
Health Care  0.0400 -0.0002 0.0248 0.0374 0.0200 
  (2.68)*** (-0.01) (1.21) (1.79)* (1.31) 
Information Technology  0.0062 -0.0205 0.0205 0.0339 0.0015 
  (0.40) (-0.90) (0.86) (1.42) (0.10) 
Telecommunication & Utilities  0.0859 0.0716 0.0830 0.0667 0.0689 
  (4.97)*** (2.93)*** (3.36)*** (2.56)** (3.81)*** 
N  3326 1430 468 156 3326 
Adj. R2 0.1749   0.2997 0.1078 0.5845 0.1405 
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Table 8.1:  2SLS regression in examining the endogeneity of total compensation 
 
 
This table reports results in examining the endogeneity of executive total compensation. In the first-stage 
OLS regression, total compensation is treated as endogenous and regressed on a set of instrumental 
variables and control variables. The lower part of the table shows the partial R-squared and the partial F-
statistic from the first-stage regression. The values for the two specification tests: the Basmann test of over-
identifying restrictions and the Hausman test for the endogeneity. All variables are defined in Table 4.1. T-
statistics are given in parentheses, one-tailed tests if have explicit predictions and two-tailed otherwise.*, 
**, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 
 
  First-Stage 
Independent Variables Pred. Sign Dependent Variable: TCOMP 
Intercept ? -2.2766 (-17.8498)*** 
    
Instruments:    
TSR + 0.5303 (8.3628)*** 
TBQ + 0.0300 (3.6226)*** 
VOL − -0.0028 (-0.7023) 
DIV_DUMMY + 0.1180 (2.5326)** 
TAX_DUMMY + 0.1013 (2.4106)** 
    
Control variables:    
SIZE + 0.2611 (29.8032)*** 
GROWTH + -0.0010 (-0.5792) 
ROE + -0.0139 (-1.6027) 
LEV − -0.0174 (-0.2326) 
BM − -0.0567 (-3.2428)*** 
CIR − -0.0748 (-0.9948) 
LAGTA    
    
Industry effects:    
Material ? 0.0256 (0.3000) 
Metals & Mining ? -0.0914 (-1.1997) 
Industrials ? 0.0869 (0.9776) 
Consumer Discretionary ? 0.0446 (0.5517) 
Consumer Staples ? -0.0751 (-0.8591) 
Health Care ? 0.1090 (1.1904) 
Information Technology ? 0.0596 (0.6882) 
Tele & Utilities ? -0.1405 (-1.2230) 
    
N  3326  
Adjusted R-square  0.5423  
Partial R-squares  0.3028  
F-statistic  84.25 (<.0001)  
Partial F-statistic  144.42 (<.0001)  
White test  230.26 (.0017)  
DW  1.60  
Basmann:   Abs (DA_ADJ) 
Basmann:   +DA_ADJ 
Basmann:   −DA_ADJ 
 χ2 = 1.12 
χ2 =1.65 
χ2 = 0.67 
(p=0.3250) 
(p=0.1927) 
(p=0.5130) 
 
Hausman:   Abs(DA_ADJ) 
Hausman:  +DA_ADJ 
Hausman:  −DA_ADJ 
 F = 0.17 
F = 1.42 
F = 0.02 
(p=0.6801) 
(p=0.2342) 
(p=0.8846) 
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Table 8.2:  2SLS regression in examining the endogeneity of fixed and at-risk 
compensation 
 
 
 
This table reports results in examining the endogeneity of executive fixed and at-risk compensation. In the 
first-stage OLS regression, fixed and at-risk compensation are treated as endogenous and regressed on a set 
of instrumental variables and control variables, respectively. The second-stage regression replaces the fixed 
compensation and at-risk compensation by their predicted values from the first-stage regression. E_FIX is 
expected fixed compensation and E_ATRISK is expected at-risk compensation. The lower part of the table 
shows the partial R-squared and the partial F-statistic from the first-stage regression. The values for the two 
specification tests: the Basmann test of over-identifying restrictions and the Hausman test for the 
endogeneity. All variables are defined in Table 4.1. T-statistics are given in parentheses, one-tailed tests if 
have explicit predictions and two-tailed otherwise.*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% respectively. 
 
 
 
                           First-Stage      Second-Stage 
Independent Variable Pred. Sign                  Dependent variable     Dependent variable  
               FIX ATRISK    +DA_ADJ 
Intercept ?,?,? -1.1012 -1.2403 0.1258 
  (-16.45) (-11.8085)*** (1.5012) 
E_FIX ~,~,+   -0.4622 
    (-2.1994)** 
E_ATRISK ~,~,+   0.2682 
    (2.1677)** 
Instruments:     
TSR +,+,~ 0.1988 0.3625  
  (5.92)*** (8.6920)***  
TBQ +,+,~ 0.0100 0.0182  
  (2.27)*** (3.3305)***  
VOL −,−,~  -0.0016  
   (-0.62)  
DIV_DUMMY +,+,~  0.0497  
   (1.5909)  
TAX_DUMMY +,+,~  0.0438  
   (1.5043)  
Control variables:     
SIZE +,+,? 0.1342 0.1233 0.0082 
  (29.26) (17.4238)*** (0.6900) 
GROWTH +,+,? -0.0006 -0.0003 0.0019 
  (-0.69) (-0.3040) (1.6594)* 
ROE +,+,? -0.0106 -0.0014 -0.0070 
  (-2.33) (-0.2433) (-0.8414) 
LEV −,−,? 0.0770 -0.1035 0.1232 
  (1.94) (-2.0755)** (5.8471)*** 
BM −,−,? -0.0246 -0.0380 -0.0093 
  (-2.65) (-3.2794)*** (-1.5893) 
CIR −,−,− -0.0598 -0.0132 -0.0220 
  (-1.50) (-0.2652) (-1.0425) 
LAGTA ~,~,+   -0.0100 
    (-0.6916) 
Industry effects:     
Material ?,?,? 0.0497 0.0167 -0.0165 
  (1.10) (0.2922) (-0.6876) 
Metals & Mining ? ?,? -0.0237 -0.0313 -0.0514 
  (-0.59) (-0.6222) (-2.2521)** 
Industrials ?,?,? -0.0011 0.1433 -0.0804 
  (-0.02) (2.3961)** (-3.0373)*** 
Consumer Discretionary ?,?,? 0.0795 0.0151 -0.0136 
  (1.86) (0.2793) (-0.5230) 
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Table 8.2 (Contd.) 
 
 
                           First-Stage      Second-Stage 
Independent Variable Pred. Sign                  Dependent variable     Dependent variable  
               FIX ATRISK    +DA_ADJ 
Consumer Staples ?,?,? 0.0068 -0.0321 -0.0507 
  (0.15) (-0.5491) (-2.1975)** 
Health Care ?,?,? 0.0331 0.1080 -0.0553 
  (0.68) (1.7925)* (-2.0862)** 
Information Technology ?,?,? 0.0491 0.0498 -0.0019 
  (1.07) (0.8707) (-0.0817) 
Tele & Utilities ?,?,? -0.0578 -0.0436 -0.0373 
  (-0.95) (-0.5761) (-1.3676) 
     
N  3326   
Adjusted R-square  0.5165 0.3623 0.1718 
Partial R-squares  0.2059 0.2168  
F-statistic  92.35(p<.0001) 40.99(p<.0001)  
Partial F-statistic  44.93(p<.0001) 92.42(p<.0001)  
White test  172.42 
(0.0005) 
216.52 
(0.0105) 
 
DW  1.68 1.66  
Basmann:   Abs (DA_ADJ) 
Basmann:   +DA_ADJ 
Basmann:   −DA_ADJ 
    χ2 = 1.12 (p=0.3250)            
χ2 = 1.43 (p=0.2341)             
χ2 = 0.67  (p=0.5130) 
Hausman:  Abs(DA_ADJ) 
Hausman:  +DA_ADJ 
Hausman:  −DA_ADJ 
   F =0.13 (p=0.7174)              
F = 2.89 (p=0.0564)              
F = 1.03 (p=0.3569) 
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Table 8.3:  2SLS regression in examining the endogeneity of individual compensation components 
 
 
This table reports results in examining the endogeneity of executive individual compensation components. In the first-stage OLS regression, salary, bonuses, 
options, shares, and LTIPs are treated as endogenous and regressed on a set of instrumental variables and control variables, respectively. The second-stage 
regression replaces the salary, bonuses, options, shares, and LTIPs by their predicted values from the first-stage regression. The lower part of the table shows the 
partial R-squared and the partial F-statistic from the first-stage regression. The values for the two specification tests: the Basmann test of over-identifying 
restrictions and the Hausman test for the endogeneity. All variables are defined in Table 4.1. T-statistics are given in parentheses, one-tailed tests if have explicit 
predictions and two-tailed otherwise.*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 
  First Stage Second Stage 
Independent Variables Pred. Sign Dependent variable Dependent variable  
  SALARY BONUS OPTION SHARE LTIP +DA_ADJ 
Intercept  -0.8975 -0.5572 -0.3528 -0.0390 -0.1227 0.0184 
  (-16.5888)*** (-11.1639)*** (-5.3837)*** (-1.2143) (-2.9231)*** (0.1659) 
        
E_SALARY ~,~,−      -1.8956 
       (-3.6425)*** 
E_BONUS ~,~,+      2.4050 
       (3.1871)*** 
E_OPTION ~,~,+      0.4449 
       (1.2210) 
E_SHARE ~,~,+      -0.1066 
       (-0.4959) 
E_LTIP ~,~,+      0.0150 
       (0.2301) 
Instruments:        
TSR +,+,~ 0.2264 0.1660 0.0521 0.0238 0.0985  
  (8.4182)*** (6.6905)*** (2.0040)** (1.8552)*** (5.9958)***  
TBQ +,+,~ 0.0084 0.0077 0.0076 0.0005 0.0004  
  (2.4064)** (2.3897)** (2.2464)** (0.2926) (0.1920)  
VOL −,−,~   -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0008  
    (-0.03) (-0.25) (-0.79)  
DIV_DUMMY +,+,~   0.0181 0.0040 0.0111  
    (0.9287) (0.4133) (0.9024)  
TAX_DUMMY +,+,~   0.0097 0.0070 0.0052  
    (0.5313) (0.7800) (0.4544)  
Control variables:        
SIZE +,+,? 0.1114 0.0592 0.0364 0.0053 0.0098 0.0412 
  (29.9940)*** (17.2781)*** (8.2396)*** (2.4526)** (3.4572)*** (2.1264)** 
GROWTH +,+,? -0.0005 -0.0004 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0023 
  (-0.6493) (-0.5970) (0.1357) (0.6274) (-0.2311) (1.9596)* 
ROA +,+,? -0.0074 -0.0013 0.0010 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0093 
  (-2.0028)** (-0.3722) (0.2660) (-0.1474) (-0.2292) (-1.0964) 
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Table 8.3 (Contd.) 
 
 
  First Stage Second Stage 
Independent Variables Pred. Sign Dependent variable Dependent variable  
  SALARY BONUS OPTION SHARE LTIP +DA_ADJ 
LEV −,−,? 0.0146 -0.0229 -0.0173 -0.0143 -0.0288 0.1776 
  (0.4592) (-0.7845) (-0.5562) (-0.9340) (-1.4651) (6.3527)*** 
BM −,−,? -0.0331 -0.0195 -0.0075 -0.0027 -0.0048 -0.0138 
  (-4.4555)*** (-2.8424)*** (-1.0387) (-0.7719) (-1.0530) (-2.2106)** 
CIR −,−,− -0.0575 -0.0198 -0.0100 -0.0140 0.0247 -0.0544 
  (-1.8038)* (-0.6716) (-0.3229) (-0.9206) (1.2612) (-2.2768)** 
LAGTA ~,~,+      -0.0493 
       (-2.1227)** 
Industry effects:        
Material ?,?,? 0.0430 0.0380 -0.0376 -0.0039 -0.0007 -0.0373 
  (1.1881) (1.1395) (-1.0558) (-0.2232) (-0.0290) (-1.1161) 
Metals & Mining ? ?,? -0.0543 -0.0376 0.0168 -0.0140 -0.0031 -0.0656 
  (-1.6802)* (-1.2604) (0.5349) (-0.9093) (-0.1577) (-2.6980)*** 
Industrials ?,?,? 0.0201 0.0209 -0.0430 -0.0055 0.0943 -0.0572 
  (0.5329) (0.6011) (-1.1516) (-0.3007) (3.9452)*** (-1.5441) 
Consumer Discretionary ?,?,? 0.0660 -0.0135 -0.0036 -0.0044 0.0138 0.1139 
  (1.9239)* (-0.4272) (-0.1056) (-0.2661) (0.6471) (2.3640)** 
Consumer Staples ?,?,? -0.0152 -0.0112 -0.0593 -0.0016 0.0112 -0.0359 
  (-0.4106) (-0.3276) (-1.6260) (-0.0906) (0.4855) (-1.0969) 
Health Care ?,?,? 0.0119 0.0274 0.0697 -0.0071 0.0065 -0.1248 
  (0.3071) (0.7638) (1.8557)* (-0.3873) (0.2729) (-3.6454)*** 
Information Technology ?,?,? 0.0494 0.0080 0.0048 -0.0043 0.0208 0.0563 
  (1.3449) (0.2366) (0.1353) (-0.2451) (0.9235) (1.8581)* 
Tele & Utilities ?,?,? -0.0270 0.0031 -0.0441 -0.0154 0.0121 -0.0905 
  (-0.5543) (0.0700) (-0.9335) (-0.6638) (0.4044) (-2.3067)** 
        
N  3326      
Adjusted R-square  0.5469 0.3039 0.0904 0.0589 0.1269 0.1929 
Partial R-squares  0.1593 0.1165 0.0395 0.0544 0.0672  
F-statistic  104.03(p<.0001) 38.27(p<.0001) 7.86(p<.0001) 11.39(p<.0001) 11.56(p<.0001) 7.09(p<.0001) 
Partial F-statistic  161.44(p<.0001) 112.70(P<.0001) 11.39(p<.0001) 18.21(p<.0001) 24.79(p<.0001)  
White test  186.33 
(0.0019) 
204.02 
(0.0001) 
214.01 
(0.0143) 
77 
(0.1956) 
91 
(0.2247) 
330.68 
(0.2006) 
DW  1.43 1.58 1.93 2.06 1.92 1.82 
Basmann:   Abs (DA_ADJ) 
Basmann:   +DA_ADJ 
Basmann:   −DA_ADJ 
 just identified 
just identified 
just identified 
Hausman:  Abs(DA_ADJ) 
Hausman:  +DA_ADJ 
Hausman:  −DA_ADJ 
 F =0.99 (p=0.4230) 
F = 4.42 (p=0.0006) 
F = 0.47 (p=0.8003) 
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Table 8.4:  Examining the backing-out problem by using non-discretionary accruals 
to replace adjusted discretionary accruals 
 
The dependent variable is non-discretionary accruals (NDA), measured as the difference between total 
accruals (reported earnings minus operating cash flows) and DA_ADJ.  Pre-managed earnings level (PME) 
are defined as reported earnings (E) minus NDA; pre-managed earnings change (ΔPME), calculated as 
reported earnings change (ΔE) minus NDA. The remaining variables are defined in Table 4.1. N is number of 
observations. The estimated coefficients and t statistics are two-way cluster-robust adjusted with White 
(1980) method. T-statistics are given in parentheses, one-tailed tests when we have explicit predictions and 
two-tailed otherwise.*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
Panel A-Pre-managed earnings level 
 
Independent Variables Pred. Sign Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Intercept ? 0.0789 
(5.61)*** 
0.0416 
(2.25)** 
0.0698 
(2.89)*** 
-0.0234 
(-0.58) 
0.0470 
(2.83)*** 
BELOW_1 (PMEit < 0) + -0.0282 
(-8.00)*** 
    
BELOW_2 (PMEit < 0, Eit ≥ 0) +  -0.0313 
(-5.11)*** 
   
BELOW_3 (−0.04 ≤ PMEit < 0) +   -0.0077 
(-1.35) 
  
BELOW_4 (−0.04 ≤ PMEit < 0, 0 ≤ Eit < 0.04) +    -0.0092 
(-0.88) 
 
HIGH −     0.0220 
(6.02)*** 
LOW −     -0.0067 
(-1.29) 
Control Variables:       
SIZE − -0.0069 
(-8.63)*** 
-0.0053 
(-5.41)*** 
-0.0086 
(-5.18)*** 
-0.0055 
(-2.01)** 
-0.0057 
(-5.97)*** 
GROWTH + 0.0000 
(0.46) 
0.0000 
(0.08) 
0.0007 
(2.53)** 
0.0016 
(0.56) 
0.0000 
(0.63) 
ROE ? 0.0009 
(0.14) 
0.0432 
(3.53)*** 
-0.0190 
(-0.70) 
0.2640 
(3.08)*** 
0.0029 
(0.32) 
LEV ? 0.0251 
(5.37)*** 
0.1003 
(9.06)*** 
0.0737 
(3.98)*** 
0.0370 
(1.17) 
0.0254 
(3.59)*** 
BM  0.0046 0.0024 0.0070 0.0222 0.0058 
  (1.60) (0.60) (1.18) (1.69)* (1.94)* 
CIR  0.0472 0.0157 -0.0008 -0.0294 0.0389 
  (3.52)*** (0.77) (-0.03) (-0.62) (2.88)*** 
LAGTA  0.0000 0.0000*** -0.0000 -0.0000   0.0000 
  (0.82) (2.62) (-0.30) (-1.74)* (0.38) 
Industry Effects:       
Material  0.0084 0.0374 0.0062 -0.0090 0.0131 
  (0.49) (1.31) (0.19) (-0.15) (0.77) 
Metals & Mining  -0.0239 -0.0181 -0.0046 0.0243 -0.0231 
  (-1.55) (-0.79) (-0.14) (0.55) (-1.48) 
Industrials  -0.0137 0.0277 -0.0022 0.0241 -0.0033 
  (-0.83) (0.81) (-0.07) (0.56) (-0.21) 
Consumer Discretionary  0.0003 0.0210 0.0110 0.0478 0.0047 
  (0.02) (0.82) (0.33) (1.09) (0.29) 
Consumer Staples  0.0059 0.0118 0.0166 0.0745 0.0133 
  (0.35) (0.41) (0.53) (1.24) (0.77) 
Health Care  0.0587 0.0453 0.0391 0.0910 0.0564 
  (3.53) (1.75) (1.09) (1.60) (3.36)*** 
Information Technology  -0.0038 -0.0163 0.0101 0.0064 -0.0052 
  (-0.22) (-0.62) (0.29) (0.12) (-0.29) 
Telecommunication & Utilities  0.0822 0.0869 0.0588 0.0268 0.0812 
  (3.81) (2.74) (1.16) (0.65) (3.80)*** 
       
N  3326 1430 468 156 3326 
Adj. R2 0.0671 0.0860 0.0618 0.0323 0.0631 
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Table 8.4 (Contd.) 
 
 
 Panel B-Pre-managed earnings change 
 
Independent Variables Pred. Sign Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model( 4) Model (5) 
Intercept ? 0.0644 
(4.76) 
0.0856 
(3.91) 
0.0610 
(2.48)** 
0.0433 
(1.17) 
0.0495 
(3.05)*** 
BELOW_1 ( ∆PMEt <0) + -0.0291 
(-10.47)*** 
    
BELOW_2 (∆PMEt < 0, ∆Et ≥ 0) +  -0.0212 
(-4.35)*** 
   
BELOW_3 (−0.04≤∆PMEt<0) +   -0.0035 
(-0.83) 
  
BELOW_4 (−0.04≤ ∆PMEt <0,  0≤ ∆Et <0.04) +      -0.0083 
(-1.51) 
 
HIGH −     0.0234 
(5.73)*** 
LOW −     -0.0258 
(-6.69)*** 
Control Variables:       
SIZE − -0.0054 
(-6.92)*** 
-0.0065 
(-6.25)*** 
-0.0068 
(-5.49)*** 
-0.0091 
(-5.57)*** 
-0.0050 
(-5.31)*** 
GROWTH + 0.0000 
(0.35) 
0.0000 
(0.48) 
-0.0001 
(-0.25) 
0.0020 
(1.20) 
0.0000 
(0.28) 
ROE ? 0.0225 
(3.75)*** 
0.0151 
(1.77)* 
0.0086 
(0.60) 
0.2011 
(5.59)*** 
0.0215 
(2.73)*** 
LEV ?           0.0251 
   (5.38)*** 
0.0617 
(6.42)*** 
0.0859 
(6.99)*** 
0.1486 
(7.84)*** 
0.0256 
(3.93)*** 
BM  0.0047 0.0047 0.0045 0.0116 0.0041 
  (2.75) (1.27) (1.24) (1.98)** (1.47) 
CIR  0.0403 0.0183 -0.0048 -0.0320 0.0410 
  (3.01)*** (0.99) (-0.30) (-1.12) (3.08)*** 
LAGTA  0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.09) (1.36) (-0.23)   (-0.83) (0.39) 
Industry Effects:       
Material  0.0149 0.0402 0.0019 0.0034 0.0150 
  (0.91) (1.89)** (0.09) (0.11) (0.91) 
Metals & Mining  -0.0218 -0.0254 -0.0235 0.0108 -0.0222 
  (-1.46) (-1.29) (-1.10) (0.39) (-1.48) 
Industrials  -0.0078 0.0117 -0.0027 0.0076 -0.0008 
  (-0.50) (0.49) (-0.14) (0.26) (-0.05) 
Consumer Discretionary  0.0051 0.0204 -0.0018 0.0102 0.0068 
  (0.34) (0.97) (-0.09) (0.34) (0.45) 
Consumer Staples  0.0101 0.0395 0.0037 0.0132 0.0127 
  (0.61) (1.72)** (0.18) (0.43) (0.77) 
Health Care  0.0504 0.0394 0.0200 0.0406 0.0495 
  (3.10)*** (1.79)** (0.91) (1.17) (3.05)*** 
Information Technology  -0.0044 -0.0105 -0.0156 -0.0109 -0.0057 
  (-0.26) (-0.46) (-0.69) (-0.30) (-0.33) 
Telecommunication & Utilities  0.0765 0.0850 0.0857 0.1179 0.0714 
  (3.75)*** (2.83)*** (2.89)*** (2.85) (3.47)*** 
       
N  3326 1430 468 156 3326 
Adj. R2 0.0786 0.0723 0.0691 0.1924 0.0881 
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Table 8.5:  Examining the backing-out problem by using operating cash flow to 
replace pre-managed earnings 
 
The dependent variable is signed adjusted discretionary accruals, DA_ADJ.  Pre-managed earnings levels 
(PME) are defined as operating cash flows (CF); pre-managed earnings change (ΔPME) is defined as the 
change of cash flows. The remaining variables are defined in Table 4.1. N is number of observations. The 
estimated coefficients and t statistics are two-way cluster-robust adjusted with White (1980) method. T-
statistics are given in parentheses, one-tailed tests if have explicit predictions and two-tailed otherwise.*, **, 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
Panel A-Pre-managed earnings level 
 
Independent Variables Pred. Sign Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model( 4) Model (5) 
Intercept ? -0.0174 
(-1.05) 
-0.0150 
(-0.70) 
-0.0075 
(-0.35) 
0.0212 
(0.48) 
0.0161 
(1.07) 
BELOW_1 (PMEit < 0) + 0.0532 
(12.01)*** 
    
BELOW_2 (PMEit < 0, Eit ≥ 0) +  0.0785 
(12.20)*** 
   
BELOW_3 (−0.04 ≤ PMEit < 0) +   0.0188 
(3.38)*** 
  
BELOW_4 (−0.04 ≤ PMEit < 0, 0 ≤ Eit < 0.04) +    0.0204 
(2.23)** 
 
HIGH −     -0.0511 
(-14.64)*** 
LOW −     0.0693 
(12.63)*** 
Control Variables:       
SIZE − -0.0021 
(-2.30)** 
-0.0027 
(-2.41)** 
-0.0003 
(-0.24) 
-0.0017 
(-0.65) 
-0.0025 
(-3.08)*** 
GROWTH + 0.0000 
(0.88) 
0.0000 
(0.38) 
0.0001 
(5.14)*** 
0.0008 
(1.29) 
0.0000 
(0.78) 
ROE ? 0.0696 
(7.14)*** 
0.0959 
(5.10)*** 
0.4674 
(10.33)*** 
0.4595 
(3.70) 
0.1218 
(10.10)*** 
LEV ? 0.0223 
(4.17)*** 
0.0812 
(5.66)*** 
0.0036 
(0.46) 
0.0269 
(0.92) 
0.0222 
(4.87)*** 
BM  0.0042 0.0027 0.0027 0.0121 0.0028 
  (1.51) (0.73) (0.56) (1.50) (1.09) 
CIR  0.0553 0.0243 0.0146 -0.0852 0.0591 
  (4.21)*** (1.17) (0.78) (-2.06)** (4.65)*** 
LAGTA  0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.72) (2.84)*** (-1.08) (-1.73)* (0.73) 
Industry Effects:       
Material  0.0256 0.0450 0.0234 0.0076 0.0154 
  (1.63) (1.84)* (0.88) (0.13) (1.04) 
Metals & Mining  -0.0283 -0.0266 -0.0261 0.0090 -0.0299 
  (-1.95)* (-1.24) (-0.95) (0.18) (-2.14)** 
Industrials  0.0178 0.0047 0.0102 0.0390 0.0088 
  (1.22) (0.15) (0.39) (0.74) (0.64) 
Consumer Discretionary  0.0270 0.0229 0.0218 0.0352 0.0225 
  (1.84)* (0.96) (0.83) (0.68) (1.60) 
Consumer Staples  0.0203 0.0388 0.0238 0.0411 0.0128 
  (1.27) (1.48) (0.91) (0.74) (0.84) 
Health Care  0.0447 0.0367 0.0403 0.0574 0.0307 
  (2.69)*** (1.52) (1.37) (0.95) (1.85)** 
Information Technology  0.0007 -0.0135 -0.0002 -0.0043 -0.0016 
  (0.04) (-0.54) (-0.01) (-0.07) (-0.10) 
Telecommunication & Utilities  0.0888 0.0935 0.0957 0.1061 0.0798 
  (4.46)*** 
 
(2.96)*** 
 
(2.82)*** 
 
(1.67)* 
 
(4.09)*** 
 
N  3326 1430 468 156 3326 
Adj. R2 0.0986 0.1561   0.3802 0.2837 0.1619 
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Table 8.5 (Contd.) 
 
 
Panel B-Pre-managed earnings change 
 
Independent Variables Pred. Sign Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model( 4) Model (5) 
Intercept ? 0.0418 
(2.56)** 
0.0178 
(0.83) 
0.0424 
(1.71)* 
0.0424 
(1.14) 
0.0480 
(2.87)*** 
BELOW_1 ( ∆PMEt <0) + 0.0116 
(4.37)*** 
    
BELOW_2 (∆PMEt < 0, ∆Et ≥ 0) +  0.0261 
(8.19)*** 
   
BELOW_3 (−0.04≤∆PMEt<0) +   0.0012 
(0.32) 
  
BELOW_4 (−0.04≤ ∆PMEt <0,  0≤ ∆Et <0.04) +    0.0056 
(0.78) 
 
HIGH −     -0.0085 
(-2.34)** 
LOW −     0.0102 
(2.82)*** 
Control Variables:       
SIZE − -0.0057 
(-6.21)*** 
-0.0053 
(-4.74)*** 
-0.0067 
(-5.38)*** 
-0.0085 
(-3.60)*** 
-0.0059 
(-6.26)*** 
GROWTH + 0.0000 
(0.98) 
0.0000 
(0.41) 
0.0000 
(0.86) 
0.0009 
(0.88) 
0.0000 
(0.98) 
ROA ? 0.0281 
(3.54)*** 
0.0606 
(3.47)*** 
0.1092 
(6.20)*** 
0.3897 
(4.90)*** 
0.0306 
(3.78)*** 
LEV ? 0.0243 
(3.79)*** 
0.0976 
(6.59)*** 
0.0540 
(3.95)*** 
0.0908 
(3.30)*** 
0.0244 
(3.82)*** 
BM  0.0037 0.0042 0.0042 0.0067 0.0041 
  (1.36) (1.29) (1.24) (1.38) (1.46) 
CIR  0.0509 0.0318 0.0333 -0.0052 0.0477 
  (3.86)*** (2.03)** (2.48)** (-0.23) (3.57)*** 
LAGTA  0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 
  (1.00) (0.81) (-0.23) (-1.92)* (0.42) 
Industry Effects:       
Material  0.0147 0.0292 0.0043 0.0037 0.0171 
  (0.89) (1.55) (0.25) (0.12) (1.04) 
Metals & Mining  -0.0292 -0.0231 -0.0255 -0.0196 -0.0243 
  (-1.90)** (-1.33) (-1.49) (-0.68) (-1.60) 
Industrials  -0.0014 0.0087 -0.0068 0.0094 -0.0006 
  (-0.09) (0.46) (-0.42) (0.34) (-0.04) 
Consumer Discretionary  0.0151 0.0221 0.0039 0.0109 0.0109 
  (0.97) (1.22) (0.24) (0.38) (0.70) 
Consumer Staples  0.0114 0.0329 0.0070 0.0097 0.0149 
  (0.68) (1.70)* (0.41) (0.33) (0.89) 
Health Care  0.0493 0.0497 0.0436 0.0517 0.0547 
  (2.88)*** (2.52)** (2.41)** (1.54) (3.30) 
Information Technology  0.0027 -0.0068 -0.0203 -0.0186 -0.0026 
  (0.15) (-0.33) (-1.08) (-0.55) (-0.15) 
Telecommunication & Utilities  0.0916 0.0938 0.0859 0.0738 0.0878 
  (4.29)*** (3.59)*** (3.54)*** (2.03)** (4.12) 
       
N  3326 1430 468 156 3326 
Adj. R2 0.0547   0.0694 0.1141   0.2137 0.0559 
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Table 8.6:  Re-estimate the association between the magnitude of earnings 
management and executive compensation by controlling year effects 
 
This table reports OLS regression results in testing the magnitude of earnings management and its association 
with executive compensations. The dependent variable is the magnitude of earnings management which is 
measured as absolute values of discretionary accruals. Absolute value of discretionary accruals is estimated 
from Performance Adjusted Technique-Abs (DA_ADJ). Explanatory variables are executive compensations 
which decomposed into three tiers: executive total compensation (TOMP); executive fixed remuneration 
(FIX) versus at-risk compensation (ATRISK); and, individual components including fixed salary (SALARY), 
bonuses (BONUS), options (OPTION), shares (SHARE), and long-term incentive plans (LTIP). Firm 
characteristics, industry and year effects are controlled. All variables are defined in Table 4.1. The estimated 
coefficients and t statistics are calculated using White (1980) method. T-statistics are given in parentheses, 
one-tailed tests when we have explicit predictions and two-tailed otherwise.*, **, *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
Variable Pred. 
Sign 
(1) Total Compensation (2)   Fixed v. At-risk (3) Individual Components 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Intercept ? 0.2868 (8.1250)*** 0.2790 (7.8151)*** 0.2763 (7.7336)*** 
TCOMP + -0.0045 -0.8190     
FIX −   -0.0265 (-1.8164)*   
ATRISK +   0.0075 0.8485   
SALARY −     -0.0215 -1.4020 
BONUS +     0.0513 (2.2038)** 
OPTION +     0.0083 0.6200 
SHARE ?     -0.0007 -0.0440 
LTIP ?     -0.0226 -1.0819 
Control Variables:        
SIZE ? -0.0065 (-2.7241)*** -0.0056 (-2.2629)** -0.0054 (-2.2096)** 
GROWTH + 0.0005 (2.8323)*** 0.0005 (2.8378)*** 0.0005 (2.8381)*** 
ROE ? -0.0321 (-4.3204)*** -0.0327 (-4.4027)*** -0.0322 (-4.3274)*** 
LEV ? 0.0121 0.8746 0.0127 0.9171 0.0124 0.8984 
BM − -0.0046 -1.2733 -0.0049 -1.3560 -0.0050 -1.3914 
CIR − 0.0045 0.3086 0.0040 0.2719 0.0049 0.3360 
LAGTA + 0.0004 0.7347 0.0004 0.6603 0.0004 0.6526 
Industry Effects:        
Material  -0.0307 (-1.8509)* -0.0293 (-1.7627)* -0.0293 (-1.7619)* 
Metals & Mining  -0.0288 (-1.9578)* -0.0287 (-1.9501)* -0.0283 (-1.9291)* 
Industrials  -0.0365 (-2.0887)** -0.0363 (-2.0804)** -0.0326 (-1.8538)* 
Consumer Discretionary  -0.0496 (-3.2242)*** -0.0479 (-3.1125)*** -0.0474 (-3.0760)*** 
Consumer Staples  -0.0549 (-3.2822)*** -0.0538 (-3.2170)*** -0.0520 (-3.1048)*** 
Health Care  -0.0408 (-2.3798)** -0.0410 (-2.3897)** -0.0400 (-2.3308)** 
Information Technology  -0.0170 -1.0325 -0.0155 (-0.9418) -0.0145 -0.8795 
Tele & Utilities  0.0349 1.6295 0.0355 (1.6609)** 0.0368 (1.7194)* 
Year Effects:        
2001  -0.0650 (-2.7764)*** -0.0635 (-2.7118)*** -0.0625 (-2.6694)*** 
2002  -0.0974 (-4.3188)*** -0.0952 (-4.2195)*** -0.0948 (-4.1968)*** 
2003  -0.0743 (-3.4231)*** -0.0730 (-3.3621)*** -0.0732 (-3.3741)*** 
2004  -0.0903 (-4.3980)*** -0.0893 (-4.3512)*** -0.0904 (-4.4001)*** 
2005  -0.0736 (-3.5996)*** -0.0726 (-3.5504)*** -0.0732 (-3.5806)*** 
2006  -0.0773 (-3.7829)*** -0.0760 (-3.7190)*** -0.0774 (-3.7882)*** 
        
Adj. R-square  0.0623  0.0630  0.0642  
F  7.85 (<0.0001) 7.63 (<0.0001) 6.99 (<0.0001) 
N  3326  3326  3326  
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Table 8.7:  Re-estimate the association between the magnitude of earnings 
management and executive compensation by using discretionary accruals from 
Modified Jones Model 
 
This table reports OLS regression results in testing the magnitude of earnings management and its association 
with executive compensations. The dependent variable is the magnitude of earnings management which is 
measured as absolute values of discretionary accruals. Absolute value of discretionary accruals is estimated 
from Modified Jones Model (DA_MJ). Explanatory variables are executive compensations which 
decomposed into three tiers: executive total compensation (TOMP); executive fixed remuneration (FIX) 
versus at-risk compensation (ATRISK); and, individual components including fixed salary (SALARY), 
bonuses (BONUS), options (OPTION), shares (SHARE), and long-term incentive plans (LTIP). Firm 
characteristics, industry and year effects are controlled. All variables are defined in Table 4.1. The estimated 
coefficients and t statistics are based on White (1980) method. T-statistics are given in parentheses, one-tailed 
tests when we have explicit predictions and two-tailed otherwise.*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
Variable Pred. 
Sign 
(1) Total Compensation (2)   Fixed v. At-risk (3) Individual Components 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Intercept ? 0.2820 (6.7333)*** 0.2739 (6.2093)*** 0.2673 (4.2364)*** 
TCOMP + -0.0040 (-0.5026)     
FIX −   -0.0297 (-1.9930)*   
ATRISK +   0.0109 (0.9453)   
SALARY −     -0.035 (-1.7361)* 
BONUS +     0.0919 (1.6643)* 
OPTION +     0.0196 (1.3390) 
SHARE ?     -0.0164 (-0.9638) 
LTIP ?     -0.018 (-1.0776) 
Control Variables:        
SIZE ? -0.0049 -1.5131 -0.0039 (-1.1645) -0.0036 (-1.0522) 
GROWTH + 0.0004 0.9417 0.0004 (0.9509) 0.0004 (1.2290) 
ROE ? -0.0530 (-2.9541)** -0.0536 (-2.9950)** -0.0526 (-4.0267)*** 
LEV ? -0.0056 -0.3763 -0.0047 (-0.3072) -0.0053 (-0.2422) 
BM − -0.0065 (-3.3492)** -0.0068 (-3.7196) -0.0071 (-1.6477)* 
CIR − 0.0340 0.7672 0.0334 (0.7539) 0.0348 (1.6359) 
LAGTA + 0.0008 (7.1064)*** 0.0007 (6.0797)*** 0.0007 (2.0582)** 
Industry Effects:        
Material  -0.0157 -1.3512 -0.0142 (-1.1875) -0.0134 (-0.6082) 
Metals & Mining  -0.0087 -0.2585 -0.0086 (-0.2610) -0.0082 (-0.4593) 
Industrials  -0.0366 (-4.4303)*** -0.0367 (-4.5376)*** -0.0301 (-1.0708) 
Consumer Discretionary  -0.0394 (-3.2388)** -0.0376 (-3.1951)** -0.0368 (-1.9302)* 
Consumer Staples  -0.0302 (-3.1854)** -0.0289 (-3.2101)** -0.0255 (-0.9979) 
Health Care  -0.0382 (-4.3483)*** -0.0386 (-4.5600)*** -0.0367 (-1.6401) 
Information Technology  0.0075 0.3415 0.0091 (0.4097) 0.0109 (0.4973) 
Tele & Utilities  0.0308 1.1834 0.0315 (1.1811) 0.0344 (0.7300) 
Year Effects:        
2001  -0.0699 (-1.7635)* -0.0681 (-1.7162)* -0.0668 (-1.6769)* 
2002  -0.0991 (-2.4025)** -0.0966 (-2.3379)** -0.0958 (-2.3075)** 
2003  -0.0804 (-1.8557)* -0.0789 (-1.8185)* -0.0789 (-1.8082)* 
2004  -0.0977 (-2.3247)** -0.0966 (-2.2948)** -0.0978 (-2.3114)** 
2005  -0.0726 (-1.7283)* -0.0716 (-1.6998)* -0.0724 (-1.7136)* 
2006  -0.0782 (-1.8653)* -0.0767 (-1.8271)* -0.0791 (-1.8778)* 
        
Adj. R-square  0.0696  0.0707  0.07710  
F  5.49 (<0.0001) 5.27 (<0.0001) 5.98 (<0.0001) 
N  3326  3326  3326  
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Table 8.8:  Re-estimate the association between the upward earnings management 
and executive compensation by controlling year effects 
 
This table reports OLS regression results in testing upward earnings management and its association with 
executive compensations. The dependent variable is the direction of earnings management, upward earnings 
management, which is measured as positive discretionary accruals. Positive discretionary accruals, 
+DA_ADJ, are estimated from Performance Adjusted Technique. Explanatory variables are executive 
compensations which decomposed into three tiers: executive total compensation (TOMP); executive fixed 
remuneration (FIX) versus at-risk compensation (ATRISK); and, individual components including fixed 
salary (SALARY), bonuses (BONUS), options (OPTION), shares (SHARE), and long-term incentive plans 
(LTIP). Firm characteristics, industry and year effects are controlled. All variables are defined in Table 4.1. 
The estimated coefficients and t statistics are based on White (1980) method. T-statistics are given in 
parentheses, one-tailed tests when we have explicit predictions and two-tailed otherwise.*, **, *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 
Variable Pred. 
Sign 
(1) Total Compensation (2)   Fixed v. At-risk (3) Individual Components 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Intercept ? 0.3410 (9.5719)*** 0.3290 (9.1052)*** 0.3291 (9.0851)*** 
TCOMP + 0.0082 1.4341     
FIX −   -0.0211 -1.3903   
ATRISK +   0.0220 (2.4053)**   
SALARY −     -0.0214 -1.3474 
BONUS +     0.0217 (1.8008)* 
OPTION −     0.0220 1.3464 
SHARE ?     0.0199 0.5583 
LTIP ?     0.0264 0.8350 
Control Variables:        
SIZE ? -0.0176 (-7.5851)*** -0.0158 (-6.5975)*** -0.0158 (-6.5505)*** 
GROWTH + 0.0005 (2.9854)*** 0.0005 (3.0383)*** 0.0005 (3.0332)*** 
ROE ? -0.0115 -1.5775 -0.0131 (-1.7836)* -0.0131 (-1.7764)* 
LEV ? 0.1005 (7.2585)*** 0.1002 (7.2509)*** 0.1002 (7.2339)*** 
BM − -0.0043 -1.0802 -0.0046 -1.1411 -0.0046 -1.1360 
CIR − -0.0059 -0.4424 -0.0069 -0.5195 -0.0070 -0.5202 
LAGTA + 0.0108 1.3264 0.0111 1.3674 0.0111 1.3670 
Industry Effects:        
Material  -0.0624 (-3.2930)*** -0.0616 (-3.2580)*** -0.0617 (-3.2525)*** 
Metals & Mining  -0.0527 (-3.0169)*** -0.0539 (-3.0864)*** -0.0539 (-3.0758)*** 
Industrials  -0.0924 (-4.4476)*** -0.0928 (-4.4726)*** -0.0930 (-4.4662)*** 
Consumer Discretionary  -0.0723 (-4.1148)*** -0.0701 (-3.9870)*** -0.0701 (-3.9788)*** 
Consumer Staples  -0.0774 (-4.0649)*** -0.0770 (-4.0512)*** -0.0773 (-4.0416)*** 
Health Care  -0.0489 (-2.6381)*** -0.0498 (-2.6894)*** -0.0498 (-2.6787)*** 
Information Technology  -0.0334 (-1.7656)* -0.0324 (-1.7173)* -0.0325 (-1.7153)* 
Tele & Utilities  -0.0422 (-1.9058)* -0.0428 (-1.9351)* -0.0428 (-1.9328)* 
Year Effects:        
2001  -0.0109 -0.4456 -0.0107 -0.4385 -0.0108 -0.4428 
2002  -0.0271 -1.1748 -0.0263 -1.1416 -0.0264 -1.1431 
2003  -0.0387 (-1.7170)* -0.0384 (-1.7065)* -0.0386 (-1.7074)* 
2004  -0.0285 -1.3404 -0.0289 -1.3591 -0.0289 -1.3571 
2005  -0.0135 -0.6319 -0.0140 -0.6554 -0.0140 -0.6533 
2006  -0.0099 -0.4710 -0.0092 -0.4401 -0.0092 -0.4369 
        
Adj. R-square  0.1844  0.1867  0.1843  
F  11.82 (<0.0001) 11.51 (<0.0001) 10.15 (<0.0001) 
N  1647  1647  1647 1647 
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Table 8.9:  Re-estimate the association between the upward earnings management 
and executive compensation by using discretionary accruals from Modified Jones 
Model 
 
This table reports OLS regression results in testing upward earnings management and its association with 
executive compensations. The dependent variable is the direction of earnings management, upward earnings 
management, which is measured as positive discretionary accruals. Positive discretionary accruals, +DA_MJ, 
are estimated from Modified Jones Model. Explanatory variables are executive compensations which 
decomposed into three tiers: executive total compensation (TOMP); executive fixed remuneration (FIX) 
versus at-risk compensation (ATRISK); and, individual components including fixed salary (SALARY), 
bonuses (BONUS), options (OPTION), shares (SHARE), and long-term incentive plans (LTIP). Firm 
characteristics, industry and year effects are controlled. All variables are defined in Table 4.1. The estimated 
coefficients and t statistics are based on White (1980) method. T-statistics are given in parentheses, one-tailed 
tests when we have explicit predictions and two-tailed otherwise.*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
Variable Pred. 
Sign 
(1) Total Compensation (2)   Fixed v. At-risk (3) Individual Components 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Intercept ? 0.3183 (8.7049) 0.3030 (8.1931)*** 0.2978 (8.0234)*** 
TCOMP + 0.0004 (0.0680)***     
FIX −   -0.0318 (-2.4285)**   
ATRISK +   0.0167 (1.9517)*   
SALARY −     -0.0259 (-1.9154)* 
BONUS +     0.0326 (2.6078)*** 
OPTION −     0.0000 (0.0015) 
SHARE ?     0.0050 (0.1334) 
LTIP ?     0.0112 (0.6358) 
Control Variables:        
SIZE ? -0.0114 (-4.7066)*** -0.0095 (-3.8204)*** -0.0093 (-3.7079)*** 
GROWTH + 0.0003 (1.6074) 0.0003 (1.6701)* 0.0003 (1.6696)* 
ROE ? 0.0399 (3.1014)*** 0.0377 (2.9334)*** 0.0367 (2.8559)*** 
LEV ? 0.0916 (6.1148)*** 0.0921 (6.1605)*** 0.0909 (6.0769)*** 
BM − -0.0069 (-1.6761)* -0.0070 (-1.6968)* -0.0072 (-1.7436)* 
CIR − 0.0271 (1.8870)* 0.0262 (1.8246)* 0.0262 (1.8258)* 
LAGTA + 0.0013 (0.1730) 0.0011 (0.1432) 0.0013 (0.1743) 
Industry Effects:        
Material  -0.0975 (-5.2311)*** -0.0968 (-5.2065)*** -0.0952 (-5.1165)*** 
Metals & Mining  -0.1119 (-6.3385)*** -0.1128 (-6.4097)*** -0.1127 (-6.3965)*** 
Industrials  -0.1349 (-6.7384)*** -0.1366 (-6.8361)*** -0.1340 (-6.6416)*** 
Consumer Discretionary  -0.1168 (-6.6054)*** -0.1151 (-6.5258)*** -0.1149 (-6.5054)*** 
Consumer Staples  -0.1132 (-6.0242)*** -0.1136 (-6.0647)*** -0.1120 (-5.9603)*** 
Health Care  -0.0738 (-3.8298)*** -0.0762 (-3.9616)*** -0.0773 (-4.0138)*** 
Information Technology  -0.0945 (-4.8630)*** -0.0934 (-4.8192)*** -0.0931 (-4.7993)*** 
Tele & Utilities  -0.0752 (-3.1496)*** -0.0760 (-3.1960)*** -0.0750 (-3.1528)*** 
Year Effects:        
2001  -0.0031 (-0.1419) -0.0001 (-0.0063) 0.0008 (0.0355) 
2002  -0.0088 (-0.4101) -0.0056 (-0.2640) -0.0041 (-0.1895) 
2003  -0.0041 (-0.1958) -0.0017 (-0.0795) -0.0001 (-0.0050) 
2004  -0.0191 (-0.9747) -0.0177 (-0.9096) -0.0159 (-0.8119) 
2005  -0.0173 (-0.8797) -0.0156 (-0.7983) -0.0146 (-0.7467) 
2006  0.0023 (0.1182) 0.0042 (0.2168) 0.0052 (0.2672) 
        
Adj. R-square  0.1203  0.1253  0.1467  
F  7.64 (<0.0001) 7.65 (<0.0001) 6.89 (<0.0001) 
N   1647  1647  1647 1647 
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Table 8.10:  Re-estimate the association between the downward earnings management 
and executive compensation by controlling year effects 
 
This table reports OLS regression results in testing downward earnings management and its association with 
executive compensations. The dependent variable is the direction of earnings management, downward 
earnings management, which is measured as negative discretionary accruals. Negative discretionary accruals, 
−DA_ADJ, are estimated from Performance Adjusted Technique. Explanatory variables are executive 
compensations which decomposed into three tiers: executive total compensation (TOMP); executive fixed 
remuneration (FIX) versus at-risk compensation (ATRISK); and, individual components including fixed 
salary (SALARY), bonuses (BONUS), options (OPTION), shares (SHARE), and long-term incentive plans 
(LTIP). Firm characteristics, industry and year effects are controlled. All variables are defined in Table 4.1. 
The estimated coefficients and t statistics are based on White (1980) method. T-statistics are given in 
parentheses, one-tailed tests when we have explicit predictions and two-tailed otherwise.*, **, *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 
Variable Pred. 
Sign 
(1) Total Compensation (2)   Fixed v. At-risk (3) Individual Components 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Intercept ? -0.2546 (-4.2732)*** -0.2516 (-4.2106)*** -0.2467 (-4.1291)*** 
TCOMP − 0.0143 1.5952     
FIX +   0.0392 (1.6710)*   
ATRISK −   -0.0018 -0.1249   
SALARY +     0.0313 1.2545 
BONUS −     -0.0544 (-1.7486)* 
OPTION +     0.0016 0.0625 
SHARE ?     0.0086 0.3358 
LTIP ?     0.0434 1.4019 
Control Variables:        
SIZE ? -0.0021 (-0.5026) -0.0025 -0.6049 -0.0029 -0.6845 
GROWTH + -0.0005 (-1.7534)* -0.0005 (-1.7455)* -0.0005 (-1.7400)* 
ROE ? 0.0498 (4.0033)*** 0.0494 (3.9836)*** 0.0484 (3.8948)*** 
LEV ? 0.0528 (2.3261)** 0.0516 (2.2646)** 0.0515 (2.2603)** 
BM − 0.0053 0.9685 0.0058 1.0471 0.0058 1.0518 
CIR − -0.0103 -0.3927 -0.0093 -0.3565 -0.0110 -0.4199 
LAGTA + -0.0010 -1.4929 -0.0010 -1.4263 -0.0010 -1.4371 
Industry Effects:        
Material  0.0084 0.3278 0.0065 0.2511 0.0084 0.3262 
Metals & Mining  0.0087 0.3965 0.0077 0.3485 0.0075 0.3375 
Industrials  -0.0012 -0.0444 -0.0018 -0.0685 -0.0061 -0.2329 
Consumer Discretionary  0.0374 1.5474 0.0352 1.4533 0.0337 1.3932 
Consumer Staples  0.0363 1.4042 0.0345 1.3334 0.0335 1.2894 
Health Care  0.0379 1.2830 0.0381 1.2893 0.0369 1.2475 
Information Technology  0.0025 0.1008 0.0005 0.0182 -0.0012 -0.0456 
Tele & Utilities  -0.1532 (-4.0403)*** -0.1556 (-4.1020)*** -0.1562 (-4.1194)*** 
Year Effects:        
2001  0.1236 (3.2613)*** 0.1226 (3.2328)*** 0.1208 (3.1840)*** 
2002  0.1699 (4.5633)*** 0.1682 (4.5123)*** 0.1679 (4.5032)*** 
2003  0.1133 (3.2523)*** 0.1123 (3.2213)*** 0.1142 (3.2762)*** 
2004  0.1471 (4.4555)*** 0.1465 (4.4360)*** 0.1491 (4.5148)*** 
2005  0.1300 (3.9511)*** 0.1293 (3.9288)*** 0.1310 (3.9825)*** 
2006        
        
Adj. R-square  0.0629  0.0626  0.0644  
F  4.62 (<0.0001) 4.44 (<0.0001) 4.14 (<0.0001) 
N  1649  1649  1649  
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Table 8.11:  Re-estimate the association between the downward earnings management 
and executive compensation by using discretionary accruals from Modified Jones 
Model 
 
This table reports OLS regression results in testing downward earnings management and its association with 
executive compensations. The dependent variable is the direction of earnings management, downward 
earnings management, which is measured as negative discretionary accruals. Negative discretionary accruals, 
−DA_MJ, are estimated from Modified Jones Model. Explanatory variables are executive compensations 
which decomposed into three tiers: executive total compensation (TOMP); executive fixed remuneration 
(FIX) versus at-risk compensation (ATRISK); and, individual components including fixed salary (SALARY), 
bonuses (BONUS), options (OPTION), shares (SHARE), and long-term incentive plans (LTIP). Firm 
characteristics, industry and year effects are controlled. All variables are defined in Table 4.1. The estimated 
coefficients and t statistics are based on White (1980) method. T-statistics are given in parentheses, one-tailed 
tests when we have explicit predictions and two-tailed otherwise.*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 
Variable Pred. 
Sign 
(1) Total Compensation (2)   Fixed v. At-risk (3) Individual Components 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Intercept ? -0.3320 (-4.7910)*** -0.3354 (-4.8084)*** -0.3204 (-4.6047)*** 
TCOMP − 0.0026 (0.2310)     
FIX +   0.0125 (0.3836)   
ATRISK −   -0.0077 (-0.4226)   
SALARY +     0.0157 (0.4469) 
BONUS −     -0.1048 (-2.8866)*** 
OPTION +     0.0020 (0.0731) 
SHARE ?     0.0364 (1.1183) 
LTIP ?     0.0109 (0.0312) 
Control Variables:        
SIZE ? 0.0047 (0.9758) 0.0050 (1.0175) 0.0042 (0.8509) 
GROWTH + -0.0006 (-1.5129) -0.0006 (-1.4969) -0.0006 (-1.5085) 
ROE ? 0.0585 (4.8530)*** 0.0580 (4.8140)*** 0.0568 (4.7283)*** 
LEV ? 0.0537 (2.0598)** 0.0528 (2.0198)** 0.0527 (2.0221)** 
BM − 0.0068 (1.0546) 0.0069 (1.0599) 0.0068 (1.0495) 
CIR − -0.0457 (-1.5491) -0.0455 (-1.5424) -0.0467 (-1.5904) 
LAGTA + -0.0016 (-1.9283)* -0.0015 (-1.9009)* -0.0015 (-1.8914)* 
Industry Effects:        
Material  -0.0420 (-1.3426) -0.0433 (-1.3795) -0.0411 (-1.3142) 
Metals & Mining  -0.0467 (-1.8167)* -0.0474 (-1.8437)* -0.0488 (-1.9067)* 
Industrials  -0.0334 (-1.0484) -0.0342 (-1.0699) -0.0412 (-1.2900) 
Consumer Discretionary  -0.0194 (-0.6667) -0.0205 (-0.7031) -0.0233 (-0.8024) 
Consumer Staples  -0.0356 (-1.1264) -0.0374 (-1.1781) -0.0390 (-1.2314) 
Health Care  0.0255 (0.7948) 0.0246 (0.7673) 0.0212 (0.6628) 
Information Technology  -0.0700 (-2.3846)** -0.0711 (-2.4146)** -0.0737 (-2.5109)** 
Tele & Utilities  -0.1005 (-2.4835)** -0.1019 (-2.5174)** -0.1051 (-2.6065)*** 
Year Effects:        
2001  0.1481 (3.0595)*** 0.1476 (3.0482)*** 0.1364 (2.8010)*** 
2002  0.1899 (4.1056)*** 0.1890 (4.0784)*** 0.1893 (4.0995)*** 
2003  0.1660 (3.7762)*** 0.1659 (3.7705)*** 0.1669 (3.8081)*** 
2004  0.1836 (4.3792)*** 0.1835 (4.3729)*** 0.1854 (4.4339)*** 
2005  0.1422 (3.4096)*** 0.1422 (3.4083)*** 0.1429 (3.4391)*** 
2006  0.1709 (4.0604)*** 0.1707 (4.0519)*** 0.1733 (4.1300)*** 
        
Adj. R-square  0.0813  0.0637  0.0717  
F  4.77 (<0.0001) 4.57 (<0.0001) 4.59 (<0.0001) 
N  1649  1649  1649  
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Table 8.12:  Re-estimate the association between adjusted discretionary accruals and 
pre-managed earnings below benchmarks by controlling year effects 
 
This table reports OLS regression results in testing earnings management and its association with benchmark 
besting incentive by controlling year effects. All variables are defined in Table 4.1. The dependent variable is 
signed discretionary accruals, DA_ADJ, estimated from Performance Adjusted Technique. Main testing 
variables are pre-managed earnings below benchmarks, BELOW_1 in Model (1) to BELOW_5 in Model (5) 
which indicates different intervals in the distribution of earnings (changes). N is number of observations. The 
estimated coefficients and t statistics are based on White (1980) method. T-statistics are given in parentheses, 
one-tailed tests when we have explicit predictions and two-tailed otherwise.*, **, *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
 
Panel A-Pre-managed earnings level  
 
Independent Variables Pred. Sign Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Intercept ? -0.1899 0.0165 -0.0263 -0.0181 -0.0853 
  (10.30)*** (0.64) (-0.84) (-1.46) (-4.81)*** 
BELOW_1 (PMEit < 0) + 0.1262     
  (24.85)***     
BELOW_2 (PMEit < 0, Eit ≥ 0) +  0.1135    
   (12.51)***    
BELOW_3 (−0.04 ≤ PMEit < 0) +   0.0321   
    (4.71)***   
BELOW_4 (−0.04 ≤ PMEit < 0, 0 ≤ Eit < 0.04) +    0.0352  
     (10.49)***  
HIGH −     -0.1180 
      (-23.24)*** 
LOW −     0.0686 
      (10.35)*** 
Control Variables:       
SIZE − 0.0078 -0.0012 0.0013 0.0014 0.0066 
  (6.12)*** (-0.54) (0.62) (1.61) (5.30)*** 
GROWTH + 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0023 0.0012 0.0000 
  (-0.36) (0.55) (-1.67)* (2.04)** (-0.34) 
ROE ? 0.0001 -0.0007 0.1609 0.0007 0.0004 
  (0.17) (-1.00) (12.54)*** (0.10) (0.69) 
LEV ? -0.0100 -0.0035 -0.0378 0.0078 -0.0209 
  (-0.88) (-0.24) (-1.68) (0.78) (-1.88)* 
BM  0.0017 0.0041 -0.0173 0.0000 0.0004 
  (0.66) (1.25) (-4.25)*** (-0.03) (0.15) 
CIR  0.0261 0.0510 0.0011 -0.0086 0.0356 
  (2.51)*** (3.47)*** (0.07) (-1.39) (3.52)*** 
LAGTA  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (-0.13) (0.01) (-0.31) (-1.06) (0.36) 
Industry Effects:       
Material  0.0393 0.0183 0.0411 0.0067 0.0308 
  (3.38)*** (0.99) (2.19)** (0.89) (2.72)*** 
Metals & Mining  -0.0163 -0.0154 -0.0049 0.0083 -0.0150 
  (-1.59) (-1.04) (-0.28) (1.07) (-1.49) 
Industrials  0.0346 -0.0108 0.0347 0.0058 0.0249 
  (2.77)*** (-0.47) (1.75)* (0.75) (2.05)** 
Consumer Discretionary  0.0361 0.0049 0.0295 0.0040 0.0329 
  (3.37)*** (0.30) (1.65)* (0.56) (3.15)*** 
Consumer Staples  0.0329 0.0007 0.0357 0.0044 0.0230 
  (2.80)*** (0.04) (1.93)* (0.60) (2.00)** 
Health Care  0.0320 0.0134 0.0276 -0.0060 0.0219 
  (2.62)*** (0.80) (1.40) (-0.70) (1.84)* 
Information Technology  -0.0034 -0.0084 0.0177 0.0121 0.0042 
  (-0.29) (-0.51) (0.84) (1.42) (0.37) 
Telecommunication & Utilities  0.0667 0.0629 0.0379 0.0144 0.0692 
  (4.22)*** (3.07)*** (1.59) (1.60) (4.49)*** 
Year Effects:       
2001  0.0037 -0.0133 -0.0117 -0.0036 -0.0023 
  (0.36) (-0.84) (-0.78) (-0.66) (-0.23) 
2002  0.0119 -0.0023 0.0065 0.0057 0.0001 
  (1.56) (-0.19) (0.56) (1.03) (0.01) 
2003  0.0053 -0.0057 0.0069 0.0022 -0.0043 
  (0.77) (-0.53) (0.64) (0.53) (-0.64) 
2004  0.0167 -0.0030 0.0021 -0.0013 0.0083 
  (2.44)*** (-0.28) (0.19) (-0.29) (1.25) 
2005  -0.0204 -0.0426 -0.0042 0.0007 -0.0243 
  (-3.03)*** (-3.94)*** (-0.37) (0.14) (-3.70)*** 
2006  0.0697 0.0611 0.0035 0.0013 0.0476 
  (5.46)*** (4.04)*** (0.27) (0.19) (3.98)*** 
N  3326 1430 468 156 3326 
Adj. R2 0.2052 0.1561 0.3204 0.5989 0.2451 
 
 
256
Panel B-Pre-managed earnings change  
 
Independent Variables Pred. Sign Model( 1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Intercept ? -0.0572 0.1053 -0.0022 0.0232 0.0430 
  (-2.02)** (4.64)*** (-0.09) (2.05)** (2.50)** 
BELOW_1 ( ∆PMEt <0) + 0.1509     
  (14.55)***     
BELOW_2 (∆PMEt < 0, ∆Et ≥ 0) +  0.1031    
   (14.32)***    
BELOW_3 (−0.04≤∆PMEt<0) +   0.0179   
    (3.15)***   
BELOW_4 (−0.04≤ ∆PMEt <0,  0≤ ∆Et 
<0.04) 
+    
0.0339 
 
     (14.54)***  
HIGH −     -0.1100 
      (-20.31)*** 
LOW −     0.0844 
      (13.97)*** 
Control Variables:       
SIZE − 0.0045 -0.0056 -0.0034 -0.0024 -0.0065 
  (1.94)* (-3.38)*** (-2.18)** (-3.59)*** (-5.61)*** 
GROWTH + 0.0001 0.0000 0.0044 0.0001 0.0000 
  (0.67) (0.64) (2.48)** (0.17) (-0.27) 
ROE ? -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0082 0.0013 -0.0002 
  (-0.46) (-1.57) (3.52)*** (2.10)** (-1.01) 
LEV ? 0.0162 -0.0010 0.0577 -0.0011 0.0155 
  (1.52) (-0.11) (3.73)*** (-0.14) (1.90)* 
BM + 0.0085 0.0028 0.0025 0.0020 0.0019 
  (2.72)*** (0.89) (0.76) (0.81) (0.79) 
CIR  0.0599 0.0423 -0.0048 0.0016 0.0316 
  (3.61)*** (3.03)*** (-0.33) (0.28) (3.11)*** 
LAGTA  0.0000 0.0014 0.0000 -0.0026 0.0001 
  (0.00) (1.82)* (-0.06) (-1.62) (0.48) 
Industry Effects:       
Material  -0.0100 -0.0026 0.0242 0.0011 0.0139 
  (-0.47) (-0.16) (1.55) (0.16) (1.20) 
Metals & Mining  -0.0448 -0.0342 0.0252 0.0003 -0.0193 
  (-2.63)*** (-2.39)** (1.64) (0.04) (-1.90)* 
Industrials  -0.0488 -0.0495 0.0273 0.0016 0.0011 
  (-1.90)* (-2.62)*** (1.72)* (0.24) (0.08) 
Consumer Discretionary  -0.0179 -0.0248 0.0227 -0.0026 0.0150 
  (-0.96) (-1.64) (1.50) (-0.40) (1.42) 
Consumer Staples  -0.0176 -0.0267 0.0221 0.0045 0.0095 
  (-0.84) (-1.64) (1.42) (0.66) (0.82) 
Health Care  -0.0236 -0.0107 0.0262 0.0035 0.0373 
  (-1.24) (-0.66) (1.56) (0.48) (3.11)*** 
Information Technology  -0.0330 -0.0182 0.0197 0.0018 0.0080 
  (-1.75)* (-1.12) (1.08) (0.21) (0.70) 
Telecommunication & Utilities  0.0524 0.0646 0.0838 -0.0132 0.0785 
  (2.31)** (3.12)*** (3.77)*** (-0.72) (5.17)*** 
Year Effects:       
2001  -0.0042 -0.0045 -0.0195 0.0082 0.0005 
  (-0.23) (-0.32) (-1.39) (1.48) (0.05) 
2002  0.0001 -0.0226 -0.0069 0.0036 0.0157 
  (0.01) (-2.10)** (-0.75) (0.99) (2.07)** 
2003  -0.0037 -0.0086 -0.0004 0.0056 0.0128 
  (-0.31) (-0.84) (-0.05) (1.54) (1.89)* 
2004  -0.0045 -0.0140 0.0117 0.0033 0.0134 
  (-0.37) (-1.41) (1.32) (0.92) (1.97)** 
2005  -0.0468 -0.0339 -0.0048 0.0056 -0.0192 
  (-3.79)*** (-3.47)*** (-0.53) (1.61) (-2.85)*** 
2006  0.0772 0.0441 0.0025 0.0010 0.0346 
  (5.21)*** (4.74)*** (0.39) (0.10) (2.98)*** 
N  3326 1430 468 156 3326 
Adj. R2 0.2259 0.1586 0.0746 0.5736 0.2575 
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Table 8.13:  Re-estimate the association between adjusted discretionary accruals and 
pre-managed earnings below benchmarks by using discretionary accruals from 
Modified Jones Model 
 
This table reports OLS regression results in testing earnings management and its association with benchmark 
besting incentive. All variables are defined in Table 4.1. The dependent variable is signed discretionary 
accruals, DA_MJ, estimated from Modified Jones Model. Main testing variables are pre-managed earnings 
below benchmarks, BELOW_1 in Model (1) to BELOW_5 in Model (5) which indicates different intervals in 
the distribution of earnings (changes). N is number of observations. The estimated coefficients and t statistics 
are based on White (1980) method. T-statistics are given in parentheses, *, **, *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
 
Panel A-Pre-managed earnings level  
Independent Variables Pred. Sign Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Intercept ? -0.2700 -0.0572 -0.1941 -0.0181 -0.1650 
  (-10.80)*** (-2.02)** (-5.70)*** (-1.41) (-8.01) 
BELOW_1 (PMEit < 0) + 0.1140     
  (17.01)*** 0.1509    
BELOW_2 (PMEit < 0, Eit ≥ 0) +  (14.55)***    
       
BELOW_3 (−0.04 ≤ PMEit < 0) +   0.0349   
    (4.65)***   
BELOW_4 (−0.04 ≤ PMEit < 0, 0 ≤ Eit < 0.04) +    0.0401  
     (11.74)***  
HIGH −     -0.1149 
      (-19.25)*** 
LOW −     0.0463 
      (5.92)*** 
Control Variables:       
SIZE − 0.0167 0.0045 0.0125 0.0010 0.0155 
  (9.77)*** (1.94)* (5.68)*** (1.10) (10.77) 
GROWTH + 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0020 0.0013 0.0000 
  (-0.39) (0.67) (-1.18) (2.24)*** (-0.14) 
ROE ? 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0706 -0.0010 0.0001 
  (0.29) (-0.46) (8.53)*** (-0.24) (0.55) 
LEV ? -0.0069 0.0162 -0.0995 0.0064 -0.0129 
  (-0.55) (1.52) (-3.82)*** (0.67) (-1.48) 
BM  0.0036 0.0085 -0.0092 -0.0021 0.0033 
  (1.31) (2.72)*** (-1.93)* (-1.43) (1.25) 
CIR  0.0373 0.0599 0.0156 -0.0107 0.0388 
  (2.48)** (3.61)*** (0.86) (-1.62) (3.23) 
LAGTA  0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 
  (0.10) (0.00) (-0.80) (-1.92)* (0.42) 
Industry Effects:       
Material  0.0240 -0.0100 0.0980 0.0077 0.0147 
  (1.48) (-0.47) (4.63)*** (0.96) (1.07) 
Metals & Mining  -0.0354 -0.0448 0.0279 0.0138 -0.0326 
  (-2.41)** (-2.63)*** (1.34) (1.92)* (-2.69) 
Industrials  0.0152 -0.0488 0.0902 0.0066 0.0061 
  (1.00) (-1.90)* (3.97)*** (0.82) (0.42) 
Consumer Discretionary  0.0293 -0.0179 0.0838 0.0051 0.0244 
  (1.93)* (-0.96) (4.00)*** (0.71) (1.95) 
Consumer Staples  0.0210 -0.0176 0.0777 0.0047 0.0113 
  (1.26) (-0.84) (3.61)*** (0.63) (0.82) 
Health Care  0.0002 -0.0236 0.0758 -0.0085 -0.0064 
  (0.01) (-1.24) (3.32)*** (-1.03) (-0.45) 
Information Technology  -0.0182 -0.0330 0.0041 0.0165 -0.0164 
  (-1.02) (-1.75)* (0.17) (1.77)* (-1.21) 
Telecommunication & Utilities  0.0591 0.0524 0.0494 0.0026 0.0614 
  (3.15)*** (2.31)* (1.73) (0.25) (3.48) 
Year Effects:       
2001  -0.0019 -0.0042 -0.0003 0.0177 -0.0060 
  (-0.14) (-0.23) (-0.02) (2.81)** (-0.50) 
2002  0.0041 0.0001 0.0026 0.0060 -0.0048 
  (0.50) (0.01) (0.20) (1.10) (-0.53) 
2003  -0.0009 -0.0037 0.0075 0.0082 -0.0058 
  (-0.11) (-0.31) (0.64) (1.96)** (-0.73) 
2004  0.0051 -0.0045 0.0124 0.0039 0.0007 
  (0.64) (-0.37) (1.03) (0.78) (0.09) 
2005  -0.0256 -0.0468 -0.0128 0.0027 -0.0278 
  (-3.24)*** (-3.79)*** (-1.07) (0.60) (-3.50) 
2006  0.0445 0.0362 0.0023 0.0010 0.0366 
  (3.46)*** (2.04)*** (0.25) (0.09) (3.67)*** 
N  3326 1430 468 156 3326 
Adj. R2 0.1510 0.2249 0.2617 0.6262 0.1678 
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Panel B-Pre-managed earnings change 
 
Independent Variables Pred. Sign Model( 1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Intercept ? -0.2700 0.0133 -0.1462 -0.0012 -0.0784 
  (-12.94)*** (0.56) (-5.22)*** (-0.11) (-4.09)*** 
BELOW_1 ( ∆PMEt <0) + 0.1140     
  (19.67)***     
BELOW_2 (∆PMEt < 0, ∆Et ≥ 0) +  0.1136    
   (15.58)***    
BELOW_3 (−0.04≤∆PMEt<0) +   0.0234   
    (3.61)***   
BELOW_4 (−0.04≤ ∆PMEt <0,  0≤ ∆Et 
<0.04) 
+    
0.0290 
 
     (12.75)***  
HIGH −     -0.1157 
      (-18.64)*** 
LOW −     0.1024 
      (15.54)*** 
Control Variables:       
SIZE − 0.0167 0.0020 0.0079 0.0001 0.0047 
  (11.67)*** (1.18) (4.26)*** (0.19) (3.64)*** 
GROWTH + 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0011 0.0002 0.0000 
  (-0.21) (0.43) (-1.03) (0.28) (-0.24) 
ROE ? 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0132 0.0022 0.0002 
  (0.28) (-0.27) (4.12)*** (0.79) (0.74) 
LEV ? -0.0069 -0.0015 -0.0218 -0.0056 -0.0014 
  (-0.79) (-0.15) (-0.94) (-0.65) (-0.17) 
BM + 0.0036 0.0042 0.0062 0.0009 0.0033 
  (1.34) (1.21) (1.50) (0.40) (1.33) 
CIR  0.0373 0.0474 0.0261 0.0020 0.0404 
  (3.07)*** (3.18)*** (1.60) (0.35) (3.55)*** 
LAGTA  0.0000 0.0021 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0000 
  (0.09) (2.41)** (-0.16) (-0.09) (0.36) 
Industry Effects:       
Material  0.0240 -0.0100 0.0351 0.0013 0.0121 
  (1.73)* (-0.59) (1.94)* (0.22) (0.93) 
Metals & Mining  -0.0354 -0.0370 0.0054 -0.0007 -0.0298 
  (-2.89)*** (-2.42)** (0.32) (-0.11) (-2.59)*** 
Industrials  0.0152 -0.0509 0.0452 0.0012 -0.0018 
  (1.02) (-2.62)*** (2.50)** (0.19) (-0.13) 
Consumer Discretionary  0.0293 -0.0255 0.0455 0.0026 0.0180 
  (2.31)** (-1.62) (2.62) (0.43) (1.51) 
Consumer Staples  0.0210 -0.0243 0.0430 0.0048 0.0082 
  (1.50) (-1.42) (2.38)*** (0.77) (0.62) 
Health Care  0.0002 -0.0311 0.0386 0.0022 0.0131 
  (0.01) (-1.77)* (1.98)* (0.31) (0.97) 
Information Technology  -0.0182 -0.0238 0.0262 0.0027 -0.0052 
  (-1.33) (-1.37) (1.24) (0.30) (-0.40) 
Telecommunication & Utilities  0.0591 0.0355 0.1032 -0.0137 0.0662 
  (3.30)*** (1.64) (3.82)*** (-0.74) (3.95)*** 
Year Effects:       
2001  -0.0019 0.0101 -0.0253 0.0045 -0.0025 
  (-0.15) (0.68) (-1.70)* (0.73) (-0.22) 
2002  0.0041 -0.0143 -0.0134 0.0044 0.0095 
  (0.46) (-1.29) (-1.21) (1.29) (1.12) 
2003  -0.0009 -0.0056 -0.0049 0.0009 0.0129 
  (-0.11) (-0.52) (-0.46) (0.24) (1.70)* 
2004  0.0051 -0.0150 0.0014 0.0102 0.0078 
  (0.63) (-1.44) (0.14) (2.86)*** (1.02) 
2005  -0.0256 -0.0308 -0.0179 0.0037 -0.0240 
  (-3.18)*** (-2.99)*** (-1.72)* (1.05) (-3.18)*** 
2006  0.0747 0.0391 0.0020 0.0025 0.0446 
  (5.11)*** (4.95)*** (0.28) (0.19) (3.98)*** 
N  3326 1430 468 156 3326 
Adj. R2 0.2285 0.1731 0.1164 0.4644 0.2486 
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Figures 
 
Figure 5.1: Distribution of discretionary accruals based on earnings performances 
 
Discretionary accruals are calculated as the residual from equation (4.7) then ranked on the level of earnings 
deflated by lagged total assets and assigned into percentiles according to their rank orders.  The estimation 
sample contains 5,947 observations. The testing sample contains 3,326 observations. Mean discretionary 
accruals between −0.5 and 0.5 are plotted for the 100 percentiles. 
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Figure 5.2:  Scatter plot of discretionary accruals, earnings performance ranks and 
significance levels 
 
The X-axis is defined by Discretionary Accruals, the Y-axis is defined by Percentiles, and the Z-axis is 
defined by P-value. Discretionary accruals are calculated as the residual from equation (4.7) then ranked on 
the level of earnings deflated by lagged total assets and assigned into percentiles according to their rank 
orders.  P-value is generated from testing the null hypothesis of no earnings management (mean discretionary 
accruals equal to zero) using a two-tailed test. 0.00, 0.05, 0.10, 0.15 and 0.20 refer to the significance level of 
0%, 5%, 10%, 15% and 20% respectively. Mean discretionary accruals between −0.5 and 0.5 are plotted for 
the 100 percentiles against corresponding p-value for the rejection of no earnings management. The 
estimation sample contains 5,947 observations. The testing sample contains 3,326 observations.  
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Figure 5.3:  The magnitude of earnings management by industry  
 
 
The X-axis is defined by industry. The Y- axis is defined by the magnitude of earnings management. The 
magnitude of earnings management is measured as mean (median) value of discretionary accruals that 
estimated from Jones Model, Modified Jones Model, Cash Flow Modified Jones Model, and Performance 
Adjusted Technique. The estimation sample contains 5,947 observations. 
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Figure 5.3 (Contd.) 
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Figure 5.4:  The trend of earnings management by year  
 
The X-axis is defined by year. The Y- axis is defined by the magnitude of earnings management. The 
magnitude of earnings management is measured as mean (median) value of discretionary accruals that 
estimated from Jones Model, Modified Jones Model, Cash Flow Modified Jones Model, and Performance 
Adjusted Technique. The estimation sample contains 5,947 observations. 
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Figure 5.4 (Contd.) 
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Figure 6.1:  Decomposition of Australian CEOs compensation components  
 
 
The X-axis is defined by year (2000-2006). The Y- axis is defined by average dollar value of total 
compensation. Total compensation is the dollar value of total compensation earned by CEOs during the fiscal 
year, measured in millions of dollars (Connect4 variable Total). Salary is the dollar value of base salary 
earned by CEOs during the fiscal year, measured in millions of dollars  (Connect4 variable Salary); Bonus is 
the dollar value of bonus earned by CEOs during the fiscal year , measured in millions of dollars (Connect4 
variable Bonus); Options is the dollar value of options granted by CEOs during the fiscal year, measured in 
millions of dollars (Connect4 variable Options); Shares is the dollar value of shares granted by CEOs during 
the fiscal year, measured in millions of dollars (Connect4 variable Shares); LTIP is the dollar value of long-
term incentive plan granted by CEOs during the fiscal year, measured in millions of dollars (Connect4 
variable LTIP). For each year, the average total compensation is displayed on the top of the bar chart with the 
proportion of each compensation component displayed inside of the bar chart if the individual component 
earned in that particular year is above 10% of total compensation.  
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Figure 7.1:  Histograms of earnings and pre-managed earnings  
 
 
This figure is the histograms of reported earnings level and pre-managed earnings level. The X-axis is 
earnings level and pre-managed earnings level. The Y- axis is the proportion of observation fall into a 
particular interval. Earnings level is scaled by beginning total assets. Pre-managed earnings level is calculated 
as reported earnings level minus adjusted discretionary accruals (estimated from Performance Adjusted 
Technique). The histograms have an interval width of 0.04 and rang of [−1, 1]. Intervals greater than 1 or less 
than −1 are not shown here.  
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Figure 7.2:  Histograms of earnings change and pre-managed earnings change 
 
 
This figure is the histograms of reported earnings change and pre-managed earnings change. The X-axis is 
earnings change and pre-managed earnings change. The Y- axis is the proportion of observation fall into a 
particular interval. Earnings change is scaled by beginning total assets. Pre-managed earnings change is 
calculated as reported earnings change minus adjusted discretionary accruals (estimated from Performance 
Adjusted Technique). The histograms have an interval width of 0.04 and rang of [−1, 1]. Intervals greater 
than 1 or less than −1 are not shown here.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Review of Australian Evidence on EM 
 
Studies Setting  in detecting EM Sample 
Methodology  
in detecting EM Finding 
Black et al.  
(1998) 
Income smoothing using 
asset sales 
503 firm-year observations 
for Australian and New 
Zealand; 696 firm-year 
observations for UK  
(1985 – 1995) 
Earnings smoothing is measured as 
the change in pre-tax annual 
ordinary income before 
extraordinary items, exclusive of 
income from asset sales 
Do not find income from asset sales is associated 
with the change in income before extraordinary 
items. Firms which revalue assets in the UK and 
ANZ samples do not engage in income 
smoothing through asset sales 
Lim and 
Matolcsy 
(1999) 
 
Product price controls 94 firms divided into two 
groups based on the degree 
of price scrutiny  
(1973- 1975) 
Jones model and modified Jones 
model 
Independent-sample t-tests 
Found firms subject to price controls adjust 
discretionary accruals downward to reduce 
reported net income and to increase the likelihood 
of approval of the requested price increase during 
the period of scrutiny 
Godfrey and 
Jones 
(1999) 
Income smoothing and 
political cost 
58 ASX listed firms  of 
which 42 are smoothers 
and 16 are non-smoothers 
(1985-1993) 
Logistic regression 
Student t-test and Mann Whitney U 
test for the difference of political 
cost and contracting variables 
between smoothers and non-
smoothers 
1.Firms with highly unionized workforces and 
subject to labor-related political costs are more 
likely to smooth reported earnings via the 
classification of recurring gains and losses 
2.Firms with low ownership concentration are 
more likely to engage in income smoothing 
Eddey and 
Taylor 
(1999) 
Takeovers 43 Australian takeover 
targets (1986-1991) 
Discretionary accruals: measured as 
the difference between the change 
in earnings and the change in cash 
flows from operations comparing 
the bid year t to the year prior to the 
bid t-1 
Fail to support the hypothesis: bid-rejecters 
manage earnings upwards to claim that the 
current bid is under the ‘true’ value of the firm; 
while bid-accepters manage earnings downwards 
to make the bid look more attractive 
Jones and 
Sharma 
(2001) 
Earnings management in 
Australia’s ‘Old’ and 
‘New’ economies 
All listed ASX firms  
(1991-2000) 
Jones model 
Raw total accruals 
 
New economy firms are associated with 
significantly less management of accruals than 
old economy firms 
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Wells 
(2002) 
Earnings management and 
CEO changes 
65 CEO changes reported 
by 42 firms  
(1985-1994) 
Abnormal and extraordinary items; 
Discretionary accruals from 
Modified Jones model 
New CEOs undertake ‘earnings bath’ in the year 
of CEO change by using abnormal and 
extraordinary items. Little evidence for 
discretionary accruals 
 
Godfrey et al. 
(2003)  
Earnings management and 
CEO changes 
63 firms that changed 
CEOs (1992-1998) 
Discretionary accruals: measured as 
the difference between the change 
in earnings and the change in cash 
flows from operations comparing 
year t to year t-1 
Found downward earnings management in the 
year of CEO change and upward earnings 
management in the year after a CEO change, 
supporting new managers manipulate earnings to 
impress 
 
Monem 
(2003) 
Earnings management in 
response to the 
introduction of the 
Australian Gold Tax 
45 Australian gold-mining 
industry with 433 
observations  
(1976-1990) 
Modified Jones model Document downward earnings management in 
the period June 1985-May 1988 to mitigate 
political costs; 
while upward earnings management in the period 
of June 1988-December 1990 to maximize 
earnings prior to the introduction of income tax 
on gold mining 
 
Holland and  
Ramsay 
(2003) 
Benchmark beating 5030 observations for 
earnings level benchmark  
( 1990-2000);  
4557 observations for  
earnings change 
benchmark  
(1991-2000) 
Distribution method Found evidence of discontinuities in the 
distribution of reported earnings and earnings 
change 
Such discontinuities are interpreted as Australian 
firms manage earnings to ensure reporting of 
positive profits and to sustain the previous year’s 
profit performance 
 
Koh 
(2003) 
Institutional investor type 107 firm-year observations 
with non-financial firms  
(1993-1997) 
Jones model Found non-linear relation between institutional 
ownership and earnings management: a positive 
association at the lower institutional ownership 
levels (short-term institutional investors create 
incentives); and a negative association at the 
higher institutional ownership levels (long-term 
institutional investors constrain) 
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Hsu and Koh  
(2005) 
Institutional investor type 201 firm-year observations 
with non-financial firms 
from (1993-1997) 
Modified Jones model Found non-linear relation between institutional 
ownership and earnings management, which is 
more likely to occur when firms have stronger 
incentives to meet/beat earnings benchmarks-
profits and prior year’s earnings 
Coulton et al.  
(2005) 
Benchmark beating  Estimation sample: 6436 
firm-years (1993-
2002);Subsample:2906 
firm-years(1993-2002) 
Distribution method 
Modified Jones model 
Lagged modified Jones model 
Forward-looking modified Jones 
model 
 
Benchmark beating is not caused by earnings 
management  
Davidson et al.  
(2005) 
Internal governance 
structures 
434 listed firms in 2000 Modified Jones model A firm’s internal governance structure constrains 
earnings management: non-executive directors on 
the board and on the audit committee, the 
existence of an audit committee are significantly 
associated with lower likelihood of earnings 
management  
Koh  
(2007) 
Institutional investor type 5150 firm-years (1995-
1998) 
Modified Jones model adjust 
performance 
(Kothari et al., 2005) 
Long-term institutional investors constrain 
earnings management to meet/beat earnings 
benchmarks 
Transient institution investors is not associated 
with aggressive earnings management  
Anandarajan  
et al.  
(2007) 
Earnings management in 
Australian banks  
50 Australian commercial 
banks (1991-2001) 
Use ratio of earnings before taxes 
and loan loss provisions (LLPs) to 
total assets  
Found Australian banks use loan loss provisions 
(LLPs) for capital and earnings management 
Ahmed and 
Goodwin 
(2007) 
Earnings restatements 195 earnings restatements 
from (1970-2003) 
3 types of earnings restatements: 
1)Policy changes 
2)Revisions in estimates 
3)Errors and unknown 
Three reasons for earnings restatements, 
accounting policy changes, revision of estimates, 
and errors and unknown. Restatement firms are 
high growth and small in size 
Balachandran 
et al.  
(2008) 
On-market share buybacks, 
exercisable share options 
138 on-market buyback 
firms  (1996-2003) 
Discretionary current accruals 
measured from a variation of the 
cross-sectional modified Jones 
model (Teoh et al., 1998a) 
Managers with option holdings rely on reported 
earnings to influence share price. They use two 
mechanisms: discretionary current accruals and 
on-market buyback announcements to drive up 
share prices  
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Appendix 2: Review of Empirical Studies on Approaches in Detecting EM 
 
Approaches Studies Earnings Management Proxy 
   
Accounting choice Watts and Zimmerman (1978) Corporate lobbying on accounting standards  
 Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) Accounting choices of inventory method, depreciation method, the treatment of the 
investment tax credit, and pension costs amortization 
 Holthausen (1981) Depreciation switch-back policy 
 Bowen et al. (1981) Interest capitalization policy 
 Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981) Aggregate accounting choices of inventory method, depreciation method, the treatment 
of the investment tax credit, and pension costs amortization 
 Skinner (1993) Depreciation and goodwill methods 
 Robbins et al. (1993) Aggregate GAAP choices 
 Christie and Zimmerman (1994) Aggregate GAAP choices 
 Teoh et al. (1998c) Depreciation method 
   
Real transactions Bartov (1993) Sell fixed assets 
 Baber et al. (1991) Cut R&D expenditures 
 Dechow and Sloan (1991) Cut R&D expenditures 
 Bushee (1998) Cut R&D expenditures 
 Herrmann et al. (2003) Sell fixed assets and marketable securities 
 Roychowdhury (2006) Price discounts and overproduction 
   
Total accruals/discretionary accruals Healy (1985) Total accruals 
 DeAngelo (1986) Change in total accruals 
 Jones (1991) Discretionary accruals, estimated as residual from regression of total accruals on change 
in sales and property, plant and equipment 
 Dechow et al. (1995) Discretionary accruals, estimated as residual from regression of total accruals on change 
in sales adjusted for change in account receivables, and property, plant and equipment  
 Kang and Sivaramakrishnan 
(1995) 
Discretionary accruals, estimated as residual from regression of noncash current assets 
less liabilities on lagged levels of these balances, adjusted for increases in sales, 
expenses and property, plant and equipment 
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 Kasznik (1999) Discretionary accruals, estimated as residual from regression of total accruals on change 
in sales adjusted for change in account receivables, property, plant and equipment, and 
change in operating cash flows; discretionary accruals is then adjusted for earnings 
performance by using performance adjust technique 
 Kothari et al. (2005) Discretionary accruals, estimated as residual from regression of total accruals on change 
in sales adjusted for change in account receivables, property, plant and equipment, and 
return on assets; discretionary accruals is then adjusted for earnings performance by 
using performance-matched approach 
   
Specific accrual McNichols and Wilson (1988) Bad debt provision  
 Petroni (1992) Claim loss reserve  
 Beaver and Engel (1996) Allowance of loan losses 
 Beneish (1997) Receivable index, gross margin index, depreciation index, SG&A expense index, total 
accrual to total assets index 
   
Earnings distribution Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) Discontinuity in the distribution of reported earnings level and earnings change 
 Degeorge et al. (1999) Discontinuity in the distribution of reported earnings level, earnings change and 
analysts’ forecast of earnings per share 
   
Income smoothing Imhoff (1977) The variance of sales to the variance of earnings 
 Eckel (1981) The variance of sales to the variance of earnings 
 Wang and Williams (1994) The variance of cash flows to the variance of earnings 
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Appendix 3: Review of Empirical Studies on Compensation Incentives 
 
Study Sample Dependent Variable Independent Variable Methodology Findings 
Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978) 
52 U.S. firms 
response to General 
Price Level 
Adjustments (GPLA) 
in 1974 
Dichotomous variable for 
corporate lobbying on 
accounting standards (firm 
favored versus firm opposed 
GPLA) 
Dummy variable for the 
existence of bonus plans (1 
if firm had a management 
incentive scheme and 0 
otherwise) 
Mann-Whitnery U 
test Discriminant 
analysis 
1. Managers of unregulated small size 
firms with lower political costs will 
increase earnings   
2. Managers of regulated or large firm 
will decrease earnings which result in 
lower tax, regulatory and political costs  
Hagerman and 
Zmijewski 
 (1979) 
300 non-regulated 
U.S. industrial firms 
in 1975 
Dichotomous variable for 
accounting choices (1 if 
income-increasing policy and 
0 if income-decreasing 
policy) 
Dummy variable for the 
existence of incentive plan 
(1 if firm had management 
profit-sharing plan and 0 if 
no profit-sharing plan) 
Probit analysis The existence of  incentive 
compensation plans induce management 
choice of  depreciation method, the 
treatment of investment tax credit and 
pension costs amortization period that 
will increase reported earnings  
Zmijewski and 
Hagerman  
(1981) 
300 firms used in 
Hagerman and 
Zmijewski (1979) 
N-chotomous variable for the 
combination of income-
increasing and income-
decreasing strategy  
Dummy variable for the 
existence of incentive plan 
(1 if firm had management 
profit-sharing plan and 0 if 
no profit-sharing plan) 
N-chotomous probit 
analysis 
The existence of a profit-sharing plan, 
size, degree of concentration and debt to 
total assets ratio all influence the 
accounting strategy of a firm. 
Holthausen (1981) 96 firms switched 
depreciation from an 
accelerated method to 
a straight-line method  
(1955 - 1978 ) 
Abnormal stock returns 
around depreciation switch 
announcement  
Dummy variable for the 
existence of bonus plans 
Multiple regression 
analysis 
No evidence supports management 
compensation contracts are important 
determinants of the decision to change 
depreciation techniques 
Healy 
 (1985) 
94 Fortune U.S. 
industrial firms  
(1930-1980) 
1. Total accruals  
(estimated as the difference 
between reported earnings 
and operating cash flows) 
2. Voluntary changes in 
accounting procedures on 
earnings.  
Bonus plan parameters 
group with lower, middle, 
and upper bounds 
Contingency table 
Chi-square test  
T-test compare the 
mean differences  
1.Managers are more likely to choose 
income-decreasing accruals when their 
bonus plan upper and lower bounds are 
binding, and income-increasing accruals 
when these bounds are not binding 
2.changes in accounting procedures are 
associated with adoption or modification 
of bonus plan 
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Skinner  
(1993) 
A estimation sample 
of 504 firms in 1987 
with a sub-sample of 
the 100 largest firm  
Categorical scale: 0 for 
income-decreasing strategy; 1 
for neither income-increasing 
nor decreasing ; 2 for income-
increasing strategy  
Dummy variable for the 
existence of bonus plans 
T-test  
Wilcoxon tests  
Logit regression 
Firms with bonus plans are more likely 
to select income-increasing depreciation 
and goodwill procedures after 
controlling for investment opportunity 
Gaver et al. (1995) 837 firm-years  
(1980 to 1990) 
Discretionary accruals: 
Healy’s total accruals 
Modified Jones model 
Industry index model 
Bonus plan parameters 
group with lower, middle, 
and upper bounds 
T-test  
Chi-square test 
Support income smoothing hypothesis- 
managers select positive (income-
increasing) discretionary accruals when 
earnings before discretionary accruals 
fall below the lower bound 
 
Holthausen et al. 
(1995) 
443 firm-year 
observations  
(1982 to 1984, and 
1987 to 1991) 
Discretionary accruals: 
Healy’s total accruals 
Modified Jones model 
 
Budget-based compensation 
scheme with defined lower, 
inside, and upper bounds 
T-test  
Chi-square test 
Found managers manipulate earnings 
downwards when their bonuses are at 
the maximum 
Balsam 
 (1998) 
3,439 firm-years 
observations from 
COMPUSTAT  
(1980-1993) 
Cash salary and bonuses paid 
to CEO 
Discretionary accruals from 
Jones model  
Regression analysis Found positive association between 
discretionary accruals and CEO cash 
compensation, such association depends 
on the circumstance of the firm 
Guidry et al. (1999) 117 U.S. business 
units with 179 
business-unit-years 
observations  
(1994-1995) 
Total accruals  
Discretionary accruals from 
Modified Jones model  
Inventory reserve 
The parameters of 
compensation plans with 
lower, middle, and upper 
bounds 
Two-sample t-tests 
Two-sample 
Wilcoxon tests 
Found managers make discretionary 
accrual decisions to maximize their 
short-term bonuses at the business unit 
level for a multinational conglomerate 
Matsunaga and Park 
 (2001) 
3,651 firm-year 
observations  
(1993 – 1997) 
Change in CEO’s bonus 
deflated by prior year salary 
Dummy variables: equals to 
1 if earnings are below the 
consensus analyst forecast, 
last year earnings and zero; 
and 0 otherwise 
Pooled regression 
Wald tests 
The board reduces CEO pay when the 
firm’s quarterly earnings fall short of the 
consensus analyst forecast or the 
earnings for the same quarter of the prior 
year 
Ke  
(2001) 
1,311 publicly traded 
firms with 18,623 
quarterly data from 
EXECOMP database 
(1992-1998) 
Change in quarterly EPS The ratio of bonus to total 
compensation 
Equity incentives measured 
from Core & Guary (1998) 
method 
Probit model 
Cox hazards model 
The probability of reporting small 
increase in earnings is higher  and  The 
duration of consecutive earnings 
increases is longer for CEOs with high 
equity-based compensation 
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Gao and Shrieves 
(2002) 
7,301 firm-year 
observations from 
ExecuComp database  
(1992-2000) 
Absolute value of the scaled 
discretionary current accruals  
Dollar value of salary, 
bonus, option, restricted 
stock, long-term incentive 
plans, incentive intensity of 
stock option awards and 
restricted stock award 
Multiple regression  1. Discretionary accruals are positively 
related to bonuses and options while 
negatively related to salary 
2.The relationship is conditional on 
proximity of pre-managed earnings to an 
earnings benchmark 
Baker et al. (2003) 168  firms with 1100 
firm-year observations 
collected from Wall 
Street Journal survey 
(1992-1998) 
Signed discretionary accruals 
from Modified Jones Model 
1.The ratio of option award 
to the sum of salary, bonus, 
and option exercises 
2. The fitted value of option 
ratio  
2SLS using fitted 
value of option ratio 
 
Firms that compensate their executive 
with greater shares of options manage 
earnings downwards through negative 
discretionary accruals before the award 
date 
Cheng and Warfield  
(2005) 
9472 firm-years 
observation  
ExecuComp database 
(1993-2000) 
1.CEOs’ net sales of share in 
year t+1 
2.the probability of earnings 
surprise per share be either 
negative, zero or one cent 
Equity incentives—option 
grants, unexercisable 
options, ownership, 
exercisable options 
 
Multiple regression  
Logistic regression 
CEOs with high equity incentives are 
more likely to meet or beat analysts’ 
forecasts; CEOs with high equity 
incentives increasing their stock sales 
after earnings management 
Bergstresser and 
Philippon  
(2006) 
Entire Compustat for 
Accounting Data  
 (1976-2000); 4199 
ExecuComp data 
(1993-2000);15654 
Thomson Financial 
Insiders trading data 
 (1996-2001) 
Absolute and signed total 
accruals 
Modified Jones model 
CEO equity incentive 
measured as the ratio of a 
CEO’s total compensation 
that would come from a one 
percentage point increase in 
the equity value of the firm 
Regression 1.CEOs with overall compensation that 
is more closely tied to the value of stock 
and option holdings are associated with 
higher levels of earnings management 
2. CEOs exercise unusually large 
numbers of options and sell large 
numbers of shares during the high 
accruals periods 
McAnally et al. 
(2006) 
1,744 firms with 
9,954 firm-years 
observations  
(1992-2004) 
Dummy variable equals to 1 
if a firm miss earnings 
benchmark and zero 
otherwise 
Option grants, exercises and 
holding 
book-tax difference proxy 
for earnings management 
Logistic regression 
OLS regression 
Seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR) 
option grants create strong incentives for 
CEOs to miss earnings benchmarks via 
downward earnings management 
  
Shuto  
(2007) 
16,368 firm-year 
observations  
(1991- 2000) 
Total cash compensation data 
(the sum of salary and bonus) 
of the board of directors as a 
proxy for executive 
compensation 
Discretionary accruals from 
modified CFO Jones model 
(Kasznik, 1999) 
Regression 
Logistic regression 
Vuong (1989) test 
the difference of 
explanatory power 
between two models 
2SLS 
1.Managers use discretionary accruals to 
increase compensation 
2.Managers who do not receive bonus 
adopt bath taking strategy 
3.The association between discretionary 
accruals and executive bonus varies 
depends on the circumstances of the firm 
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Appendix 4: Selective review of empirical studies on Benchmark Beating Incentives 
 
 
Studies Sample Benchmarks Findings 
Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997) 
64,466 firm-years for 
earnings change;75999 
firm-years for earnings 
level from Compustat  
 (1976-1994) 
Two benchmarks:  
1.profits  
2.prior year’s earnings 
 
1.Benchmark beating occur due to the transaction costs theory and 
the prospect theory 
2.Two components of earnings, cash flows from operations and 
changes in working capital, are identified as the mechanisms of 
earnings management 
Degeorge et al.  
(1999) 
5387 firm-quarters 
from Compustat 
 (1974-1996) 
Three benchmarks: 
 1.profits 
 2.prior year’s earnings 
 3.analysts’ expectations 
1.Benchmarks are hierarchically ordered: to avoid losses, then is to 
report increases in quarterly earnings, and last is to meet analysts’ 
earnings forecasts 
2. Managers tend to manage earnings upwards when earnings falling 
just short of thresholds and manage earnings downwards when 
earnings far from thresholds 
Dechow et al.  
(2000) 
44,913 and  24656 
firm-years from 
I/B/E/S and Compustat  
(1988-1998) 
Two benchmarks: 
1.profits  
2.analysts’ forecast 
1. Found firms manage earnings to report profits and to meet 
analysts’ expectations  
2.Found working capital, accruals and special items could be used as 
a mechanism to achieve earnings targets 
Payne and Robb  
(2000) 
13532 firm-years 
from I/B/E/S and 
Compustat  
(1988-1997) 
One benchmark: 
1.analysts’ forecasts 
Found income smoothing when pre-managed earnings are below 
market expectation managers will move earnings toward analysts’’ 
forecasts; when pre-managed earnings are above analysts’ forecasts, 
managers will reduce income thereby reduces analysts’ forecast 
errors 
Matsunaga and Park 
(2001) 
3,651 firm-year 
observations  
(1993 – 1997) 
Three benchmarks: 
1.quarterly profits 
2.quarterly earnings increase 
3. quarterly analyst forecast 
CEO bonus payments provide CEOs with economic incentives to 
meet/beat benchmarks: bonus decrease when the firm’s quarterly 
earnings fall short of the analysts forecast and fall short of the 
earnings for the same quarter of the last year 
Plummer and Mest 
(2001) 
17667 firm-years and  
5112 firm-years from 
Line Investment 
Survey (1971-1989) 
Three benchmarks: 
1.sales forecast 
2.operating expense forecast 
3.non-operating expenses or  
  depreciation expenses 
Firms manage earnings upward by managing sales upward and 
managing operating expense downward; current assets and high 
operating margin percentages are both associated with an increased 
likelihood that a firm uses sales to manage earnings upward 
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Holland and Ramsay 
(2003) 
5030 firm-years for 
earnings level; 4557 
firm-years for earnings 
change from IRESS  
(1990-1997) 
Two benchmarks: 
1.profits  
2.last year’s earnings 
1. Australian firms practice earnings management in order to report 
positive earnings, and to sustain last year’s earnings performance 
2.Larger firms show stronger results 
3.no discontinuity in the distribution of cash flows and change of 
cash flows, suggest cash flows do not play a role in EM 
Dechow et al.  
(2003) 
47847 firm-years from 
Compustat  
(1988-2000) 
One benchmark: 
1.profits 
 
1.Small profit firms have high DA relative to other firms; however, 
both small profits and small loss firms have high DA, and have a 
similar proportion of +DA 
 2.Earnings kink is caused by other reasons rather than EM, e.g. 
managers make real effort to report profits; different scaling methods 
Cheng and Warfield 
(2005) 
9472 firm-years 
observation  from 
ExecuComp  
 (1993-2000) 
One benchmark: 
1.analysts’ forecast 
 
1.Found that managers with high stock-based compensation are more 
likely to report earnings to meet/beat analysts’ forecasts 
2.Support income-smoothing, managers with high stock-based 
compensation are less likely to report large positive earnings 
surprises 
Coulton et al.  
(2005) 
6436 firm-years 
estimation sample; 
2906 for subsample 
from Aspect database 
(1993-2002) 
Two benchmarks: 
1.profits  
2.last year earnings 
Found unusual kink around zero in the distribution of earnings levels 
or earnings changes, but authors view that the kink in earnings 
distribution is relatively poor proxy for EM, it is not caused by 
earnings management  
Barua et al. 
 (2006) 
23348 firm-years from 
I/B/E/S and Compustat  
(1992-2002) 
Two benchmarks: 
1.analysts’ forecasts  
2. prior year earnings 
Profitable firms having greater incentives than loss firms to manage 
earnings to meet earnings benchmarks: profit firms are more likely 
than loss firms to meet/beat analysts’ forecasts when pre-managed 
earnings are below analysts’ forecasts; profit firms are more likely 
than loss firms to meet/beat last year’s earnings when pre-managed 
earnings are below last year’ earnings 
Daniel et al.  
(2007) 
S&P 1500 firms 
Execucomp data  
(1992-2005)  
One NEW benchmark: 
 
1.expected dividend level  
Earnings determines dividend payment, so managers have incentives 
to manage earnings upwards to avoid dividend cuts when pre-
managed earnings fall below expected dividend level 
 
 
